Immigrant Political Economies and Exclusionary Policy in Africa
In: Comparative politics, Band 48, Heft 4, S. 517-537
ISSN: 0010-4159
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In: Comparative politics, Band 48, Heft 4, S. 517-537
ISSN: 0010-4159
In: Irish studies in international affairs, Band 27, Heft 1, S. 75-84
ISSN: 2009-0072
In: The Obama Presidency and the Politics of Change, S. 181-197
In: Constitutional Policy in Multilevel Government, S. 199-217
In: Social Development and Social Policy, S. 295-326
In: The Feasibility of Citizen's Income, S. 195-236
In: The Politics of Evidence-Based Policy Making, S. 85-118
In: Making Global Value Chains, S. 105-135
In: Soft Governance, International Organizations and Education Policy Convergence, S. 83-110
In: American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Band 98, Heft 4, S. 1018-1037
SSRN
SSRN
Working paper
In: BIS Paper No. 89a
SSRN
Working paper
In: The Statesman’s Yearbook; The Stateman’s Yearbook, S. 77-77
In: Međunarodni problemi: International problems, Band 68, Heft 2-3, S. 209-224
ISSN: 0025-8555
Organized crime as a negative social phenomenon is certainly a problem of the
state and its services. To effectively counter organized crime a basic
prerequisite is knowledge of conditions or circumstances that contribute to
its existence and operation. It is, therefore, very important to determine
the most criminogenic factors that promote organized criminal activity in
certain areas of the country. In this paper, in addition to general
considerations on the concept of prevention, a special attention is given to
factors that may adversely affect the expression of organized crime. These
factors are presenting a solid basis for further operationalization in order
to determine the possibility of manifestation of organized crime.
Determination of their role is of particular importance because they have a
wide use, primarily in preventive countering organized crime. However, the
dynamism and flexibility of organized crime social changes require constant
monitoring and updating of existing factors for an objective knowledge of the
impact on the expression and activity of organized crime.
In: Commodity market instability and asymmetries in developing countries: Development impacts and policies. 2016; Commodity market instability and asymmetries in developing countries: Development impacts and policies, Clermont-Ferrand, FRA, 2015-06-24-2015-06-25, 73-79
During food price spikes, food exporting countries frequently use export restrictions to insulate their domestic markets from high prices on the world market. Their use can be so widespread that the high levels reached by international prices could be seen as a consequence of these interventions (Dawe and Slayton, 2011), and the restrictions can be so stringent that they can lead to the near disappearance of the world market as happened to the rice market over nine months in 1973 (Timmer, 2010). Food importing countries also act: they decrease their tariffs to protect their consumers but when world prices are low, the situation is reversed and importers raise their import duties. In summary, in food markets, countries routinely adjust their trade barriers to insulate their domestic markets from international price variability (Anderson and Nelgen, 2012). The lack of commitment to leaving borders open can reduce trust in the world trade system and lead to costly policies. Importing countries that expect food exporters to restrict their exports in times of scarcity will move away from the specialization consistent with their comparative advantages in order to ensure greater self-sufficiency, or will carry expensive public stocks. For example, the current large-scale public interventions in the Asian countries, through which many countries attempt to achieve self-sufficiency in major staples, can be explained largely by their experience in the 1972/73 food crisis (Rashid et al., 2008). ; De nombreux pays ajustent leur politique commerciale de manière contracyclique par rapport aux prix alimentaires, au point que les restrictions aux exportations utilisées par beaucoup de pays exportateurs ont occasionnellement menacé la sécurité alimentaire des pays importateurs. Notre article analyse la coordination des politiques commerciales lorsque celles-ci sont motivées à la fois par la manipulation des termes de l'échange et par le désir de limiter la volatilité des prix alimentaires domestiques. Ce cadre théorique implique que les pays importateurs et exportateurs ont des incitations à dévier de la coopération à des périodes différentes: les exportateurs lorsque les prix sont élevés et les importateurs lorsque les prix sont bas. Dans la mesure où les prix des matières premières alimentaires ont une distribution asymétrique avec une queue de distribution étalée vers les prix élevés, un accord commercial tendrait à générer des résultats asymétriques. En l'absence de coopération, un pays importateur utilise plus fréquemment sa politique commerciale du fait de la concentration des prix mondiaux en dessous de leur moyenne, mais un pays exportateur aura une plus grande incitation à dévier de la coopération car les déviations positives des prix par rapport à leur moyenne sont plus importantes que les déviations négatives. L'asymétrie de la distribution des prix alimentaires pourrait donc rendre difficile tout accord international pour discipliner l'usage des restrictions aux exportations.
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