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Climate change is progressing fast and is undeniably a man-made disaster. Its impacts - heatwaves, floods, sea-level rise, melting ice caps, erratic rainfall, desertification, and similar - are likely to worsen in intensity and increase in frequency for many years to come. While the question of why measures to halt climate change are not fully implemented is not easily answered, it is necessary to reflect meanwhile on the strategies employed by governing actors to legitimise such inaction.
One such strategy is the attempt to ignore the "human" aspects of natural disasters, like bad governance and mismanagement, a process called "ecologisation." Climate change lends itself easily to this.
By presenting drought, floods, and other extreme weather events as "natural" and thus "beyond our control," governing actors can deflect responsibility for their mismanagement and bad governance regarding natural resources. This has happened in Syria, for example, following the prolonged drought occurring in the first decade of the twenty-first century.
Political Ecology provides key knowledge on how these problems can be constructed as "environmental" or "natural," how such "environmental" situations can be positioned as unprecedented and disastrous, and how framings like these may support ulterior political goals.
Somewhat counterintuitively, it may be necessary to "de-naturalise" phenomena that have been attributed to climate change to uncover the broader sociopolitical impetuses behind them.
With the fight over a possible trade-off between climate action and human rights already ongoing, policymakers need to learn how to both identify and address "ecologising moves." One way of doing this is by strengthening civil society actors who are identifying and calling out such moves, often under existential threat.

While the recent Taliban takeover in Afghanistan sparked new debate about peacebuilding, Latin American experiences have largely been ignored in such discussions. These could be instructive, particularly in their shortcomings, missed opportunities, and violent backsliding. Colombia five years into the peace agreement and Central America more than 25 years after the end of war hold important lessons.
Ending the civil wars in Central America had been amongst the first empirical tests of the liberal peacebuilding approach. However, today the region is confronting old problems in new forms: increasing authoritarianism, social exclusion, and high levels of state and non-state violence.
The peace process in Colombia remains entangled between those forces pushing for the implementation of the agreements' transformative agenda and those who staunchly resist it.
International actors such as the United Nations and the European Union actively supported the termination of wars. However, they delegated the structural reforms necessary for conflict transformation to the political systems.
Peacebuilding is possible through a variety of pathways and is a long-term endeavour. It needs to be based on context-specific combinations of violence reduction and prevention, conflict transformation, and political and social inclusion.
Latin America and other post-war societies tend to receive decreasing international attention after wars have ended and initial post-war elections have taken place. At the same time, there has been a shift in emphasis from peacebuilding to stabilisation at the international level. But peacebuilding requires long-term international support beyond short-term interventions. Latin American experiences show how short-term success can be forfeited through the re-creation of path-dependent developments, which reproduce old problems in new forms. Neither peace nor democracy is feasible without transformative reforms and an inclusive social basis.

Nachdem Frankreich und Verbündete das Ende des Antiterroreinsatzes Opération Barkhane in Mali verkündet haben, mehren sich in Deutschland Stimmen, die ebenfalls einen Rückzug befürworten. Die Diskussion ist dabei oft auf Mali bzw. den Sahel verengt. Nach dem russischen Angriff auf die Ukraine sollte das sicherheitspolitische Engagement jedoch im Kontext zweier afrikanischer bzw. globaler Trends betrachtet werden:
Erstens: Seit einigen Jahren hat eine dschihadistische Welle das subsaharische Afrika erfasst. Diese hat sich auf inzwischen fast ein Drittel aller Länder der Region ausgeweitet und droht auf weitere Staaten überzugreifen. Der Dschihadismus kann an strukturelle Schwächen und langfristige Trends andocken und hat weitreichende Folgen für Stabilität, Demokratie und Entwicklung in der Region.
Zweitens: Die dschihadistische Welle ist auch Folge des Einflusses aus der MENA-Region (Middle East and North Africa). Generell gewinnen immer mehr nicht-westliche Akteure in Afrika an Einfluss. Dies sind vor allem autoritäre Staaten wie China, Russland, die Golfstaaten und die Türkei. Der Einfluss des Westens schwindet, wie sich zuletzt am Abstimmungsverhalten in der UN-Generalversammlung zum russischen Angriff auf die Ukraine zeigte. Die geostrategischen Rivalitäten können besonderen Schaden für Stabilität, Demokratie und Entwicklung in der Region entfalten.
Auch wenn es für einen Abzug des ausländischen Militärs aus Mali gute Gründe gibt, wäre ein sicherheitspolitischer Rückzug aus der Region angesichts beider Trends kontraproduktiv. Für Mali und seine Nachbarstaaten bedeutete ein Rückzug wahrscheinlich eine Ausbreitung des Dschihadismus. Dazu käme ein weiterer Bedeutungszuwachs aggressiver und autoritärer Staaten wie China und Russland.
Die Entscheidung über eine weitere militärische Präsenz in Mali betrifft das afrikapolitische Engagement des Westens insgesamt. Eine Neujustierung sollte Zielkonflikte zwischen Werten und harten Interessen berücksichtigen und Mittel überprüfen. Erstrebenswert ist ein verstärkter transatlantischer Schulterschluss, der auch einer sicherheitspolitischen Komponente bedarf. Die Herausforderung besteht darin, eine wertegeleitete Afrikapolitik zu betreiben, die eigene Interessen wahrnimmt und afrikanische Interessen berücksichtigt.

There is a long-standing idea that societies with too many men, particularly young and single men - the so-called "bare branches" - have a tendency for vice, risk-taking and violence, ultimately threatening social order and stability.
Marriage is an important marker for adulthood across the globe. Yet, participation in the marriage market - looking for a spouse and forming a union - in sub-Saharan Africa is constrained, and the marriage market is an important institution shaping and maintaining inequality in income and opportunities.
Traditional marriage practices, such as that of polygyny, where one man is married to more than one woman at the same time, are still prevalent in sub-Saharan Africa and lead to a situation where some men, particularly the young, struggle to find a wife and start a family.
Having more men than women in the marriage market gives rise to competition amongst men, spurring frustration and anger among those that struggle to find a bride. The imbalance between men and women in the marriage market has been associated with increasing rebel attacks and intergroup conflict in the region. Hence, there is a palpable need to pay more attention to the marriage market, particularly in sub-Saharan African countries, many of which are already struggling with political and societal instability.
A more complete characterisation of the marriage market and its actors is necessary to better understand the underlying forces that cause young and unmarried men to gravitate towards violence.
Governments must begin to recognise the importance of the marriage market as an institution perpetrating injustices and economic grievances. At the same time, targeted strategies need to be developed that recognise and address perceived inequalities and thus pre-empt promises by extremist groups, who exploit the relative dearth of brides as a recruitment strategy. Targeted information campaigns and appeals are only short-term solutions. Direct interventions in the marriage market might encounter pushback. New ways of thinking based on deeper research may be required.

When Israel signed the Abraham Accords in 2020 reactions were diverse. Experts were divided - some fearing a deepening of regional divisions, others hoping for a positive impact on the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP). Two years later normalisation has intensified, but differs in degree and scope.
Israel's normalisation process has strengthened her acceptance in the region and reaches beyond security issues. While Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates lead these dynamics, eager to benefit from exchange in science and technology, in Morocco the United States' recognition of the latter's sovereignty over the Western Sahara has hardened Rabat's position on that issue. With Sudan, the process has not developed beyond contact between the Israeli government and the internationally contested military leadership.
Normalisation is not a decisive factor for Israeli-Palestinian conflict resolution. On the contrary, it was not an incentive in the past for Israel to make concessions; clashes with the Palestinians in Gaza or recently on the Temple Mount could not derail the process either. The real test, however, would be another Palestinian intifada or a return to the annexation plans of early 2020.
Iran remains an important uniting factor which has led to a shared threat perception. Nevertheless, the Gulf monarchies and Israel differ in approach towards Iran. While Arab-Israeli joint military exercises mark a historical shift, talks about a military alliance in the Middle East with Israeli (and US) involvement are premature.
The European Union and its member states should build on these positive dynamics and look at developments in the region not merely through the lens of the MEPP. Trilateral projects with Israel and Arab partners are a good starting point here. Also, Europe should become more involved in the broader Middle East through strategic dialogue with partners in the region as well as the US on the new order in the making.

As a region, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) is the world's largest grain importer. Approximately 30 per cent of global exports of wheat and barley, 20 per cent of corn, and a whopping three-quarters of sunflower oil come from Ukraine and Russia. The aggression against Ukraine is thus disrupting global food trade and affecting food security in the MENA. The war is also raising questions about future food systems and their water footprint.
In the Arab world, dependence on Ukraine and Russia for imports of wheat, the world's largest source of calories, is at 50 per cent - among the highest globally. The greatest vulnerability exists in Egypt, Lebanon, and Sudan. Imports will actually need to rise from pre-war levels if population growth and dietary changes towards meat and dairy products are taken into consideration.
For lack of water, food self-sufficiency is not an option in the MENA. Food imports constitute "virtual water" - that is, the water used to produce a commodity and thus embedded in it. Virtual water can be imported by MENA countries via the food trade and has mitigated water scarcity by adding a "second Nile River" to the region's water balance.
The global food crisis of 2007/2008 spurred MENA countries to attempt to alleviate their import vulnerabilities bilaterally, via investments in land and in value chains, but reliance on the multilateral international trading system remains. The reaction to the current crisis can build on lessons learnt since then, with coping capacities unevenly distributed between the region's richer oil exporters and poorer countries.
Avoiding new export restrictions such as those that occurred during the global food crisis of 2007/2008 is crucial. Western attempts to stabilise the multilateral food trade could help the MENA to source alternative supplies. This might also offer an opportunity to mend fences between the West and MENA at a time when closer energy cooperation is essential and an ambivalent stance in the MENA towards Russia has caused irritation in the West.

Over the past two decades, Africa has become increasingly connected as more and more Africans gained access to the internet and mobile phones. Building on this enhanced connectivity, a new wave of African startups has emerged, tackling some of the continent's biggest challenges with "homemade" digital technologies. There are growing signs that these new technologies could provide a leapfrogging opportunity for Africa. Africa has seen massive improvements in internet access and mobile phone adoption, due to investments in the continent's digital infrastructure, particularly mobile broadband networks. At the same time, there are significant connectivity gaps between Africa and the rest of the world as well as between and within African countries. These may widen as Africa's digital infrastructure faces capacity pressures from a rapidly expanding internet user base. Tech giants, primarily from the United States, have recognised a business opportunity in Africa's existing connectivity gaps and have begun investing heavily in subsea data cables, data centres, and technology hubs. It is critical that these investments bridge Africa's connectivity gaps - a growing body of evidence shows the wide-ranging positive socio-economic impacts of improved internet and mobile phone access. Africa's enhanced connectivity has led to the emergence of a new wave of growth-oriented technology startups, building innovative and "homemade" digital technologies for widespread use. Digital platforms in particular are increasingly disrupting Africa's major, mostly informal service, retail, and agricultural sectors. Anecdotal reports suggest that digital technologies from African startups can be transformative for individuals, businesses, and farms, but there is very little systematic empirical evidence on their local impacts. Such evidence is urgently needed to harness their full potential for inclusive economic development in Africa. As Africa's digitalisation accelerates, African governments must develop policies that simultaneously harness the benefits of new technologies and ensure that lagging countries and segments of society do not fall further behind. Policies should incentivise private investment in Africa's digital infrastructure and encourage entrepreneurship and innovation, while preventing unregulated new technologies from harming consumers. In addition, digital skills need to be strengthened to prepare African countries for the coming digital century.

China's attitude towards the War in Ukraine can be described as "pro-Russian neutrality." This awkward stance has gone against high hopes, particularly in Europe, that the war could be China's moment to improve its tarnished international image by condemning Russia's aggression. However, such hopes have been unrealistic, and they have also not been substantiated by policy measures expedient to incentivising China's support.
Following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, China has all in all manoeuvred cautiously. While China has lent Moscow its rhetorical support, it has shied away from providing material assistance. This shows that the war has put Beijing in a difficult position, in which it seeks to balance diverging international interests and maintain control over a challenging domestic environment.
Ultimately, for China preserving its close ties with Russia takes precedence over not exacerbating its tense relations with the West. This is because the Kremlin is China's single-most important partner in its global strategic rivalry with the United States. From Beijing's viewpoint, this rivalry has only intensified further under the Joe Biden administration, which is why it has now become locked in as the key determinant of China's foreign policy.
As the war is dragging on and might produce a number of outcomes unfavourable to China's own aspirations, the country's leaders have an interest in de-escalation and a negotiated settlement. This does not mean that China would be willing - or well-placed - to act as a mediator. It does mean, however, that China could help nudge Russia towards ending the war.
In a world of escalating US-China rivalry, thinking the latter will abandon Russia over Ukraine is fanciful. But China is likewise interested in de-escalation. Therefore, China's leaders might still be swayed to play a more constructive role regarding bringing the war to an end. For that to happen, however, European decision makers would need to change course and try offering Beijing tangible inducements instead of solely delivering threats.

Academic and political debates on peace and conflict dynamics increasingly acknowledge the relevance of the interaction between global and subnational or local dynamics but rather neglect the regional neighbourhood as an important intervening variable. The concept of "regional peace formations" either as an enabling or hindering factor for peacebuilding fills this gap. Empirical evidence from Latin America, the Middle East, and sub-Saharan Africa shows the added value of the concept for explaining regional differences.
Peacebuilding is a complex undertaking shaped by a variety of factors such as the nature of conflicts, the actors involved, and local contexts. A regional perspective regarding patterns of conflict and violence shows high levels of variation between regions.
The concept of regional peace formations is an important tool to analyse the region-specific variation in actors and conflict dynamics. It allows us to identify either convergent or divergent contexts for peacebuilding.
Empirical evidence from Latin America, the Middle East, and sub-Saharan Africa identifies relevant differences and the need to incorporate regional factors into peacebuilding strategies.
The regional level of peacebuilding offers the possibility for meaningful donor coordination and joint multilateral action. But a minimalistic approach seeking only the end of war or a certain degree of stabilisation is not enough. Initiatives need a clear focus on long-term peacebuilding, as a process of constructive conflict transformation. Regional economic and social networks are central to sustainable development, and to transforming structural conditions - leading either to the violent escalation of conflict or to the fostering of more peaceful societies.

Autocrats worldwide have exploited COVID-19 and corresponding legal measures to curtail civil liberties. However, the health crisis and related socio-economic setbacks have also created needs-induced space, leading to a rise of civil society relief activism and propelling protests against dissatisfactory government responses. Rather than uniformly shrinking, civic space has often been sustained during the pandemic.
Civil liberties have further shrunk across the Asia-Pacific region, Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), non-OECD Europe and the Caucasus, sub-Saharan Africa, and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), as 123 countries enforced 254 new legal frameworks related to COVID-19. The majority are executive measures that grant governments sweeping powers, leading to crackdowns on dissidents. Sub-Saharan Africa and non-OECD Europe and the Caucasus enacted the most legal measures, conducive to heightened repression.
All five of these world regions saw the emergence of needs-induced space, illustrated by drastic declines in GDP growth, rising poverty, and increasing inequality.
Despite (and sometimes because of) government efforts to weaponise COVID-19-related laws to erode civil liberties, protest activities have skyrocketed: demonstrators at more than 9,000 COVID-related protests have voiced their economic grievances and demanded better government responses. Most of these protests occurred in LAC and the Asia-Pacific, followed by MENA.
Civil society organisations (CSO) have enhanced their emergency relief, filling gaps left by governments. While carrying out such relief activism seems to have been easier in more democratic countries in LAC and the Asia-Pacific, CSOs have delivered aid and advocated for state provision in autocracies as well.
European policymakers should set an example of how to implement democratic laws to contain COVID-19, and they should push back against the autocratic weaponisation of such laws elsewhere. European donor governments and political foundations should seek creative ways to support relief efforts by civil society that simultaneously address economic inequality and democratic governance, thereby enabling the sustenance of civic space.

Sayyid Ebrahim Raisi, the new Iranian conservative president, has been in office for over four months now. Understanding his presidency matters for myriad reasons, including its historical significance, his foreign policy oriented towards Asia, and what the Iranian pivot to Asia under him entails geopolitically and geoeconomically.
Iranian conservative elites view the present moment as the end of the first phase of the Iranian Islamic revolution. Raisi's presidency, to them, is the dawn of a historical "second phase", a post-Ali Khamenei era for a young revolutionary generation.
Doctrinally, Raisi's foreign policy can be described as "pragmatic revolutionism." Policy-wise, Raisi - following Khamenei's edict - is embracing the "Iranian pivot to Asia," both geopolitically and geoeconomically.
Geopolitically, the revolutionary aspect of this pivot means supporting the resistance axis against the United States and Israel and expelling US forces from the region. Its pragmatism includes promoting regional solutions to regional problems, de-escalation with traditional rivals (e.g. the Emiratis, Saudis, Taliban), and further strategic proximity to Asian actors such as China.
Geoeconomically, the revolutionary dimension of this pivot is the resistance economy, a reactive policy to bypass US sanctions. The pragmatic multilateralist dimension is the Iranian connectivity strategy, a proactive process to make Iran a crossroads between various (Eur)Asian geoeconomic initiatives, such as China's Belt and Road Initiative and International North-South Transport Corridor.
If the West only concerns itself with the revolutionary component of Iranian foreign policy the costs will be too high. European and US policymakers should therefore seize upon the multilateralist and pragmatic tendencies of Raisi's emerging foreign policy to revive the nuclear deal, with a focus on economic incentives. The European Union should strive for strategic autonomy to deal with Iran independently, if need be.

President Donald Trump's departure from the White House was greeted with some concern in Taiwan. Having welcomed his confrontational stance towards China, many Taiwanese were concerned that US-Taiwan relations would worsen under President Joe Biden. The first 10 months in office, however, have seen the new administration repeatedly signal the US's continuing support while committing to maintaining the status quo across the Taiwan Strait.
As part of Trump's confrontational China policy, US-Taiwan relations saw a substantial upgrade under his leadership, both symbolically as well as in terms of concrete policies. This led many in Taiwan to view Trump as a true supporter.
In contrast, Biden was initially perceived as being "soft on China." Once in office, however, the Biden administration has continued to show its self-declared "rock solid" support for Taiwan. Alongside symbolic gestures, this includes increased non-official relations and military cooperation, as well as measures to internationalise the "Taiwan question."
In response, public opinion in Taiwan has considerably warmed towards Biden over the first 10 months of his presidency. At the same time, Chinese president Xi Jinping has intensified calls for Taiwan's unification with the mainland while the People's Liberation Army has ramped up military operations. This has further amplified Taiwanese rejection of Xi's goal of "peaceful unification" under Beijing's rule.
As an element of the US's geostrategic rivalry with China, Taiwan will continue to play an important role in Biden's foreign policy. Because the participating actors' diametrically opposed interests are unlikely to change in the foreseeable future, the Taiwan question will have to be managed carefully. The threat of violent clashes is real. Consequently, a balanced US and European policy should aim at maintaining the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, clearly signalling opposition to attempts at isolating Taiwan while also upholding the "One-China" policy.

The United Arab Emirates (UAE), while exhibiting one of the highest shares of migrant workers in its national work force globally, has very restrictive immigration policies. As a standard procedure, work visas for migrants are curtailed after the age of 65. The UAE is therefore a key site for understanding transnational inequalities premised on citizenship and social security in the Global South.
The influx of labour migration to the UAE having begun in earnest only in the 1970s, the ageing of its migrant population is critically advancing. Today, these migrants' children, who were born in the UAE, are engaged in the workforce there. Tax-free salaries, or "end-of-service benefits" offered to migrants in the UAE, however, are not adequate to provide a decent life after retirement for most.
This is particularly challenging for those who lack the necessary resources to keep their older family members in the host countries, and for those who originate from socio-economically and politically unstable countries, where the question of "return" after retirement is much less feasible.
Prolonging residency after retirement is possible; in fact, most migrants desire it, as they want to be surrounded by their children, grandchildren, and community into old age. Although in recent years the UAE has introduced longer-term visas, including for retired people, these schemes typically target high-net-worth individuals. Yet even with adequate resources, older migrants still face uncertainty, as keeping up their residency and financial subsistence requires continual renewals and investments, respectively.
Gulf policymakers should make retirement-savings schemes mandatory for its temporary migrants. This will not only financially enable some of them to envision a future in the Gulf beyond retirement but also benefit the Gulf states, which aim to attract consumers and investors. Furthermore, more origin countries should offer social protections, such as pension rights, for their ageing overseas workers in the Gulf.

Within just one year, the world witnessed the collapse of elected governments in Mali, Afghanistan, and Guinea. While the power grabs by military juntas in Mali and Guinea and by the Taliban in Afghanistan caused fear among the respective populations, many citizens were also willing to acquiesce to the overtaking forces, because the deposed civilian governments were perceived as failing and corrupt. These developments highlight important lessons about government legitimacy in fragile states.
There is more to government legitimacy than elections. The holding of elections alone often does not suffice to render a government legitimate in the eyes of citizens. Questionable or botched elections can do more harm than good to government legitimacy.
In weak and fragile states, governments cannot rely on citizens' acceptance of state institutions to legitimate their authority. They must find alternative ways to continually legitimate their rule in the eyes of citizens.
Insights from Burkina Faso suggest that government legitimacy can be improved by addressing problems of state-society relations. Even in communities that have very strained relations with the state, most citizens actually desire greater state presence and would be willing to give state institutions and security forces the benefit of the doubt - if they were perceived to be doing more to protect people's safety and livelihoods.
If the conditions are right, local governments can play a crucial role in mitigating the central state's deficient capacity and legitimacy. In some areas, local governments are the most powerful and legitimate political actors in citizens' lives.
In dealing with governments that are deficient in legitimacy, international actors should be guided by a careful analysis of state-society relations. Calls for rapid elections are no panacea, and elected governments should not automatically be considered legitimate representatives of society. Instead, international actors should focus on identifying and supporting societal changes that are prerequisites for more legitimate governance.

In September 2021, the European Union (EU) presented its strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. Several states and regional organisations have now embraced the "Indo-Pacific" as a concept to respond to geopolitical and geo-economic dynamics linked to China's rise. The "Indo-Pacific" lens fails, however, to properly capture the interests and perspectives of small powers in the Pacific.
The Indo-Pacific is not a coherent world region but a strategic space in which China and the United States, as well as other regional and extra-regional actors, compete for power and influence.
Small Pacific powers cannot avoid the strategic dynamics of the broader Indo-Pacific but seek to exert agency and autonomy. And they are concerned about a potential militarisation of the region.
Rather than simply viewing small Pacific powers through homogenising concepts such as "Indo-Pacific," or in the case of New Zealand (NZ) also "the Anglosphere," they need to be understood on their own terms instead.
Pacific Island Countries (PICs) have championed the "Blue Pacific" narrative to capture their collective identity and common interests. Environmental and human-security issues loom much larger for them than military ones do.
New Zealand has embraced the "Indo-Pacific" rubric but calls for an inclusive approach. It also continues to seek an "independent foreign policy" reflecting its own interests and values.
The EU strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific names seven priority action areas, ranging from connectivity to security and defence. Not all areas are equally important for the EU's cooperation with PICs and NZ. Green transition and ocean governance should be prioritised in both instances, while human security regarding PICs and trade liberalisation in the case of NZ should also top the agenda.