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This article builds on previous forecasts of the presidential primary vote by incorporating elite party endorsements and estimates of candidate electability. Elite endorsements are significant predictors of both parties' primary vote, but cash reserves are significant only for Democrats while Gallup poll results are significant only for Republicans. The model updated by the New Hampshire primary results indicates that the primary affects both parties' remaining primary vote, especially for Democrats. Republican nominations are largely predictable and determined mainly by effects occurring prior to the primaries, while Democratic nominations are relatively unpredictable before the primaries and are susceptible to momentum during the primaries.

Executive agreements represent a powerful tool for pursuing commitments with other nations across the spectrum of foreign policy issues. In particular, the executive agreement gives presidents the flexibility to act independently of Congress. The authors' research demonstrates, quantitatively, how presidents use international executive agreements to advance their foreign policy priorities. The authors evaluate the foreign policy agendas of the Carter, Reagan, G. H. W. Bush, and first Clinton administrations and test whether the executive agreements signed during each administration serve to further the individual foreign policy goals of each president. The authors find that presidents are more likely to devote personal attention to an agreement that furthers a specific policy priority, and they identify greater agreement activity in areas that correspond to presidential initiatives.

While Lawrence's analysis highlights the importance of considering outliers, it neither disconfirms the original Rothenberg and Sanders analysis of shirking on the impeachment vote nor findings of shirking generally. Indeed, when a systematic analysis of outliers is conducted for Republican voting on the Clinton impeachment, shirking results again emerge. While outlier analysis is important, it must be done systematically and not in an ad hoc manner.

In this article, the authors examine perceptions of the salience of the issue under dispute by both sender and target states and their impact on sanction outcomes. They find that both the sender's perception of the salience of the issue and the asymmetry in perception of issue salience between sender and target favoring sender states have significant and dramatic effects on sanctions outcomes. This finding suggests that how states perceive the issue(s) at dispute matters in determining the likelihood of sanctions success and adds to our understanding of what determines sanctions outcomes.

Recent scholarship points to governors losing budgetary influence to legislatures. A survey of executive and legislative budget analysts from thirteen western states is used to test hypotheses derived from Abney and Lauth's theoretical propositions regarding the end of executive dominance over the budgetary process. This article finds that the legislature's ability to independently access budgetary information, a separate legislative budget agenda from the governor, the addition of detailed language in appropriation bills, and consensus revenue forecasting all decrease the likelihood of gubernatorial budgetary influence. Pork barrel additions and the ability to item veto appropriation language increase the likelihood of gubernatorial influence.

What explains public confidence in the leadership of government institutions at the state level? The authors explore how political processes, the nature of representation, and economic and policy performance in the states translate into citizen confidence in state institutions. Using a multilevel modeling approach, the authors consider the sources of public confidence in the people who lead state legislatures, offices of the governor, and state courts. While the explanations for government confidence at the state level resemble, in part, those of the national government, the authors also observe notable differences, with each branch of state government drawing on distinct sources of public satisfaction.

In the struggle to control the federal bureaucracy, presidents have an overlooked but powerful tool: the recess appointment. By making recess appointments, presidents can fill vacancies without the advice and consent of the Senate. The authors delineate three conditions that define presidential unilateral powers and demonstrate how recess appointments fit within that paradigm. Presidents, the authors argue, should be more likely to make recess appointments to important policy-making positions, namely, major independent agencies. The authors compile a data set of every civilian nomination and recess appointment between 1987 and 2004. After controlling for other factors, the authors find strong support for their theory.

Majority Party leaders are hypothesized, through their control of the legislative schedule in the House of Representatives, to use legislative success as a selective incentive to encourage majority party members to contribute to the collective goals of the party. Members can demonstrate party loyalty through floor voting and financial contributions to the party's re-election efforts. This article examines legislative success from the 103rd through 107th Congresses. The evidence shows that both demonstrations of party loyalty have a significant effect on legislative success.

Recent scholarship on unilateral presidential actions has recast our understanding of modern presidential policy making. However, our knowledge on this issue remains incomplete. In this article, the authors expand the literature on the unilateral presidency by exploring presidential proclamations from 1977 to 2005 (Presidents Carter to Bush) and identifying the importance of these tools as a policy-making instrument in expanding presidential power. By carefully examining the use of presidential proclamations, the authors discover that a majority of presidential proclamations involve presidential authority under congressionally delegated powers of international trade (and presidents most often use this authority to propose new trade arrangements or modify existing trade agreements), and they use this power in coordination with (but largely independent of) Congress. Presidents also use proclamations on the issue of national parks and federal lands exclusively to initiate new federal arrangements to establish new national parks or protections for federal lands, often against the will of Congress.

The debate between which model, directional or proximity, better describes citizens' political behavior engages scholars because the former constitutes a serious challenge to long-standing, Downsian, spatial logic. Despite an engaging series of empirical tests, scholars comparing the two models continue to disagree about which model performs better. Noting experimental methods remain conspicuously absent from methods deployed to date, the author describes an experiment designed to settle key assumption debates and measure subjects' reactions to candidates in contexts in which the models make very different predictions. The author reports results vindicating Downs's assertion that proximity matters and direction does not.

This article examines the usage of popular address rhetoric within all the State of the Union Addresses to determine whether presidents have consistently used this rhetorical tool, or whether the introduction of going public is indeed a 'modern' development that was little used in the rhetorical past of the presidency. By looking at instances in which the president identifies himself with the people, Congress, or as president, the author finds that many formerly 'traditional' presidents exhibit 'modern' tendencies, which suggests inconsistencies with the 'traditional/modern' divide that is a commonly utilized paradigm in presidential study. Adapted from the source document.

House rules allow the Speaker to choose any conferees he wishes, suggesting he might use conference delegations to advance partisan goals. In practice, the Speaker nearly always selects members of the bill's jurisdictional committee(s). The authors propose a theory of conferee selection that endogenizes both partisan goals and committee participation. They argue that the Speaker's incentives lead him to appoint committee members, but he anticipates cases in which they would produce an outcome unfavorable to the majority party. In these cases, the Speaker appoints other conferees in addition to those from the jurisdictional committee, thereby "packing" the delegation in favor of the majority party position. The authors derive and test hypotheses regarding when the Speaker packs conference delegations, and what delegations look like when packed. The tests support the theory.

There is a positive relationship between how much we talk about politics and current events and how much we participate in civic activities. However, analytical biases make it difficult to accurately estimate the causal influence of talk on individual behavior. Moreover, existing data sources do not include information on the mechanisms that might explain how individuals translate talk into action. These problems are addressed with new data that were collected through a natural experiment. The results show that civic discussions promote civic participation largely because during such discussions we are recruited to become involved.

This article develops a regime-splitting process model of decentralized policy implementation to integrate two theoretical approaches rooted in the tension between local flexibility and national control. The author estimates a model that simultaneously assesses the ability of each approach to explain the outcome it is meant to map onto (case-level discretion for local flexibility and aggregate responsiveness for national control) as well as each approach's extensibility to the other approach's domain. The data for the study come from the implementation of eight primary statutes by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's regional offices. The results are counterintuitive: the national control approach largely explains case-level discretion, the domain of local flexibility, but retains some power for explaining aggregate responsiveness. The local flexibility perspective contributes to both case-level discretion and aggregate responsiveness. Both models work outside their traditional domains, but neither is a sufficient explanation for decentralized policy implementation.

Conventional wisdom has long held that Republicans are advantaged when partisan labels are removed from the ballot. However, in this article, the authors argue that the advantage gained from nonpartisan elections favors the minority party because the low-cost partisan cue is hidden from voters who otherwise would be inclined to support majority party candidates. The authors test this hypothesis using aggregate-level data from state legislative races in nonpartisan Nebraska and partisan Kansas, mayoral races in nonpartisan Phoenix and partisan Tucson, and California statewide races including the nonpartisan contest for superintendent of public instruction. Findings indicate that nonpartisan elections have partisan consequences but that the effect is in favor of the minority party rather than the Republican Party.