Suchergebnisse

AbstractBased on Herbert Simon's conceptualization of bounded rationality, this article develops and tests an integrative model of the strategic decision‐making process (SDMP) and outcomes in public organizations. The model integrates different SDMP dimensions—procedural rationality, intuition, participation, and constructive politics—and examines their impacts on the successful implementation of strategic decisions. Additionally, it analyzes the influence of implementation on the overall outcomes of strategic decisions. The model was tested with data from multiple sources on 170 strategic decisions collected from senior executives working in 38 public organizations in Qatar—a context in which studies on decision making are rare. With the exception of intuition, this study shows a positive impact of all SDMP dimensions on the successful implementation and outcomes of strategic decisions. Successful implementation fully mediates the relationships between procedural rationality, participation, and constructive politics and the outcomes of strategic decisions.Evidence for Practice

The study shows how managers decide on strategic issues for public organizations.
There is a positive relationship between procedural rationality, participation, and constructive politics and the successful implementation of strategic decisions.
Public managers can influence the success of strategic decisions by establishing formal processes to ensure that all relevant information is collected and analyzed and that people with experience and diverse perspectives participate in decision making.
Developing effective implementation processes is necessary for improving the outcomes of strategic decisions in public organizations.

As governments lack the rationality-promoting selective pressures of market competition, the standard (unbounded) rationality assumption is less legitimate in Public Choice than in analysis of markets. This paper argues that many Public Choice problems require recognizing that human rationality has bounds, that these differ across individuals, and that rationality must therefore be treated as a special scarce resource, tied to individuals and used for deciding on its own uses. This complicates resource-allocation in society, which has to rely on institutionally shaped selection processes. But this also appears to be the only way to produce the long-missing analytical support to the first head of J.S. Mill's criticism of government, of which Public Choice has so far supported only the second.

AbstractWe model imperfect governments with public choices that are sequential, myopic and not free of error. We first use this framework to explore governmental incremental budgeting. We argue that a model of bounded rationality is required to capture the empirical reality of incremental budgeting. We then provide a model that integrates bounds errors and systematic errors. We argue that the empirical evidence is that bounds errors and systematic errors are inextricably intertwined—some level of bounded rationality is required for systematic errors to emerge. We use this to explore political information lobbying. A testable hypothesis is that lobbyists will focus efforts on policy‐makers of low ability. We show that choosing leaders with high ability, that is Madison's wisdom to discern, is important, especially when policy decisions concern dangerous products (rifles) or dangerous environments (pandemics).

"Cognitive Approaches to Foreign Policy Analysis" published on by Oxford University Press.

Chapter 1 Introduction: The Goal and Contents of This Dissertation 1 ECOLOGICALLY RATIONAL HEURISTICS 2 ACT-R: A UNIFIED THEORY OF COGNITION 5 ORGANIZATION OF THE DISSERTATION 8 Chapter 2 Methodological Preliminaries 10 INTRODUCTION 10 OVERVIEW OF THE CHAPTER AND INTRODUCTORY DEFINITIONS 11 HOW TO SELECT BETWEEN FORMAL MODELS: A SHORT OVERVIEW 12 CONCLUSION 18 Chapter 3 How Memory Aids Strategy Selection 19 ABSTRACT 19 INTRODUCTION 19 HOW MEMORY AIDS STRATEGY SELECTION: THE HYPOTHESIS OF NON-OVERLAPPING COGNITIVE NICHES 21 JUDGMENTS FROM THE ACCESSIBILITY OF MEMORIES 22 THE ADAPTIVE TOOLBOX 23 OVERVIEW OF THE CHAPTER 25 AN ACT-R MODEL OF NON-OVERLAPPING COGNITIVE NICHES 26 OVERVIEW OF SIMULATION STUDIES 1 AND 2 33 HOW I CALIBRATED THE MODEL TO PREDICT MEMORY RETRIEVAL (SIMULATION STUDY 1) 33 TESTS OF THE TARTLE NICHE AND TARTLE–KNOWLEDGE NICHE HYPOTHESES (SIMULATION STUDY 2) 42 WHEN WOULD A PERSON USING THE FLUENCY HEURISTIC MAKE ACCURATE INFERENCES? (EXPERIMENTS 1–6; SIMULATION STUDIES 3, 4) 44 ACCURACY AS A DETERMINANT OF STRATEGY SELECTION (EXPERIMENT 7) 53 EFFORT AS A DETERMINANT OF STRATEGY SELECTION (EXPERIMENT 8) 58 TIME AS A DETERMINANT OF STRATEGY SELECTION (EXPERIMENT 9) 62 GENERAL DISCUSSION 67 CONCLUDING REMARKS: EMERGING COGNITIVE NICHES 72 Chapter 4 Models of Recognition-based Multi-alternative Inference 74 ABSTRACT 74 INTRODUCTION 74 GENERALIZING THE RECOGNITION HEURISTIC: ELIMINATION BY RECOGNITION 75 ALTERNATIVE MODELS OF INFERENCE: A COMPETITION 76 TOWARD A THEORY OF STRATEGY SELECTION BY DEFAULT 79 OVERVIEW OF THE EXPERIMENTS: RECOGNITION IN POLITICAL ELECTIONS 82 DO CONFLICTING CUES OVERRULE THE RELIANCE ON RECOGNITION? (EXPERIMENT 11; REANALYSIS OF EARLIER ELECTION STUDY) 83 GENERALIZING THE RECOGNITION HEURISTIC: HOW EPISODIC KNOWLEDGE AIDS USING RECOGNITION (EXPERIMENT 12) 89 IS A LACK OF KNOWLEDGE INFORMATIVE ABOUT THE PREDICTIVE ACCURACY OF RECOGNITION? (EXPERIMENT 13) 98 HOW WELL DO COMPENSATORY MODELS PREDICT INDIVIDUAL INFERENCES? (EXPERIMENT 14; REANALYSIS OF EXPERIMENT 7) 102 DO ...