Suchergebnisse

The thrust of the survival of any nation is embedded on its security situation. Insecurity is a threat to development because it produces economic stagnation. However, the situation is not absolutely, if at all so in Nigeria given the insurgency of Boko Haram and its attendant negative consequences on the economy of the country. The work utilized the theory of Good Governance and National Security in analyzing Boko Haram insurgence and the Nigerian economic development. Deriving from the above, it was discovered that there is a close relationship between and among good governance, national security and economic development through the study of Boko Haram insurgence. The study therefore argued that the only thing that can sustain development and curb insurgencies in Nigeria is good governance, as what we are witnessing presently is the resultant implication of contrapuntal maladministration that had hitherto characterized the Nigerian state. DOI:10.5901/mjss.2014.v5n17p31

Military rule as a form of autocratic governance can mean either rule by a military strongman unconstrained by other officers or rule by a group of high-ranking officers who can limit the dictator's discretion. We label the latter form a military regime. Both military strongmen and military regimes are more likely to commit human rights abuses and become embroiled in civil wars than are civilian dictatorships. The behavior of strongmen diverges from that of more constrained military rulers in other areas, however. Military strongmen start more international wars than either military regimes or civilian dictators, perhaps because they have more reason to fear postouster exile, prison, or assassination. Fear of the future may also motivate their resistance to transition. Military strongmen are more often ousted by insurgency, popular uprising, or invasion than are military regimes or civilian dictators. Their tenures rarely end in democratization, whereas the opposite is true of military regimes.

Повстанческие бандформирования являлись наиболее опасными вооруженными группами в 1920-1921 гг. на территории Сибири. Бандформирования ставили своей целью свержение Советской власти путем вооруженных выступлений в ходе нападений на местные правоохранительные органы и вооруженные силы. Их действия выражались в совершении терактов и актов вредительства на важнейших государственных объектах. Повстанческое движение и крестьянские восстания как формы острого вооруженного конфликта между населением и действующей властью спровоцировали рост бандитской преступности. ; Gangs of the rebels were the most dangerous armed groups on the territory of Siberia. Gangs were aiming to overthrow the Soviet power through armed actions in the course of attacks on local law enforcement authorities and armed forces. Their actions were in committing terrorist attacks and acts of sabotage on the most important state objects. The insurgency and the peasant uprising as a form of acute armed conflict between the population and the current government provoked an increase in gang crime.

The article of record as published may be located at http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.dg ; Security and governance in Ghazni Province, Afghanistan are threatened by resource conflict dynamics: groups focus on exploiting lootable resources in the short term while weak institutions and conflict persist. Elements within the Afghan government and insurgent organizations alike expand their power and influence in this manner. Understanding how criminal organizations operate within the regional political economy is essential to reducing the leverage these networks, associated criminal syndicates, and corrupt government officials have on the community. We proffer three hypotheses for development and stability practitioners to monitor as transition approaches in 2014, as well as recommendations for mitigating the onset of resource conflict in Ghazni as the province experiences a downgrade in foreign security forces. Adopting effective, anti-insurgency policies will be fundamental to mitigating the malicious effects on the population and providing incentives for peace, rather than continuing conflict.

We study effects of wartime violence on social cohesion in the context of Nepal's 10‐year civil war. We begin with the observation that violence increased levels of collective action like voting and community organization—a finding consistent with other recent studies of postconflict societies. We use lab‐in‐the‐field techniques to tease apart such effects. Our causal‐identification strategy exploits communities' exogenous isolation from the unpredictable path of insurgency combined with matching. We find that violence‐affected communities exhibit higher levels of prosocial motivation, measured by altruistic giving, public good contributions, investment in trust‐based transactions, and willingness to reciprocate trust‐based investments. We find evidence to support two social transformation mechanisms: (1) a purging mechanism by which less social persons disproportionately flee communities plagued by war and (2) a collective coping mechanism by which individuals who have few options to flee band together to cope with threats.

One of the most important events in U.S. congressional history is the 1910 revolt against Speaker Cannon. The rebellion had myriad ramifications for the inner workings of the House of Representatives and dramatically altered the chamber's power structure. Despite its significance, we do not have a clear understanding of the character of the revolt and why the 42 Republican insurgents revoked their allegiance to Cannon and their party. Did the insurgents rebel because of their strong progressive ideals or for more pragmatic reasons, such as political survival or retribution? Using data gathered from Cannon's personal papers and other sources, we systematically explore disparate explanations credited for the revolt. For the progressive core of the insurgency, our analysis indicates that policy differences drove their behavior. These early insurgents were later joined by a group of less progressive members who appear to have supported the rebellion for electoral and retaliative reasons.

Can targeted land reform reduce levels of civil war conflict by mitigating the factors that contribute to rural rebellion? This article uses new micro-level data on land reform and insurgency at the municipal level from Colombia from 1988 to 2000, a country with high rates of land inequality and informal land ownership, to test whether land reform undercut subsequent guerrilla activity. The reform had two distinct aspects. Politically powerful large landholders blocked most large-scale reform, which resulted primarily in an enduring, low-intensity, and geographically dispersed reform that spurred low levels of insurgent activity. Larger-scale reforms were only implemented in areas that threatened serious violence and had the potential to harm elite interests, and in these limited areas reform reduced guerrilla activity. This suggests that while land reform can be an effective counterinsurgency policy, it may be politically difficult to implement at a sufficient scale because it threatens the status quo.

Terrorism is a mounting global threat for national security, yet the rise of social media facilitates prosumption and the spread of alternative grassroots stories in response to civic militarization and state propaganda. This article discusses the structural and cultural conditions underlying the production and spread of online user-generated content as radical media tactics. By presenting a case study on the escape and man-hunting of a key terrorist in Southeast Asia, the article examines prosumption and transmediation practices whereby official stories of the terrorist escape are appropriated, remediated, and virally disseminated across different social media–blogs, vlogs, and digital games–to help clarify how new media supports critical citizen engagement. The identification of online activities exhibiting middle-ground resistance, including rumors, political parodies, and infotaining play, illustrates counter narrative responses to mainstream media representations. Findings have implications for the management of tensions in wired global insurgency and strategic communication performances.

Making an agreement to stop the war (armed conflict) in Colombia, should not mean the end of conflict, is only the first step that would show: - by the insurgency, to continue the struggle for their ideals without arms and - by the state, to make reforms, not the congress grounds and the Palace of Nariño, but from and to the application of real democracy, is to say, the direct participation of the people. ; Lograr un acuerdo para detener la guerra (conflicto armado interno) en Colombia, no debe significar el fin del conflicto, es apenas el primer paso que darán muestra: - por parte de la insurgencia, de seguir la lucha por sus ideales sin las armas y - por parte del estado, de realizar las reformas, no desde el recinto del congreso y del palacio de Nariño, sino desde y con la aplicación de la democracia real, es decir con la participación directa del pueblo.

The Niger Delta of Nigeria is the largest mangrove forest in Africa and the chief source of wealth to the Nigerian state. This naturally endowed region once became a hot bed of kidnapping, violence, insurgency, crude oil bunkering, gang war and hostage taking. This paper investigates the challenges of democracy and development in Nigeria.s Niger Delta region. It relied heavily on secondary data. Using the Marxist political economy approach, the paper reveals that the tensions that rob the region of its peace and stability were the people.s quest to get a reasonable share of the states resources. Since democracy and development cannot thrive under a restive atmosphere, it recommends that current measures at restoring peace and infusing a massive infrastructure in the area should be maintained. Lastly, the provision of life sustaining skills for the youths of the region should be continued. This will enable them survive without recourse to violence and criminality.

AbstractThe second half of the 1990s saw the emergence of a new, distinctive type of Afghan poetry, the Taliban tarana performed in Pashto by one or more vocalists without instrumental accompaniment and characterised by the melodic modes of local folk music. Over the last fifteen years the tarana chants have gained wide distribution within Afghanistan and Pashto speaking parts of Pakistan, as well as among the Pashtun diaspora. Considering their unambiguous ideological status and their immense popularity within the country of origin they can be regarded as the signature tune of the Afghan insurgency. The present article, which focuses on the literary roots of these songs, attempts to demonstrate that their authors are following century old patterns of Pashto oral and written poetry while adopting traditional material to the needs and the milieu of contemporary Afghan society. The publication is supplemented by a transcription and English translation of five tarana chants.

The essay focuses on the political dimensión of the crisis of the Spanish monarchy in 1808 had, in its reorganization, two ways of manifestation: the wars of insurgency and the meeting of deputies in the port of Cadiz. In the case of the viceroyalty of New Spain, the two tracks agreed its inception in September 1810. From its junction were defined the main parameters governing elements of the new nations. ; El ensayo centra la atención en la dimensión política de la crisis de la monarquía española de 1808 que tuvo, en su recomposición, dos vías de manifestación: las guerras de insurgencia y la reunión de los diputados en el Puerto de Cádiz. Para el caso del virreinato de la Nueva España las dos vías coincidieron en sus inicios en septiembre de 1810. De su confluencia se fueron definiendo los principales parámetros de los elementos rectores de las nuevas naciones.

This paper argues that the emergence of stabilisation as a concept out of peace-building, state-building and counter-insurgency theories has carried with it some of the key weaknesses of international intervention, in particular the idea that imposing western liberal systems on non-western societies will contribute towards stability. With reference to two case studies, the Wheat Seed project in Afghanistan and a gas cylinder distribution project in Iraq, the paper argues that stabilisation activities do not engage fully with the underlying premise that stabilisation must support and engender local political legitimacy, in part because of the conceptual baggage that stabilisation has adopted from other areas. The paper concludes by arguing that greater use should be made of the knowledge and histories of non-western state formation, characterized as being non-Weberian, as a counter to the overuse by interveners of the desire to support rational Weberian state structures in other countries.