Suchergebnisse

Twenty years after the dissolution of the USSR, Russia is ambivalent about its former leader Mikhail Gorbachev. Far from being hailed as a hero, Gorbachev is mostly remembered as a disastrous leader. He launched a new era of openness with previously unthinkable freedoms in the 1980s, but in Russia he is also held responsible for the economic collapse in the 1990s. Most Russians do not honor him for ending the Soviet empire, either; Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin has described the event a catastrophe. He is viewed very negatively in polls throughout modern Russia. However, Gorbachev is not to blame for the lack of transparency in modern Russia, or the weakness of political parties, the return of the former KGB as a source of influence and power, or the violence that Russian authorities intermittently use against dissenters. Adapted from the source document.

Статья посвящена оценке состояния гражданского общества в России и анализу работы его трех важнейших институтов: общественных организаций, профсоюзов и политических партий. Проводится анализ направлений и особенности деятельности некоммерческого сектора в России; рассматриваются трудности работы независимых профсоюзов при агрессивной политике Федерации Независимых Профсоюзов России; прослеживается динамика развития многопартийности в России и оценка роли политических партий в общественном сознании. ; The article deals with assessment of the state of civil society in Russia and analysis of its three main institutes: public organizations, trade unions and political parties. The analysis of peculiarities and areas of activities of non-profit sector in Russia is carried out; the difficulties of new independent trade unions in getting over aggressive policy of Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia (FNPR) are discussed; the dynamic of development of multiparty system in Russia and the assessment of activities of political parties in public opinion is observed.

Россия, кроме высокотехнологичных вооружений, по преобладающему большинству промышленных изделий оказалась не готовой конкурировать с крупнейшими транснациональными корпорациями. Их бюджет сопоставим с национальным бюджетом страны. Единственным сравнительно достойным соперником в такой геоэкономической конкуренции может быть только российское государство, способное создавать стратегическое партнерство с бизнесом для инновационно-предпринимательской деятельности. В статье сформулированы основные принципы государственной инновационной политики России и стратегические задачи повышения конкурентоспособности ее промышленности. ; Russia nowadays, with exception to the high-tech equipments, in terms of majority of production products turned out to be unprepared to compete with Transnational corporations, whose budget can be compared to national budget of many countries. The only way for Russia to compete successfully is to do it through building strategic Public private partnerships for innovations and entrepreneurs in Russia. The main principles of Russia government's innovation policy and strategic tasks of increasing its production competitiveness are represented in this Article.

The article examines the assessments of the February Revolution in Russia, given by the French press in 1917. In general the French press welcomed the fall of the tsarist government. The tsarist bureaucracy incompetence and «special mentality» of Russian people were viewed as the main causes for the fall of autocracy. At the same time autocracy was regarded by the French press as the most suitable form of governmental structure for Russia. ; The article examines the assessments of the February Revolution in Russia, given by the French press in 1917. In general the French press welcomed the fall of the tsarist government. The tsarist bureaucracy incompetence and «special mentality» of Russian people were viewed as the main causes for the fall of autocracy. At the same time autocracy was regarded by the French press as the most suitable form of governmental structure for Russia.

Historians of Russia have not analyzed the roles that the memory of World War I played in Russian life, and Russia remains largely absent from comparative studies of the war and its legacy. Russian people did have "sites of memory" where they expressed myths, displayed symbols, and mobilized public opinion around the memory of World War I. Outside the Soviet Union, a non-Soviet Russian memory of the Great War flourished in the interwar years, and the war became an important memory that military émigrés used to overcome the rupture from the past (imperial Russia) and the present (Russian territory) caused by revolution and life in emigration. The war had a different expression in Soviet Russia, where journalists and publicists evoked its image, but not its historical content, to break the USSR from the Russian past and separate the first socialist society from its enemies in the present.

The Russia-Ukraine Relationship - Empire or Democracy?, by Annie Daubenton
The breaking up of the Soviet Union was thought to have severed the links forged by history between Russia and the Ukraine. Ukraine stated its new found independence within the CIS, rivalling Russia and banking on an equilibrium of East-West influences to assure its democratie transition. But Ukraine's economie liabilities, inherited from the dislocation of the empire (foreign debt, disputes over energy resources...), and a serious political crisis in 2000 hâve brought the two countries together, destabilising the equilibrium to Moscow's benefit and leading to retreats on reform. At the same time, Moscow's fight against "terrorism" in Chechnya is now seen in the context of international preoccupations (11 September) and has brought about the NATO-Russia agreement (2002), which seems to relegate the Ukraine to a secondary role on the international scene.

Tarih boyunca önemli bir coğrafyada bulunan ve önemli bir güç olan Rusya, devlet geleneğinde bulunan yayılmacı politikasıyla başka devletlere çoğu kez müdahalelerde bulunmuştur. Sovyetler Birliği'nin halefi olarak ortaya çıkan Rusya Federasyonu da Vladimir Putin ile beraber büyük güç statüsüne sıklıkla vurgu yapmış, dış ve güvenlik politikalarında çok kutupluluğu vurgulayan pragmatik politikalar izlemiştir. Rus ulusal çıkarların korunması bağlamında yakın çevreye özel bir önem veren Rusya, uluslararası arenada saygın bir aktör olarak görülme ve etkin politikalar izlemesinin yolunun yakın çevre üzerinde nüfuz kurmaktan geçtiğini düşünmüştür. Bu bağlamda Rusya için yakın çevrede öne çıkan aktör Ukrayna olmuştur. Ukrayna jeopolitik konumunun yanı sıra, boru hatları transit geçiş noktası konumunda olması ve Rusya'nın askeri üssünün bulunduğu Kırım'daki Sivastopol askeri üssüne ev sahipliği yapmasıyla önemli bir devlet konumundadır. Ukrayna bu söz konusu konumu dolayısıyla sadece Rusya için değil ABD ve AB için de dikkate alınması gereken bir aktör olmuştur. Bir yanda Batı diğer yanda Rusya gibi iki aktör arasında kalan Ukrayna çok yönlü politikalar izlemeye özen göstermiştir. Batı'nın bu ülkeyi, NATO'ya üye yapma ve AB'ye entegre etme kararlılığı, Rusya'nın Avrasya Ekonomik Birliği'ne çekme çabaları ile çatışınca Rusya Kırım'a müdahale bulunmuş ve bu bölgeyi ilhak etmiştir. Bu çalışmada da Rusya'nın Kırım'a müdahalesi saldırgan realizm yaklaşımı perspektifinde incelenmiş ve Rusya'yı Kırım'a müdahaleye iten saikler değerlendirilmiştir. Çalışmada Rusya'nın Kırım'a müdahale etmesinde Ukrayna ile olan tarihsel, kültürel ve duygusal motivasyonların yanında Kırım'ın Rus jeopolitiğinde arz ettiği konumun da çok önemli olduğu sonucuna varılmıştır. Bununla beraber Rusya'yı müdahaleye iten esas saikin, konjonktürel gelişmeler neticesinde önüne çıkan fırsatlar olduğu görülmüş ve Rusya taktiksel bir eylemle bu fırsatları avantaja çevirmiştir. ; Russia, which has stretched over a strategic region and has been a major power throughout the history, has intervened in other states with respect to the expansionist policy existing in its state tradition. Starting with Vladimir Putin's power, Russia Federation, which emerged as the successor of the Soviet Union, has also emphasized the concept of great power frequently and pursued a pragmatic policy laying weight on multipolarity in foreign and security policies. As part of paying special attention to the immediate vicinity to protect Russian national interests, Russia has concluded that the only way to be regarded a respected actor in the international arena and pursue effective policies is to dominate the neighbouring regions. In this regard, Ukraine was the prominent actor in the immediate vicinity for Russia. In addition to its geopolitical location, Ukraine is regarded an important state as it harbours the transit pipelines and the Russian Sevastopol military base in Crimea. Due to this location, Ukraine has been an actor to be paid special attention not only by Russia, but also by the USA and the EU. Remaining in between the West and Russia, Ukraine has elaborated to devise multidirectional policies. When the western determination to make this state a NATO member and integrate it with the EU clashed with Russian efforts to make it a part of Eurasia Economic Union, Russia intervened in Crimea and annexed this region. This study analyzes the Russian intervention in Crimea in the framework of offensive realism and reviews the motives leading Russia to the intervention in Crimea. The study concludes that the Russian intervention in Crimea results from Crimean position in Russian geopolitics in addition to Russian historical, cultural and emotional motivations with Ukraine. Yet, it is obvious that the basic motive for Russian intervention were opportunities which emerged as a result of cyclical developments, and Russia has exploited these opportunities with a tactical action and turned it into an advantage.

This year confirmed an ambiguous situation with food security in Russia. On the one hand, the government insists on the achieved sustainable food self-sufficiency/sovereignty: "Russia is self-sufficient in all basic types of food", "the level of food security in Russia is one of the most reliable in the world", "the Eurasian Economic Union has reached a level of self-sufficiency in most food products (grain, vegetable oils, pork, lamb, sugar, eggs)". The Russian leadership admits the "very complex nature" of food sovereignty as depending on climate change, population growth, trade wars, sanctions, and so on. However, the official discourse emphasizes that "we should not be pessimists", "a country striving to be sovereign must provide itself with food", and Russia solves this task so successfully that has become one of the largest food exporters. Therefore, "in 2023, food inflation in Russia will be one of the lowest in the world due to self-sufficiency in basic products" and "systemic measures of anti-crisis support for enterprises and sectors that ensure food security" . Since mid-2020, rising prices on world markets have determined higher prices on domestic markets, and high food inflation affected many countries. In Russia, food inflation is lower compared to other regions (10% vs 19.1% in the EU or 14.9% in the OECD), and the rate of increase in food prices is lower than general inflation, while in other countries food prices became key drivers of accelerating retail prices. The article considers Russia's measures for keeping food prices down and its population's everyday food-consumer practices for keeping usual diet under rising prices. The survey confirmed the persistent inconsistency of Russians' assessment of food practices, which can be explained by the trend to 'normalize' one's life situation in general and in its most essential part (daily diet) in particular.

This article analyses post-Soviet reforms in Russia, and treats them as an example of 'authoritarian modernization', which were implemented to achieve a high level of socioeconomic development by focusing on rapid economic growth while neglecting political democratization. It discusses the arguments in favour of authoritarian modernization as such, and the dilemmas, challenges, and constraints in its implementation which became evident during the period of 1990-2010s. A special emphasis is made on the poor quality of the Russian state against the background of its relatively low international integration. The rent-seeking nature of the state together with the formation and further entrenchment of an electorally authoritarian regime provide negative incentives for the implementation of authoritarian modernization. The article considers a number of contradictions associated with such a project in Russia, including some unintended consequences of the economic growth, including the growth of the demands for democratization, the disjuncture between ambitious policy reforms and their inept implementation by the state apparatus, and the 'mediocrity syndrome' resulting from unjustified claims of Russia's unique influence on the global scale. The article concludes that the features of Russia's current political and economic order impose insurmountably high barriers for the implementation of authoritarian modernization in terms of ideas, institutions, and policies, thereby exhausting the very potential of this project. ; Peer reviewed