Suchergebnisse

The effects of financial capital mobility on monetary policy autonomy are relatively well understood, but the importance of particular monetary regimes in distinct national-institutional settings is not. This article is a theoretical and empirical exploration of the effects of monetary policy regimes on unemployment in different national wage-bargaining settings. Based on a rational expectations, two-stage game of the interaction between the wage behavior of labor unions and the monetary policies of governments, I argue that monetary policies have real (employment) effects in all but the most decentralized bargaining systems. Specifically, in intermediately centralized bargaining systems a credible government commitment to a nonaccommodating monetary policy rule will deter militant wage behavior with salutary effects on unemployment. In highly centralized systems, by contrast, restrictive monetary policies will clash with unions' pursuit of wage-distributive goals and produce inferior employment performance. Only in highly fragmented bargaining systems is money "neutral" in the sense that employment performance is unaffected by monetary regimes. The model has clear consequences for the optimal design of central banks and collective bargaining arrangements and suggests new ways to study institutional change (hereunder the causal effect of increasingly globalized capital markets). The argument is supported by pooled time-series data for fifteen OECD countries over a twenty-one-year period.

ABSTRACT: The main purpose of this article is to analyze how sovereign risk influences the loan supply reaction of banks to monetary policy through the bank lending channel. Additionally, we aim to test whether this reaction differs in easy and tight monetary regimes. Using a sample of 3,125 banks from the euro zone between 1999 and 2012, we find that sovereign risk plays an important role in determining loan supply from banks during tight monetary regimes. Banks in higher sovereign risk countries reduce lending more during tight regimes. However, we find little evidence to support any relationship between sovereign risk and loan supply reaction to monetary policy expansions. These results are very interesting for the way monetary policy is conducted in Europe. Banking union, banking system strength, and the budget control of governments would be necessary measures to reduce the heterogeneous transmission of the monetary policy in the euro zone.

Union der Sozialistischen Sowjetrepubliken (UdSSR). Examines trade and monetary policy coordination among the Russian Federation and other post-Soviet states; since 1992.

Chapter 1: Introduction . - Chapter 2: Intellectual Context: The Evolution of IO Theory . - Chapter 3: United Nations . - Chapter 4: United Nations Case Study: Rwanda/Genocide . - Chapter 5: The World Bank . - Chapter 6: World Bank Case Study: Environmental Behavior and Performance . - Chapter 7: The International Monetary Fund . - Chapter 8: International Monetary Fund Case Study: IMF and the Global Financial Crisis . - Chapter 9: The World Trade Organization . - Chapter 10: World Trade Organization Case Study: Intellectual Property, Trade, and Access to Medicine . - Chapter 11: Regional Organizations/European Union . - Chapter 12: Regional Organizations Case Study: African Union Peace Operations