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Cyber-attacks have increased since the 1988-Morris worm and can target any connected device from any place in the world. In 2010, Stuxnet received a lot of attention as the first cyber-weapon. Its targets were the Iranian nuclear enrichment centrifuges. Nation states are developing cyberspace capabilities to conduct offensive cyberspace operations. Academic researchers have been calling for a more transparent discussion on offensive capabilities and have pointed out the positive impact researchers had during the development of nuclear capabilities. Shrouded in secrecy, the development of offensive capabilities used for operations makes it difficult to conduct research. Therefore, one way to mitigate this is to conduct a systematic review of the current state of research in offensive cyberspace operations. The systematic review method makes it possible to establish certain inclusion and exclusion criteria and systematically go through academic articles to identify the contents, thoughts and research focus of academic researchers. Six scientific databases were queried and 87 articles were read and clustered. The first insight is that, based on the results of the queried databases, research about offensive cyberspace operations is limited. The resulting clusters are a general cluster about cyberspace operations, followed by research in policy, decision-making, governance, capabilities, levels, models, training, deterrence and international affairs. These are then further grouped into: a) general cyberspace operations; b) deterrence; c) international affairs; d) modelling, simulation and training. The article concludes that research into offensive cyberspace operations is maturing as more information is becoming public. Secondly, current research lists some good basic ideas regarding effects which can be achieved through offensive cyberspace operations, how they should be conducted, and related tools, techniques and procedures. However, discrepancies in research efforts exist, with the majority of research coming primarily from the western world. In addition, secrecy and the resulting limited access to information, coupled with research being either too technically focused or too qualitatively focused, show that there still remains room for research in this field. Finally, some directions for future research are examined.

Intro -- Foreword -- Abstract -- Introduction -- 1. Background -- 1.1. Articles, News Items, Blogs -- 1.2. Western Studies -- 1.3. Ukrainian Studies -- 1.4. The "Ideological Problem" of Russian Historiography -- 2. The Crimean Internet in Figures: 2011-2014 -- 3. The Russian "Information Warfare Machine". The Main Actors -- 4. Russia's Activity. The Channels of Information Influence (October-December 2013) -- 4.1. Internet Forums -- 4.2. The GRU and Facebook -- 4.3. The Twitter of "Crimean Events" -- 4.4. The Blocking of Facebook -- 4.5. The Nationwide Anti-Ukrainian Campaign in Russia: The Crimean Dimension -- 5. The Ukrainian Response. Countermeasures Against Foreign Information Influence -- Conclusions -- References -- Appendix -- Short Biography of the Author.

This edited volume explores how artificial intelligence (AI) is transforming international conflict in cyberspace. Over the past three decades, cyberspace developed into a crucial frontier and issue of international conflict. However, scholarly work on the relationship between AI and conflict in cyberspace has been produced along somewhat rigid disciplinary boundaries and an even more rigid sociotechnical divide - wherein technical and social scholarship are seldomly brought into a conversation. This is the first volume to address these themes through a comprehensive and cross-disciplinary approach. With the intent of exploring the question 'what is at stake with the use of automation in international conflict in cyberspace through AI?', the chapters in the volume focus on three broad themes, namely: (1) technical and operational, (2) strategic and geopolitical, and (3) normative and legal. These also constitute the three parts in which the chapters of this volume are organised, although these thematic sections should not be considered as an analytical or a disciplinary demarcation.

Government, industry, and academia need better tools to explore threats, opportunities, and human interactions in cyberspace. The interactive exercises called cyber wargames are a powerful way to solve complex problems in a digital environment that involves both cooperation and conflict. Cyber Wargaming is the first book to provide both the theories and practical examples needed to successfully build, play, and learn from these interactive exercises. The contributors to this book explain what cyber wargames are, how they work, and why they offer insights that other methods cannot match. The lessons learned are not merely artifacts of these games - they also shed light on how people interpret and interact with cyberspace in real life. This book covers topics such as cyber action during conventional war, information effects in conflict scenarios, individual versus group decision-making, the intersection of cyber conflicts and nuclear crises, business resilience, emerging technologies, and more.

The aim of this article is to present how Chinese strategies are manifested into offensive cyberspace operations targeting Sweden. It is commonly known that People's Republic of China (PRC, and in this definition the meaning of thegovernment and its military), uses five-year plans (FYP) for social and economic steering strategy of their country. This has been going on since 1953 until today. In 2015, the national strategic plan Made in China 2025 (中国制造2025) was launched by Le Keqiang, the Premier of the State Council of PRC. The main goal with this plan is to strengthen the economic development. In addition, Chinese military strategists noted the importance of information warfare and intelligence during military operations. This article is based on open sources: the official English translated version of the 13th Five-year plan (FYP) and other reporting on cyberspace operations linked to the PRC. A number of cases are presented to highlight the link between the PRC FYP and their targets. Next, the current situation in Sweden is presented and how the country is targeted by PRC-linked activities, both in and through cyberspace, but also military infiltration on academia. The results show that Sweden has been, and is continuously the target of offensive cyberspace operations. In parallel, the country is also the target of military infiltration on the academia, and direct investment strategies such as Huawei attempting to compete for the 5G frequency actions arranged by the Swedish Post and Telecom Authority. In conclusion, Sweden will continue to experience cyberespionage from PRC on all levels and on all domains; science, technology, IP and privacy information theft. Previously unveiled cyberspace operations cases in this article have proven to be a convenient strategy for the PRC to reduce its research and development gap in several ways; innovatively, financially and to shortening the time-to-market (TTM).

Cyberwarfare, like the seismic shift of policy with nuclear warfare, is modifying warfare into non-war warfare. A few distinctive characteristics of cyberwar emerge. Cyberwarfare has blurred the distinction between adversary and ally. Cyber probes continuously occur between allies and enemies alike, causing cyberespionage to merge with warfare. Espionage, as old as war itself, has technologically merged with acts of cyberwar as states threaten each other with prepositioned malware in each other's cyberespionage probed infrastructure. These two cyber shifts to warfare are agreed upon and followed by the US, Russia and China. What is not agreed upon in this shifting era of warfare are the policies upon which cyberwarfare is based. This book charts the policies in three key actors and navigates the futures of policy on an international stage. Essential reading for students of war studies and security professionals alike.