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AbstractI analyse a model in which it is socially optimal for banks to manage depositor funds but in which concerns about fraud discourage depositing and justify regulation. The regulator screens bankers and decides the level of charter value which they will receive as incentive to prevent fraud. She can also encourage deposits by insuring them. The optimal policy depends upon the regulator's screening ability: high ability regulators rely upon charter value and low ability regulators rely upon deposit insurance. I relate these findings to the regulation of transition economy banks, to operational risk management, and to banking competition policy.

The Copyright Tariff process has expanded into K - 12 Education and is now expanding into the area of Provincial and Territorial Government and into Canadian Universities and Colleges. What can we learn about the process that the K - 12 Education has gone through to see what is next for other sectors? Will Access Copyright continue to file more tariff proposals with the Copyright Board of Canada and who might be next? ; Yes

Abstract: The B.B.C. is facing a fiscal crisis ‐ its revenue will no longer increase without further rises in the licence fee. The government is reluctant to raise the licence fee for political reasons and because of anxiety over its impact on low income households. There is evidence of growing resistance towards paving the licence fee. One of the major reasons suggested for non‐payment is that poor households simply cannot afford to pay the lump sum required.The Peacock Committee are considering other methods of raising revenue for the B.B.C. The Public Accounts Committee have called for more efficient detection methods and higher penalties. But these solutions will cost money and hurt poor households most. One way of avoiding prosecuting poor evaders and ensuring that the licence is paid, is to introduce a system of licence‐direct similar to that pioneered by the fuel boards.

In Germany national licences are funded by the "Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG)" as part of their system for nationwide literature supply. In contrast there is no comparable scheme and no central office to finance and foster research information infrastructure in Austria. Universities in Austria obviously suffer more and more from the lack of backfile archives particularly in the field of e-journals and literature databases. Out of this in 2007 the task force "ARGE Bibliotheksdirektor/-innen" started to pull the attention of university steering boards and political decision-makers towards this important topic which is critical for science and research in Austria. The initiative is supported by the "Kooperation e-Media Österreich". ; Während in Deutschland das Konzept der Nationallizenzen als Teil des Systems der Überregionalen Literaturversorgung im Wesentlichen von der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) getragen wird, gibt es in Österreich derzeit weder ein vergleichbares Programm zur Förderung der Forschungsinfrastruktur noch eine nationale Stelle für die Finanzierung. Weil auch an den österreichischen Universitäten die Versorgungslücken, insbesondere bei Zeitschriftenbackfile-Archiven und bei speziellen Fachdatenbanken, immer offensichtlicher werden, hat die Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Bibliotheksdirektor/-innen Österreichs, mit Unterstützung der Kooperation e-Medien Österreich, 2007 begonnen, dieses für die Zukunft des Forschungs- und Wissenschaftsstandortes Österreich wichtige Thema an die Leitungsgremien der Universitäten sowie an die politischen Entscheidungsträger heranzutragen.

In response to the increasing international pressure on Switzerland to reform the ring-fenced elements in its tax system, the Swiss Government has put forward a comprehensive tax reform package. The proposal comprises, among other things, the introduction of a licence box, a substantial reduction in the cantonal profit tax rates and an allowance for excess corporate equity. We apply a computable general equilibrium model to quantify the economic effects of this reform. Our results reveal that the licence box, combined with the reduction in the cantonal profit tax, limits the outflow of the tax base of those companies that benefit from the current preferential tax treatment. The reduction in the cantonal profit tax and the fact that regularly taxed companies also benefit from the licence box render the reform package costly, such that the tax revenues will decline after the reform.

In response to the increasing international pressure on Switzerland to reform the ring-fenced elements in its tax system, the Swiss Government has put forward a comprehensive tax reform package. The proposal comprises, among other things, the introduction of a licence box, a substantial reduction in the cantonal profit tax rates and an allowance for excess corporate equity. We apply a computable general equilibrium model to quantify the economic effects of this reform. Our results reveal that the licence box, combined with the reduction in the cantonal profit tax, limits the outflow of the tax base of those companies that benefit from the current preferential tax treatment. The reduction in the cantonal profit tax and the fact that regularly taxed companies also benefit from the licence box render the reform package costly, such that the tax revenues will decline after the reform.