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This article offers an assessment of zero‐base budgeting (ZBB) derived from a field study conducted by the Urban Institute and supported by the National Science Foundation. Four cities and four states participated in the study, and several hundred public officials were interviewed.

ABSTRACTThe objective of this article is to examine how executive policy‐making authority is affected by allocating public resources via zero‐base budgeting (ZBB). After reviewing the concept and rationale of ZBB, the article compares incremental policy‐making with scientific policy‐making. This review and comparison are then used to draw implications of using ZBB. Ultimately the article argues that ZBB will result in greater policy‐making authority in the hands of senior management of the executive branch at the expense of the legislative agencies and bureaus. Thus, government's responsiveness toward the particularistic interests of individuals and groups will be reduced as a result of using ZBB.

Presented is an examination of how executive policy-making authority is affected by allocating public resources via zero-base budgeting (ZBB). As an alternative to traditional incremental budgeting, ZBB uses analytical methods to develop decision packages for each discrete activity of an organization & then ranks the packages on a cost/benefit basis. A review of the concept & rationale for ZBB is presented as the basis for a comparison of incremental policy making with scientific policy making. Decisions reached through incremental policy making result from various competing interest groups trying to advance their own political preferences. Scientific policy making entails identification of decision units & their respective objectives. The argument is made that ZBB will result in greater policy-making authority in the hands of management at the expense of legislative agencies & bureaus. Thus, government's responsiveness to interests of individuals & groups will be reduced using ZBB. Modified HA.

Intro -- Contents -- Foreword -- Acknowledgments -- Government at Risk: Contingent Liabilities and Fiscal Risks -- Learning to Deal with Fiscal Risks in Government Portfolio -- Dealing with Government Fiscal Risk: An Overview -- Accounting and Financial Accountability to Capture Risk -- Budgeting for Fiscal Risk -- Institutional and Analytical Framework for Measuring and Managing Government Contingent Liabilities -- Analytical Techniques Applicable to Government Management of Fiscal Risk -- Fiscal Sustainability and a Contingency Trust Fund -- A Framework for Assessing Fiscal Vulnerability -- Evaluating Government Net Worth in Colombia and Républica Bolivariana de Venezuela -- The Challenges of Fiscal Risks in Transition: Czech Republic, Hungary, and Bulgaria -- Analyzing Government Fiscal Risk Exposure in China -- Dealing with Contingent Liabilities in Indonesia and Thailand -- Dealing with Contingent Liabilities in Colombia -- Dealing with Specific Sources of Government Fiscal Risk -- Pension Guarantees: A Methodology for Assessing Fiscal Risk -- Measuring and Managing Government Contingent Liabilities in the Banking Sector -- Government Insurance Programs: Risks and Risk Management -- Contingent Liabilities of the Central Bank: Analyzing a Possible Fiscal Risk for Government -- Contingent Liabilities in Infrastructure: Lessons from the East Asian Financial Crisis -- Monitoring Fiscal Risks of Subnational Governments: Selected Country Experiences -- Guarantees as Options: An Evaluation of Foreign Debt Restructuring Agreements -- The Fiscal Risk of Floods: Lessons of Argentina -- Toward a Code of Good Practice on Managing Fiscal Risk.