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'Certainly, there should be a better way to strengthen peace and stability, a way to move away from a future that relies so heavily on the prospect of rapid and massive nuclear retaliation and toward greater reliance on defensive systems which threaten no one.' (President R. Reagan, Jan. 1985)1 'It is ironic and paradoxical that the age of deterrence has so confused the strategic mentality of many commentators that their reaction to a purely defensive system is to suggest that it increases danger.' (Z. Brzezinski, National Security Advisor under President Carter, July 1984)2 'What I want is a radar surveillance system which allows you to spot everything that's moving, either on the surface or above the surface of the earth. And if we had a number of companion systems, a high-energy laser, or particle beam weapon, or something else along with the pointing and tracking ability to knock down airplanes and missiles, then you wouldn't even need to knock out cities; you would knock out forces. You could pin your enemy down on earth. What would they do? If I control the high ground and you can't move, what are you going to do? You're going to negotiate a surrender. That's what it's all about.' (Gen. (Ret.) B. Schriever, who formulated the transition report on space policy when Reagan took office in 1980/81)3

President Putin started his second term in Russia with overwhelming popularity and power. Ironically, however, since that time he has been confronted with mounting domestic and international problems. The most serious issue is how to deal with increasing terrorist attacks. Putin's political initiatives of centralizing state power in the Kremlin has been criticized domestically and in the West as an attempt to strengthen his grip on power, thereby endangering democracy in Russia.

As a growing global threat, cyber-attacks can cost millions of dollars or endanger national stability and human lives. While relatively well understood in most sectors, it is becoming clear that, although the maritime sector is becoming more digitally advanced (e.g., autonomy), it is not well protected against cyber or cyber-physical attacks and accidents. To help improve sector-wide safety and resiliency, the University of Plymouth (UoP) is creating a specialised maritime-cyber lab, which combines maritime technology and traditional cyber-security labs. This is in response to the lack of research and mitigation capabilities and will create a new resource capability for academia, government, and industry research into maritime cybersecurity risks and threats. These lab capabilities will also enhance existing maritime-cyber capabilities across the world, including risk assessment frameworks, cybersecurity ranges/labs, ship simulators, mariner training programmes, autonomous ships, etc. The goal of this paper is to explain the need for next generation maritime-cyber research capabilities, and demonstrate how something like the proposed Cyber-SHIP Lab (Hardware, Software, Information and Protections) will help industry, government, and academia understand and mitigate cyber threats in the maritime sector. The authors believe a next generation cyber-secure lab should host a range of real, non-simulated, maritime systems. With multiple configurations to mirror existing bridge system set-ups, the technology can be studied for individual system weakness as well as the system-of-systems vulnerabilities. Such as lab would support a range of research that cannot be achieved with simulators alone and help support the next generation of cyber-secure marine systems.

This conceptual study describes an approach to corporate entrepreneurship using an outsider perspective – learning to think like an outsider. Three propositions using this perspective are examined in the context of offensive and defensive corporate entrepreneurship. The impact of market conditions on entrepreneurship are used as a basis for developing these propositions. Finally, we investigate the factors that have a significant impact on the success of entrepreneurial efforts by the firm. These variables include: processes, values, resources, organizational structure, corporate culture, and leadership. We use examples of how mature corporations have responded, with particular attention to the changes confronted by Research In Motion (RIM).

Mit der Beendigung der Wachstumsphase haben sich die ökonomischen Rahmenbedingungen der Gewerkschaftspclitik in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland entscheidend gewandelt. Die zunehmende Notwendigkeit der Verteidigung von in der Wachstumsphase erreichten Positionen drückt sich u.a. darin aus, daß das Ziel der Besitzstandssicherung in den Vordergrund der Tarifpolitik getreten ist. Im vorliegenden Beitrag wird die Entstehung dieser Konzeption aus der Rationalisierungsschutzpolitik heraus am Beispiel der IG Metall dargestellt und zur Entwicklung der gewerkschaftlichen Kriseninterpretation sowie der auf die Überwindung von Stagnation und Krise gerichteten wirtschaftspolitischen Konzeptionen in Beziehung, gesetzt. Anhand der Sicherungsbereiche Arbeitsplatz, Einkommen und Qualifikation wird die These vertreten, daß wesentlich eine Verallgemeinerung passiver Besitzstandssicherung gelungen ist, während die angestrebten Elemente einer gestaltenden Besitzstandssicherung nicht realisiert werden konnten. Gleichzeitig wird die Gefahr angedeutet, daß die alleinige Orientierung an einer vorausschauenden Strukturpolitik einerseits die angestrebten Ziele nicht sicherstellen kann, andererseits zu einer stärkeren Differenzierung zwischen den einzelnen Industriegewerkschaften führen kann.