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The nature and dynamics of the party system in India are unique. Indian politics represents the spectacle of a multiparty system on the surface; but for long periods of modern India's electoral history, it has been characterized by 'one dominant party system' with congress occupying the center stage. Since 1970s Indian party system has become highly competitive both at the center as well as in the states. This competitiveness has significantly made the political parties to move from the stage of 'fluidity' during the early years to that of a structural consolidation. The bewildering pluralities of political formations and interests have been developed into full-fledged political parties, with unique models of social engineering. A notable feature of the electoral outcomes since 1989 has been the fractured mandate leading to the emergence of hung parliament as well as multi-party coalitions. After analysing the changing profile of the Indian party system, this article makes a prognosis reflecting the end of the era of single party governments in the wake of the formation of multi-party coalitions at the national level and also in several states. Adapted from the source document.

Withattention turning towards Kenya's second multi-party elections, due to be held before the end of 1997, it is imperative to look back to the flaws in the system which helped deliver President Daniel arap Moi and the Kenya African National Union (KANU) their victories in 1992. At present there is no sign of these defects being eradicated and the creation of new districts since then has demonstrated the Government's intention of enhancing an already biased structure. The underlying distribution of tribes and ethnic groups has had a fundamental impact on the electoral geography of Kenya, since they have controlled the delimitation of both the parliamentary constituencies and the administrative machinery of the whole country.1

The Multi-Party Presidential Government in Indonesia has reached a critical point. The 2.5 percent parliamentary threshold rule in the 2009 Election was incapable to address the issue. The parliamentary threshold was raised to 3.5 percent in 2014, in the hope to reduce the number of party joining the election, but it failed to do so. There were 9 national parties participating in the 2009 election, and it will be increased to 16 in the 2019 election. Theoretically, the combination of multi-party parliament in a Presidential Government is rather strange. It is not surprising that the "conflict" between the president and parliament often occurs. There suppose to be a coalition supporting the government in parliament, but the coalition is not a firm one. The coalition did not have a significant influence in strengthening the presidential government. Therefore, this study intends to provide a complete picture of multi-party system practices while trying to provide solutions for strengthening the presidential government in Indonesia. To achieve this goal, this study uses the literature study method in collecting relevant information, using a qualitative approach. This approach is considered appropriate because multi-party phenomena and presidential systems are multidimensional. In contrast to previous research which was limited to the description and problems of multiparty systems, this research besides describing the system of government also provided moderate solutions that were considered to be in accordance with the Indonesian context. This study assumes that strengthening presidential systems can be done if the political parties are more modest. In addition, parliamentary support for the president must be optimized. The results of the study concluded that the strengthening of presidential systems must be carried out through the purification of the government system contained in the constitution, forming and strengthening the ranks of government coalitions in parliament, and carrying out a number of institutional engineering through various forms. These three things must be wrapped in a constitutional frame (amendments to the 1945 Constitution) and regulations (revisions to laws and government regulations). The amendments and revisions can be done through three corridors, namely the intra-parliamentary movement, the extra-parliamentary movement, and the referendum.

Purpose
Multi-party systems (MPS) comprise interdependent stakeholders (teams, organizations) that engage in complex interactions and negotiations. Building on the approach/inhibition theory of power, the self-enhancement strategy and on social interdependence theory, this study aims to understand the mediating role of attributions (i.e. perception of who/what is responsible for a certain outcome) in the relation between perceptions of the stakeholders' power (i.e. self-perceptions of power, power ascribed to others and others' perception of one's own power) and their perceptions of intergroup climate and future collaborative intentions.


Design/methodology/approach
Data were collected from 30 groups (113 participants) that took part in five multi-party simulations concerning the negotiation of funds allocation among six stakeholders. The authors have evaluated attributions, intergroup climate and future collaborative intentions using questionnaires and different facets of systemic power were derived from a round-robin procedure.


Findings
Mixed models and multi-level mediation analyses were carried out, and the results show that self-attributed power and power attributed by others predict internal attributions, while power attributed to others predicts external attributions. Moreover, attributions mediate the relationship between perceived power and future collaborative intention, as well as between power and perceptions of intergroup climate.


Practical implications
Managing the multi-party systems is a complex endeavor, and the results point toward ways in which power dynamics in multi-party systems can be addressed.


Originality/value
To the best of authors' knowledge, this study is among the first empirical attempts to explore the association between the perceptions of power and attributions in multi-party systems engaged in negotiation tasks.

THIS ARTICLE COMPARES TWO SPATIAL MODELS OF PARTY COMPETITION: (A) THE TRADITIONAL PROXIMITY MODEL AND (B) THE DIRECTIONAL MODEL OF VOTER CHOICE. THE ARTICLE FIRST LAYS OUT THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO MODELS IN MULTI-PARTY SYSTEMS. THE TRADITIONAL PROXIMITY MODEL MAKES NO CLEAR PREDICTION ABOUT THE SPATIAL STRUCTURE OF POLITICAL PARTIES: THE DIRECTIONAL MODEL PREDICTS THAT OPTIMAL PLACEMENT FOR PARTIES WILL BE ALONG THE CIRCUMFERENCE OF A CIRCLE AT A MODERATE DISTANCE FROM THE CENTER. BOTH THEORIES HAVE IMPLICATIONS FOR OVERTIME STRATEGY AND THE SUCCESS OF NEW POLITICAL PARTIES. TRADITIONAL PROXIMITY THEORY EMPHASIZES THE MOVEMENT TOWARD A LOCATION WITH HIGH DENSITY OF VOTERS, WHILE DIRECTIONAL THEORY EMPHASIZES THE IMPORTANCE OF A DISTINCT DIRECTIONAL STRATEGY. THE AUTHORS EXAMINE THE NORWEGIAN POLITICAL SYSTEM FROM 1969-1985 AND THE SWEDISH SYSTEM FROM 1979-1982 AND FIND THE DIRECTIONAL THEORY MORE STRONGLY SUPPORTED.

Who Are the Parties to the Contract(s) or to the Arbitration Clause(s) Contained Therein? The Theories Applied by Courts and Arbitral Tribunals --May an Arbitration Clause Be Extended to Non-signatories: Individuals, States or Other Companies of the Group? --The Possibility of Bringing Together in One Single Proceeding all the Parties Who Have Participated in the Performance of One Economic Transaction Through Interrelated Contracts --Joinder of Parties and Joinder of Claims: Voluntary and Compelled Intervention of Third Parties, Cross-Claims and Consolidation --Setting in Motion of Arbitral Proceedings and Appointment of Arbitrators --Arbitration Proceedings --Enforcement of the Arbitral Award --The Res Judicata Effect of an Award Rendered in a Connected Arbitration Arising from the Same Project.

ABSTRACTRecent research on political dimensions in the Scandinavian party systems at five non‐electorate "levels" of dimensional analysis (content analysis of party programs, content analysis of expressions of party stances on current issues, positions taken by the parliamentary parties as behaving units, roll call analysis and interviews of individual legislators, and interviews with leaders and members of party organizations) justify the rejection of the unidimensional spatial model of party competition. Data on the social structure, attitudes and opinions, and voting behavior of the supporters of different parties provide indirect information about the dimensions of political cleavage. More directly, the "perceived party dimensions" can be concluded from aggregates of individual assessments for which the parties as such are the stimuli Averaged rank orderings of the parties provide ordinal measures that have been used as inputs for multidimensional scaling techniques.An experiment of measuring the mutual distances of political parties in Finland used percentages of the second and the two last party choices as measures of party distance. A qualitative analysis of the exceptions to regular orderings along the basic left/right dimension suggested the presence of six additional political dimensions: the producers and agriculture/the consumers and urban industries; the established parties/the temporary small parties; recognized and noted centers/the "forgotten people" (populist dimension); Finnish/Swedish; communism/non‐communism; and victorious/losing.Three developments can be envisaged in future dimensional analysis of multiparty systems: comparisons across countries, comparisons between different levels in the political system, and predictions of emerging political changes.

Assesses the emerging party system in Tanzania and examines the question of whether the competition that emerged represents an expansion of political choice for citizens and a broader representation of societal forces. The emerging party system is assessed in view of several salient features of the Tanzanian political system. (Original abstract-amended)