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Although extensive research has been done on the causes of violence against civilians, it is usually directed at explaining why civilians are deliberately targeted or how militaries organize themselves in ways that lead soldiers to endanger civilians. As I show, many civilians are injured or killed by members of armed forces who strive to comply with the norms of war. Some attacks on civilians during ground combat operations in contemporary wars can be explained in terms of the tension soldiers experience between their indefeasible right of self-defense and their uncertainty about the identity and location of civilians on the battlefield. I illustrate this tension and explore its consequences by drawing on interviews with American and British veterans of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. This helps to explain the persistence of attacks on civilians even as the American and British armed forces make greater efforts to respect noncombatant immunity.

This research examines how individuals with different affect regulation strategies cope with just-world threats. Our study demonstrated that individuals who poorly downregulate negative affect (a state-oriented style) more avidly attempt to defend a just world after this opportunity is offered via an authority figure when that belief of a just world was threatened than do individuals who successfully downregulate negative affect (an action-oriented style), after a filler task. Sizable differences thus exist in how individuals defend their just-world beliefs as a function of how people deal with their affective states.

Half Title -- Series Information -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Contents -- Foreword -- Preface -- Table of Cases -- Table of Treaties -- Notes on Contributors -- Introduction: Non-state Actors, Changing Actors and Subjects of International Law -- 1 The Usefulness of the Category of 'Non- state actors' in International Law -- 2 Actors and the Persistent Notion of the 'Subject of International Law' -- 3 Overview of Chapters in the Volume -- Select Bibliography -- Part 1 Changing International Norm-Makers -- Chapter 1 Sovereignty's Accommodations: Quasi-States as International Lawmakers -- 1 Defining the Field -- 2 Quasi-state Participation in Treaties -- 2.1 Multilateral Treaties -- 2.2 Bilateral Treaties -- 3 Quasi-state Participation in International Organizations -- 4 Quasi-state Participation in International Dispute Settlement -- 5 Concluding Thoughts on the Importance of Quasi-state Contributions -- Acknowledgment -- Select Bibliography -- Chapter 2 Quasi-States and Sport: Building a Case for Statehood -- 1 Introduction: Why Are They at the Olympics? -- 2 Conceptualizing Statehood -- 3 The Global Sport Regime -- 4 State Participation in Global Sport -- 5 Quasi-State Case Studies -- 5.1 German Democratic Republic -- 5.2 Kosovo -- 5.3 Palestine -- 5.4 Taiwan -- 5.5 Puerto Rico -- 5.6 South Africa -- 6 The Relationship between Political Success and Sporting Success -- 6.1 Does Participation in Sport Achieve Quasi-State Goals? -- 6.2 Does Sporting Success Lead to Political Success? -- 7 Conclusion -- Acknowledgment -- Select Bibliography -- Chapter 3 Self-Determination Claimant Groups and the Creation of International Norms -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Defining Non-State Actors as Subjects of International Law -- 3 The Right of Self-determination in International Law -- 3.1 Self-determination and International Legal Personality.

How and to what extent is the preventive use of force becoming the future of foreign policy for states around the world? We explore the spread of preventive logic to increasing numbers of states and examine the degree to which an international norm toward preventive self-defense is cascading in the international system. Through content and comparative case study analysis, we investigate leaders' rhetoric and security policies concerning what we theorize is the key indicator of a country's emulation of the United States: assertion of the right to the unilateral, preventive use of force outside of its borders. Our evidence indicates that there has been a shift away from the established international norm-which considers the use of preventive force illegal and illegitimate-toward growing acceptance of unilateral preventive strategies, a shift largely propelled by the precedents set by the United States in the war in Iraq and its use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs or drones) in the global war on terror. Our findings also reveal that some states are applying the strategy of preventive self-defense beyond the use of UAVs for targeted killings to the extreme contingency plan for nuclear war. We conclude by discussing possibilities for further research and considering the implications of this phenomenon. Adapted from the source document.

This volume offers a series of short and highly self-reflective essays by leading international lawyers on how global crises inform the functioning and theorizing of international law as well as how international law addresses global crises.; Readership: This book is of immediate interest to a readership of both scholars and practitioners, International lawyers, including scholars, practitionners, PhD students, postgraduate students and International Relations scholars

The objective of this note is to illustrate the impact of defense alliances on international arms trade. By differentiating between the income and price effects that are associated with the formation of international alliances, it is possible to consider the involvement of alliance member countries in international arms trade. The availability of a world market for armaments enables alliance members to encash the spillover benefits created by alliance formation. When alliance members make a significant contribution to world trade, the impact upon the international terms of trade affects the gains from membership. Should allied countries engage in trade management, they may affect the distribution of such membership benefits. An analysis of interalliance trade in armaments suggests a distinction between world efficiency and alliance efficiency. Allied countries exporting armaments may have an incentive to trade with other allies at a reduced price rather than trade with the rest of the world.