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"Ever since Plato made the case for the primacy of ideas over names, philosophy has tended to elevate the primacy of its ideas over the more common understanding and insights that are circulated in the names drawn upon by the community. Commencing with a critique of Plato's original philosophical decision, Cristaudo takes up the argument put forward by Thomas Reid that modern philosophy has generally continued along the 'way of ideas' to its own detriment. His argument identifies the major paradigmatic developments in modern philosophy commencing from the new metaphysics pioneered by Descartes up until the analytic tradition and the anti-domination philosophies which now dominate social and political thought. Along the way he argues that the paradigmatic shifts and break-downs that have occurred in modern philosophy are due to being beholden to an inadequate sovereign idea, or small cluster of ideas, which contribute to the occlusion of important philosophical questions. In addition to chapters on Descartes, and the analytic tradition and anti-domination philosophies, his critical history of modern philosophy explores the core ideas of Locke, Berkeley, Malebranche, Locke, Hume, Reid, Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Schelling, Marx, Kierkegaard, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Husserl and Heidegger. The common thread uniting these disparate philosophies is what Cristaudo calls 'ideaism' (sic.). Rather than expanding our reasoning capacity, 'ideaism' contributes to philosophers imposing dictatorial principles or models that ultimately occlude and distort our understanding of our participative role within reality. Drawing upon thinkers such as Pascal, Vico, Hamann, Herder, Franz Rosenzweig, Martin Buber and Eugen Rosensock-Huessy Cristaudo advances his argument by drawing upon the importance of encounter, dialogue, and a more philosophical anthropological and open approach to philosophy"--

The article deals with a part of scientific and philosophical heritage of Valerian Nikolaevich Muravyov (1885‒1930), a thinker and a representative of Russian cosmism. The author of the article undertakes an attempt to explicate the major notions of the philosophy of action as the active principle of the common cause project by N.F. Fyodorov. In the theoretical system of Muravyov action is a uni­versal notion which unites various connections and relations among objects of different nature. Basing on philosophy of Parmenides and mathematical set theo­ry of G. Cantor Muravyov believes a possibility of action to be determined by the structure of the system: to possess the action capacity the system has to be a non-homogeneous set. The article reviews the general scheme of interaction of the active system elements which are defined as hypostases in the philosophy of action. The work also reveals the hierarchy of rational action points. Time is in­separably connected with set and action in the philosophical concept of Mu­ravyov. The paper observes Mouraviov's logical approach to understanding time genesis and structure resting on the ideas of H. Bergson. Defining time as an ac­tion subject, its obligatory output the philosophy of action sets a task of time takeover.

A diverse bandwagon of academics is working with and celebrating the notion of phronesis as a metacognitive capacity, guiding morally aspirational cognition and action. However, this new phronesis discourse is characterised by frequently unrecognised tensions, lacunae, and ambivalences. This text aims to set the recently surging interest in phronesis in context, elaborate on the standard model of phronesis, and to juxtapose that with a recent consensual model of wisdom.

The purpose of the article is to determine and reconsider Voltaire's ideas concerning religion and human nature. In order to achieve this purpose it is necessary to complete the following tasks: to analyse academic literature on Voltaire's interpretation of the phenomenon of religion; to expose Voltaire's basic ideas about human nature; to substantiate the importance of anthropological approach to the phenomenon of religion with the ideas of Voltaire's philosophical works. Methodology. The achievements of anthropocentric philosophical thought of the XIX century possess great potential in the process of constructive comprehension and theoretical reconstruction of the anthropological intention that accompanies the process of philosophising. The research extensively applies hermeneutical method for interpreting Voltaire's philosophy. Scientific novelty. In academic literature on Voltaire's works we have ascertained the basic anthropological component of his philosophy and reconsider Voltaire's ideas about religion as something that is rooted in human nature. Conclusions. In academic literature the interpretation of the phenomenon of religion in Voltaire's heritage is a rather controversial one. At the one hand, Voltaire criticizes religion for its superstitions and fanaticism. On the other hand, he recognises the existence of God. In our opinion, the phenomenon of religion should be examined in the context of human nature and basic problems related to it such as the problem of soul and the problem of free will. The anthropological approach to the phenomenon of religion allows to avoid the extremity of atheistic and metaphysical approaches and to enable its anthropological interpretation.

"In his renowned collection Philosophy as a Way of Life, Pierre Hadot suggests that the original trait of philosophy as a method by which one exercises themselves to achieve a new way of living and seeing the world fails with the rise of modernity. In that time, philosophy increasingly takes on a merely theoretical aspect, tending toward a system. However, Hadot himself glimpses at the dawn of modernity some instances of the original trait of philosophy still very much present, and in his wake, Michel Foucault warns that between the late 16th and early 17th centuries the philosophical question of the reform of the mind attests to a still very close link between asceticism and truth. This book aims to develop just such an idea by thoroughly analyzing the most representative works of the reform of the mind in the early modern period: Francis Bacon's New Organon (1620), René Descartes' Discourse on the Method (1637), and Baruch Spinoza's Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect (1677). From this analysis it will emerge that these modern works fully deserve to be counted among the tradition of philosophy as way of life. On closer inspection, the inquiries about method elaborated in these works are fully understandable only when read in the light of a broader and more complex philosophical need: to establish the spiritual conditions for accessing truth and aspiring to full self-realization"--

Dealing with the presumed universality of metaphor and its role in the
discourse of philosophy and science, the article discusses, in the first
part, the theses on metaphor as ?all pervading means? of language and
thought, raised by romantic and post-romantic philosophers of language, and
its impact on the meta-discourse on philosophy and science in recent
contemporary contributions by epistemologists of science and language
philosophers. The aim of the article is to show, on one side, that this
universalisation of metaphor has been operative in the recent philosophy
rather as a tacit confusion of metaphors with models and analogies than as
elaboration of the presumed constitutive role of the so-called genuin
metaphor in the rational discourse. On this ground, the article tries to
provide, in the second and the third part, additonal and different arguments
than those raised by ?friends of metaphor? for locating the presumed
?irrationality? of metaphor so as to reexamine the relevance of the
difference between the literality of the underlying linguistic functions and
the emphatic assertion by metaphorical expressions. As a result, in the
fourth part, a different model has been suggested for estimating metaphors as
universal, legitimate, and epistemically innovative in the rational discourse
of philosophy and science. Such a view allows for conceiving of the presumed
?all-pervading? character of transference in language and thought as based on
the universality of linguistic functions and yet enables to consider
metaphors as what they actually are - a particular, but peculiar,
intralinguistic phenomenon without which no insight into the differential and
material character of language and speech seems to be possible at all.