Part 1 -- 1. Introduction: background and context -- Part 2: Country experiences and best practices -- 1. USA: Shultz, Rahtz, Sirgy, (Phillips?) et al -- 2. Canada: Detlev Zwick, et al., York University; Stan Shapiro, SFU -- 3. Mexico: Luis Raul Rodriques Reyes & David Foust Rodriquez, ITESO – Guadalajara -- 4. Argentina: Jaqueline Pels & Liza Kharoubi Echenique, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella -- 5. Colombia: Andrés Barrios, et al. Universidad de los Andes – Bogotá -- 6. Brazil: João Felipe Sauerbronn, Universidade UNIGRANRIO; Marcus Wilcox Hemais, PUC-Rio de Janeiro, et al.-10. Finland: Pia Polsa, HANKEN; Petteri Repo, University of Helsinki -- 11. Sweden: Ira Haavisto, Nordic Health Group and HANKEN -- 11. Germany: Michaela Haase, Freie Universität Berlin; Michael Ehret, Nottingham Trent University -- 12. Spain: Maria José Montero Simó, Rafael Padilla Araque, Universidad Loyola Andalucía -- 13. Croatia: Dario Miocević, et al. University of Split -- 14. Vatican: Augusto Zampini Davies, Vatican Dicastery for the Service of Integral Human Development (S.I.H.D.) -- 15. UK: Anthony Samuel, Cardiff University 16. Russia: Alexander Krasnikov, et al. Loyola University of Chicago; National Research University, Higher School of Economics -- 17. Turkey: Ahmet Ekici et al., Bilkent University-Ankara -- 18. Algeria: Habib Tilouine, Oran University -- 19. Ghana: Charlene Dadzie, University of South Alabama, Kofi Dadzie, Georgia State University in Accra -- 20. Rwanda: June Francis, Simon Fraser University; et al -- 21. South Africa: Stefan Kruger, Northwest University -- 22. Lebanon: Georges Aoun, Karine Aoun Barakat, et al., St. Joseph University, Beirut.-23. India: Nicholas Santos, et al., Creighton University and XIMB-India -- 24. Indonesia: Tony and Primidya K.M. Soesilo, Bina Nusantara University, Jakarta -- 25. Vietnam: Nguyen Thi Tuyet Mai, et al., National Economics University – Hanoi -- 26. Singapore: TBD May Lwin et al., Nanyang Technological University -- 26. Thailand: Busaya Virakul, et al., National Institute of Development Administration – Bangkok -- 27. China/Taiwan: Duan-Rung Chen, National Taiwan University; Winston Tseng, UC-Berkeley; Julian Chow, UC-Berkeley -- 28. Japan: Yoshiko, et al. Tokyo City University -- 29. Korea: Dong-Jin Lee, Yonsei University -- 30. Australia: Michael Polonsky, Deakin University -- 31. New Zealand: Ben Wooliscroft, Auckland University of Technology, Alexandra Ganglmair-Wooliscroft, Massey University -- Part 3: Epilogue -- 32. Summary and ways forward.
Zugriffsoptionen:
Die folgenden Links führen aus den jeweiligen lokalen Bibliotheken zum Volltext:
In Not Done With Life Yet, Wafa Darwish muses on major stops along the road of her life in Palestine and abroad. At first impression, the book may seem to be an ordinary tale of an ordinary woman: A young child grows up in Jerusalem, spends her school years in Ramallah, moves to Beirut for college, and becomes a woman, mother, lecturer. On careful reading, however, Darwish's extraordinary persona shines through. Considering critical eras in the personal history of Darwish, the narrative also touches on a collective history of the region: Palestine, Lebanon, and Egypt are among the countries where Darwish strove to grow roots and find normalcy. Slowly, massive layers peel off to reveal the fight that Darwish had to lead against disability, oppression, and many strings of loss and longing. It traces a humane experience of life, spanning from ordinary childhood situations, infatuations, and merriment to major losses and injustices. There are many challenges to overcome in a journey of growth that takes place in a region that is never stable or peaceful. The opening chapters offer a window into the old city of Jerusalem and find a child born into a torn house to divorced parents. Walking through the book, the reader grows close to the author, feeling the first pangs of loss, realizing that Darwish is gradually losing not only her homes and homeland to occupation but also her eyesight, a main means by which we survive. But life carries on with more surprises for both protagonist and reader. The book sorts through chapters in the history of a family that is at war with belonging: Jerusalem is an occupied city in which the Darwish family fights not only for physical space but also for joy in long nights of hospitable summers. Readers lose and find themselves the same way the author does, gliding to a possibility of a brighter end as the fight for life continues and the author's thirst for a middle ground has not been fully realized. As the years pass, readers rest with Darwish as she contemplates the breeze blowing from the window by her daughter's bedside, an alternative middle ground. Within the journey, one can feel the strength of the woman Darwish has become within the whirlwind of political and personal turbulence. Even though Darwish is not a typical, traditional Palestinian woman, she radiates strength and nationalism, evident in the many sacrifices she's made to survive divorces, death, and the side effects of war. Far from the classic romanticization frequently associated with writings about Palestine, and far from political diction and jargon, the book is written in a simple manner, narrated as if spoken, and packed with action and movement. There's a whiff of every place: the reader can smell the jasmine of summer and taste the mujadara made for friends in Lebanon. Despite extensive losses, bitterness rarely exists, and the tone of the writing tends to be lighthearted, at times even funny. Wafa Darwish made me laugh and cry; and by the way she combs disasters with the back of her hand and walks on, not done with life yet, she makes me realize what a Palestinian woman is.
Die vorliegende Arbeit zielt darauf ab, zwei Forschungslücken in der Literatur über Bürgerkriege zu schließen. Erstens, die Analyse der Strukturen nicht-staatlicher bewaffneter Gruppen. Zweitens, die Untersuchung der Politik von Milizen, als Form nicht-staatlicher Gruppen, denen in gegenwärtigen Bürgerkriegen eine zunehmende Bedeutung zukommt. Diese beiden Bereiche werden mit Hilfe einer historisch vergleichenden Analyse am Beispiel von zwei Milizen, die im sudanesischen und libanesischen Bürgerkrieg kämpften, untersucht. Die "Popular Defense Forces", 1989 von der Regierung des Sudan mobilisiert, wurden zum Sammelbecken für undisziplinierte und teilautonome militärische Einheiten, die schwerste Kriegsverbrechen begingen. Die "Lebanese Forces", eine maronitisch-nationalistische Miliz, wurde von einer Koalition konservativer christlicher Parteien gegründet. Nach dem Zusammenbruch des Staates 1975-6 wurde diese Miliz zu einer autonomen politischen Einheit mit einem territorial abgegrenzten Kanton im Osten von Beirut. Die vorliegende Arbeit untersucht die Prozesse und Strategien, die diesen Milizen die Etablierung von Herrschaft ermöglichte. Die beiden Gruppen entwickelten sich zu Organisationen, die die zu verteidigenden Gebiete beherrschten und mit staatlichen Geldgebern verbündet waren, aber auch in Konkurrenz zu ihnen standen. Diese Arbeit identifiziert drei Mechanismen, die die Entwicklungen von Milizen im Laufe ihrer Zeit bestimmen. Der Erste erklärt die Formierung von Milizen als ein Bricolage von politischen und nicht-politischen Antworten auf Unsicherheit. Der Zweite erklärt, wie sich Milizen in hybride Organisationen, von zentraler Mobilisierungseinheit und lokal eingebettete Organisationen, entwickeln. Der Dritte führt die Kontrolle des Zentrums über die lokalen Organisationen auf die Macht über Ressourcen zurück. Die Arbeit schließt mit dem Entwurf eines alternativen analytischen Modells für die Untersuchung von Bürgerkriegen. ; This thesis provides an analysis of the organizational politics of state supporting armed groups, and demonstrates how group cohesion and institutionalization impact on the patterns of violence witnessed within civil wars. Using an historical comparative method, strategies of leadership control are examined in the processes of organizational evolution of the Popular Defence Forces, an Islamist Nationalist militia, and the allied Lebanese Forces, a Christian Nationalist militia. The first group was a centrally coordinated network of irregular forces which fielded ill-disciplined and semi-autonomous military units, and was responsible for severe war crimes. Equally responsible for war crimes, such as the Sabra and Shatila massacre of Shi''a and Palestinian civilians in 1982, the second group, nonetheless, became an autonomous military formation with an established territorial canton with a high degree of control over military units. After first analysing the political and institutional context of formation of these two groups, detailed case study analysis illustrates how political-military leaderships consolidated internal authority over combat units. At first, this authority relied on a bricolage of norms, motivations and institutions, as highly diverse, loosely coordinated actors mobilised in response to insecurity. As key leadership figures emerged, these groups evolved into hybrid organisations, divided between central organisations and locally embedded units operating according to localised security arenas decoupled from central military or political strategy. Central authority was then consolidated through a process of progressive institutionalisation and expansion, as centralised control was established, often violently, over resources, recruitment and discipline. This thesis shows, how militias, formed in allegiance with the state evolved into organizations rivalling state sovereignty and exploiting the communities which they claimed to defend.
Die Inhalte der verlinkten Blogs und Blog Beiträge unterliegen in vielen Fällen keiner redaktionellen Kontrolle.
Warnung zur Verfügbarkeit
Eine dauerhafte Verfügbarkeit ist nicht garantiert und liegt vollumfänglich in den Händen der Blogbetreiber:innen. Bitte erstellen Sie sich selbständig eine Kopie falls Sie einen Blog Beitrag zitieren möchten.
A recent essay from Israeli writer Gadi Taub in Tablet makes clear that Israel's war in Gaza is not its last. Israel is going "to shed its defensive strategy and go on the offensive." That means taking out Hezbollah and then taking on "a multifaceted struggle against Iran over its drive for regional hegemony and its nuclear weapons program."Taub, whose hawkish views in many ways reflect the vital center of Israel opinion, sees the Biden administration as following a longstanding Democratic policy of appeasing Iran. In sharp contrast to Henry Kissinger, whose 1970s diplomacy he lauds, Taub finds Secretary of State Antony Blinken's policy to be a disaster. "By empowering the Iranians, Blinken's policy will inevitably also further the penetration of the region by Iran's patrons, the Russians and the Chinese, at America's expense. Kissinger's policy was focused on pushing America's great power rivals out. American policy today is inviting them in."The Dream Palace of the IsraelisThe most extraordinary feature of Taub's essay is its unreal portrait of the regional forces arrayed for and against Israel. Iran, Taub writes, "is at war with the old American regional alliance system — which includes Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states. But Secretary Blinken and President Biden are appeasing the new radicals, not containing them."In this imaginary tableau, shared by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel is in an unspoken but deep alliance with the Sunni Arab states, who want to see Hamas crushed and Iran and its proxies relentlessly attacked. What these rulers say in public, so the story goes, is miles apart from what they say in private. In public, of course, Arab leaders are breathing fire about Israel's mad amplification of the Dahiya Doctrine in Gaza. In private, these Arab leaders are reportedly telling U.S. and Israeli insiders (but seemingly no one else) that they heartily approve Israeli's operations. This Israeli view of Arab leaders is delusional. Yes, Arab leaders have big issues with Hamas. But they also think, as do their people, that Israel's extreme violence in Gaza may open the gates of hell, as the 2003 Iraq War once did. They don't think it's possible to pulverize Hamas into oblivion, because new defiant leaders will inevitably emerge. Israel, in their view, is not solving anything, but rather magnifying insecurity in the region. The (feeble) attempt by Blinken to put restraints on Israel's conduct of the war in Gaza is said by Taub to invite Russia and China into the region, but in fact it is Israel's policy that does so. That policy pushes Iran and America's traditional Arab coalition into one another's arms, making them realize that they have congruent interests in opposing Israeli plans. These interests, in turn, are likewise simpatico with those of Russia and China right now. Taub believes that Israel's coming offensives would break the new relations between the Saudis and the Sino-Russian bloc. No, these relations would be strengthened. This Islamic consensus — which joins Arabs, Iranians, and Turks and is supported by Russia and China — would be given further impetus if Israeli ambitions in the West Bank are fully realized. Another Nakba in Gaza and in the West Bank is anathema to America's Arab friends. Yet Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu speaks of the Palestinian Authority just as harshly as Hamas or Hezbollah. He has rejected U.S. proposals to bring the PA into Gaza after the war. Netanyahu maintains within his coalition powerful ministers (National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir, Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich) who have big plans for the West Bank and Temple Mount. In this regard there appears to be a fourth security front in the West Bank and Jerusalem, distinct from Gaza, Lebanon, and Iran. Washington as Enabler and RestrainerTaub hangs his essay on a comparison between Henry Kissinger's Middle East diplomacy in the 1970s and Antony Blinken's policy today. Kissinger, Taub relates, taught a masterclass in diplomacy. Arab leaders, Kissinger saw, "would understand that only the U.S. could deliver Israeli concessions, and that the price–peace with Israel and breaking with the Soviet orbit–would be worth it. It worked."Fast forward to today. If the United States cannot or will not deliver Israeli concessions, surely its leverage with the Arab states is sharply diminished. Israel is totally dependent on U.S. arms for the conduct of its current and projected operations. "The Israelis are playing with house money," as one U.S. official puts it. As of December 1, transfers loaded on to U.S. cargo planes included 15,000 bombs and 57,000 artillery shells. More is on the way. The Biden administration has lots of leverage over Israel. They are just unwilling to use it. The Biden administration has rightly warned Israel against a big offensive operation in Lebanon. Hezbollah is in a use-it-or-lose-it situation with respect to its offensive systems, with Hezbollah reportedly having 100,000 to 150,000 missiles and rockets, far superior to Hamas's force. The evacuation after October 7 of some 80,000 Israelis from communities bordering Lebanon is undoubtedly an unacceptable outcome for Israel, but Israel cannot seek to eliminate Hezbollah without incurring grave risks to its own population. It would be far better for Israelis to reoccupy the northern towns under the auspices of the mutual deterrence that prevailed before October 7, rather than to launch a big war against Hezbollah. However, the Israelis clearly think otherwise. Defense Minister Yoav Gallant has promised a military campaign to drive Hezbollah beyond the Litani River unless Hezbollah heeds Israel's ultimatum to evacuate the border region. The horrifying risk from such an escalation is that Israel would turn Beirut and southern Lebanon into Gaza. If Taub's views are a reliable guide, the Israelis have totally given up on Biden and the Democrats. The putative "appeasement" of Iran is not "an offhand mistake of the Democratic Party" but "a premeditated strategy designed to strengthen Iran at the expense of America's traditional allies." At a time when Arab Americans and their allies are livid with Biden and Blinken, it is curious to find Taub and the Israelis joining in the execration. The former group hates B&B for giving Israel the greenest of green lights, the other for the bright red lights (stop with the civilian killing, don't invade Lebanon) that Taub discerns. The administration's position is unenviable. On one side is the geopolitical disaster that follows from a blank check to Israel, on the other the domestic perils of having a gigantic fight with Netanyahu and the whole Israeli nation. In this acute battle between the national interest and personal political survival, will President Biden do a John Adams and choose country over party? I do not have an answer to this question. One thing is crystal clear. Supporting Israel means supporting a grand design that calls for a war on all fronts, financed and enabled by the United States. The Israelis seem to have no consciousness of the fact that previous uses of force in Lebanon and Palestine didn't solve their security problem. Instead, they believe that more destruction, on a Dresden-like scale, will do this time around what it has not done in the past. Given Israel's lonely existence in a sea of Muslims, this belief seems irrational to me. Israel cannot get rid of its security problem or its enemies by the massive use of force. Escalation imperils Israelis as much as it imperils their neighbors. But the Israelis hold to their belief in force with theological conviction, and the belief should be taken with the utmost seriousness. Thus far, this irresistible force has not encountered an immovable object.
Depuis la fin des années 1980, une image négative, implicite et explicite, est liée à la religion musulmane. Cette image dépeint les personnes de confession musulmane comme soumises et capables de rallier des groupes de lutte armée se réclamant de l'islam. La présente étude sur le vécu de femmes de confession musulmane par rapport au groupe de lutte armée Daesh tente de saisir les répercussions des idées et des actes de ce groupe sur leurs vies. La thèse se situe dans un courant de l'anthropologie du politique et du religieux en abordant une démarche expérientielle et une position réflexive. À partir de la mobilisation de concepts tels que la radicalisation, le jihadisme, la laïcité, le point Godwin islamique et le féminisme musulman et décolonial, l'objectif de la thèse est de comprendre les perceptions quant aux exactions de Daesh et au groupe Daesh, de femmes musulmanes de trois pays différents (Liban, Belgique, Canada), vivant dans des contextes sociopolitiques et économiques très divers. La méthodologie repose sur des récits de vie, un terrain multisitué, et des entretiens menés auprès de 92 femmes, soient 37 à Bruxelles, 36 à Beyrouth et 19 à Montréal. Les résultats de mes analyses montrent la présence de catalyseurs anthropiques, qui ont pour effet d'intensifier la réactivité (passive, active ou neutre) des femmes rencontrées . Ces réactions s'expriment par des actions ou sentiments concrets, conscients ou inconscients. Il peut y avoir plusieurs catalyseurs anthropiques selon les pays, les régions, et l'environnement des femmes rencontrées. ; Since the late 1980s, a negative image, both implicit and explicit, has been linked to Islam. This image portrays people of the Muslim faith as submissive and capable of joining armed groups claiming to be Islamic. This study of Muslim women's experiences with the armed group Daesh (the Islamic State) attempts to capture the impact of the group's ideas and actions on their lives. The thesis is situated in a current of anthropology of politics and religion by approaching an experiential approach and a reflexive position. From the mobilization of concepts such as radicalization, jihadism, secularism, Point Godwin islamique, and decolonial and Muslim feminism, the objective of the thesis is to understand the perceptions of Muslim women from three different countries (Lebanon, Belgium, Canada), living in very diverse socio-political and economic contexts. The methodology is based on life stories, a multi-site fieldwork, and interviews with 92 women: 37 in Brussels, 36 in Beirut, and 19 in Montreal. The results of my analyses show the presence of anthropogenic catalysts, which have the effect of intensifying reactivity (passive, active or neutral). These reactions are expressed through concrete, conscious or unconscious actions and feelings. There may be several anthropic catalysts depending on the country, region, and environment of the women we met.
AbstractEpisodes of urban violence, particularly those inflected by religious sectarianism, have a particular dynamic of ordering urban spaces and identity publics, not just during the episodes themselves but long after. Using sketches of urban violence in Lebanon (Beirut) and India (Delhi and Ahmedabad), this article focuses on an emerging phenomenon associated with such episodes — one that orders city spaces around rehabilitative activities in such a way that these spaces, in both material and experiential terms, bear an integral relationship with aspects of religious activity. Religiously motivated aid practices, channeled through faith‐based relief organizations, enumerate vulnerable populations and circumscribe their continued survival within bounded spatial entities, especially in those contexts where long‐term 'secular' or state‐sponsored rehabilitative effort is lacking. These processes of emplacing religiously marked populations in urban environments suggest the potential for a religiously coded bio‐politics, or a practice of governmentality that puts agents other than the state in a position of exerting power over continued social life. The three sketches variously illustrate how the intertwining of religion with survival within contemporary urban socio‐spatial formations suggest powerful intimacies between religion and individual or community life, which at the same time make place for alternative claims of governance, security and citizenship.RésuméLes épisodes de violence urbaine, notamment s'ils sont teintés de sectarisme religieux, présentent une dynamique particulière de classement des espaces urbains et des publics identitaires, à la fois pendant les événements et longtemps après. À partir de scènes de violence urbaine survenues au Liban (Beyrouth) et en Inde (Delhi et Ahmedabad), cet article s'intéresse à un phénomène qui se dessine conjointement et ordonne les espaces de la ville autour d'activités de réinsertion de sorte que ces espaces comportent, tant en termes matériels que d'expérience, une relation intrinsèque avec certains aspects d'une activité religieuse. Des aides motivées par la religion, dispensées par des organismes d'assistance aux fondements religieux, recensent les populations vulnérables et confinent leur survie future dans des entités spatiales circonscrites, notamment si les efforts de réinsertion à long terme "laïcs" ou financés par l'État sont insuffisants. Ces processus d'implantation de populations étiquetées sur le plan religieux laissent entrevoir la possibilité d'une biopolitique codifiée par la foi, ou d'une pratique de gouvernement qui permet à des agents autres que l'État d'exercer un pouvoir sur la pérennité de la vie sociale. Les trois événements illustrent diversement comment l'intrication entre religion et survie au sein de formations socio‐spatiales urbaines contemporaines sous‐entend de puissantes proximités entre religion et vie communautaire ou individuelle, lesquelles laissent simultanément le champ à des revendications alternatives en matière de gouvernance, de sécurité et de citoyenneté.
The Mashreq countries such as Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq are facing significant risk of losing their geographical locations as a main transit corridor in Middle East. This is because of the emerging new alternative transit corridors that were raised and developed in the neighboring areas because of the unsettled political situation in the Mashreq region. Nonetheless, although the weak infrastructure connections between Mashreq countries and the fragile legislation environment, it cannot be left unsaid that the major reason behind these lost opportunities on transport and trade is an inefficient operation of the transport corridors network in the Mashreq region due to the lack of logistical services and projects at seaports. Although all Mashreq governments revealed Dryports as inevitable solution to optimize the distribution of maritime containers and reduce congestion level at seaports, the coordination at the level of decision-makers to improve transport corridors and their operations was completely ignored. This research argues that Mashreq countries should act as one integrated body to save their role as the main transit corridor in the region. They should coordinate at their decision making level, in terms of establishing an integrated dry-ports network system. The limitations in previous network design models in addressing the communication between decisionKmakers in different countries had led to the introduction of a numbe of potential locations within one regional integrated network to bring in an opportunity to develop a new network design model. This can offer a flexible and standard platform that helps make a mutual decision that is not necessarily the optimum for each stakeholder, but it will be satisfied by every end-user. This Thesis is aimed at demonstrating the feasibility of applying an ontological approach to develop a new model to evaluate dry port location decision within a case study of Integrated Dry Ports Network (IDPN) in Mashreq countries. This proposed IDPN model helps to determine the best regional scenario of integrated dry ports network that adequately link the Mashreq countries transport corridors together, as well as the extensions of these corridors with its Mediterranean neighborhood transport corridors. An Integrated Dry Port Network (IDPN) model provides a sustainable allocation for the expected increase in container traffic at the region. (IDPN)is a comprehensive network design model based ontological approach to help evaluate dry port locations. It will adequately serve more than one seaport in two different countries. Furthermore, this research defined the role that Mashreq governments could play to facilitate the container allocation among their borders and beyond to enhance transportation corridors in the region. An ontological approach is proposed because ontologies improve communication and re-use of knowledge by providing a shared understanding that reduces ambiguities and misunderstanding in the terminology adopted in a certain domain. They also support the engineering process of transport solutions by providing a basis for automated specification, analysis, and consistency in checking for alternatives. First a source Ontology is designated in terms of container movement requirements within a regional hinterland, which depends on stakeholder objectives. Container Movement Route Ontology (CMRO) describes container movement routes for intermodal freight distribution within regional hinterland network. It is a semanticKbased representation of transport activities within regional network. It's based on the presence of dry ports in a transportation system to formally define all available scenarios of containers routes which the decision makers should be aware of. Qualitative and quantitative data were collected to essentially compare between two scenarios of container traffic distribution (a national (vs) regional), where operating strategies have been considered for both existing and planned dry ports interactions with two major containers seaports in the Mashreq region. These are the Latakia seaport in Syria and the Beirut seaport in Lebanon. Finally, Minimum Cost Flow Mathematical model, was used to validate the developed ontological scenarios. The computational results obtained satisfied the proposed ontological model aimed to reduce transport cost and maintain a maximum flow.
Conditions of rapid social disorganisation can overtax the intellectual capacity of the average citizen, resulting in communication disorganisation. During the 1975-76 civil war in Lebanon, the multiplicity of socio-political variables and the acceleration of the tempo of their interac tion overwhelmed the individual's capacity to arrive at a coherent and objective explanation of the war situation that could win the consensus of a small gathering of friends. The diversity of interpretations presented within the group tended to frustrate communication, and produced hostile polemics, with patterns resembling those found in compulsive-obsessional neuroses. The present paper analyses this cognitively induced state of psychopathology, as expressed in small groups observed by the author. Social psychologists have long observed that group solidarity and cohesiveness increase markedly whenever a collection of individuals face a common external threat or stress. Schachter (1959) theorised that the greater the anticipated threat, the stronger is the desire to await its pain in the company of others in the same predicament. Adopting Festinger's (1954) social comparison theory, Schachter postulated that the arousal of any strong emotion evokes a need for comparison. If emotions are assumed to be non-specific affective states, then per sons can only evaluate the quality, intensity and appropriateness of their emotions by compar ing their own reaction with those of others. Accordingly, novel and unpredictably threatening stimuli are expected to induce a greater tendency to affiliate, because an individual is more obliged to seek out other persons in order to define the emotional effect of unfamiliar stimuli. A large body of literature indicates that group cohesiveness tends to affect group interaction in the following three major ways: (a) it increases the group's capacity to retain members and enhances their participation in group activities; (b) it brings about conformity to group norms; (c) it reduces member's anxiety and heightens their self-esteem (Cartwright, 1968). The first phase (1975-76) of the Lebanese civil war was largely fought in urban centres and directly involved non-combatant civilian population who tended to suffer a great number of casualties. Such exposure to danger no doubt tended to enhance cohesiveness among in teracting individuals, as evidenced by accounts of increase in visiting and mutual assistance among neighbours and relatives. Under such conditions, one would expect to find evidence of the effects of cohesiveness within friendly group encounters. The author visited Lebanon during a pause following the above-mentioned period of in tense fighting, and was impressed by a certain pattern of group interaction that seemed to be contrary to that expected from cohesiveness theory. This group pattern was expressed within small gatherings of friends and relatives, and consisted of heated arguments, characterised by extreme diversity of political interpretations and by the use of generalised statements with affective overtones of anger and hostility. Every such gathering observed by the author ended in a quarrel, or with feelings of frustration and negativism; this and the intellectual processes expressed in the arguments were suggestive of collective psychopathology. The members were middle class, Christian Lebanese, living in the western, predominantly Moslem section of Beirut. They had remained in their homes during the fighting, did not formally belong to any political party, and were characterised by lack of homogeneity in their political leanings. The need to share news and experiences, and the need to map a threatening environment no doubt were responsible for the increase in the frequency of these get-together meetings. Their problematical aspect was that they not only failed to achieve any level of conformity or consensus on interpretation of events, but also accentuated differences in views and attitudes and promoted individual antagonisms. This paper will attempt to show that this disruptive counter-cohesive force was a product of intellectual disorganisation (cognitive anomie) pro duced in the process of communication. The intellectual disorganisation was engendered through attempts at comprehending a highly complex and threatening situation that over whelmed the intellectual capacity of members to explain and to communicate their explanations.
"Keith David Watenpaugh breaks new ground in analyzing the theory and practice of modern humanitarianism. Genocide and mass violence, human trafficking, and the forced displacement of millions in the early twentieth century Eastern Mediterranean form the background for this exploration of humanitarianism's role in the history of human rights. Watenpaugh's unique and provocative examination of humanitarian thought and action from a non-Western perspective goes beyond canonical descriptions of relief work and development projects. Employing a wide range of source materials--literary and artistic responses to violence, memoirs, and first-person accounts from victims, perpetrators, relief workers, and diplomats--Watenpaugh argues that the international answer to the inhumanity of World War I in the Middle East laid the foundation for modern humanitarianism and the specific ways humanitarian groups and international organizations help victims of war, care for trafficked children, and aid refugees."--Provided by publisher
Verfügbarkeit an Ihrem Standort wird überprüft
Dieses Buch ist auch in Ihrer Bibliothek verfügbar:
• The issue of cigarette smuggling is now high on the agenda of governments and international organizations. It has been estimated that a third of internationally exported cigarettes are lost to smuggling. Total revenue lost by governments due to cigarette smuggling is estimated at US$ 25–30 000 million annually. • Studies of the impact of smuggling show that when smuggled cigarettes account for a high percentage of the total sold, the average price for all cigarettes, taxed and untaxed, will fall, increasing sales of cigarettes overall. • The cigarette companies often blame organized crime for the massive amount of cigarette smuggling worldwide, but much of the organized criminal smuggling that accounts for the vast majority of cigarette smuggling worldwide has occurred with the knowledge of the major cigarette companies themselves, and would not occur without the cigarette companies' compliance. • In the Middle East, the two main target markets for international tobacco companies are the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq. Both the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq represent huge possibilities for international cigarette companies. Indeed, tobacco trade journals, internal tobacco industry documents and documents filed in legal actions make the importance placed on both countries by the entire tobacco industry very clear. • According to trade journals, Cyprus is an important distribution point for American cigarettes going to the Islamic Republic of Iran through traders in Oman. At the same time, some of these cigarettes are sold to traders in Turkey who take them into Iraq. Beirut's imported cigarettes are distributed to traders and merchants in various countries in the Middle East and North Africa. It appears that the major customers for cigarettes distributed from Lebanon are the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq. From Beirut to Dubai or Oman and then on to the Islamic Republic of Iran is the path of some of the American cigarettes destined for Lebanon. Trucks now carry cargo through the Syrian Arab Republic to reach the open-air markets in Iraq. • In their legal action against several international tobacco companies, the European Union (EU) filed in January 2002 documents on cigarette smuggling into Iraq showing that since the early 1990s, American tobacco companies have distributed their products from the United States into Iraq. For example, cigarettes produced in the United States have been shipped to and through ports in the EU to companies in Cyprus for years. Indeed, since 1996, approximately 50 billion cigarettes have been sent by RJ Reynolds Tobacco Company (RJR) (and its successor, Japan Tobacco) to Cyprus. Approximately half of these shipments were exported from Cyprus to Turkey in transit. Many of these shipments were destined for Iraq. • On 30 October 2002, the EU and ten Member States launched another lawsuit against RJR. The new EU lawsuit goes far beyond any previous allegations, accusing RJR of direct complicity in facilitating not only money laundering schemes but also other criminal enterprises. Allegations on cigarette smuggling into Iraq were even more detailed. • The EU allegations on smuggling in Iraq are in line with the well known methods of the cigarette smuggling scheme: – Exports of billion of cigarettes from major tobacco manufacturers. – Complex transport routes in order to complicate investigations. – Off-loading and re-loading of containers and removing marks and numbers from products to prevent their being traced. – Frequently switched bank accounts to cover up actions. – Operations led from Switzerland, a country protected by bank secrecy and business privacy laws. – Offshore companies located in Liechtenstein. – Use of tax-free harbours such as Mersin in Turkey. • Internal tobacco industry documents describe in great detail the monitoring of smuggling operations and the illegal character of the transit (smuggling) trade in Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic. Several documents stipulate that it is unwise for the tobacco companies to have direct links with the transit trade. • The objective of each company is to sell more products and make higher profits. Penetrating new markets and increasing the market share of its products is part of the strategy to achieve this objective. An obstacle for multinational tobacco companies are trade restrictions and/or embargoes. Some markets are closed to foreign companies or allow imported cigarettes only under certain strict conditions. Where there are high tariffs or a state monopoly, international cigarettes will be smuggled into the country, weakening the position of the state monopoly and delivering the market into the hands of the multinationals. • While illegal imports may be an option in order to penetrate a market, the ultimate goal in the long term is to obtain official imports or production. The strategy of the international tobacco companies in the Islamic Republic of Iran became a success story in 2002, when the state tobacco authority signed an import and production deal with four cigarette companies in a bid to cut down cigarette smuggling. It is a clear example of how successful this strategy of international tobacco companies can be. The stages of the strategy are: 1. Penetrate the market through illegal imports. 2. Weaken the state monopoly by reducing the market share of domestic brands and legal sales. 3. Convince the authorities to privatize or to open the market. 4. Authorize the legal import and/or production of foreign brands. 5. Stop fuelling the illegal market and take over the market in a legal way. • If tobacco smuggling is to be tackled successfully it will require international collaboration. The likeliest mechanism for achieving this is the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC). In the text of the FCTC, article 15 deals with illicit trade of tobacco products, including markings, monitoring, data collection, cooperation, penalties, confiscation and licensing. • Manufacturers should be required to have covert and overt markings on all packages of tobacco products that would identify manufacturer, date and location of manufacture, and another identifier that would show the chain of custody—wholesaler, exporter, distributor and end market. The onus should be placed on the manufacturer (through record keeping, and tracing and tracking systems) to prove that the cigarettes that leave the factory arrive in their intended end market. • The way to combat smuggling is not to reduce taxes, but rather to control the supply of illegal cigarettes.
Die Inhalte der verlinkten Blogs und Blog Beiträge unterliegen in vielen Fällen keiner redaktionellen Kontrolle.
Warnung zur Verfügbarkeit
Eine dauerhafte Verfügbarkeit ist nicht garantiert und liegt vollumfänglich in den Händen der Blogbetreiber:innen. Bitte erstellen Sie sich selbständig eine Kopie falls Sie einen Blog Beitrag zitieren möchten.
The death of three Americans in Jordan due to an attack by the "Islamic Resistance in Iraq" was an avoidable tragedy. It should prompt the United States to speed up its exit from Syria and Iraq, something policy makers have been contemplating for some time. Washington must minimize its risks. To dig in and escalate would be a mistake that is likely to lead to more Americans killed. The mission that brought U.S. troops to Iraq and Syria – to destroy ISIS – has been accomplished. Residual policing of ISIS remnants can be undertaken from bases in Qatar, Kuwait and Turkey.Hawks in Washington insist that by striking Iran directly and hard, the U.S. can bring security to its troops, the danger will subside because Iran understands force. But this analysis misunderstands the region and minimizes the dangers arrayed against U.S. troops. Iran has been committed to pushing U.S. troops out of Iraq and Syria, something its leaders articulated clearly following an earlier use of U.S. force, the assassination of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Gen. Suleimani in 2020. Iran will not back down if the U.S. assassinates more of its leaders or strikes infrastructure in Iran for the simple reason that it has the upper hand in the region.But Iran is far from being the only government that wants U.S. troops out. Turkey, Iraq and Syria are equally determined to drive the U.S. from its bases. Every single government in the region is demanding that U.S. troops leave. Turkey has escalated its war against America, not by sending missiles and drones against U.S. bases, but by sending them against America's allies in northeast Syria and the Kurdish region of Iraq. Turkey has assassinated dozens of YPG leaders and destroyed important infrastructure. It has mobilized Syrian opposition groups under its control to attack the Syrian Democratic Forces that Washington relies on. These attacks are designed to weaken the U.S. position in the region and eventually drive it from northeast Syria.The Syrian government is also determined to drive Americans from its soil. It accuses Washington of illegally occupying 30% of its territory and stealing its oil to subsidize the quasi-independent territory the U.S. has established in northeast Syria. As a consequence, the majority of Syrians languish in poverty and must survive with only a few hours of electricity per day, while the economy remains paralyzed by U.S. sanctions. They want the U.S. out.The Iraqi government is also demanding that U.S. troops leave. It was provoked into doing so by Washington's January 4 assassination of Mushtaq al-Jawari, a leader of Harakat al-Nujaba, one of the Shi'a militias that belongs to the popular mobilization forces. Washington targeted him in retribution for an earlier attack on a U.S. base. Did this show of force cow the Harakat al-Nujaba or the popular mobilization forces? No. On the contrary, it led to an escalating drumbeat of missile and drone attacks on American bases.But the militias were not the only forces to go on the offensive, the Iraqi government did as well. Because the popular mobilization forces are officially under Baghdad's control, the U.S. found itself effectively at war with the central government. Prime Minister Sudani cannot ignore them. To save his government, Sudani had to ask U.S. forces to leave. Both he and Iraq's president, as well as almost every Iraqi politician, insist that Iraq not be turned into a proxy battleground.Striking Iran will not solve America's problems in the region. Biden's support for Israel's war against the Palestinians has inflamed anti-American and anti-Western feelings across the entire Arab world. It has breathed new life into the resistance front. Only yesterday, most Arabs scoffed at it for being impotent and doing nothing to deter Israel's mistreatment of the Palestinians. Because of Gaza, Arabs are once again rooting for resistance.Lastly, the forces allied with Iran that stretch from Lebanon to Iraq are not foreign to the region. They cannot be rolled back by U.S. power and retaliatory strikes. There are more Shiite Arabs in Lebanon, Syria and Iraq combined than there are Sunni Arabs. The power of the Shiite militias today may seem like an aberration or some Iranian feat of levitation, but it is not. Centuries of discrimination against Shiites meant that they were the dispossessed and a political minority in a region where they were in fact the demographic majority. It is for good reason that the area stretching from Beirut to Busra is today called the Shiite Crescent.The notion that several thousand American soldiers can be kept safe while hunkered down in desert bases sprinkled across the great expanse of this region is a mirage. No one wants them there, not the governments and not the people. All are sharpening their knives and devising new ways to weaken them and force them to leave. It is pointless for Washington to keep them there for a mission that has long since passed its expiration date or to escalate a war it cannot win.
Die Inhalte der verlinkten Blogs und Blog Beiträge unterliegen in vielen Fällen keiner redaktionellen Kontrolle.
Warnung zur Verfügbarkeit
Eine dauerhafte Verfügbarkeit ist nicht garantiert und liegt vollumfänglich in den Händen der Blogbetreiber:innen. Bitte erstellen Sie sich selbständig eine Kopie falls Sie einen Blog Beitrag zitieren möchten.
After his first meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in 1996, Bill Clinton vented his fury before his staff about his visitor's apparent presumptions about the balance of power in the bilateral relationship. "Who the f**k does he think he is?," Clinton reportedly bellowed. "Who's the f**king superpower here?" Twenty-seven years later, another American president should be asking himself the same question about the very same Bibi Netanyahu and the country he leads. Forgive me for not taking seriously the repetitio ad nauseam statement that "the Biden administration has been working hard to change Israeli policy." Too many defenders of our policy towards the tragedy of Gaza usually add the comment that it is not "politically feasible" to issue a demand and then crack down on the Netanyahu government if it does not comply for fear of the backlash from the powerful so-called Israel lobby. Are Biden's apologists telling us that the United States, and by extension its president, is a powerless weakling reduced to begging the leader of a small country that owes the U.S. for its very existence to do far more to protect the lives and welfare of the inhabitants of Gaza, who have suffered three months of —in Biden's own words — 'indiscriminate bombing'? The situation in Gaza is now so bad that the UN's humanitarian chief declared the Gaza Strip "uninhabitable" as of last Saturday.Biden is president of the United States, still the most powerful country in the world by almost every measure and a country without whose support Israel has no future. A firm public demand to cease and desist immediately would have enormous domestic political repercussions in Israel — far less in the United States. Biden would not have to publicly threaten to cut off weapons deliveries; a few words delivered in private to Netanyahu and a few members of his war cabinet would probably suffice. Most of Netanyahu's government would desert him. Even the most hawkish of the Israel Defense Forces' leadership would not want to test an American president's resolve. Netanyahu's refusal would accelerate the departure of secular Israelis from the country — alongside many Haredim, especially those who hold U.S. passports. A decisive American president can do anything he wants, whether or not a powerful lobby opposes him. Eisenhower did it, forcing David Ben Gurion to withdraw from Sinai in 1956. Carter did it, in his "walk in the woods" at Camp David in 1978, forcing Menachem Begin to abandon Sinai settlements and agree to a peace treaty with Egypt. Reagan did it in June 1982, forcing Begin to order a ceasefire in Beirut. George H. W. Bush did it in 1991, withholding $10 billion in aid after Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir refused to stop settlement construction. Israel caved in each case. No one believes Netanyahu is made of the same stuff as Ben Gurion, Golda Meir, Menachem Begin nor Yitzhak Shamir.Biden seems not to understand that his stance supports Netanyahu's political survival, not the long-term interests of Israel. Bibi does not care how much damage he does to Israel as long as he stays out of jail. He has sacrificed the Jewish homeland to his personal interests. He and his government have presided over a slaughter of innocent civilians unprecedented in any of Israel's previous wars. Their rhetoric reinforces the view gaining currency across the globe that Israel has decided to ethnically cleanse the Palestinians from their homeland; South Africa has brought a case of genocide before the International Court of Justice which is scheduled to take it up later this week.Israel's war against the Palestinians has reignited the perception among the vast majority of countries in the so-called Global South that the Palestinians are the new manifestation of the conflict against colonialism and imperialism. UN votes demanding a cease-fire have grown increasingly one-sided against Israel, further isolating the U.S. in the process. If Israel's bloody campaign against Gaza does not end soon, the Abraham Accords between Israel and four Arab countries may survive in name only; popular revulsion against Israel in those countries will rob them of any value. Biden owes it to Israel, a country long dear to his heart, to stop Netanyahu's recklessness and that of his nationalist-religious extremist allies.Netanyahu has no plan for the post war. Instead, it appears that he has a plan to keep the war going as long as he can, possibly by attacking Lebanon (which Biden "firmly" opposes), not to mention depopulating Gaza by forcing its now-homeless inhabitants into Sinai or deporting them elsewhere (which Biden also "firmly" opposes). Left unchecked, Netanyahu's intransigence will drag the United States into military actions we do not need; American hawks are now demanding we bomb the Houthis. Tomorrow, it might well be hostilities with Iran.Biden's continued, full-throated support for Netanyahu mystifies. His initial embrace of Israel and unconditional material and moral support were to be expected. It was an emotional reaction to the horrors of October 7. While Biden has earned a great deal of praise for his handling of the Ukraine war, Israel's war in Gaza has shifted American attention from Ukraine. In effect, the American president has become bogged down dealing with a war marginal to American interests and diverting attention and resources from a conflict whose outcome is a vital interest to the United States. Biden's policies have caused others to see America as either weak or complicit. He has allowed Netanyahu to get away with "flipping the finger" to the United States, a serious blow to the prestige of the superpower.The Gaza war has also dealt a serious, if not mortal, blow to Biden's reelection. Given its large Arab-American population, Michigan is lost. Ohio, Minnesota, and Wisconsin also have significant Muslim and Arab populations. He is about to lose the Armenian vote unless someone cracks down on the hoodlums who have viciously attacked Armenian clergy in Jerusalem. As a politician rooted firmly in the 1990s — especially the 1992 Clinton-Bush face-off — Biden may fear the loss of Jewish support in the coming election. That fear looks misplaced. A recent survey indicates that nearly half of young Jewish-Americans do not support his current policies towards Israel, while Christian Zionists, who form a significant part of the Republican base, are unlikely to vote for Biden in any event. One also wonders why Biden, if politics are indeed the driver of a misguided policy, would support a foreign politician who has demonstrated his hostility towards every Democratic president since 1993.Biden has a very short window within which he can cut off Netanyahu before he can carry out his apparent war aim to depopulate Gaza and carry the conflict to Lebanon and possibly beyond — a conflict, in other words that could very well drag American forces into another endless Middle Eastern war. A quick and decisive decision, combined with real diplomacy to exploit the crisis and craft a workable solution to 75 years of Israeli-Palestinian conflict, would recover America's reputation.Now is the time, in other words, for the superpower in this relationship to assert its own interests.
Acknowledgement -- Introduction -- Maps -- Chapter 1 Travel Literature and Geographical Guides - 1. Al-Harawi on Antioch, Tiberias and its surroundings, Acre, Jerusalem, Bethlehem, Hebron, and Ascalon -2. Ibn Jubayr on the Christians of Mount Lebanon and trade between Muslims and Franks - 3. Ibn Jubayr on the cities of Banzas, Acre, Tyre, and the Muslims under Frankish rule - 4. Yaqut al-Hamawi on Ascalon, Jaffa, Caesarea, Atlit, Acre, Tyre, Margat, Saone, and Kerak -- Chapter 2 Jihad Books an Juridical Directives - 1. Ibn 'Asakir on Jihad - Al-'Izz son of 'Abd al-Salam's juridical directive banning the sale of arms to the Franks - 4. Ibn Taymuyya's juridical directive against the Shi'is -- Chapter 3 Chronicles, Memoirs, and Poetry - 1. Ibn al-Athir on the emerence of the Franks - 2. Ibn al-Qalanisi on the capture of Antioch, Ma'arrat al-Nu'man, and Jerusalem, and the attack against Ascalon in 1098-1099 - 3. Ibn Al-Athir on the capture or Jerusalem and the attack against Ascalon - 4. Al-'Azimi on the Battle of the Field of Blood (1119) and several events between 1108 and 1141 - 5. Hamdan al-Atharibi on receiving a land tenure from the Frankish lord of al-Atharib - 6. Al-Qaysarani's poems about the Frankish and Greek women in Antioch - 7. Ibn al-Qalanisi on the siege of Damascus in 1148 - 8. Ibn al-Athir on the siege of Damascus - 9. Ibn'asakir's poem about Nur al-Din in honor of his forces taking Egypt in 1169 - 10. Ibn al-Athir on the defeat of the Franks at Hattin in 1187 - 11. 'Imad al-Dinal-Ifsahani on the seizure of the Relic of the True Cross, the capture of Tiberias, and the execution of the Frankish prisoners - 12. Rashid al-Din al-Nabulusi's poem on Saladin's liberation of Jerusalem in 1187 - 13. Ibn Shaddad on the expedition of the German emperor and the letter of the Armenian catholicos to Saladin in 1190 - 14. Ibn Al-Athir on the Frank's capture of Damietta in 1219 and their defeat in 1221 - 15. Sibt Ibn al-Jawzi on al-Mu'azzam's destruction of the wall of Jerusalem in 1219 - 16. Sibt Ibn al-Jawzi on the Frank's capture of Damietta in 1219 and their defeat in 1221 - 17. Sibt Ibn al-Jawzi on the envoys of Frederick to al-Mu'azzam in 1226 - 18. Ibn Wasil on Frederick arriving in Acre in September 1228 - 19. Sibt Ibn al-Jawzi on Frederick's visit to the Noble Sanctuary of Jerusalem in March 1229 - 20. Ibn Wasil on the negotiations between al-Kamil and Frederick, and the emperor's visit to the Haram of Jerusalem - 21. Ibn Wasil on the handing over of Jerusalem to the Franks in 1243 - 22. Al-Yumini on a local Christian ransoming a Muslim captive from a Frank - 23. Jamal al-Din Ibn Matruh's poem on the defeat of King Louis IX near Damietta in 1250 - 24. Abu Shama on the Mongol's capture of Damascus in 1260 - 25. Ibn Wasil on the battle o 'Ayn Jalut in 1260 and related events - 26. Ibn Wasil on a Muslim embassy to Emperor Manfred in 1262 - 27. Baybars al-Mansuri on the capture of Crac des Chevaliers (1271) the death of the Sultan Baybars (1278) and teh capture of Tyre, Sidon, Atlit, Beirut, and Haifa (1291) - 28. Al-Nuwayri al-Iskandarani on Peter of Cyprus's sack of Alexandria in 1365 -- Chapter 4 Biographies - 1. Ibn 'Asakir on Jesus - 2. Ibn 'Asakir on al-Findalawii - 3. Ibn 'Asakir on Nur al-Din - 4. Sibt Ibn al-jawzi on al-Mu'azzam - 5. Al-Dhahabi on al-Mu'azzam - 6. Ibn Abu Usaybi'a on the Christian physician Ya'qub son of Siqlab - 7. Al-Dhahabi on the Christian physicianya'qub son of Siqlab -- Chapter 5 Correspondences, Treaties, and Truces - 1. Al-Qalqashandi's account of Saladin's letter of condolence to King Baldwin IV in 1174 - 2. Ibn Shadda on Saladin's negotiations with Richard the Lionheart in 1191 and the latter's proposal that al-'Adil marry Richard's sister Joan - 3. Ibn Nazif al-Hamawi's account of Frederick's letter to commander Fakhr al-Din son of Shaykh al-Shuyukh - 4. Al-Qalqashandi's account of the oaths of the truce between Sultan Qalawun and the Franks of Acre, Sidon, and Atlit -- Chapter 6 Inscriptions - 1. Fatimid inscription on a tower fortification in Ascalon (1150) - 2. Inscription on the pulpit that Nur al-Din commissioned for the Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem (1168-1169) - 3. Inscription panel marking the foundation of a trench around the fortification wall of the old city of Jerusalem during the reign of Saladin (1191) - 4. Inscription above the entrance to St.Anne's Church in Jerusalem, transformed into a college of Shafi'i law and named after Saladin al-Madrasa al-Salihiyya (1192) - 5. Inscription above the main entrance gate to the shrine in Hebron housing the cenotaphs of Isaac and Rebecca (1215) - 6. Foundation inscription on the wall of the Fortress os Subayba (Nimrod's Fortress) on the hllls overlooking Bayas (1228) - 7. Inscription above the arch of the gate to the northwest tower of the Fortress of Subaya - 8. Inscription on a mosque in the village of Bayt Hanun (1239) - 9. Inscription on the mausoleum of Khalid son of al-Walid in Hims (1266) - 10. Inscription on the shrine of Salman al-Farisi in Ashood (1269) - 11. Inscription commemorating Baybars's renovations of Crac des Chevaliers (1271) - 12. Inscription commemorating Baybars's renovations of the Fortress of Subaya (1275) - 13. Inscription on a hospice for pilgrims in Jerusalem (1282) - 15. Inscription on the top and the bottom of the two doors of the gate that leads to the shrine housing the cenotaphs of Abraham and Sarah (1286) -- Apprendix A Islamic calendar -- Apprendix B Quranic Verses on war and peace -- Appendix C Bibliographic Overview of the Major Muslim sources of the Crusader Period -- Apprendix D Glossary of Dynasties, Persons, Sects, Terms, etc. -- Bibliography --index A Honorific titles -- Index B names -- Index C Place Names -- Index D Terms and Events -- Index E Quranic and Biblical References.