Suchergebnisse

Der Beitrag widmet sich dem personenbezogenen Ansatz von Carl Deichmann und dessen Anwendung im Bereich der internationalen Politik; im Zentrum steht dabei die Person des UNO-Generalsekretärs. Konkret wird an der Person des siebten Generalsekretärs Kofi Annan das Potenzial eines personenbezogenen Ansatzes näher betrachtet. Zunächst werden die Handlungsbedingungen und Grundlagen des Amtes des UNO-Generalsekretärs skizziert. Daran schließt sich ein Blick auf die Biografie Kofi Annans an, d. h. hier im Besonderen auf seine Prägungen, Erfahrungshorizonte und Wertvorstellungen. Anhand einiger Ereignisse aus der Amtszeit Annans wird gezeigt, wie sich individuelles Handeln und politische Prozesse so verdichten, dass über die beschriebene gegenseitige Konstituierung, Analyse und Verständnis der politischen Realität erleichtert werden. Ein Fazit bietet einen Ausblick auf Anwendungsoptionen des hier erläuterten Beispiels in der politischen Bildung. (ICB2).

One of the concerns of international political economy in the past several years has been to theorize about the conditions conducive to the development of international cooperation and institutionalization. This article explores the usefulness of economic theories of dynamic contracting, which are essentially functionalist in nature, to understand international financial innovation in the 1920s. It interprets the founding of the Bank for International Settlements as an important effort to overcome the problems of contract enforcement and information asymmetries in international lending that had contributed to capital market inefficiencies as the 1920s drew to a close. Dynamic contracting theories suggest reasons why borrowers and lenders have a strong interest in developing cooperative international institutions that help establish a borrower's credibility. This approach is supplemented with a multilateral bargaining model between debtor, private lenders, and creditor governments to explain international financial innovation during the interwar years. The evidence suggests that the BIS was created primarily to enhance Germany's incentives to repay its debts and that it was part of a deal between private creditors and creditor governments to reduce and commercialize German reparations. By looking not only at interstate bargaining but also at public'private bargaining, it is possible to understand the paradox of cooperative international institutional development in a period otherwise marked by conflict.

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Die Auseinandersetzung mit vergangener massiver Gewalt führt nicht unbedingt zu mehr Gerechtigkeit und Versöhnung. Warum dies so ist, zeigt Eva Ottendörfer anhand einer Fallstudie zu Timor-Leste. Sie hinterfragt die Prämissen internationalen Engagements in diesem Bereich und formuliert zentrale Annahmen der Sozialisationsforschung neu: Lokale und internationale Akteure bilden ihre Haltung bezüglich bestimmter Normen in Interaktion miteinander. Eine inkonsistente Haltung internationaler Akteure kann daher zu lokalem Widerstand und zur Formulierung alternativer Konzepte führen. Basierend auf diskurstheoretischen Ansätzen präsentiert die Autorin ein neues Modell für die Analyse von Prozessen der Vergangenheitsaufarbeitung, das nicht nur die entsprechenden Instrumente, sondern auch deren Übertragung ins politische System mit einbezieht. Zudem wirbt sie für ein neues Verständnis für das Verhalten internationaler und lokaler Akteure in internationaler Sozialisationspolitik im Allgemeinen

Despite growing international environmental interdependence, the international system lacks a central authority to foster environmental protection. As a consequence, countries have adopted different policies to reduce international environmental problems. More specifically, costly regulations are not universally supported. In order to explain the success and failure of international environmental regulation, it is necessary to systematically focus on the factors that shape the environmental foreign policy of sovereign states. Since such an approach is missing from the literature, we develop an interest-based explanation of support for international environmental regulation and postulate what impact it should have on state preferences for international environmental regulation. Specifically we apply our framework to two prominent cases of negotiations on atmospheric pollution control, namely, efforts to protect the stratospheric ozone layer and the regulation of transboundary acidification ("acid rain") in Europe.

Two consequences of the internationalization of economic activities that has taken place since the early 1960s have been that, within the international trading system, participant states have become more vulnerable and sensitized to the economic conditions obtaining in other countries; and economic actors have, in general, become more transnational and universal in their orientation and more aware of worldwide business possibilities. Consequently, visible trade flows have been progressively transformed through global raw material sourcing, production location and marketing; and invisible trade has been restructured by global deposit sourcing and lender servicing. Both types of international exchange required extensive external production networks which had to be newly created by international capital transfers and institutional migration. Despite the outward manifestation of these infrastructures, international exchange tensions nevertheless remained because of 'the continued existence of still mainly nationally based political systems' and the conflicts of interest and uncertainties created by the asserted extra-territorial orientation of national tax and legal system's, These problems were largely untouched by the harmonization and liberalization processes attempted by industrial nations under the aegis of GATT and other international institutions. As a result, the transnational operations of multinational companies have often had to be channelled to parts of the world where their activities are least frustrated by obstructive interventionist policy in order to secure particular objectives.

This article relates the effectiveness of the European Union's (EU) effectiveness to its international actorness in negotiations on international food standards taking place in the Codex Alimentarius Commission (CAC). Actorness is taken to result from EU competence, preference homogeneity and processes of socialisation among EU Member State representatives. In the 2009 negotiations on growth promoters for livestock, whose use the EU opposes, the Commission took the lead. It was trusted and supported by the EU Member States, but its dominant role resulted in them being rather passive. As a result, the EU's potential to negotiate effectively in the CAC was not used in its full potential.

Der vorliegende Beitrag arbeitet hinsichtlich der zukünftigen Resultate des Reformprozesses in den mittel- und osteuropäischen Länder für die internationale Arbeitsteilung folgende Befunde heraus: (1) In den Transformationsprozessen Mittel- und Osteuropas werden marktförmige, autonome Wirtschaftsregulative in ein komplexes gesellschaftliches Umfeld eingeführt, das sowohl historisch überkommene Elemente als auch zukünftig noch auszuprägende, über die gegenwärtig bekannten Strukturen der Industrieländer hinausgehende Merkmale aufweisen wird; (2) Kern dieses Prozesses ist im wirtschaftlichen Bereich die Ausbildung komplexer Rentabilitätsbedingungen in allen ökonomisch-reproduktiven Sphären. Dies ist nur bei Integration in eine entfaltete Arbeitsteilung auf der Ebene des Weltmarkts möglich, wobei äußere und innere Wirkungszusammenhänge in enger Wechselwirkung stehen. (ICE)

AbstractThe duty of states to settle their disputes peacefully and in accordance with international law is emphasized in a number of important provisions enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations (UN) and state practices. Adjudication is one among a range of existing means of pacific settlement of disputes. This article analyzes the role of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in pacific settlement of international disputes. It critically examines judicial settlement of armed conflicts, taking the ICJ decision in the Case Concerning Armed Activities in the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of Congo v. Uganda) as a focal point. The main argument of the author is that while the adjudicatory role of the ICJ as the principal judicial organ of the UN is a crucial method in the pacific settlement of international disputes, it is unlikely to suit armed conflicts situations. Jurisdictional limitations of the ICJ in adjudication of armed conflicts situations is pointed out. The article points to the preclusion of the Court from adjudicating the other cases brought by the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) against Rwanda and Burundi as an illustration of such limitations. It, however, stresses that the very outcome of the 2005 ICJ decision in the Democratic Republic of Congo v. Uganda case is another clear example of such shortcomings. Without getting into detailed discussions of theories of compliance with international law, the article further discusses the question of compliance with the current ICJ decision in the light of previous state practices. Since there are no established enforcement mechanisms in the international system akin to those in national legal systems, the question whether decisions of international judicial bodies (the ICJ in this case) are complied with remains at the mercy of condemned states. In the final analyses, the author points to the current weaknesses and limitations of the international legal system as a whole in the administration of justice.

Cooperation in international environmental agreements appears difficult to attain because of strong free-riding incentives. This paper explores how different technology spillover mechanisms among regions can influence the incentive structures to join and stabilise an international agreement. We use an applied modelling framework (STACO) that enables us to investigate stability of partial climate coalitions. Technology spillovers to coalition members increase their incentives to stay in the coalition and reduce abatement costs, which leads to larger global payoffs and a lower global CO2 stock. Several theories on the impact of technology spillovers are evaluated by simulating a range of alternative specifications. We find that while spillovers are a good instrument to improve stability of bilateral agreements, they cannot overcome the strong free rider incentives that are present in larger coalitions. This conclusion is robust against the specification of technology spillovers.