Suchergebnisse

Chapter 1: Joost Augusteijn, Constant Hijzen, and Mark Leon de Vries - Introduction: Democracy, the Nation State, and their adversaries -- Section 1: learning to deal with anti-democratic groupings, 1870-1933 -- Section 1 Introduction -- Chapter 2: Mark Leon de Vries - "… a Wretched, Down Trodden and Impoverished People." The Louisiana White League and the Propaganda of Democratic Legitimacy -- Chapter 3: Kristian M. Mennen - Nazis, Violence and the State: Social Democratic Repertoire Discussions in Germany and the Netherlands around 1930 -- Chapter 4: Joris Gijsenbergh - Democracy's Various Defenders: The Struggle Against Political Extremism in the Netherlands, 1917-1940 -- Section 2: New Forms of Mobilisation in the age of civil resistance, 1960-1997 -- Section 2 Introduction -- Chapter 5: Joost Augusteijn and Jacco Pekelder - Terrorist Constituencies in Terrorist-State Conflicts. The debate on the use of violence among Irish nationalists and West Germany's Radical Left in the Mid 1970s -- Chapter 6: Constant Hijzen - The seeds of danger. The security service and its 'enemy image' of 'the movement' in the 1980s -- Chapter 7: Yavuz Yildirim - (In)effectiveness of Social Movements in Turkish Democracy: institutional and non-constitutional cases -- Chapter 8: Miina Kaarkoski - Parliamentary democracy versus direct democracy? Challenging liberal, representative democracy in the German Bundestag during the antinuclear demonstrations of 1995-1997 -- Section 3: Dealing with opposition in the post-Cold War period, 1998-2018 -- Section 3 Introduction -- Chapter 9: Henrik Vigh - Displaced without Moving. Loyalism and democratic haunting in Northern Ireland -- Chapter 10: Ana Maria Albulescu - Towards an understanding of incomplete secession in the Moldovan-Transnistrian case; between democracy and autocracy -- Chapter 11: Arianna Piacentini - Fragmented Democracy in Dayton's Bosnia Herzegovina. Institutions, Political Elite and Youth -- Conclusions -- Chapter 12: Joost Augusteijn, Constant Hijzen, and Mark Leon de Vries - Concluding Remarks --

Introduction : politology : the science of politics -- An analytical beginning : from anarchy to state formation -- Elements of politics : the building blocks of regimes -- The compounds : democracies and dictatorships -- A political world : regimes, countries, regions -- An electoral system : variables and parameters -- Laws of politics : primary and secondary -- The first law of politics : the law of shrinking support -- The second law of politics : the law of alternation in office -- Other constants of incumbent vote -- The operation of primary laws in dictatorships -- The laws of state expansion -- State spending in democracies and dictatorships -- Cuba : a historical outline -- Democracy in Cuba : a comparative analysis -- Dictatorship in Cuba : a comparative analysis -- A constitutional framework for a free Cuba -- Laws of politics : summary and Extension.

Der Beitrag versucht die fiskalische Nachhaltigkeitsbilanz demokratisch sowie autokratisch verfasster Staaten anhand unterschiedlicher Performanzindikatoren (Kreditwürdigkeit, Zahlungsausfälle, Staatsverschuldung, Auslandsvermögen) zu erfassen und darüber hinaus zu klären, inwieweit die Regimetypausprägung einen Einfluss auf die Konsolidierungsanstrengungen in einem Land hat. Die Untersuchung fördert dabei zwei Kernerkenntnisse zu Tage. Während es den Demokratien in der Vergangenheit deutlich besser als ihren autokratischen Pendants gelungen ist, ihre Kredit- und Zahlungsfähigkeit aufrecht zu erhalten und Staatsinsolvenzen zu vermeiden, lässt sich ein ähnlicher Demokratievorteil im Hinblick auf die Verringerung der Staats- und Auslandsverschuldung nicht feststellen. Warum sich Demokratien, trotz vorhandener gemeinwohlsensitiver institutioneller und prozessualer Arrangements, schwer damit tun, eine Lastenverschiebung auf zukünftige Generationen zu vermeiden, Sparanstrengungen zu unternehmen und in ausreichendem Maße finanziell vorzusorgen, kann dabei im Kern als Kehrseite einer stark gegenwartslastigen Interessenorientierung interpretiert werden, welche durch einen kurzen "demokratiespezifischen Zeittakt" noch zusätzlich befördert wird.

Abstract
One of the most influential arguments suggests that new democracies are more inclined than others to commit to international human rights treaties. This paper examines whether new democracies are more likely to commit not only to the basic, but also to the more demanding and constraining treaties. We argue that despite the strategic utility of costly commitments, new democracies are often unwilling to pay for the increased costs of more demanding and constraining treaties. We test our argument by tackling some of the trickiest inferential challenges. We employ propensity score weighting to address the nonrandom assignment of new democracies and further specify marginal structural models to account for dynamic confounding. Our analyses reveal intriguing findings. While new democracies commit to the broad human rights conventions more quickly, they are more reluctant than established democracies to commit to the more demanding and constraining protocols.

One of the most influential arguments suggests that new democracies are more inclined than others to commit to international human rights treaties. This paper examines whether new democracies are more likely to commit not only to the basic, but also to the more demanding and constraining treaties. We argue that despite the strategic utility of costly commitments, new democracies are often unwilling to pay for the increased costs of more demanding and constraining treaties. We test our argument by tackling some of the trickiest inferential challenges. We employ propensity score weighting to address the nonrandom assignment of new democracies and further specify marginal structural models to account for dynamic confounding. Our analyses reveal intriguing findings. While new democracies commit to the broad human rights conventions more quickly, they are more reluctant than established democracies to commit to the more demanding and constraining protocols.

Research on autocracies and their consequences has been a growth industry in the latest decade. Nonetheless, the relationship between the type of autocracy and the violation of civil liberties has largely been ignored. In this article, we employ a new dataset, which includes cross-temporal data on freedom of speech, freedom of assembly/association, freedom of religion, and freedom of movement, to shed light on this issue. Analysing 182 countries in the period 1979-2008, we show that democracies repress civil liberties less than autocracies do, whereas we find little evidence to the effect that different kinds of autocracies violate civil liberties to different degrees. However, we also show that the differences between democracies and autocracies have declined starkly since the Cold War. Finally, our results demonstrate that the difference in the extent to which democracies and autocracies repress civil liberties is larger for the freedom of speech and freedom of assembly/association than for the freedom of religion and freedom of movement. We take the general difference between the two categories of liberties as evidence that autocracies repress political liberties more than private liberties because the former presents levers for oppositional activity. We argue that the cross-temporal differences are a consequence of the spread of more minimalist democracies since the end of the Cold War. Adapted from the source document.

Recent research concludes fighting or losing an interstate war is not costlier for democratic leaders than dictators, which implies most of our institutional explanations for differences in conflict behavior across regime type rest on empirically tenuous assumptions. I argue military mobilization, a fundamental but often overlooked aspect of war, should be costlier for democrats than dictators. Waging interstate war is associated with higher military spending and, often, lower social spending. Variation across regime type in the representation of the general public, civilian elite, and military in leaders' winning coalitions should make democrats more likely than dictators to lose power given wartime patterns of government spending. This argument finds support during the period from 1950 to 2001. My findings provide microfoundations for a number of existing empirical results and suggest that differences in the conflict behavior of democracies and dictatorships should be largest when waging war requires a significant mobilization effort.