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Liberalism has been the most successful political ideology during the past two centuries in withstanding challenges and adapting to new environments. The liberal international order, set up after the Second World War and strengthened at the end of the Cold War, is going through a series of crises, propelled by deglobalization pressures, and the rise of illiberal and populist leaders, all challenging the three pillars of the liberal order: democracy, economic interdependence and international institutions. Two critical reasons for the decline of the liberal order are internal in terms of income distribution and institutional malaise. The article argues that the demise of the liberal order is not inevitable provided liberal states take remedial measures and adapt to the new environment as they did in 1919, 1930s, the second half of the 1940s, 1960s and 1991. Reformed globalization, or re-globalization is essential for facing the geopolitical challenges emanating from China and other illiberal states. The inability of other systems to offer both prosperity and freedom that the liberal order can provide is its main attractiveness. The connection between internal reforms in liberal states to address deepening inequalities and wealth distribution, a by-product of intensified globalization, and the prospects of liberal order's success is highlighted. The need for a refined welfare state taking into account the new realities to tackle the internal challenges is proposed.

The liberal world order that the United States has led since the end of the Cold War is based on a standard of civilization that includes within its requirements the protection, promotion and dissemination of the modern state model: sovereign, independent, democratic, respectful of freedoms and fundamental, capitalist and globalized rights. In order to guarantee the preservation of the liberal order, the United States and its allies have been carrying out diplomatic, political, social, economic and cultural actions for more than three decades in defense of compliance with this model of statehood. However, these efforts, paradoxically far from contributing to the consolidation of the modern state, have indirectly ended up undermining its fundamental principles, compromising the standard of civilization, and consequently the stability and durability of the liberal order itself that they seek to safeguard. ; El orden mundial liberal que lidera Estados Unidos desde el fin de la guerra fría está basado en un estándar de civilización que contempla dentro de sus requisitos la protección, promoción y difusión del modelo del Estado moderno: soberano, independiente, democrático, respetuoso de las libertades y derechos fundamentales, capitalista y globalizado. Con el fin de garantizar la preservación del orden liberal, Estados Unidos y sus aliados adelantan desde hace más de tres décadas acciones diplomáticas, políticas, sociales, económicas y culturales en defensa del cumplimiento de dicho modelo de estatalidad. Sin embargo, estos esfuerzos paradójicamente lejos de contribuir a la consolidación del Estado moderno, indirectamente han terminado socavando sus principios fundamentales, comprometiendo el estándar de civilización y, en consecuencia, la estabilidad y perdurabilidad del propio orden liberal que pretenden salvaguardar.

After the fall of the Cold War, many theories tried to explain the changes that the world was experiencing. One of the most fruitful was the one posed by G. John Ikenberry, stipulating the victory of an international liberal order. The author deemed back then, that the order was greatly expanding and would have a promissory future. However, different perspectives and facts have emerged over time, justifying a revision of the main tenets of the order as well as the way it could evolve in light of current experiences and visions. ; Luego del fin de la Guerra Fría numerosas teorías trataron de explicar los cambios que el mundo estaba experimentando. Una de las más fructíferas fue la presentada por G. John Ikenberry, la cual estipulaba la victoria de un orden liberal internacional. El autor estimaba en ese entonces que el orden estaba en expansión y que tendría un futuro promisorio. Sin embargo, diferentes perspectivas y hechos emergieron con el paso del tiempo, justificando una revisión de los postulados principales de este orden, así como de la manera en la que puede evolucionar a la luz de las experiencias y visiones del presente.

AbstractThis article contributes a step towards the consolidation of the wide-ranging intellectual history and rapidly growing literature of international order theory. It traces the development of international order theory across three eras: 1919 and the interwar era; 1945 and the Cold War era; and 1989–1991, the post-Cold War era and rise of the "liberal" order debate. Gathering this history finds that critics in contemporary debates are deploying arguments with a quasi-polemical style similar to those used by E.H. Carr and others in past international order debates. These polemical qualities, it is suggested, may likely make contemporary debates difficult to assess and persistently controversial, even after the contemporary crisis of international order has run its course in practice.

This article contributes a step towards the consolidation of the wide-ranging intellectual history and rapidly growing literature of international order theory. It traces the development of international order theory across three eras: 1919 and the interwar era; 1945 and the Cold War era; and 1989–1991, the post-Cold War era and rise of the "liberal" order debate. Gathering this history finds that critics in contemporary debates are deploying arguments with a quasi-polemical style similar to those used by E.H. Carr and others in past international order debates. These polemical qualities, it is suggested, may likely make contemporary debates difficult to assess and persistently controversial, even after the contemporary crisis of international order has run its course in practice.

India's limited partnership with the liberal international order (LIO) of the post-Second World War period had seen a substantial transformation after the end of the Cold War through its economic integration with the world economy. At this critical time of liberal internationalism triggered by the relative decline of American hegemony, rise of the non-Western powers and the tendency of populism in the West, India's role in the emerging order has been a fundamental imperative. The rationale for its comprehensive partnership with the liberal order rests on four main considerations: the looming threat to the liberal order and India's role; consistency of India's political principles with that of the liberal order; the concern for national interest, identity and global role; and finally, the absence of any viable alternative order. In spite of these promising values and necessities, India's deeper integration has been constrained by three major factors. The first reason relates to the very concept of the LIO, which is slightly Western-oriented. The second reason corresponds to India's core identity and its governing view with regards to the world—of non-alignment, sovereign autonomy, non-interference and civilisational identity. Finally, its maximum assimilation within the liberal order continues to be hindered by 'domestic setbacks'.

TEZ12617 ; Tez (Yüksek Lisans) -- Çukurova Üniversitesi, Adana, 2019. ; Kaynakça (s. 88-111) var. ; XIV, 112 s. ;_29 cm. ; Bu çalışmada etkileşim halinde olduğu ideolojilere eklemlenebilen bir söylem ve eylem bütünü olan popülizm incelenmiştir. Farklı ideoloji ve hareketlerle bütünleşebilen popülizm için ortak bir tanım oluşturmak oldukça zordur. Popülizm her aktör ve harekete uygun özellikler barındırabilmektedir. Popülizm biz ve onlar, gerçek ve halk, yozlaşmış ve seçkinler gibi ayrımlar yaparak liderlere kitleleri kendi yanına çekebilme gücü vermektedir. 1990 sonrası aşırı sağ popülizmin yükselişinin temelinde, 1980'den itibaren kapitalist ekonominin üretim tarzının devamlılığını sağlamak için neoliberal ekonomi politikalarının sebebiyet verdiği yoksullaşma, işsizlik gibi olumsuz ve toplumu ayrıştırmaya doğru giden eğilimlerin olduğu görülmektedir. Bu çalışma Avrupa'da ve Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nde (ABD)'de yükselen sağ popülizmin neoliberal politikalar ile olan ilişkilerini ele alacaktır. Son zamanlarda Avrupa siyaseti, hızla artan ırkçılık ve göçmen karşıtı popülist söylemlere sahne olmaktadır. Bu popülizmin tipik birer örneğini Polonya'da iktidarda bulunan Hukuk ve Adalet Partisi'nin (PiS) ve Macaristan'da FIDESZ'in eylemlerinde görmek mümkündür. Amerika Birleşik Devletleri Başkanı Donald Trump'ın popülist söylemleri bu partilerin motivasyonunu daha da arttırmıştır. Bu partiler, kamuoyu nezdinde "halkı temsil" iddiası ile ortaya çıkarak halkı mobilize etmekte ve başarılı da olmaktadırlar. Burada en önemli ve tehlike içeren kısım ise 20. yüzyıl içerisinde artan küreselleşme ile giderek daha da yayılan aşırı sağ popülizminin liberal dünya düzenine ve evrensel değerlere zarar vereceğinin düşünülmesidir. Bu bağlamda, bu tez çalışmasında.Avrupa'da ve ABD'de yükselen popülist söylem ve pratikleri incelenerek bunların var olan liberal değerleri aşındırdığı ve 1950'lerde oluşan liberal dünya düzenini tehdit ettiği savunulmaktadır. ; This thesis focuses on populism, a set of discourses and practices, which is articulated with different ideologies and movements it interacts with. As populism can be accommodated and employed by different ideologies, movements and actors, it is very difficult to establish a common definition. Populism gives leaders the power to attract the masses by employing distinctions like us and them, corrupt elites and pure people. The roots of political, social and economic reasons behind the rise of extreme right wing populism since the 1990s can be found in neoliberal economic policies, introduced in the 1980s to maintain capitalist mode of production, which resulted in poverty and unemployment which, in turn, led to divisions within society. This study examines the relationship between rising populism and neoliberal policies in Europe and the USA within the context of the liberal world order. Of late, Europe has witnessed the rise of racist and anti-immigrant populist discourses. Typical examples of these can be found in the discourses and practices employed by the Law and Justice Party (PiS) in power in Poland and FIDESZ in Hungary. In the United States, Donald Trump's populist rhetoric and practices have further motivated these parties. These populist parties and leaders claim to represent "the people" and thus are able to successfully mobilize the people. Lately, it is argued that the extreme right-wing populism challenges and damages the liberal world order and universal values. Within this context, this study analyzes populist discourses and practices in the cases of Hungray, Poland, and the United States and it argues that populism erodes the existing liberal values and, thus, poses a threat to the liberal order.

From its beginnings, in the aftermath of the first post-war period, the liberal order has significantly changed the texture, actors and tones of international politics, aiming to create institutions and rules that harnessed the forces that for centuries led political communities to wage war. Never fully realized, the liberal order has produced the most significant network of connections between societies, going so far as to make war unlikely in the areas where it has established itself most profoundly. An ambitious model which, refusing to separate the peaceful space of liberal democracy from the international one of Westphalian states, it promised widespread well-being, security and prospects for progress for individuals and groups. Today, however, many of its promises have been broken, illiberal actors have taken on ever-increasing economic and political weight, and the liberal world has become fragmented and weakened. Moreover, the crisis of liberal democracy within states and the phenomena of "autocratization", as well as the difficulty of liberal societies in giving effective responses to the challenges posed by a rapidly evolving technological world, represent challenges that make the liberal order's resilience uncertain. This chapter aims to analyze the main features of the crisis of the liberal order to evaluate its possible evolution.

The Group of Twenty (G20) was created first at the ministerial level and later upgraded to the summit level as a response to the global financial crises that first erupted from Asia in 1997, and then from the US in 2008 and Europe in 2010. These crises called into question the core principles and practices of the liberal order based on the economic, social and political openness that had been progressively internationally institutionalized since 1944. The G20 was designed with a dual distinctive foundational mission to promote financial stability and to make globalization work for all. It combined all established and emerging economies with high capability and connectivity, to operate as equals, to protect all within their borders and those beyond. It increasingly did so since its first summit in 2008. Its performance spiked at the summit in Hangzhou, China, on 3–4 September, 2016, and again at Hamburg, Germany, on 7–8 July, 2017. The latter coped with the new populist, protectionist US president and UK prime minister, whose countries had hosted the first three summits. G20-supported initiatives and agreements for full free trade have advanced since the first summit in 2008. No other center of global summit governance has emerged to guide an increasingly globalized world. The G20 has also steadily become an effective governor of global security. As the forces that propelled this rise will intensify, the Argentinian-hosted G20 summit on 30 November–1 December, 2018, promises to proceed along this path. It is guided by a country again afflicted by a financial crisis but now dedicated to following the core liberal order and making it work better for all. The real test will arrive in 2019, when Japan as host must co-operate with Korea and China, its neighbouring Asian powers and previous G20 hosts, to provide a new center of inclusive, progressive, liberal global governance that the world badly needs.

The rise of China raises fundamental questions about the future of the liberal international order (LIO) at a time when it is under ever more strain. Although China's focus for some years was on joining and participating in existing multilateral institutions, today China is increasingly building its own. Prominent among them is the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), launched in late 2014. Against the background of contending theoretical expectations, this article examines the extent to which the AIIB either reinforces or challenges the LIO and highlights what this tells us about China's broader relationship with the LIO. We provide a definition of the LIO that is based on its social purpose rather than on its formal characteristics. State-centric approaches offer insights into China's decision to engage in new institution building via the AIIB, but we argue that a focus on social purpose is necessary to assess the AIIB's broader implications for the LIO. We find that, while conforming in large measure to existing institutional models, the AIIB promotes China's integration into global social networks, strengthens state-led development pathways, and is associated with the Chinese norm of non-interference. The AIIB, thus, foreshadows the possibility of an institutionalised international order indifferent to liberalism. In sum, the AIIB reflects the tensions between the socialising effects of the LIO and China's growing externalisation of its own non-liberal, state-led model of political economy.

Under President Donald Trump, the United States has burned like a wildfire through the goodwill it accrued in seventy years of propagating its liberal political values. Can Western nations preserve the liberal world order against rising authoritarian powers without the United States, or with Washington working against them? In America vs the West, Kori Schake argues that the success of the liberal order is not preordained. It will have to be fought for, compromised for, and rejuvenated. Can it be done without American leadership? That will depend on the strengths of the major challengers - Russia and China - but above all on whether the West's middle powers are prepared to band together