Suchergebnisse

We present a unified model of the politics of the European Union (EU). We focus on the effects of the EU's changing treaty base (from the Rome to Amsterdam Treaties) on the relations among its three supranational institutions—the Commission of the European Communities, the European Court of Justice, and the European Parliament—and between these actors and the intergovernmental Council of Ministers. We analyze these institutional interactions in terms of the interrelationships among the three core functions of the modern state: to legislate and formulate policy (legislative branch), to administer and implement policy (executive branch), and to interpret policy and adjudicate disputes (judicial branch). Our analysis demonstrates that the evolution of the EU's political system has not always been linear. For example, we explain why the Court's influence was greatest before the passage of the Single European Act and declined in the following decade, and why we expect it to increase again in the aftermath of the Amsterdam Treaty. We also explain why the Commission became a powerful legislative agenda setter after the Single European Act and why its power today stems more from administrative discretion than from influence over legislation.

This article assesses the responses of EU–15 member states to the poverty reduction objectives of the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) on social inclusion between 2001 and 2006. As a flexible mechanism of information sharing between governments, the OMC could not produce strong convergence. A thorough analysis of the OMC documents indeed points to the enduring power of national institutions and partisan politics, for the three dimensions of social inclusion identified by the EU (rights, labour market policies, and participation). There was however some learning and adaptation around emerging policy ideas like activation and the participation of people experiencing poverty.

The implementation of European Union (EU) policies has been investigated for several policy areas, but Decisions made under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) have rarely been considered. While many CFSP measures are applicable throughout the EU without the need for further action on the domestic level, some Decisions must be implemented by Council Regulations. These Council Regulations adopted with the intent to implement CFSP Decisions have qualities of Directives, which delegate implementing tasks to member states and require transposition. The aim of this article is to investigate whether restrictive measures imposed by the EU are uniformly implemented across the member states, and, if not, to what extent implementation performance varies. We observe significant differences in implementation performance across member states. The findings of this article are twofold. First, we claim that implementation and compliance studies should involve CFSP decisions more systematically. Second, empirical confirmation is provided of how uneven transposition and application occurs also in CFSP matters. This study is based on empirical work that consisted of desk research and semi-structured interviews with national competent authorities of 21 EU member states taking place between March 2020 and January 2021.

We will study in this paper the relation between public investment, public debt and fiscal rules in the European Union countries. The strict fiscal rules imposed by EU have negatively affected the investments. The decline in public investment in European Union is related to the fiscal rules (mainly the deficit rule) included in the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). There have been made several attempts to amend the SGP in such a way to grant a more flexible treatment to capital expenditure when fixing budgetary targets and ceilings. According to the golden rule of budget deficit, investments can be financed through loans, while current expenditure should be financed from taxes. The golden rule promotes thus intergenerational fairness and contributes to economic growth.

What you find inspiring depends to a degree on where you come from and what you are looking for. So, by applying the principle of transparency, let me put my cards on the table. Those who founded the European Communities, and indeed both Jack Mackenzie Stuart and I, went through the last World War. I imagine that I will be the last judge of the Court in Luxembourg of whom this can be said. If you have been through such an experience, it is something which marks your whole life.

We assess the performance of National Regulatory Authorities across 16 EU countries regarding economic regulation in telecommunications sector, by constructing a so-called Composite Regulatory Performance Indicator for regulatory aspects such as effectiveness of the national regulatory system, effectiveness of the dispute settlement body, general market access conditions and application of remedies in markets for narrowband voice, mobile, broadband and business services. This composite indicator is the output measure used in the DEA non-parametric approach. The computation of efficiency scores allows to rank the NRAs and to detect some room for improvement in terms of efficiency gains for each national authority.