Is quantum medium a metaphysical continuum?
In: Socrates, Band 5, Heft 3and4, S. 58
ISSN: 2347-6869
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In: Socrates, Band 5, Heft 3and4, S. 58
ISSN: 2347-6869
In: Problemy zakonnosti: zbirnyk naukovych pracʹ = Problems of legality, Heft 123, S. 179-185
ISSN: 2414-990X
The problem of the choice of methods of knowledge of legal reality, including criminal law and legal relations, is considered from the standpoint of the possibility of applying the tools and techniques of metaphysics – the science of being and existence. Legal reality, as an independent phenomenon genesis, attributed both to the intersubjective reality that a person is going through and so shared with other people, and to its opposite - monosubjective reality.
In: The Making of the Modern State, S. 83-105
In: American political science review, Band 88, Heft 2, S. 278-291
ISSN: 1537-5943
This essay analyzes modern and postmodern concepts of freedom and contrasts them to a Heideggerian understanding. Positive, negative, and what might be called Foucaultian or Nietzschean liberty are demonstrated to bear a common trait. In such modern and postmodern formulations, freedom is consistently identified with a form of mastery. This identification of freedom with mastery, I argue, encourages ecological abuse, supports the dangerous prerogatives of statist sovereignty, and strengthens the resilience of patriarchy. The political significance of Heidegger's alternative vision is addressed.
In: American political science review, Band 88, Heft 2, S. 278-291
ISSN: 0003-0554
Philosophisch
World Affairs Online
In: Inquiry: an interdisciplinary journal of philosophy and the social sciences, Band 21, Heft 1-4, S. 201-212
ISSN: 1502-3923
In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Band 200, Heft 4
ISSN: 1573-0964
In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Band 196, Heft 7, S. 2777-2802
ISSN: 1573-0964
In: Heidegger studies: Heidegger Studien = Etudes Heideggeriennes = Studi Heideggeriani, Band 33, S. 329-342
ISSN: 2153-9170
In: Političeskie issledovanija: Polis ; naučnyj i kul'turno-prosvetitel'skij žurnal = Political studies, Heft 4, S. 23-40
ISSN: 1026-9487, 0321-2017
In: Problemos: filosofijos leidinys, Band 99, S. 131-147
ISSN: 2424-6158
This paper discusses certain anti-metaphysical readings of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. The metaphysical and anti-metaphysical readings can be divided on the interpretations of textual fidelity. The anti-metaphysical readings can be differentiated in taking into account two different understandings with regard to Wittgenstein's pronouncement of nonsense in Tractatus. One is the logical positivists' understanding of nonsense and the other is the resolute reading of the text that emerged as an opposite to the orthodox or standard reading. The aim of discussing these anti-metaphysical readings is to highlight whether a metaphysical reading is possible.
In: Social theory and practice: an international and interdisciplinary journal of social philosophy, Band 32, Heft 2, S. 173-189
ISSN: 2154-123X
In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Band 197, Heft 3, S. 1181-1201
ISSN: 1573-0964
Metaphysics has a problem with plurality: in many areas of discourse, there are too many good theories, rather than just one. This embarrassment of riches is a particular problem for metaphysical realists who want metaphysics to tell us the way the world is and for whom one theory is the correct one. A recent suggestion is that we can treat the different theories as being functionally or explanatorily equivalent to each other, even though they differ in content. The aim of this paper is to explore whether the notion of functionally equivalent theories can be extended and utilized in the defence of metaphysical realism, drawing upon themes from structuralism in the philosophies of mathematics and science in which the specifics of theories do not matter as long as the relations in which they stand to other theories are maintained. I argue that despite its initial attractiveness, there are significant difficulties with this proposal. Discovering these obstacles (most probably) thwarts the realist structuralist project, but reveals interesting features of metaphysical systems.
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In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Band 201, Heft 1
ISSN: 1573-0964
AbstractIn this paper I argue that the concept of time-reversal invariance in physics suffers from metaphysical underdetermination, that is, that the concept may be understood differently depending on one's metaphysics about time, laws, and a theory's basic properties. This metaphysical under-determinacy also affects subsidiary debates in philosophy of physics that rely on the concept of time-reversal invariance, paradigmatically the problem of the arrow of time. I bring up three cases that, I believe, fairly illustrate my point. I conclude, on the one hand, that any formal representation of time reversal should be explicit about the metaphysical assumptions of the concept that it intends to represent; on the other, that philosophical arguments that rely on time reversal to argue against a direction of time require additional premises.