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We argue that the Correlates of War dataset on sovereign state. - membership has two weaknesses: a requirement that states maintain. - diplomatic relations with Britain and France, and a size. - inconsistency that disqualifies many mid-sized states in the. - pre-1920 period. As a consequence, entire state systems are. - excluded from the data, and the total number of states during. - the nineteenth century is undercounted. After reviewing two other. - approaches to identifying states, we offer an alternative set of criteria. - that identifies 100 completely new cases, and a total of 363 states. - between 1816 and 2011. These modifications reveal several previously. - overlooked patterns. Most importantly, the global trend in. - the number of states over time is concave. From a high of 134 in. - 1816, states declined precipitously in the mid-nineteenth century. - through the processes of accession, conquest, and unification. This. - pattern of state consolidation bottomed out in 1912, and states. - have proliferated since 1945. However, the pattern of state death. - and state birth varied by region in the nineteenth century. Whereas. - the state systems of South Asia and Southeast Asia experienced a. - steady reduction in the number of states, Africa underwent a more. - dynamic process of state formation, consolidation, and death. . - (International Interactions (London)/ FUB)

rezensiertes Werk: Zimmermann, Andreas (Hrsg.): Deutschland und die internationale Gerichtsbarkeit, Vortragsreiheam Walther-Schücking-Institut für Internationales Recht an der Universität Kiel im WS 2002/03 und SS 2003. (Veröffentlichung des Walther- Schücking-Instituts für Internationales Recht an der Universität Kiel ; Bd. 149).- Berlin :Duncker & Humblot, 2004. - 118 S. ISBN 3-428-11706-9

International Relations scholars have turned to China's tributary system to broaden our understanding of international systems beyond the 'states-under-anarchy' model derived from European history. This scholarship forms the inspiration and foil for this article, which refines International Relations scholars' conceptualizations of how international hierarchy arose and endured in East Asia during the Manchu Qing Dynasty — China's last and most territorially expansive imperial dynasty. I argue that existing conceptions of East Asian hierarchy overstate the importance of mutual identification between the region's Confucian monarchies in sustaining Chinese hegemony. Instead, we can understand Qing China's dominance only once we recognize the Manchus as a 'barbarian' dynasty, which faced unique challenges legitimating its rule domestically and internationally. As 'barbarian' conquerors, Manchus did not secure their rule by simply conforming to pre-existing Sinic cultural norms. Instead, like other contemporary Eurasian empires, they maintained dominance through strategies of heterogeneous contracting. Domestically, they developed customized legitimacy scripts tailored to win the allegiance of the empire's diverse communities. Internationally, meanwhile, the Manchus strategically appropriated existing Confucian norms and practices of tributary diplomacy in ways that mitigated — but did not eliminate — Confucian vassals' resentment of 'barbarian' domination. East Asian hierarchy may have been more peaceful than Westphalian anarchy, but the absence of war masks a more coercive reality where the appearance of Confucian conformity obscured more fractious relations between Qing China and even its ostensibly most loyal vassals.

We reassess the well-known "narrow-but-deep" versus "broad-but-shallow" trade-off in international environmental agreements (IEAs), taking into account the principal–agent relationship induced by the hierarchical structure of international policy. To this end, we expand the modest coalition formation game, in which countries first decide on whether to join an agreement and then decide on emissions by a strategic delegation stage. In the weak delegation game, principals first decide whether to join an IEA, then delegate the domestic emission choices to an agent. Finally, agents in all countries decide on emissions. In countries not joining the IEA, agents choose emissions to maximize their own payoff, while agents of countries joining the IEA set emissions to internalize some exogenously given fraction γ of the externalities that own emissions cause on all members of the IEA. In the strong delegation game, principals first delegate to agents, who then decide on membership and emissions. We find that strategic delegation crowds out all efforts to increase coalition sizes by less ambitious agreements in the weak delegation game, while in the strong delegation game the first-best from the principals' point of view can be achieved.

Il y a dix ans nous avions publié un premier entretien avec Claude Jorda. Force est de constater que ce sujet est toujours d'une brûlante actualité 1 . Le 31 décembre 2017, le Tribunal pénal international pour l'ex-Yougoslavie a fermé ses portes et définitivement cessé d'exister. Claude Jorda en a été le Président de 1999 à 2003. En mai 1993, le Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies a voté la résolution 827 créant ce TPIY alors que le pays est à feu et à sang depuis plus de deux ans. Membre du Conseil de sécurité, la France devait y être représentée. Directeur des services judiciaires au ministère de la Justice de 1982 à 1985, ce juriste est nommé procureur général près la cour d'appel de Bordeaux de 1985 à 1992 puis de celle de Paris de 1992 à 1993. Il est un des juges du TPIY dès janvier 1994 puis Président de la chambre de première instance d'octobre 1995 à novembre 1999, date à laquelle il préside le TPIY jusqu'en février 2003. Il rejoint alors la Cour pénale internationale. Retraité, il est président honoraire de la Cour nationale du droit d'asile. Cette expérience pourrait-elle un jour servir dans le cas syrien ?

We propose an international comparison of school systems in OECD countries in terms of social mobility in schools based on the PISA (Program for International Student Assessment) test results in mathematics between 2003 and 2015. For each country, we calculate students'interdecile social mobility in schools on the basis of their ranking in the PISA test in mathematics, compared to their social ranking in their country, and compare this new index of equity to those generally used in OECD studies (slope and intensity of social gradient, percentage of resilient students). A new representation, the "Great Gatsby curve of school", in reference to the Great Gatsby curve of income, is proposed: the social mobility of a school system is closely linked to the educational inequality between students and schools. Countries such as Belgium or France with high levels of school inequality also stand out for low social mobility in schools. Inversely, countries such as Finland or Canada are characterised by low school inequality and high levels of social mobility in schools. A second important conclusion of the analysis is that the countries in which social mobility in schools is above average are also most often those with school achievement levels above the average.