Der Weg der baltischen Staaten in die Vereinten Nationen und andere internationale Organisationen
In: Osteuropa, Band 44, Heft 10, S. 945-956
ISSN: 0030-6428
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In: Osteuropa, Band 44, Heft 10, S. 945-956
ISSN: 0030-6428
World Affairs Online
Blog: The Grumpy Economist
With President Milei's election in Argentina, dollarization is suddenly on the table. I'm for it. Here's why. Why not? A standard of valueStart with "why not?'' Dollarization, not a national currency, is actually a sensible default. The dollar is the US standard of value. We measure length in feet, weight in pounds, and the value of goods in dollars. Why should different countries use different measures of value? Wouldn't it make sense to use a common standard of value? Once upon a time every country, and often every city, had its own weights and measures. That made trade difficult, so we eventually converged on international weights and measures. (Feet and pounds are actually a US anachronism since everyone else uses meters and kilograms. Clearly if we had to start over we'd use SI units, as science and engineering already do.) Moreover, nobody thinks it's a good idea to periodically shorten the meter in order to stimulate the economy, say by making the sale of cloth more profitable. As soon as people figure out they need to buy more cloth to make the same jeans, the profit goes away. PrecommitmentPrecommitment is, I think, the most powerful argument for dollarization (as for euorization of, say, Greece): A country that dollarizes cannot print money to spend more than it receives in taxes. A country that dollarizes must also borrow entirely in dollars, and must endure costly default rather than relatively less costly inflation if it doesn't want to repay debts. Ex post inflation and devaluation is always tempting, to pay deficits, to avoid paying debt, to transfer money from savers to borrowers, to advantage exporters, or to goose the economy ahead of elections. If a government can precommit itself to eschew inflation and devaluation, then it can borrow a lot more money on better terms, and its economy will be far better off in the long run. An independent central bank is often advocated for precommitment value. Well, locating the central bank 5,000 miles away in a country that doesn't care about your economy is as independent as you can get!The Siren Vase. Greek 480-470 BC. Source: The Culture CriticPrecommitment is an old idea. See picture. It's hard. A country must set things up so that it cannot give in to temptation ex post, and it will regret and try to wriggle out of that commitment when the time comes. A lot of the structure of our laws and government amount to a set of precommitments. An independent central bank with a price-level mandate is a precommitment not to inflate. A constitution and property rights are precommitments not to expropriate electoral minorities. Especially in Argentina's case, precommitment is why full dollarization is better than an exchange rate peg or a currency board. A true exchange rate peg -- one dollar for one peso, as much as you like -- would seem to solve the temptation-to-inflate problem. But the country can always abrogate the peg, reinstitute currency controls, and inflate. An exchange rate peg is ultimately a fiscal promise; the country will raise enough taxes so that it can get the dollars necessary to back its currency. When that seems too hard, countries devalue the peg or abandon it altogether. A currency board is tougher. Under a currency board, every peso issued by the government is backed by a dollar. That seems to ensure adequate reserves to handle any conceivable run. But a strapped government eyes the great Uncle-Scrooge swimming pool full of dollars at the currency board, and is tempted to abrogate the board, grab the assets and spend them. That's exactly how Argentina's currency board ended. Dollarization is a burn the ships strategy. There is no return. Reserves are neither necessary nor sufficient for an exchange rate peg. The peg is a fiscal promise and stands and falls with fiscal policy. A currency board, to the governmentFull dollarization -- the country uses actual dollars, and abandons its currency -- cannot be so swiftly undone. The country would have to pass laws to reinstitute the peso, declare all dollar contracts to be Peso contracts, ban the use of dollars and try to confiscate them. Dollars pervading the country would make that hard. People who understand their wealth is being confiscated and replaced by monopoly money would make it harder -- harder than some technical change in the amount of backing at the central bank for the same peso notes and bank accounts underlying a devalued peg or even an abrogated currency board. The design of dollarization should make it harder to undo. The point is precommitment, to make it as costly as possible for a following government to de-dollarize, after all. It's hard to confiscate physical cash, but if domestic Argentine banks have dollar accounts and dollar assets, it is relatively easy to pronounce the accounts in pesos and grab the assets. It would be better if dollarization were accompanied by full financial, capital, and trade liberalization, including allowing foreign banks to operate freely and Argentinian banks to become subsidiaries of foreign banks. Absence of a central bank and domestic deposit insurance will make that even more desirable. Then Argentinian bank "accounts" could be claims to dollar assets held offshore, that remain intact no matter what a future Peronist government does. Governments in fiscal stress that print up money, like Argentina, also impose an array of economy-killing policies to try to prop up the value of their currency, so the money printing generates more revenue. They restrict imports with tariffs, quotas, and red tape; they can restrict exports to try to steer supply to home markets at lower prices; they restrict currency conversion and do so at manipulated rates; they restrict capital markets, stopping people from investing abroad or borrowing abroad; they force people to hold money in oligopolized bank accounts at artificially low interest rates. Dollarization is also a precommitment to avoid or at least reduce all these harmful policies, as generating a demand for a country's currency doesn't do any good to the government budget when there isn't a currency. Zimbabwe dollarized in 2009, giving up on its currency after the greatest hyperinflation ever seen. The argument for Argentina is similar. Ecuador dollarized successfully in much less trying circumstances. It's not a new idea, and unilateral dollarization is possible. In both cases there was a period in which both currencies circulated. (Sadly, Zimbabwe ended dollarization in 2019, with a re-introduction of the domestic currency and redenomination of dollar deposits at a very unfavorable exchange rate. It is possible to undo, and the security of dollar bank accounts in face of such appropriation is an important part of the dollarization precommitment.) The limits of precommitmentDollarization is no panacea. It will work if it is accompanied by fiscal and microeconomic reform. It will be of limited value otherwise. I'll declare a motto: All successful inflation stabilizations have come from a combination of fiscal, monetary and microeconomic reform. Dollarization does not magically solve intractable budget deficits. Under dollarization, if the government cannot repay debt or borrow, it must default. And Argentina has plenty of experience with sovereign default. Argentina already borrows abroad in dollars, because nobody abroad wants peso debt, and has repeatedly defaulted on dollar debt. The idea of dollar debt is that explicit default is more costly than inflation, so the country will work harder to repay debt. Bond purchasers, aware of the temptation to default, will put clauses in debt contracts that make default more costly still. For you to borrow, you have to give the bank the title to the house. Sovereign debt issued under foreign law, with rights to grab assets abroad works similarly. But sovereign default is not infinitely costly and countries like Argentina sometimes choose default anyway. Where inflation may represent simply hugging the mast and promising not to let go, default is a set of loose handcuffs that you can wriggle out of painfully. Countries are like corporations. Debt denominated in the country's own currency is like corporate equity (stock): If the government can't or won't pay it back the price can fall, via inflation and currency devaluation. Debt denominated in foreign currency is like debt: If the government can't or won't pay it back, it must default. (Most often, default is partial. You get back some of what is promised, or you are forced to convert maturing debt into new debt at a lower interest rate.) The standard ideas of corporate finance tell us who issues debt and who issues equity. Small businesses, new businesses, businesses that don't have easily valuable assets, businesses where it is too easy for the managers to hide cash, are forced to borrow, to issue debt. You have to borrow to start a restaurant. Businesses issue equity when they have good corporate governance, good accounting, and stockholders can be sure they're getting their share. These ideas apply to countries, and the choice between borrowing in their own currency and borrowing in foreign currency. Countries with poor governance, poor accounting, out of control fiscal policies, poor institutions for repayment, have to borrow in foreign currency if they are going to borrow at all, with intrusive conditions making default even more expensive. Issuing and borrowing in your own currency, with the option to inflate, is the privilege of countries with good institutions, and democracies where voters get really mad about inflation in particular. Of course, when things get really bad, the country can't borrow in either domestic or foreign currency. Then it prints money, forcing its citizens to take it. That's where Argentina is. In personal finance, you start with no credit at all; then you can borrow; finally you can issue equity. On the scale of healthier economies, dollarizing is the next step up for Argentina. Dollarization and foreign currency debt have another advantage. If a country inflates its way out of a fiscal mess, that benefits the government but also benefits all private borrowers at the expense of private savers. Private borrowing inherits the inflation premium of government borrowing, as the effective government default induces a widespread private default. Dollarization and sovereign default can allow the sovereign to default without messing up private contracts, and all prices and wages in the economy. It is possible for sovereigns to pay higher interest rates than good companies, and the sovereign to be more likely to default than those companies. It doesn't always happen, because sovereigns about to default usually grab all the wealth they can find on the way down, but the separation of sovereign default from inflationary chaos is also an advantage. Greece is a good example, and a bit Italy as well, both in the advantages and the cautionary tale about the limitations of dollarization. Greece and Italy used to have their own currencies. They also had borders, trade controls, and capital controls. They had regular inflation and devaluation. Every day seemed to be another "crisis" demanding another "just this once" splurge. As a result, they paid quite high interest rates to borrow, since savvy bondholders wanted insurance against another "just this once."They joined the EU and the eurozone. This step precommitted them to free trade, relatively free capital markets, and no national currency. Sovereign default was possible, but regarded as very costly. Having banks stuffed with sovereign debt made it more costly. Leaving the euro was possible, but even more costly. Deliberately having no plan to do so made it more costly still. The ropes tying hands to the mast were pretty strong. The result: borrowing costs plummeted. Governments, people and businesses were able to borrow at unheard of low rates. And they did so, with aplomb. The borrowing could have financed public and private investment to take advantage of the new business opportunities the EU allowed. Sadly it did not. Greece soon experienced the higher ex-post costs of default that the precommitment imposed. Dollarizaton -- euroization -- is a precommitment, not a panacea. Recommitments impose costs on yourself ex post. Those costs are real. A successful dollarization for Argentina has to be part of a joint monetary, fiscal, and microeconomic reform. (Did I say that already? :) ) If public finances aren't sorted out, a default will come eventually. And public finances don't need a sharp bout of "austerity" to please the IMF. They need decades of small primary surpluses, tax revenues slightly higher than spending, to credibly pay down any debt. To get decades of revenue, the best answer is growth. Tax revenue equals tax rate times income. More income is a lot easier than higher tax rate, which at least partially lowers income. Greece and Italy did not accomplish the microeconomic reform part. Fortunately, for Argentina, microeconomic reform is low-hanging fruit, especially for a Libertarian president. TransitionWell, so much for the Promised Land, they may have asked of Moses, how do we get there? And let's not spend 40 years wandering the Sinai on the way. Transition isn't necessarily hard. On 1 January 1999, Italy switched from Lira to Euro. Every price changed overnight, every bank account redenominated, every contract reinterpreted, all instantly and seamlessly. People turned in Lira banknotes for Euro banknotes. The biggest complaint is that stores might have rounded up converted prices. If only Argentina could have such problems. Why is Argentina not the same? Well, for a lot of reasons. Before getting to the euro, Italy had adopted the EU open market. Exchange rates had been successfully pegged at the conversion rate, and no funny business about multiple rates. The ECB (really the Italian central bank) could simply print up euros to hand out in exchange for lira. The assets of the Italian central bank and other national central banks were also redenominated in euro, so printing up euros to soak up national currencies was not inflationary -- assets still equal liabilities. Banks with lira deposits that convert to Euro also have lira assets that convert to euro. And there was no sovereign debt crisis, bank crisis, or big inflation going on. Italian government debt was trading freely on an open market. Italy would spend and receive taxes in euros, so if the debt was worth its current price in lira as the present value of surpluses, it was worth exactly the same price, at the conversion rate, in euro. None of this is true in Argentina. The central problem, of course, is that the government is broke. The government does not have dollars to exchange for Pesos. Normally, this would not be a problem. Reserves don't matter, the fiscal capacity to get reserves matters. The government could simply borrow dollars internationally, give the dollars out in exchange for pesos, and slowly pay off the resulting debt. If Argentina redenominated interest-bearing peso debt to dollars at a market exchange rate, that would have no effect on the value of the debt. Obviously, borrowing additional dollars would likely be difficult for Argentina right now. To the extent that its remaining debt is a claim to future inflationary seigniorage revenues, its debt is also worth less once converted to dollars, even at a free market rate, because without seigniorage or fiscal reforms, budget deficits will increase. And that leads to the primary argument against dollarization I hear these days. Yes it might be the promised land, but it's too hard to get there. I don't hear loudly enough, though, what is the alternative? One more muddle of currency boards, central bank rules, promises to the IMF and so forth? How do you suddenly create the kind of stable institutions that Argentina has lacked for a century to justify a respectable currency? One might say this is a problem of price, not of quantity. Pick the right exchange rate, and conversion is possible. But that is not even clearly true. If the state is truly broke, if pesos are only worth anything because of the legal restrictions forcing people to hold them, then pesos and peso debt are genuinely worthless. The only route to dollarization would be essentially a complete collapse of the currency and debt. They are worth nothing. We start over. You can use dollars, but you'll have to export something to the US -- either goods or capital, i.e. stock and bonds in private companies -- to get them. (Well, to get any more of them. Lots of dollars line Argentine mattresses already.) That is enough economic chaos to really put people off. In reality, I think the fear is not a completely worthless currency, but that a move to quick dollarization would make peso and peso claims worth very little, and people would rebel against seeing their money holdings and bank accounts even more suddenly worthless than they are now. Maybe, maybe not. Just who is left in Argentina counting on a robust value of pesos? But the state is not worth nothing. It may be worth little in mark to market, or current dollar borrowing capacity. But a reformed, growing Argentina, with tax, spending, and microeconomic reform, could be a great place for investment, and for tax revenue above costs. Once international lenders are convinced those reform efforts are locked in, and Argentina will grow to anything like its amazing potential, they'll be stumbling over themselves to lend. So a better dollarization plan redeems pesos at the new greater value of the post-reform Argentine state. The question is a bit of chicken and egg: Dollarization has to be part of the reform, but only reform allows dollarization with a decent value of peso exchange. So there is a genuine question of sequencing of reforms. This question reminds me of the totally fruitless discussion when the Soviet Union broke up. American economists amused themselves with clever optimal sequencing of liberalization schemes. But if competent benevolent dictators (sorry, "policy-makers") were running the show, the Soviet Union wouldn't have failed in the first place. The end of hyperinflation in Germany. Price level 1919-1924. Note left-axis scale. Source: Sargent (1982) "The ends of four big inflations." A better historical analogy is, I think, the ends of hyperinflation after WWI, so beautifully described by Tom Sargent in 1982. The inflations were stopped by a sudden, simultaneous, fiscal, monetary, and (to some extent) microeconomic reform. The fiscal problem was solved by renegotiating reparations under the Versailles treaty, along with severe cuts in domestic spending, for example firing a lot of government and (nationalized) railroad workers. There were monetary reforms, including an independent central bank forbidden to buy government debt. There were some microeconomic reforms as well. Stopping inflation took no monetary stringency or high interest rates: Interest rates fell, and the governments printed more money, as real money demand increased. There was no Phillips curve of high unemployment. Employment and the economies boomed. So I'm for almost-simultaneous and fast reforms. 1) Allow the use of dollars everywhere. Dollars and pesos can coexist. Yes, this will put downward pressure on the value of the peso, but that might be crucial to maintain interest in the other reforms, which will raise the value of the peso. 2) Instant unilateral free trade and capital opening. Argentina will have to export goods and capital to get dollars. Get out of the way. Freeing imports will lower their prices and make the economy more efficient. Capital will only come in, which it should do quickly, if it knows it can get out again. Float the peso. 3) Long list of growth - oriented microeconomic reforms. That's why you elected a Libertarian president. 4) Slash spending. Reform taxes. Low marginal rates, broad base. Subsidies in particular distort prices to transfer income. Eliminate. 5) Once reforms are in place, and Argentina has some borrowing capacity, redenominate debt to dollars, and borrow additional dollars to exchange pesos for dollars. All existing peso contracts including bank accounts change on the date. Basically, you want people to hold peso bills and peso debt in the interim as claims on the post-reform government. Peso holders have an incentive to push for reforms that will raise the eventual exchange value of the peso. 6) Find an interim lender. The central problem is who will lend to Argentina in mid stream in order to retire pesos. This is like debtor in possession financing but for a bankrupt country. This could be a job for the IMF. The IMF could lend Argentina dollars for the purpose of retiring pesos. One couldn't ask for much better "conditionality" than a robust Libertarian pro-growth program. Having the IMF along for the ride might also help to commit Argentina to the program. (The IMF can force conditionality better than private lenders.) When things have settled down, Argentina should be able to borrow dollars privately to pay back the IMF. The IMF might charge a decent interest rate to encourage that. How much borrowing is needed? Less than you think. Interest-paying debt can simply be redenominated in dollars once you pick a rate. That might be hard to pay off, but that's a problem for later. So Argentina really only needs to borrow enough dollars to retire cash pesos. I can't find numbers, but hyper inflationary countries typically don't have much real value of cash outstanding. The US has 8% of GDP in currency outstanding. If Argentina has half that, then it needs to borrow only 4% of GDP in dollars to buy back all its currency. That's not a lot. If the peso really collapses, borrowing a little bit more (against great future growth of the reform program) to give everyone $100, the sort of fresh start that Germany did after WWII and after unification, is worth considering. Most of the worry about Argentina's borrowing ability envisions continued primary deficits with slow fiscal adjustment. Make the fiscal adjustment tomorrow."You never want a serious crisis to go to waste," said Rahm Emanuel wisely. "Sequencing" reforms means that everything promised tomorrow is up for constant renegotiation. Especially when parts of the reform depend on other parts, I'm for doing it all as fast as possible, and then adding refinements later if need be. Roosevelt had his famous 100 days, not a 8 year sequenced program. The Argentine reform program is going to hurt a lot of people, or at least recognize losses that had long been papered over in the hope they would go away. Politically, one wants to make the case "We're all in this, we're all hurting. You give up your special deal, preferential exchange rate, special subsidy or whatever, but so will everyone else. Hang with me to make sure they don't get theirs, and in a year we'll all be better off." If reforms are in a long sequence, which means long renegotiation, it's much harder to get buy in from people who are hurt earlier on that the ones who come later will also do their part. The standard answersOne standard critique of dollarization is monetary policy and "optimal currency areas." By having a national currency, the country's wise central bankers can artfully inflate and devalue the currency on occasion to adapt to negative shocks, without the inconvenience and potential dislocation of everyone in the country lowering prices and wages. Suppose, say, the country produces beef, and exports it in order to import cars. If world demand for beef declines, the dollar price of beef declines. The country is going to have to import fewer cars. In a dollarized country, or with a pegged exchange rate, the internal price of beef and wages go down. With its own country and a floating rate, the value of the currency could go down, leaving beef and wages the same inside the country, but the price of imported cars goes up. If lowering prices and wages causes more recession and dislocation than raising import prices, then the artful devaluation is the better idea. (To think about this question more carefully you need traded and non-traded goods; beef, cars, and haircuts. The relative price of beef, cars, and haircuts along with demand for haircuts is also different under the two regimes). Similarly, suppose there is a "lack of demand'' recession and deflation. (90 years later, economists are still struggling to say exactly where that comes from.) With its own central bank and currency, the country can artfully inflate just enough to offset the recession. A country that dollarizes also has to import not-always-optimal US inflation. Switzerland did a lot better than the US and EU once again in the covid era. This line of thinking answers the question, "OK, if Argentina ($847 bn GDP, beef exports) should have its own currency in order to artfully offset shocks, why shouldn't Colorado ($484 bn GDP, beef exports)?'' Colorado is more dependent on trade with the rest of the US than is Argentina. But, the story goes, people can more easily move across states. A common federal government shoves "fiscal stimulus" to states in trouble. Most of all, "lack of demand" recessions seem to be national, in part because of the high integration of states, so recessions are fought by national policy and don't need state-specific monetary stimulus. This is the standard "optimal currency area" line of thinking, which recommends a common currency in an integrated free trade zone such as US, small Latin American countries that trade a lot with the US, and Europe. Standard thinking especially likes a common currency in a fiscal union. Some commenters felt Greece should keep or revert to the Drachma because the EU didn't have enough common countercyclical fiscal policy. It likes independent currencies elsewhere.I hope you're laughing out loud by now. A wise central bank, coupled with a thrifty national government, that artfully inflates and devalues just enough to technocratically exploit price stickiness and financial frictions, offsetting national "shocks" with minimum disruption, is a laughable description of Argentina's fiscal and monetary policies. Periodic inflation, hyperinflation and default, together with a wildly overregulated economy with far too much capital and trade controls is more like it. The lure of technocratic stabilization policy in the face of Argentina's fiscal and monetary chaos is like fantasizing whether you want the tan or black leather on your new Porsche while you're on the bus to Carmax to see if you can afford a 10-year old Toyota. Another reason people argue that even small countries should have their own currencies is to keep the seigniorage. Actual cash pays no interest. Thus, a government that issues cash earns the interest spread between government bonds and interest. Equivalently, if demand for cash is proportional to GDP, then as GDP grows, say 2% per year, then the government can let cash grow 2% per year as well, i.e. it can print up that much cash and spend it. But this sort of seigniorage is small for modern economies that don't have inflation. Without inflation, a well run economy might pay 2% for its debt, so save 2% by issuing currency. 2% interest times cash which is 10% of GDP is 0.2% of GDP. On the scale of Argentinian (or US) debt and deficits, that's couch change. When inflation is higher, interest rates are higher, and seigniorage or the "inflation tax" is higher. Argentina is living off that now. But the point is not to inflate forever and to forswear bigger inflation taxes. Keeping this small seigniorage is one reason for countries to keep their currency and peg to the dollar or run a currency board. The currency board holds interest-bearing dollar assets, and the government gets the interest. Nice. But as I judge above, the extra precommitment value of total dollarization is worth the small lost seigniorage. Facing Argentina's crisis, plus its catastrophic century of lost growth, lost seigniorage is a cost that I judge far below the benefit. Other countries dollarize, but agree with the US Fed to rebate them some money for the seigniorage. Indeed, if Argentina dollarizes and holds 10% of its GDP in non-interest-bearing US dollars, that's a nice little present to the US. A dollarization agreement with Argentina to give them back the seignorage would be the least we can do. But I don't think Argentina should hold off waiting for Jay Powell to answer the phone. The Fed has other fires to put out. If Argentina unilaterally dollarizes, they can work this sort of thing out later. Dollarization would obviously be a lot easier if it is worked out together with the US government and US banks. Getting cash sent to Argentina, getting banks to have easy payment systems in dollars and links to US banks would make it all easier. If Argentina gets rid of its central bank it still needs a payment system to settle claims in dollars. Accounts at, say, Chase could function as a central bank. But it would all be easier if the US cooperates. Updates:Some commenters point out that Argentina may be importing US monetary policy just as the US imports Argentine fiscal policy. That would lead to importing a big inflation. They suggest a Latin American Monetary Union, like the euro, or using a third country's currency. The Swiss franc is pretty good. Maybe the Swiss can set the world standard of value. Both are good theoretical ideas but a lot harder to achieve in the short run. Dollarization will be hard enough. Argentines have a lot of dollars already, most trade is invoiced in dollars so getting dollars via trade is relatively easy, the Swiss have not built out a banking infrastructure capable of being a global currency. The EMU lives on top of the EU, and has its own fiscal/monetary problems. Building a new currency before solving Argentina's problems sounds like a long road. The question asked was dollarization, so I stuck to that for now. I imagined here unilateral dollarization. But I didn't emphasize enough: The US should encourage dollarization! China has figured this out and desperately wants anyone to use its currency. Why should we not want more people to use our currency? Not just for the seigniorage revenue, but for the ease of trade and international linkages it promotes. The Treasury and Fed should have a "how to dollarize your economy" package ready to go for anyone who wants it. Full integration is not trivial, including access to currency, getting bank access to the Fed's clearing systems, instituting cyber and money laundering protocols, and so forth. Important update: Daniel Raisbeck and Gabriela Calderon de Burgos at CATO have a lovely essay on Argentinian dollarization, also debunking an earlier Economist article that proclaimed it impossible. They include facts and comparison with other dollarization experiences, not just theory as I did. (Thanks to the correspondent who pointed me to the essay.) Some quotes:At the end of 2022, Argentines held over $246 billion in foreign bank accounts, safe deposit boxes, and mostly undeclared cash, according to Argentina's National Institute of Statistics and Census. This amounts to over 50 percent of Argentina's GDP in current dollars for 2021 ($487 billion). Hence, the dollar scarcity pertains only to the Argentine state....The last two dollarization processes in Latin American countries prove that "purchasing" the entire monetary base with U.S. dollars from one moment to the next is not only impractical, but it is also unnecessary. In both Ecuador and El Salvador, which dollarized in 2000 and 2001 respectively, dollarization involved parallel processes. In both countries, the most straightforward process was the dollarization of all existing deposits, which can be converted into dollars at the determined exchange rate instantly.in both Ecuador and El Salvador, dollarization not only did not lead to bank runs; it led to a rapid and sharp increase in deposits, even amid economic and political turmoil in Ecuador's case....There is a general feature of ending hyperinflation: People hold more money. In this case, people hold more bank accounts once they know those accounts are safe. Short summary of the rest, all those dollar deposits (out of mattresses into the banking system) allowed the central bank to retire its local currency liabilities. Emilio Ocampo, the Argentine economist whom Milei has put in charge of plans for Argentina's dollarization should he win the presidency, summarizes Ecuador's experience thus:People exchanged their dollars through the banks and a large part of those dollars were deposited in the same banks. The central bank had virtually no need to disburse reserves. This was not by design but was a spontaneous result.In El Salvador also, Dollar deposits also increased spontaneously in El Salvador, a country that dollarized in 2001. By the end of 2022, the country's deposits amounted to 49.6 percent of GDP—in Panama, another dollarized peer, deposits stood at 117 percent of GDP.El Salvador's banking system was dollarized immediately, but the conversion of the circulating currency was voluntary, with citizens allowed to decide if and when to exchange their colones for dollars. Ocampo notes that, in both Ecuador and El Salvador, only 30 percent of the circulating currency had been exchanged for dollars four months after dollarization was announced so that both currencies circulated simultaneously. In the latter country, it took over two years for 90 percent of the monetary base to be dollar‐based.Cachanosky explains that, in an El Salvador‐type, voluntary dollarization scenario, the circulating national currency can be dollarized as it is deposited or used to pay taxes, in which case the sums are converted to dollars once they enter a state‐owned bank account. Hence, "there is no need for the central bank to buy the circulating currency" at a moment's notice.Dollarization starts with both currencies and a peg. As long as people trust that dollarization will happen at the peg, the conversion can take a while. You do not need dollars to soak up every peso on day 1. Dollarization is, above, a commitment that the peg will last for years, not a necessary commitment that the peg will last a day. I speculated about private borrowing at lower rates than the sovereign, once default rather than inflation is the only way out for the sovereign. This happened: ... as Manuel Hinds, a former finance minister in El Salvador, has explained, solvent Salvadorans in the private sector can borrow at rates of around 7 percent on their mortgages while international sovereign bond markets will only lend to the Salvadoran government at far higher rates. As Hinds writes, under dollarization, "the government cannot transfer its financial costs to the private sector by printing domestic money and devaluing it."A nice bottom line: Ask people in Ecuador, El Salvador, and Panama what they think:This is yet another lesson of dollarization's actual experience in Latin American countries. It is also a reason why the vast majority of the population in the dollarized nations has no desire for a return to a national currency. The monetary experiences of daily life have taught them that dollarization's palpable benefits far outweigh its theoretical drawbacks. Even more important update:From Nicolás Cachonosky How to Dollarize Argentina The central problem is non-money liabilities of the central bank. A detailed plan. Many other blog posts at the link. See his comment below. Tyler Cowen on dollarization in Bloomberg. Great quote: The question is not how to adopt a new currency, it is how to adopt a new currency and retain a reasonable value for the old one. Dollarization is easy. Hyperinflate the Peso to zero a la Zimbabwe. Repeat quote. Emilio Ocampo on dollarization as a commitment device. One of the main reasons to dollarize is to eliminate high, persistent, and volatile inflation. However, to be effective, dollarization must generate sufficient credibility, which in turn depends critically on whether its expected probability of reversal is low.... The evidence suggests that, in the long-run, the strongest insurance against reversal is the support of the electorate, but in the short-run, institutional design [dollarization] can play a critical role.Fifty years ago, in testimony to U.S. Congress, Milton Friedman argued that "the whole reason why it is an advantage for a developing country to tie to a major country is that, historically speaking, the internal policies of developing countries have been very bad. U.S. policy has been bad, but their policies have been far worse. ... (1973, p.127)."In this respect, not much has changed in Argentina since. Craig Richardson explains how dollarization failed in Zimbabwe, a wonderful cautionary tale. Deficits did not stop, the government issued "bonds" and forced banks to buy them, bank accounts became de linked from currency. Gresham's law prevailed, the government "bonds" circulating at half face value drove out cash dollars. With persistent government and trade deficits there was a "dollar shortage."
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(Abhandlungen zur Handels‐ und Sozialgeschichte, edited by the Hansischen Geschichtsverein. Vol 11. Weimar. 1959. Pp xii +282.)Rudolf Forberger. Die Manufaktur in Sachsen vom Ende des 16. bis mm Anfang des 19. Jahrhunderts. (Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, Schriften des Instituts für Geschichte, Reihe 1: Allgemeine und deutsche Geschichte, Vol. 3. Akademie‐Verlag, Berlin. 1958. Pp. ix + 456 + 2 maps. DM 46.‐.)Ingomar Bog. Der Reichsmerkantilismus. Studien zur Wirtschaftspolitik des Heiligen Romischen Reiches im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert. (Stuttgart: Gustav Fischer. 1959. Pp. 194. DM 29.50.)Theodore S. Hamerow. Restoration, Revolution, Reaction: Economics and Politics in Germany, 1815‐1871. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 1958. Pp. xi + 347. $6.00.)Gerhard Bondi. Deutschlands Aufienhandel 1815‐1870. (Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin. Schriften des Instituts für Geschichte Reihe I, Band 5. Berlin: Akademie‐Verlag. 1958. Pp. viii + 156. DM (Ost) 8.‐.)Theodor Schieder. Staat und Gesellschaft im Wandel unserer Zjeit. Studien zur Geschichte des ig. und 20. Jahrhunderts. (Miinchen: Oldenbourg. 1958. Pp. 208. DM 18.50.)Adolf Trende. Geschichte der deutschen Sparkassen bis zum Anfang des 20. Jahr‐hunderts. (Stuttgart: Deutscher Sparkassenverlag. 1957. Pp. xii ‐f‐ 610. DM 34.50.)W. G. Hoffmann, J. H. Müller. Das deutsche Volkseinkommen, 1851‐1957. (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck]. 1959. Pp. 162. DM 16.50.)Heinrich Benedikt. Die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung in der Franz‐Joseph‐eit. (Wiener Historische Studien, Vol. IV. Vienna, Munich: Herold. 1958. Pp. 200. DM 17.50.)Hans Georg Kirchhoff. Die staatliche Sozialpolitik im Ruhrbergbau, 1871‐1914. (Wissenschaftliche Abhandlungen der Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Forschung des Landes Nordrhein‐Westfalen, Vol. 4. Köln und Opladen: West‐deutscher Verlag. 1958. Pp. 179. DM 12.80.)Karl Erich Born. Staat und Sozialpolitik seit Bismarcks Sturz‐ Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der innenpolitischen Entwicklung des Deutschen Retches 1890‐1914. (Historische Forschungen im Auftrag der Historischen Kommission der Mainzer Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur. Hefraus‐gegeben von O. Brunner, P. Rassow, J. Vogt. Vol. I. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner. 1957. Pp. 256. DM 24.‐.)Wilhelm Brepohl. Vom Industrievolk an der Ruhr. (Schriftenreihe Ruhr und Rhein, Ed. Fritz Pudor, Heft 4. Essen: West‐Verlag. 1957. Pp. 73. DM 3.30.)Gerhard Gebhardt (Ed.). Ruhrbergbau. Geschichte, Aufbau und Verflechtung seiner Gesellschqften und Organisationen. (Compiled in collaboration with the mining companies of the Ruhr.) (Essen: Verlag Glückauf. 1957. Pp. xvi + 580. DM 28.‐.)Heinz Haushofer. Ideengeschichte der Agrarwirtschqft und Agrarpolitik im deutschen Sprachgebiet. Vol. II. Vom ersten Weltkrieg bis zur Gegenwart. (Bonn, Munich, Vienna: Bayerischer Landwirtschaftsverlag. 1958. Pp. 439. 12 art prints. DM 54.‐.)Gerhard Kroll. Von der Weltwirtschaftskrise zur Staatskonjunktur. (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot. 1958. Pp. 743. DM 56.80.)Fritz Behrens. Einige Fragen der okonomischen Entwicklung im Lichte der Grqfien Sozialistischen Oktoberrevolution. (Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, Vortrage und Schriften, Heft 63. East Berlin: Akademie‐Ver‐lag. 1958. Pp. 21. DM 1.40.)Hildebrandt‐Böhme. Die Schwerindustrie in der Sowjetunion. Entwicklung und Probleme. (Introduction and Comments by Walter Hildebrandt. Selection and Translation by Gisela Bohme.) (Bad Homburg, Berlin, Zurich: Max Gehlen. 1957. Pp. 520. DM48.50.)Helmut Croon, Kurt Utermann. Zeche und Gemeinde. Untersuchungen über den Strukturwandel einer Zechengemeinde im nördlichen Ruhrgebiet. (Soziale Forschung und Praxis. Ed. Sozialforschungsstelle an der Universität Minister, Dortmund. Vol. 19. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck]. 1958. Pp. x + 305, 1 map. DM 25.60.)Max Silberschmidt. Amerikas industrielle Entwicklung. Von der Zeit der Pioniere zur Ara von Big Business. (Sammlung Dalp. Vol. 86. Berne: A. Francke. 1958. Pp. 240. S frs. 9.80; DM 9.40.)A. Hoffmann.'Die Grundherrschaft als Unternehmen', Zeitschrift für Agrar‐geschichte und Agrarsoziologie, VI (1958), 123‐131.H. ‐J. Stiebens.'Die Gehöferschaften des Trierer Bezirks und sonstige alt‐deutsche Gemeinschaften in Rheinland‐Pfalz', Zeitschrift für Agrarge‐schichte und Agrarsoziologie, VI (1958), 131‐143.K. Lippmann.'Die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung der Landwirtschaft und der Wandel im Bereich des Bäuerlichen', zeitschrift für Agrargeschichte und Agrarsoziologie, VI (1958), 155‐176.I. Leister.'Zum Problem des "Keltischen Einzelhofs" in Irland', Zeitschrift für Asrargeschichte und Agrarsoziologie, VII (1959), 3‐13W. Achilles.'Getreidepreise und Getreidehandelsbeziehungen europaischer Raume im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert', Zeitschrift für Agrargeschichte und Agrarsoziologie, VII (1959), 32‐55‐W. Schubring.'Betriebs‐ und Grundbesitzverhaltnisse der Agrarwirtschaft der Welt', Zeitschrift für Agrargeschichte und Agrarsoziologie, VII (1959), 56‐80.H. Kellenbenz.'Der italienische Grosskaufmann und die Renaissancé, Vierteljahrsschrift für Sozial‐ und Wirtschaftsgeschichte, XXXXV (1958), 145‐167.M. Barkhausen. Staatliche Wirtschaftslenkung und freies Unternehmertum im westdeutschen und im nord‐ und sudniederlandischen Raum bei der Entstehung der neuzeitlichen Industrie im 18. Jahrhundert, Vierteljahrsschrift für Sozial‐ und Wirtschqftsgeschichte, XXXXV (1958), 168‐241.H. Stoob.'Minderstädte. Formen der Stadtentstehung im Spatmittel‐alter', Vierteljahrsschrift für Sozial‐ und Wirtschqftsgeschichte, XXXXVI (1959), 1‐28K. E. Born. 'Sozialpolitische Probleme und Bestrebungen in Deutschland von 1848 bis zur Bismarckschen Sozialgesetzgebung', Vierteljahrsschrift für Sozial‐ und Wirtschqftsgeschichte, XXXXVI (1959), 29‐44.W. Kollmann.'Industrialisierung, Binnenwanderung und "Soziale Frage". (Zur Entstehungsgeschichte der deutschen Industriegroßstadt im 19. Jahrhundert)', Vierteljahrsschrift für Sozial‐ und Wirtschqftsgeschichte, XXXXVI (1959), 45‐70.W. Treue.'Die Ilseder Hütte und der Staat in den Jahren 1916 bis 1919′, Tradition, ZeitschriftfurFirmengeschichte und Untemehmerbiographie, III (1958), 129‐140.P. E. Schramm.'Kaufleute während Besatzung, Krieg und Belagerung (1806‐1815). Der Hamburger Handel in der Franzosenzeit, dargestellt an Hand von Firmen‐ und Familienpapieren', Tradition, Zeitschrift für Firmengeschichte und Untemehmerbiographie, IV (1959), 1‐22 and 88‐114.E. v. BÖVENTER.'Die wirtschaftlichen Auswirkungen amerikanischer Rezes‐sionen auf die iibrige Welt. Eine Untersuchung über die amerikanischen Konjunkturriickschlage, 1937/38, 1949 und 1953/54′, ‐zeitschrift für die p&amte Staatswissenschaft. CXIV (1958). 297‐330.H. Sperling.'Die wirtschaftliche Struktur des Erwerbslebens der Bundes‐republik im internationalen Vergleich', Schmollers Jahrbuch, LXXVIII (1958) 149‐166A. Hauser.'Die Schweiz und der Deutsche Zollverein, Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Volkswirtschaft und Statistik, XCIV (1958), 482‐494.Rosario Romeo. Risorgimento e Capitalismo. (Bari: Laterza. 1959. Pp. 209. Lire 1400.)L. Dal Pane. Storia del Lavoro in Italia. Vol IV. Dagli Inizi del secolo XVIII al 1815. (Milano: Giuffré. 1958 Pp. xx + 629.)R. P. Dore. Land Reform in Japan. (Royal Institute of International Affairs and Oxford University Press. 1959. Pp. xvii +510. 55J.)Albert Feuerwerker. China's Early Industrialization: Sheng Hsuan‐huai (1844‐1916) and Mandarin Enterprise. (Harvard University Press; Oxford University Press. 1958. Pp. xiii + 311+ xxxii. $ 6.50; 52s.)Sally Falk Moore. Power and Property in Inca Peru. (Columbia University Press. New York. 1958. Pp. 190. 405.)University Museum of Archaeology and Ethnology, Downing Street, CambridgeWoodrow Borah and Sherburne F. Cook. Price trends of some basic commodities in Centrpl Mexico, 1531‐1570. (Ibero‐Americana 40, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles. 1958. Pp. 89. $2.00.)Florian Paucke S.J. Zwettler Codex 420. Part 1, ed. Etta Becker‐Donner with the collaboration of Gustav Otruba. (Publications of the Archive for Ethnology, Vol. IV/i, Vienna. Wilhelm Braumuller Universitäts:Ver‐lagsbuchhandlung, 1959. Pp. 444 with 29 illustrations.)JOHN B. RAE. American Automobile Manufacturers. A History of the Automobile Industry: The First Forty Tears. (Philadelphia and New York: Chilton Company. 1959. Pp. 223. $6.00.)Russel Ward. The Australian Legend. (Melbourne University Press; London, Cambridge University Press. 1958. Pp. xii + 262. 45s.)Eric Stokes. The English Utilitarians and India. (Oxford University Press. 1959. Pp‐ 350‐ 45sF. Klemm. A History of Western Technology. (Translated by D. W. Singer. Allen and Unwin. 1959. Pp. 401. 32s.)W. G. Hoffmann. The Growth of Industrial Economics. (Translated from the German by W. O. Henderson and W. H. Chaloner.) (Manchester University Press. 1958. Pp. xiii + 183. 25J.)E.J. Hobsbawm. Primitive Rebels. (Manchester University Press. 1959. Pp. vii + 208. 25s.)
In: Osteuropa, Band 47, Heft 12, S. 1250-1258
ISSN: 0030-6428
World Affairs Online
L'Etat de droit face au terrorisme, défi majeur des démocraties européennes L'année deux mille vingt et un sonne le glas de vingt ans d'une lutte entamée au lendemain des attentats du 11 septembre et communément évoquée sous le terme de « guerre contre le terrorisme ». En effet il y a vingt-ans, le monde occidental découvre que la guerre auparavant délocalisée se retrouve dans leurs localités. Jamais un tel scénario n'aurait été envisageable pour une majorité d'individus, le sentiment d'invincibilité et la supériorité d'un régime démocratique débellicisé grandissant alors à l'époque depuis une dizaine d'années dans les mœurs. Pourtant, la menace terrorisme ne cessera dès lors d'augmenter pour atteindre son paroxysme chronique à partir de l'attaque dans les locaux de Charlie Hebdo en janvier deux mille quinze. Cette même année, la France connaît en novembre une tuerie de masse sans précèdent depuis la seconde guerre mondiale. Tous deux filmés pour l'Histoire à l'instar des procès de Nuremberg, les procès très médiatiques et hors normes de ces attentats ont débuté l'année dernière pour le premier et il y a quelques mois pour le second. Ces deux évènements marquent ainsi sans aucun doute le début d'une nouvelle ère au sein de l'arène judiciaire européenne, complétée par un cadre policier et législatif actualisé, composée à la fois de nouveaux combats mais aussi et surtout de nouveaux moyens. De l'état d'urgence à la justice de précaution, en passant par un désintérêt profond pour des problématiques ayant trait au socle législatif sur lequel se base notre société, les gouvernements démocratiques occidentaux revendiquent une place de faiseurs de normes sur l'échiquier diplomatique international. En y regardant de plus près, ces démocraties cauteleuses s'engouffrent pourtant dans une faille faisant basculer la balance en faveur d'une plus forte poussée du droit au détriment de la consécration des libertés. Ce phénomène, qui est censé plutôt résulter sur un équilibre afin de construire leur légitimité, entache fortement les gouvernements successifs en charge de la question terroriste. Bien qu'une opinion éclairée de la population appelle à plus de rigueur et de respect des normes fondatrices de l'Etat de droit, une grande majorité semble accepter cet écart sous couvert d'un climat sécuritaire se renforçant au fil du temps. Les représentants des Etats européens se sont lancés de plein fer dans cette guerre contre le terrorisme, à l'origine nonobstant frileux à employer ce ton martial au lendemain des attentats du 11 septembre, à l'instar de Jacques Chirac qui affirmait en 2001« Je ne sais pas s'il faut utiliser le mot guerre. Ce qui est sûr, c'est que nous avons un conflit d'une nouvelle nature »1. Ce « conflit d'une nouvelle nature » a engendré des politiques de prévention et de proactivité de l'Etat questionnant la gouvernance démocratique de l'Etat lui-même. Si le terrorisme a toujours existé, jamais autant de théories complémentaires ne se sont d'ailleurs glissées dans le contexte académique et sociétal, témoignant d'un véritable engouement pour la problématique. Certainement, se demander si l'intention vaut faute appelle une réponse qui semble sempiternelle. En revanche une dimension s'impose, celle de la mutation de l'éthique des relations internationales qui, bien que toujours présente face aux enjeux sécuritaires, a évolué avec certitude. Comment traiter des combattants étrangers élevés sur le sol européen partis rejoindre Daech en Syrie ? Que faire de leurs enfants ? Ces défis sont liés au fait que la « menace terroriste n'est plus seulement exogène » (Esposito & Baudouï, 2021), mais grandit et mature sur le sol des démocraties européennes. Il n'en reste pas moins que pour tenter d'endiguer une menace diffuse mais certaine, l'État de droit s'est paré de tout un arsenal législatif et judiciaire lui permettant de prévenir toute radicalisation et passage à l'acte. Les règles d'exception s'inscrivent pourtant dans une durée plus longue que celle de leur établissement, et comme « les dispositifs d'exception resteront en vigueur encore longtemps » (Ibid., 2021), cela implique ainsi de se questionner sérieusement. La question des enfants de combattants étrangers et de leur traitement se place comme un point de départ assez pertinent pour questionner l'affaiblissement de l'État de droit. Les États européens sont tous signataires de la Convention relative aux droits de l'enfant, ce qui implique que leur prise de position originelle, rejetant en majorité l'hypothèse d'un rapatriement, peut être considérée comme une violation de ce traité. En effet, les conditions de vie dans les camps de réfugiés de la zone irako-syrienne sont « déplorables » (Winkel, 2018, p.4), « indignes » (Baudouin, 2019, p.6) et les besoins sont multidimensionnels : santé, éducation, hygiène, alimentation. Les Nations Unies ont par exemple dénombré pas moins de 11 000 enfants âgés de 6 à 18 ans n'ayant pas rejoint les bancs scolaires depuis au moins 5 ans (OCHA, 2019, p.4). Sans compter ceux qui n'ont même pas encore la conscience de comprendre la situation dans laquelle ils se trouvent. N'étant pas scolarisés, vivant dans des conditions plus que déplorables, et constituant potentiellement des menaces aux yeux des États, ces enfants sont au cœur d'un véritable dilemme qui mêle des enjeux sécuritaires, humanitaires, politiques, légaux et moraux. Chaque État adopte une stratégie qui lui est propre, car compte-tenu de la complexité des positions en jeu, il devient impossible d'établir une réponse commune. Certains décident donc d'être entreprenants, tandis que d'autres préfèrent détourner le regard, ce qui soutient l'idée d'une « compassion à géométrie variable » (Belporo, 2020). La position des États se heurte à celle du Conseil des droits de l'homme, sur laquelle viennent se greffer les alertes des ONG qui n'hésitent pas à désigner le camp d'Al-Hol « Guantánamo bis ». Ainsi, l'intérêt supérieur de l'État est confronté à l'intérêt supérieur de l'enfant. La situation résulte donc d'une rupture complète avec le droit international, laquelle s'étant formée depuis le début des années 2000 dans le cadre de la guerre contre le terrorisme.Les réponses des pouvoirs publics aux questions du terrorisme doivent s'appréhender au regard de la lumière visiblement médiatique, au sein de laquelle à la fois les terroristes et finalement les politiques tirent leur épingle du jeu. Le traitement médiatique de chaque attaque, accentué par la diffusion instantanée sur différents canaux d'informations, s'impose comme un oxygène pour les premiers tandis qu'il se place comme l'initiateur d'un enjeu ayant intérêt à être intégré à l'agenda politique pour les seconds. L'opinion publique s'engouffre dans ce qu'il est possible de qualifier de « guerre des valeurs », où le phénomène de co-radicalisation, compris comme une montée exacerbée de l'altérité et d'une poussée terroriste identitaire, côtoie des manquements étatiques. Les enfants européens de combattants étrangers laissés pour compte sont des victimes malheureuses et collatérales de tels agissements. La littérature s'accordant sur « l'impassibilité du public devant les évènements à distance » (Sreberny, 2006, p.230), distance qui en l'occurrence ici est autant spatio-géographique que socio-culturelle, il devient plus aisé de comprendre ce manque d'intérêt et de sensibilité à l'égard des mineurs détenus dans les camps de réfugiés. A cela s'ajoute le fait qu'ils sont assimilés à la terreur de Daesh car en effet « c'est la vérité que ces enfants nous rappellent » (Giraud, 2020, p.229). Ainsi, face aux actes terroristes et particulièrement depuis les attentats du onze septembre, pléthore de réactions dans les médias s'imbibent de démonstration émotionnelle manifeste (Sreberny, 2006, p.232). Ce rejet est caractéristique de l'insensibilité qui se développe face à la question du rapatriement, y compris envers les enfants.Si l'on peut tenir les parents pour responsables de leurs progénitures, la réciproque est fausse. En effet, selon le réseau européen de sensibilisation à la radicalisation, le RAN (Radicalisation Awareness Network), ces enfants sont avant tout des « victimes » (RAN, 2017, p.50). De plus, ils auront de grandes difficultés à devenir citoyen d'un Etat et se sentir appartenir à la communauté de ce dernier en ayant été socialisés dans l'horreur. D'une part, comme le montre l'expertise de l'anthropologue Dounia Bouzar (2019), l'objectif du groupe jihadiste est de transmettre aux enfants « une idéologie totalitaire » (Bouzar, 2019, p.82) dès leur plus jeune âge, et surtout de les amener à appréhender le monde à travers une vision guerrière et haineuse. D'autre part, dans les camps de réfugiés de la zone irako-syrienne, dont notamment celui d'al-Hol où se trouve la majorité des ressortissants mineurs européens, les conditions de vie sont « apocalyptiques », digne d'un « enfer désertique » (Baudouin, 2019, p.6). La socialisation de ces mineurs ne répond donc à aucun standard européen et une fois de retour dans leur pays d'origine, leur réinsertion sera un défi complexe (Heinke, Raudszus, in Coolsaet & Renard, 2018, p.54). Les experts onusiens exhortent donc sans plus tarder les États ayant des ressortissants mineurs dans les camps de réfugiés irako-syrien à prendre toutes les mesures nécessaires pour respecter « l'intérêt supérieur de l'enfant »2. Les mécanismes qui bloquent le rapatriement de ces mineurs dans les pays européens semblent résulter d'un triptyque sécuritaire, confortée par une incertitude des services de sécurité quant à la menace qu'ils peuvent représenter mais également émotionnel, avec un désintérêt de la population à leur égard, et enfin politique, car les gouvernements en place peuvent être réticents face à la prise en charge de ces enfants pour ne pas avoir à assumer un coût d'audience nationale qui leur serait probablement défavorable « face à une problématique peu porteuse électoralement » (Winkel, 2018, p.18). Par exemple, la France avait mis sur pied un plan global de rapatriement mais face à une opinion publique française très défavorable à cette idée, le plan a été abandonné (Mazoue, 2019). C'est d'ailleurs pourquoi les plaidoyers de retour sont plutôt l'œuvre d'organisations non-gouvernementales ou de collectifs de familles ayant des proches sur place.Les tensions entre les intérêts sécuritaires et ceux éthiques se retrouvent également dans la question du retour des mères radicalisées, ayant pris la décision de rejoindre le proto-Etat de Daesh. En effet, les Etats « s'opposent au rapatriement des femmes considérées comme dangereuses et répugnent à rapatrier des enfants sans leur mère3 ». Elles constituent un facteur de radicalisation pour leurs enfants et leur retour est fortement décrié, ce qui explique que le rapatriement des orphelins soit plus aisément réalisable et légitime vis-à-vis de la population. En outre, depuis la tentative d'attentat de 2016, les femmes terroristes sont systématiquement judiciarisées et les mères d'enfants radicalisés déplorent le manque d'empathie de la population à l'égard de leur problématique (Bannani, 2019). Le cadrage dont elles font l'objet est effectivement en rupture totale avec celui de la figure de la femme terroriste que l'on retrouve dès la fin du XVIIIe siècle avec Charlotte Corday où la « femme « terroriste » est une beauté héroïque, emportée par son émotion, influencée par ses sentiments, exaltée plus que dotée d'une réelle conviction politique » (Salomé, 2010, p.10). Bien au contraire, la femme radicalisée et djihadiste est perçue comme une menace, et indéniablement coupable d'avoir mis sa capacité de conception au service de l'ennemi en lui permettant d'alimenter le vivier de ses jeunes recrues.L'Europe semble confrontée à un défi. Une personne qui porte atteinte à son État origine via un acte terroriste ou bien un citoyen qui part rejoindre les rangs d'une organisation terroriste étrangère implique en effet une réponse qui s'accorde avec les lois en vigueur sur le territoire d'origine ou de départ. Or, les États européens tiennent une posture moins respectueuse de ces normes qu'intrinsèquement hypocrites : leur double jeu consiste en effet d'une part à promouvoir des traités favorisant le respect des droits humains ou à condamner des gouvernements ne respectant pas ces derniers, mais de l'autre, ne pas afficher une position ferme à l'égard de leurs ressortissants se trouvant dans les couloirs de la mort en Irak dans l'atteinte de leur peine ou encore d'être intraitables aux frontières de la Biélorussie. Cela ouvre la porte à certains questionnements, dont notamment celui de l'adéquation des moyens utilisés dans la lutte contre le terrorisme en Europe face aux valeurs établissant le fondement de l'État de droit.
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Ned
Lebow on Drivers of War, Cultural Theory, and IR of Foxes and Hedgehogs
Drawing
on classical political theories, International Relations is dominated by
theories that presuppose interests or fear as dominant drivers for foreign
policy. Richard Ned Lebow looks further back into the history of ideas to conjure up a
more varied set of drives that underpin political action. In this Talk, Lebow, among others, elaborates on
the underpinnings of political action, discusses how war drives innovations in
IR theorizing in the 20th century, and likens himself to a fox,
rather than a hedgehog.
Print version of this Talk (pdf)
What
is, according to you, the biggest challenge / principal debate in current IR?
What is your position or answer to this challenge / in this debate?
Well, the big challenge in international politics is always
how do we keep from destroying one another and that's the negative question.
But it is mirrored by a positive question which is, how do we build community
and tolerance and peace? And that's not exactly the flip side, but that's
always been the big question in IR. And part of that, I think, is how we learn
to manage threatening change. Because in my perspective, that's the driving
force of conflict: ultimately, both World Wars can be attributed to
modernization and its destabilizing consequences. That is also the reason why
it is a falsehood to base theory on that little select slice of history during
the World Wars, extrapolate it, and try to think its universal. Yet that is
what IR theory does: so many theorists, and so many of the people you recently
interviewed, are guilty of doing that. So that's the big question and
certainly, that's what drove me to study IR in the hope that I could make some
small contribution to figuring out some of the answers or partial answers to
these questions.
If we turn to what the central debate should be in
International Theory, well, I would frame this in two parts: the first should
be 'what are the different ways in which we can conceive of international
theory and how, by all of us pursuing it the way we feel comfortable with, we
can enrich the field without throwing bric-a-brac at each other and find ways
of learning from each other?'
A few years ago, I edited a book with Mark Lichbach (Theory and Evidence in Comparative Politics
and International Relations) as a rejoinder to King, Keohane and Verba's
book, which we found deeply offensive. It has the narrowest framework and then
they base their understanding on the Vienna school yet they seem to have forgotten
that Hempel and Popper would disavow the positions that King, Keohane and Verba
(KKV) are anchoring themselves in as epistemologically primitive. And the very
examples they give to illustrate 'good science'—Alvarez and his groupaddressing the problem of dinosaur extinction—they fail to see that what
these people did was in fact code on the dependent variable, which is the big
no-no for KKV! And the reason why Alvarez et al were taken seriously, was not because they went through the order
of research that KKV promoted, but rather because they came up with an
explanation for a phenomenon that people have long known about—yet explanations
don't figure at all in KKV's take; they had no interest in mechanisms, it was
all narrow correlations. It's absurd! So we edited the book, and we invited
people who represented different perspectives, but all of whom had evidence and
struggled to make sense of the evidence, to talk to one another and to look at
the problems they themselves find in their positions and how one could learn
broadly from considering this. That's the kind of debate that seems to me is a
useful one. Not who is right or wrong, but how can we learn collectively. And
secondly, I think maybe we need fewer debates, and more good research.
How did you arrive
at where you currently are in your thinking about IR?
I suppose it's a combination of people, books, and events, and
being a dog that constantly gnaws on bones and works it through. Very clearly the
Second World War and the Cold War were what brought me to the study of IR. I'm sure
in their absence, considering the counterfactual, I would have gone into Astrophysics,
which was the other field that really interested me.
I think the first concrete influence was as an undergraduate
and then as a graduate, being struck by certain individuals whose minds seemed
to sparkle; and I admired them for that and they became role models. And I
would make myself, intellectually, a little Hans Morgenthau, a little Karl
Deutsch; see the world through their eyes, and play with it. I never really wanted
to make myself into them, but rather to benefit by seeing what the world was
like when seen through their eyes. So in this sense, let me go back and draw on
Boswell, Hughes, and Mill for my answer. They all conceived of identity as
something that's a process of self-fashioning in which we mix and match the
characteristics that we observe in other people. And the purpose of society is
to throw up these role models and provide interaction with them so that we can
constantly be engaging in self-fashioning. And ultimately, we create something
that's novel that other people want to emulate or reject, as the case may be.
And I think that mixing and matching, and ultimately creating a synthesis of my
own, I developed my own approach to things.
The second element of this is to pick problems that engage
me, and stick with them. My first book in IR was about international crises and
I worked on this, it must have been 8, possibly even 9 years. I started out initially
convinced that deterrence theory made sense but wouldn't fit the historical evidence. Then one day, while
playing around, I realized the theory was wrong and by reversing it, I could
understand why it didn't work and see there were very different dynamics at
play. So working on a problem constantly and going back and forth between
theory and empirical findings, you gradually develop your own sense of the
field.
It also helps, over the course of an intellectual lifetime, to
work on different kinds of problems: I've just finished a book on the politics
and ethics of identity; I finished a manuscript up for review on the nature of
causation and different takes on cause; and the previous two books were on
counterfactuals and the origins of war. And I learned something theoretically
and methodologically by throwing myself into these problems and also, in some
cases, by going beyond what one would normally consider the domain of IR to look
for answers. I've often done philosophy and literature in the identity book. I
also go to musical texts: I have a reading of the Mozart Da Ponte Operas as a deliberate
thought experiment to test out ancient regime
and enlightenment identities under varying circumstances to expose what's wrong
with them and to work toward a better approach of Così fantutte. And I
read the music, not only the libretti,
to get at an answer. Of course, when you've been doing it a long time, it keeps
you alive and alert when you look at something new. I'm just finishing my 46th
year of University teaching. It's a long time!
Thirdly, there were a few pivotal books. I read George
Orwell's 1984 and Aldous Huxley's Brave New World in the early 50s. Both
of those were very powerful books. I also read in about 1950 - Life Magazine
produced a large volume on WWII and it had fabulous photographs and of course
Life was famous, Robert Capa's photographs, and
the text by John Dos Passos. A big big book that I read and re-read and that
was a powerful influence on me. I'd say the Diary of Anne Frank, when it came
out, which was not all that dissimilar but had a different ending from my own
war experience, and then in high school I read, or struggled to read—I don't
think I understood it—Ideology and Utopia
(full text here) by Karl
Mannheim, and then I read Politics among
Nations and the Twenty Year's Crisis.
And both those books made enormous sense to me at the time. But I think the
book that over the course of my lifetime has had the most influence on me of
anything is Thucydides' The History of
the Peloponnesian War (read full text here).
What would a
student need to become a specialist in IR or understand the world in a global
way?
I am tempted to give you a flippant answer that an expert is
somebody from out of town; what used to be with slides would now be with a PowerPoint
presentation. I think frankly you need to do two things: you need to be
analytically sophisticated and original on the one hand, but to do it well, you
have to have an empirical base. There has to be some problem or set of problems
that you've rolled up your sleeves, looked at the data, talk to the people who
are on the ground doing these things, and you need to go back and forth between
that empirical knowledge and conceptual one. That's success as a social scientist.
And traditionally, there's
always been another key. You must have one foot in society in which you belong
and another foot outside so you can do it as an outsider as well as an insider.
That's terribly important. I think, in this sense, that Americans are more
parochial than other people. They are good insiders but they are not very good
outsiders and they just don't understand the rest of the world and when you
read what they write about the rest of the world, you wonder what planet they
are living on. If you don't see the rest of the world, you can't look at the
America from another perspective. It's like people who take hegemony seriously;
it's like believing in Santa Claus, except Santa Claus is benign. To gain a
deep experience of the world in itself is a pre-requisite. Do a year abroad in
some other culture. Learn a language. Have a relationship with someone from a
different culture—you begin to learn the languages and all the rest will come.
That's the way to start.
You are
most famous to most people for your Cultural
Theory of International Relations (2008). What does it comprise and can you
say something about its classical roots?
I return to classical theory of conflict and cooperation
because I find that in modern theory, all drives of human action have been
reduced to appetite, and reason to mere instrumentality. The Greeks, by
contrast, believed there were several fundamental drives—drives that affected
politics—and while these included appetite, they weren't just appetite. Reason was more than instrumentality; it also had
the goal of understanding what led to a happy life; then, next to reason and
appetite, the third drive was spirit or self-esteem (the Greek thumos), which is very different and
often opposed to appetite. It is about winning the approbation of others to
feel good about ourselves. The difference between honor and standing—two
variants of self-esteem—is that honor is status achieved within a fixed set of
rules, while standing is whenever you achieve status by whatever means.
Now most existing IR theories are either only built on
appetites—as liberalism and Marxism—or fear. And for the Greeks fear is not a
human drive but a powerful emotion which can become a motive. And when reason
loses control over either appetite or spirit, people begin to worry about their
own ability to satisfy their appetites, their spirit, or even protect
themselves physically. That's when fear becomes a powerful motive. Realism is
of course the paradigm developed around fear. I differ in that my theory
recognizes multiple motives, that are active to varying degrees at different
times. They don't blend the way a solution does in chemistry, but they retain
their own characteristics, even if jumbled together. So my theory expects to
see quite diverse and often conflicting behavior, whereas other theories only
pay attention to state behavior that seems to support their theory, and feel
the need to explain away other behavior inconsistent with their theory. I revel
in these variations. Second, I vary in describing what derives from these
motives as (Weberian) ideal types—which means, something you don't encounter in
the real world, but rather, an abstraction, a fictional or analytical
description, that helps to make sense of the real world but never maps onto it
exactly. So, a fear-based world gives you a very nice description of a
foundation of anarchy. But of course this is an ideal-type world. Fear is only
one motive. You have go to a place where civil order has broken down, like
Somalia or the trenches in WWII, to see fear-based models compete.
Starting from these three motives and the emotion of fear, I
argue that each of these generates a very different logic of cooperation,
conflict and risk-taking; and each is associated with a different kind of
hierarchy. And all of them except fear rely on a different principle of
justice. Just to give an example: for actors—whether individuals or
states—driven by self-esteem, they tend to be risk prone (because honor has to
be won by successfully overcoming ordeals and challenges); it leads to a
conflictual logic because you are competing with others for honor; and it can
be rule-based (although the rules can brake down and move into fear); and the
principle is one of fairness, in contrast to interest or appetite which has a
principle of equality. The hierarchy is one of clientelism, where people honor
those at the top, which, in return, provides practical benefits for those on
the bottom. The Greeks called this hegemonia;
the Chinese had a similar system.
But because any actual system is not an ideal type, we have
to figure out what that mixture is and we can begin to understand foreign
policies. And I try to give numerous examples in the book. And the big turning
point, I argue, is modernity, where it becomes more difficult to untangle the
motives and their discourses. Because in modernity both Rousseau and Adam Smith
try to understand why we want material things, so the two become connected. You
could argue that even in Egyptian times they were connected, in the pyramids,
which are nothing if not erections of self-esteem. But it becomes more
difficult and so, rather than saying, using literary texts, artistic works and
political speeches as a way of determining the relationship, I approached the
problem differently with the examples of the World Wars, the Cold War, and the
Anglo-American Invasion of Iraq. I said let's run a test of seeing how
carefully we can explain the origins and the dynamics of these conflicts on the
basis of interest, on the basis of fear, on the basis of self-esteem. And I
think that's methodologically defensible.
Now the interesting point is that the honor or self-esteem
explanation is gone completely from modern IR explanations but does at least
just a good a job—if not better—at explaining these conflicts I mention above. There is an important sense—and this is my latest book—in which going to war was the dominant way to get recognized as a great power, and I feel that the example of the war in Iraq illustrates that that principle is on the retreat.
I obviously use Greek thinking as a source here of—again, I
wouldn't use the word knowledge—but as a source of insight into human nature
and the recurring problems regardless of society. Some of the great writers and
thinkers cannot be surpassed as sources of knowledge that we as social
scientists are shadows on the cave by comparison. And I find the Greeks
particularly interesting for several reasons. One, they had a richer
understanding of the psyche that moderns who have adduced everything to appetite
and reason to a mere instrumentality, this is, to me, an incredibly narrow,
crude way of thinking of the human mind. And, for whatever reason, they were
gifted with tragedians who pierced to the core of things. So I find them as a
source of inspiration but it's by no way limited to the Greeks. You can pick
great authors from any culture, in any century, and read them and learn a lot.
How
should we understand your cultural theory of international relations in
relation to the 'big' paradigms?
My theory is constructivist, at every level. I can go even further and claim that my theory is
the only constructivist theory.
Alexander Wendt is not a constructivist. If anything, he's a structural
liberal. It did have preexisting identities and has a teleology as he believes
a Kantian world is inevitable— that's quite a statement to make! And I hope
he's right. On the other hand, I define constructivists in a broader way. Most
constructivists start with identities and identities are certainly an important
feature of my work, but my theory rests on a different premise, and that is the
notion of there being certain core values which are germane to politics, and
they vary in relative importance from society to society, and they find
expression in different ways. So it is constructivist, I think, in the Weberian
sense: we have to understand from within the culture what makes things
meaningful. And, in that sense, you could bring in the notion of
inter-subjective reality, but I go beyond it, because other values are always
present in this mix and therefore there's behavior that appears contradictory
that is often misunderstood if you apply the wrong lens to it. So there's a
lack of interdisciplinary understanding as well: you have to look at both to
see how the world works. So cultural theory is constructivist and it allows us
to reframe and expand what constructivism means.
If I apply this constructivist thinking to one of the core
principles in our approach to world politics: what is a cause? I start by
asking, what does 'cause' mean, in physics? Why physics? Because physics is
always the field that political scientists look at, we have 'physics envy', so
to speak. And interestingly, in physics, there is no consensus about what cause
means. Some physicists think that very notion of cause is unhelpful to what
they do. Others are happy with regularities and subscribe to causal thinking. Still
others thing that you need to have mechanisms to explain anything. Still others,
and here statistical mechanics can be taken as a case in point, invoke Kantian
understandings of cause. Within physics there's no argument between people
adhering to these different understandings of 'cause', because you should do
what works! They don't criticize one another. So if they have this diversity,
why shouldn't we? Why shouldn't we develop understandings of cause that are
most appropriate to what we do? So I develop an understanding I call 'inefficient
causation' (download full paper here),
sort of playing off of Aristotle. And it is a constructivist understanding, but
it also incorporates elements that are distinctively non-constructivist. And
identities are only a small piece of the puzzle.
Is
there any sense to make of the way IR has evolved over the 20th
century?
I think if you look at some of the central figures, it's
quite easy. There are 2 great cohorts of International Relations theorists.
Those born in the early years of the 20th century comprise Hans
Morgenthau, John Hertz, E.H. Carr, Harold Lasswell, Nicholas Spykman, Frederick Schuman, and Karl Deutsch—who was
on my dissertation committee together with Isaiah Berlin and John Hertz. The
second cohort is born between about 1939 and 1945, and it comprises Robert
Jervis (Theory Talk #12), Joseph Nye
(Theory Talk #7), Robert Keohane (Theory Talk #9), Oren Young, Peter
Katzenstein (Theory Talk #15), Stephen Krasner (Theory Talk#21), Janice Steinberg… And I'll tell you what I think the reasons are for
these groups to emerge at these particular moments: the first cohort lived
through World War I. And did so, fortunately, in at an age where they were too
young to be combatants for the most part, but they certainly had to deal
intellectually and personally with its consequences and then watch the horrors
unfold of the 1930s.
And the second, my own, cohort was born at the outset of the
Second World War. I think, in that group, I may be the only one of them born in
Europe (France). The rest of them were born in the US. And we came of age
during the most acute crisis of the cohort. So I was either in university or
graduate school during the Berlin crisis, during the Cuba crisis, and certainly
had an interest first in the consequences of WWII and how something like this
could happen, and then living through the horrors of the Cold War, not knowing
if indeed one would live through
them. And that created a very strong incentive and focus for our group of
people. Now a surprising number of this second group did their graduate studies
at Yale: Janice Stein, I, Oren Young, Bruce Russet, Krasner, later all at Yale
with Karl Deutsch. The rest, Jervis, Keohane and Krasner at Harvard with Samuel
Huntington. I think you have the odd person who's born somewhere in between –
so, Ken Waltz (Theory Talk #40), for
instance, is younger. He must be a 1920 person, almost exactly in between these
two, just as Ernst Haas.
And I wouldn't be surprised now if there is another cohort
emerging, the people of around the age of Stefano Guzinni, Jens Bartelson,
Patrick Jackson (Theory Talk #44).
What ties this third cohort together is that they all watched the end of the
Cold War and are coping with its aftermath. So I believe that it's probably two
things: the external environment and the extent to which you're in an
intellectually nurturing institution. And of course for our cohort, it
certainly helped that there were jobs. That was not true of the earlier cohort.
Almost all of them, except E.H. Carr, ended up in the US as refugees. Did you
know Morgenthau started as an elevator boy in New York? Then he got a job
teaching part-time at Brooklyn College because someone fell ill. His wife
cleaned other people's apartments to supplement their income. Then he got a job
at the University of Kansas City, which was a hellhole, and finally Harold
Lasswell got called to Washington for some war work and got Chicago to hire
Morgenthau to replace him.
What is
the issue with the discipline today if, as you noted before, we fail to ask the
most interesting questions and instead focus on method?
Well, it of course depends on which side of the pond you
sit. On the American side of the pond, positivist or game-theoretical
behaviorist or rationalist modeling approaches dominate the literature; it's
just silly, from my perspective. It's based on assumptions which bear no
relationship to the real world. People like it because it's intellectually
elegant: they don't have to learn any languages, they don't have to read any
history, and they can pretend they're scientists discussing universals.
Intellectually, it's ridiculous. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita (Theory Talk #31) is a classic case in point. He's made a huge
reputation for himself with The War Trap (1981).
That book and the corresponding theory are based on a simple assumption,
namely, that there's a war trap compelling states into war, because initiators
win wars. But just look at the empirical record from 1945 to the present—initiators
lose between 80-90% of the wars they start. And that really depends on the
definition of victory. If you use the real definition, the Clausewitzian one,
you have to ask: do they achieve their political goals through violence? Then
the answer is, even fewer "victories". Well, let's cut them some slack, use a
more relaxed definition: did they beat the other side militarily? Initiators
still lose 78 or 82%—I forget exactly which percentage of their wars. And the
profession right now is so ignorant of history that nobody said 'Wait a
minute!' the day the book came out. Instead IR scholars all focus on this model
and fine-tuning it—it's ridiculous! And well, I don't want to go on with a
critique, but this is a serious problem, for it concerns a huge
misunderstanding regarding one of the most important problems out there.
But what happens now is this kind of thinking metastasizes
throughout the discipline because what students in International Relations or
Political Science more generally are taught are calculus, statistics—and I'm
not against this, one should learn them; I use them myself when I wear my
psychologist hat and do quantitative research and statistical analysis—but they
don't learn languages, they don't learn history, they don't learn philosophy.
They are so narrow! Much of this of course has to do with the reward structure
in the United States. It's clear that the statistical scientists are at the top
of the hill. So, economists transform themselves into scientists; but the
social scientists copy them because there are clear institutional rewards. If
you look at our salaries in comparison to the salaries of anthropologists,
historians—then if you sit at the edge of your chair and look over the abyss
you might see the humanists down there in terms of what they get. So very
clearly, there are strong institutional rewards. Once the positivist crowd got
a lock on various foundations and journals, if you want a job, if you want to
rise up through the profession, students tell me you have to do this stuff. IR
graduate students are bricklayers that get turned out of these universities.
That's the tragedy! It's no longer a serious intellectual enterprise. It's not
connected to anything terribly meaningful.
And mind you, I must say, while on the other, European, side
of the pond there is more diversity (one of the reasons I feel more comfortable
here), at the same time there is a strong tendency to go for a certain
heavy-handed brand of post-modernism. If you don't start an article with a
genuflection to Foucault or De Saussure or Derrida, you don't get published.
And by not looking beyond these 20th century thinkers, people in
Europe are often given credit for inventing things which were common knowledge
for hundreds and hundreds of years. Utterly ridiculous. But in between, there
are of course people who are trying to make sense of the world, including many
people in the positivist tradition who are doing good quantitative research and
trying to address serious problems in the world. The difficulty is that these
two extremes are often people who approach IR as a religion and they think that
their way of doing research is the only way
and they have no respect for others. And that's a kind of arrogance to which,
to me, is a violation of what the university is all about.
Ultimately, what is good theory? One approach would be to
say that a good theory is one that appears to order a domain in a way that is
conceptually rigorous - to the extent that that's even possible - that is
original and that raises a series of interesting questions which haven't been
asked before, but which are amenable to empirical research and finally it
should have normative implications. This is what Hans Morgenthau meant when he
said that the purpose of IR theory is not to justify what policymakers did, but
to educate them to act in ways that would lead to a better and more peaceful
world. And that, I think, is the ultimate goal of IR theory that we should not
lose sight of.
You
indicated that Isaiah Berlin was on your dissertation committee. He famously
tries to explain Tolstoy's philosophy of history (in War and Peace) through the parable of the hedgehog and the fox. If
theorists constraining themselves to one drive underpinning policy choices
would be hedgehogs, how would you see yourself? A fox or a hedgehog?
I am clearly a fox! I do different things. Whether I do them
well is debatable. But I certainly think that I'm a man of many tricks. Of
course the distinction also implies not believing in an overarching truth, and
indeed, I try hard not to think about truth because I don't think you can get
very far when you do. Epistemologically and eclectically, I'm a great believer
that we can never really establish a cause, truth, and knowledge. One of the
great problems here goes back to Plato who was shocked that craftsmen equated
technical ability to produce things with knowledge—Sofia, which is wisdom. And
today you have the problem one step up, so another category of knowledge for
the Greeks was episteme. Aristotle
would describe it as 'conceptual knowledge' or that which might even be
represented mathematically. And the people who would be 'expert' in episteme
think they have sofia and their claim
to being a hedgehog is the same kind of conceit, a form of hubris. Berlin's
distinction between hedgehogs and foxes is a very useful and nice concept to
play around with.
Yet it's a bit much to reduce Tolstoy to that tension. You
could do it as a game but it doesn't do much justice because there is so much
else in Tolstoy. He's tilting against the French historians of the 19th
century who have erected Napoleon into this strategic genius. And he does a
very convincing job of showing that what goes on on the battlefield has nothing
whatsoever to do with what Napoleon or anyone else who is wearing a general's
ebullience or theorists hat says. And also, and in this sense, one could see
him as the beginning of subaltern history of social science, he's telling the
story—admittedly about aristocrats, not commoners—but he's telling the story of
ordinary people on the battlefield, not the people making the decisions. So the
war is in a way a background to the lives of the people, focusing our attention
a very humanist way, on people. This, too, is revolutionary for his time.
Professor
Richard Ned Lebow Professor of International Political Theory at the Department
of War Studies, King's College London and James O. Freedman Presidential
Professor Emeritus at Dartmouth College. He is also a Bye-Fellow of
Pembroke College, University of Cambridge. He has taught strategy and the
National and Naval War Colleges and served as a scholar-in-residence in the
Central Intelligence Agency during the Carter administration. He has
authored and edited 28 books and nearly 200 peer reviewed articles.
Related
links
Read the
first chapter of Lebow's The Tragic
Vision of Politics (2003) here (pdf)
Read
Lebow & Kelly's Thucydides and
Hegemony: Athens and the United States (Review of International Studies
2001), here (pdf)
Read
Lebow's Deterrence and Reassurance:
Lessons from the Cold War (Global Dialogue 2001) here (pdf)
Read
Lebow's The Long Peace, the End of the
Cold War, and the Failure of Realism (International Organization, 1994)
here (pdf)
Read
Lebow's The Cuban Missile Crisis: Reading
the Lessons Correctly (Political Science Quarterly 1983) here (pdf)
Print version of this Talk (pdf)
Threats To International Peace And Security. The Situation In The Middle East ; United Nations S/PV.8231 Security Council Seventy-third year 8231st meeting Friday, 13 April 2018, 10 a.m. New York Provisional President: Mr. Meza-Cuadra . (Peru) Members: Bolivia (Plurinational State of). . Mr. Llorentty Solíz China. . Mr. Ma Zhaoxu Côte d'Ivoire. . Mr. Tanoh-Boutchoue Equatorial Guinea. . Mr. Ndong Mba Ethiopia. . Mr. Alemu France. . Mr. Delattre Kazakhstan. . Mr. Umarov Kuwait. . Mr. Alotaibi Netherlands. . Mr. Van Oosterom Poland. . Ms. Wronecka Russian Federation. . Mr. Nebenzia Sweden . Mr. Skoog United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland . Ms. Pierce United States of America. . Mrs. Haley Agenda Threats to international peace and security The situation in the Middle East This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the translation of speeches delivered in other languages. The final text will be printed in the Official Records of the Security Council. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room U-0506 (verbatimrecords@un.org). Corrected records will be reissued electronically on the Official Document System of the United Nations (http://documents.un.org). 18-10728 (E) *1810728* S/PV.8231 Threats to international peace and security 13/04/2018 2/22 18-10728 The meeting was called to order at 10.05 a.m. Adoption of the agenda The agenda was adopted. Threats to international peace and security The situation in the Middle East The President (spoke in Spanish): In accordance with rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to participate in this meeting. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. I wish to warmly welcome His Excellency Secretary-General António Guterres, to whom I now give the floor. The Secretary-General: The situation in the Middle East is in chaos to such an extent it has become a threat to international peace and security. The region is facing a true Gordian knot — different fault lines crossing each other and creating a highly volatile situation with risks of escalation, fragmentation and division as far as the eye can see, with profound regional and global ramifications. We see a multiplicity of divides. The first is the memory of the Cold War. But, to be precise, it is more than a simple memory: the Cold War is back with a vengeance — but with a difference. The mechanisms and the safeguards to manage the risks of escalation that existed in the past no longer seem to be present. Secondly, there is the Palestinian-Israeli divide. Thirdly, there is the Sunni-Shia divide, evident from the Gulf to the Mediterranean. It is important to note that apparent religious divides are normally the result of political or geostrategic manipulation. Finally, there is a wide range of different factors — from opposing attitudes in relation to the role of the Muslim Brotherhood or the status of the Kurds, to the dramatic threats to communities that have been living in the region for millenniums and are part of the rich diversity of Middle Eastern societies. Those numerous divisions are reflected in a multiplicity of conflicts with different degrees of interconnection, several of which are clearly linked to the threat of global terrorism. Many forms of escalation are possible. We see the wounds of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict continuing to fester. The recent violence in Gaza resulted in many needless deaths and injuries. I repeat my call for an independent and transparent investigation into those incidents. I also appeal to those concerned to refrain from any act that could lead to further casualties, in particular any measures that could place civilians in harm's way. That tragedy underlines the urgency of revitalizing the peace process for a two- State solution that will allow Palestinians and Israelis to live side by side in peace in two democratic States within secure and recognized borders. I reaffirm the readiness of the United Nations to support those efforts. In Yemen, we are witnessing the worst humanitarian disaster in today's world. There is only one pathway to ending the Yemeni conflict and to addressing the humanitarian crisis: a negotiated political settlement through inclusive intra-Yemeni dialogue. My Special Envoy, Martin Griffiths, is doing everything possible to facilitate that political settlement. He will brief the Council next week. In Libya, I encourage all parties to continue to work with my Special Representative, Ghassan Salamé, as he engages in the political process with a broad range of Libyan interlocutors across the country in order to implement the United Nations action plan. It is high time to end the Libyan conflict. The case of Iraq demonstrates that progress is possible with concerted local, regional and global commitment. With the defeat of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, having overcome the risk of fragmentation, the Government of Iraq must now focus on reconstruction, reforms and reconciliation. I hope that the upcoming elections will consolidate that progress. At the recent Paris and Rome conferences, the international community reaffirmed its support for Lebanon's sovereignty, stability and State security institutions. It is absolutely essential to prevent a new Israel-Hizbullah conflict, which could inevitably result in many more victims and much greater destruction than the last war. I reiterate the critical importance to act on key principles and commitments on Lebanon, including the Security Council resolutions, such as resolution 1701 (2006), and the policy of disassociation. The dangers of the links to the Syrian conflict are 13/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8231 18-10728 3/22 evident in the recent confrontations between Iran and Israel in Syria.Syria today indeed represents the most serious threat to international peace and security. We see there confrontations and proxy wars, involving several national armies, a number of armed opposition groups, many national and international militia, foreign fighters from everywhere in the world and various terrorist organizations. From the beginning, we have witnessed systematic violations of international humanitarian law, international human rights law and international law, in general, in utter disregard for the letter and spirit of the Charter of the United Nations.For eight long years, the people of Syria have endured suffering upon suffering. I reiterate that there is no military solution to the conflict. The solution must be political through the Geneva intra-Syrian talks, as stipulated in resolution 2254 (2015), and in line with the consistent efforts of my Special Envoy, Staffan de Mistura. Syrians have lived through a litany of horrors: atrocity crimes, sieges, starvation, indiscriminate attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure, the use of chemical weapons, forced displacement, sexual violence, torture, detention and enforced disappearances. The list goes on.In a moment of hope, the Security Council adopted resolution 2401 (2018), demanding that all parties cease hostilities without delay for a durable humanitarian pause. Unfortunately, no such cessation of hostilities ever really took place. That is the bleak panorama of Syria today.In that panorama, I am outraged by the continued reports of the use of chemical weapons in Syria. I reiterate my strong condemnation of the use of chemical weapons by any party to the conflict under any circumstances. Their use is abhorrent and a clear violation of international law. The seriousness of the recent allegations requires a thorough investigation, using impartial, independent and professional expertise.In that regard, I reaffirm my full support for the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and its Fact-finding Mission in undertaking the required investigation into those allegations. The mission should be granted full access, without any restrictions or impediments, to perform its activities. I take note that the Syrian Government has requested that and is committed to facilitating it. The first OPCW team is already in Syria; a second team is expected today or tomorrow.However, we need to go further. In a letter to the Council two days ago, I expressed, following the end of the mandate of the OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism,"my deep disappointment that the Security Council was unable to agree upon a dedicated mechanism to attribute responsibility for the use of chemical weapons in Syria".I want to repeat today that the norms against chemical weapons must be upheld. As I wrote in the same letter:"[e]nsuring accountability for a confirmed use of chemical weapons is our responsibility, not least to the victims of such attacks. A lack of accountability emboldens those who would use such weapons by providing them with the reassurance of impunity. This, in turn, further weakens the norm proscribing the use of chemical weapons and the international disarmament and non-proliferation architecture as a whole. I urge all Member States to act responsibly in these dangerous circumstances;"I appeal to the Security Council to fulfil its duties and not to give up on efforts to agree upon a dedicated, impartial, objective and independent mechanism for attributing responsibility with regard to the use of chemical weapons. I stand ready to support such efforts."The increasing tensions and the inability to reach a compromise in the establishment of an accountability mechanism threaten to lead to a full-blown military escalation. In my contacts with the members of the Security Council, particularly the permanent members, I have reiterated my deep concerns about the risks of the current impasse and stressed the need to prevent the situation from spiralling out of control.That is exactly the risk that we face today — that things spiral out of control. It is our common duty to stop it.The President (spoke in Spanish): I thank the Secretary-General for his valuable briefing.I shall now give the floor to those Council members who wish to make statements.S/PV.8231 Threats to international peace and security 13/04/2018 4/22 18-10728 Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We are greatful to the Secretary-General for his briefing. His participation, his assessments and his authoritative words about the situation that has developed are very significant. We agree with him that there are many wounds in the Middle East. However, most important, currently the deepest wound is the situation in Syria, insofar as any negative repercussions would have major global implications.Two days ago, news of a threat by the United States to launch missile strikes against the Syrian Arab Republic ricocheted around the world. The Russian Federation was also warned to prepare for strikes. Let me point out that our military is in Syria at the invitation of its legitimate Government in order to combat international terrorism. We continue to see dangerous military preparations for an illegal act of force against a sovereign State in violation of the norms of international law. It is not just the use of force but even the threat of it that flies in the face of the Charter of the United Nations, and that is precisely what we are seeing in the most recent statements and actions of Washington and its allies. The bellicose rhetoric is being ratcheted up at every level, including at the very top. Additional forces and assets of the United States military and its allies are bearing down on the Syrian coast. It feels as though Washington is singlemindedly heading towards unleashing a military scenario against Syria. That cannot be permitted. Such developments would be fraught with terrible consequences for global security, especially considering that a Russian military contingent is deployed in Syria.There are also those who have been observing these risky preparations with tacit approval, declaring that they understand Washington's motives or engaging in direct incitement, thereby becoming potential accomplices in an act of reckless military adventurism. There are people in the Security Council who love to talk about preventive diplomacy. Right now, for some reason, they are nowhere to be seen or heard. The guilty parties have been speedily identified not just before any investigation has been conducted but even before it has been established whether the incident in question took place at all, but evidently they must still be punished. Someone will have to answer for these unfortunate developments and for the previous interventions that have engulfed many countries in years of crisis with untold casualties.Witness the recent experience of Iraq and Libya, which, among other things, shows that the attitude of America's leaders to the Security Council is largely one of convenience. They need it as cover for their Iraqi test tubes and Libyan no-fly zones. What they are presenting us with now is another virtual test tube, and an empty one. The reckless behaviour of the United States as it tramples on international law and State sovereignty is unworthy of its status as a permanent member of the Security Council, which presupposes the highest possible degree of responsibility and certainly not a right to sabre rattling, a right that is unknown in international law.Why does the United States continue to torture the Middle East, provoking one conflict after another and pitting the States of the region against one another? Who will benefit from a potential strike against the Syrian military, which is taking the brunt of the fight against terrorism and achieving major victories in it? We know for sure that the ringleaders of the Syrian armed groups were given orders to launch an offensive after a possible military action. Is this latest wave of chaos really being unleashed just for that?The excuse is the alleged use of toxic substances in the Syrian town of Douma on 7 April, for which there has been no reliable confirmation. Our specialists found no trace of the use of toxic substances. The residents of Douma know of no such attack. All the evidence of the alleged attack has been provided by anti-Government forces for whom this development is in their interests. We have good reason — indeed, we have information — leading us to believe that what took place was a provocation with the participation of various countries' intelligence services. We have been issuing warnings about this for a long time. It is a repeat of the Khan Shaykhun scenario in April of last year.The Syrian Government, for which this is clearly the last thing it needs, has said that it was not involved and has sent a request for an immediate inspection by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) of the location of the alleged incident. It has offered security guarantees jointly with the Russian military. The mission is already getting started on its work in Syria and we hope that it will be able to conduct a truly independent and impartial investigation.Only the Security Council has the authority at the international level to decide what measures to take and against whom in connection with the use of chemical 13/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8231 18-10728 5/22 weapons in Syria. Russia will continue to work diligently and systematically to de-escalate the recent tensions in international relations. We proposed adopting a brief resolution in support of the OPCW inspection mission in Douma that the United States, Britain and France irresponsibly blocked, thereby demonstrating their lack of interest in an investigation. The only thing they care about is overthrowing the Syrian Government and, more broadly, deterring the Russian Federation. This has been clearly visible in other international and domestic political events built on unfounded hoaxes and conspiracy theories that always centre around the Russian Federation.What is the United States trying to achieve? After many years of internecine strife in Syria, significant areas of the country have been stabilized. The political process is reviving and indicators of national reconciliation are emerging. The terrorists have been dealt a significant blow. We have never denied that the United States has also made a certain contribution to achieving that shared goal, but it has always kept certain types of terrorists in reserve for its fight against the so-called regime and for advancing its geopolitical priorities in the region.My British colleague is always asking me what Russia is doing to implement resolution 2401 (2018). My answer is that my country is practically the only one that is doing anything about it. Over the course of the Astana process, peace has been restored in more than 2,500 towns and villages. That does not mean that they have become victims of the regime, as the United States calls it, merely that with the help of Russia and other guarantors they have established normal relations with the central authorities in Damascus. With the support of the United Nations, the Syrian National Dialogue Congress was held successfully in Sochi. How many towns and villages has the United States brought peace to? How many groups has it persuaded to join the ceasefire agreements?In order to break the deadlock in the situation in eastern Ghouta after the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018), complex negotiations were conducted with the leaders of armed groups, with Russian assistance. The militias and their family members were safely evacuated from the district, and civilians were finally given the opportunity to shake off years of terror. Film of their genuine joy exists, but the Western media is not showing it. The United States does not care about the fate of the prisoners of the militias in eastern Ghouta who had been supporters of the Syrian Government. When they were bargaining with the Syrian authorities to exchange prisoners, the militias claimed that they were holding between 2,000 and 4,000 people. Now it turns out that there are far fewer. People died from harsh treatment and hard labour digging huge tunnels for their torturers.Some members have grieved to see their bearded pilgrims setting off for Syria on free tourist tickets. They lost no opportunity to shriek from every street corner about the plight of the hundreds of thousands of people in besieged eastern Ghouta. Now those people need help in rebuilding normal lives, but these Council members have already lost interest because the area is under Government control. Now there will have to be unpleasant discussions about the blockade of Fo'ah and Kefraya. When was the last time a humanitarian convoy was there? When was the last time Council members even asked about it? Someone must answer for the coalition's destruction of Raqqa.These are dangerous developments, with far-reaching ramifications for global security. In this instance, responsibility lies entirely with the United States and its allies. It is a pity that Old Europe continues to lose face. We call on the leaders of these States to immediately reconsider, return to the international legal fold and not to lead the world to the dangerous brink. We urgently need to find a peaceful way out through a collective effort. The Russian Federation is ready to cooperate equitably with all partners and to solve the problems that may arise through dialogue. We will continue to focus on finding a peaceful settlement to the conflict in Syria based on established international law. We will continue to work actively to that end, and we call on all our partners to do the same.Mrs. Haley (United States of America): I started to listen to my Russian friend so as to respond to him, but instead I am truly in awe of his ability to say what he said with a straight face.Today's meeting of the Security Council has been convened under truly strange circumstances. The Russian Federation has asked us to discuss what it calls unilateral threats related to Syria. What is strange is that Russia is ignoring the real threat to international peace and security that has brought us all here. It is ignoring its own unilateral responsibility for all of it. What we should discuss today is the use of deadly chemical weapons to murder innocent Syrian S/PV.8231 Threats to international peace and security 13/04/2018 6/22 18-10728 civilians. That is one of the most blatant and grotesque violations of international law in the world today. It is a violation of all standards of morality. It violates the long-standing international consensus that chemical weapons represent a unique evil. Chlorine, mustard gas and other chemical weapons killed 90,000 people and injured more than 1 million during the First World War. In the history Canada in the Great World War, the Canadian soldier A.T. Hunter described it this way."The gas cloud gathered itself like a wave and ponderously lapped over into the trenches. Then passive curiosity turned to active torment — a burning sensation in the head, red-hot needles in the lungs, the throat seized by a strangler. Many fell and died on the spot. The others, gasping, stumbling with faces contorted, hands widely gesticulating and uttering hoarse cries of pain, fled madly through the villages and farms and through the city itself, carrying panic to the remnants of the civilian population and filling the roads with fugitives of both sexes and all ages".Chemical weapons did not produce the most casualties in the First World War, but they were the most feared. In the Second World War chemical weapons were employed on an industrial scale against civilians, resulting in the worst genocide in human history, which the United States recalled just yesterday on Holocaust Remembrance Day. That is what brings us here today. That is what chemical weapons are all about. That is why we must not stay silent in the face of the horrible use of chemical weapons in our own time.The first response to all of this death and injury was the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which banned the use of chemical weapons and more. Later, in 1993, the Chemical Weapons Convention was signed. It obligates all of its parties to never under any circumstances"develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons, or transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to anyone".It also prohibits all parties from helping anyone to engage in such activities. The United States is a party to the Convention. Russia is a party to the Convention. Every country that is currently a member of the Security Council is a party to the Convention. Even the Al-Assad regime has pledged to abide by the Convention, so in theory all of us agree on the core principle at stake today. No country can by allowed to use chemical weapons with impunity. Now that we have established what we all agree on, let us ask ourselves what we should be condemning today. We should be discussing the actions that truly brought us to this moment in time. We should not be condemning the country or group of countries that might have the courage to stand up in defence of our common principle against the use of chemical weapons. Instead, we should be condemning the country that has unilaterally prevented the Security Council from upholding it.Which member of the Council most exhibits unilateralism with regard to chemical weapons? It is Russia alone that has stopped at nothing to defend the Syrian regime's multiple instances of the use of chemical weapons. It is Russia alone that killed the Joint Investigative Mechanism, which enabled the world to ensure accountability for the use of chemical weapons in Syria. It is Russia alone that has used its veto six times to prevent the condemnation of Al-Assad's use of chemical weapons. It is Russia alone that has used its veto 12 times to protect the Al-Assad regime. To make matters worse, it was Russia alone that agreed to be the guarantor of the removal of all chemical weapons in Syria. If Russia had lived up to its commitment, there would be no chemical weapons in Syria and we would not be here today. That is the Russian record of unilateralism. It is a record that has led to the trashing of all international standards against the use of chemical weapons. This meeting should not be about so-called unilateral threats, but rather about the multiple actions that Russia has taken to bring us to this point.Our President has not yet made a decision about possible actions in Syria, but should the United States and its allies decide to act in Syria, it will be in defence of a principle on which we all agree. It will be in defence of a bedrock international norm that benefits all nations. Let us be clear. Al-Assad's most recent use of poison gas against the people of Douma was not his first, second, third or even forty-ninth use of chemical weapons. The United States estimates that Al-Assad has used chemical weapons in the Syrian war at least 50 times. Public estimates are as high as 200.In the weeks after Al-Assad's sarin-gas attack last April, which killed nearly 100 people, including many children, the regime used chlorine gas at least once and possibly as many as three times in the same area. Last November, just as the mandate of the Joint Investigative Mechanism expired, the regime again attacked its people with sarin in the Damascus suburbs.13/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8231 18-10728 7/22 In January, Al-Assad used at least four chlorine-filled rockets in Douma, and then he struck again last weekend. Thanks to Russia, there was no United Nations body to determine blame. But we know who did this; our allies know who did this. Russia can complain all it wants about fake news, but no one is buying its lies and its coverups. Russia was supposed to guarantee that Al-Assad would not use chemical weapons, and Russia did the opposite.The world must not passively accept the use of chemical weapons after almost a century of their prohibition. Everything the United Nations stands for is being blatantly defied in Syria, with the help of a permanent member of the Council. All nations and all peoples will be harmed if we allow Al-Assad to normalize the use of chemical weapons. It is those who act to violate the prohibition of chemical weapons who deserve our condemnation. Those who act to defend it deserve our support. The United States and its allies will continue to stand up for truth, accountability, justice and an end to the use of chemical weapons.Mr. Ma Zhaoxu (China) (spoke in Chinese): I thank Secretary-General Guterres for his briefing and deeply appreciate his tireless efforts on the issue of the Middle East and that of Syria.The current situation in Syria is perilous. The country is at the crossroads of war and peace, and China is following the developments there with great concern. The possibility of an escalation of tensions worries us deeply. The pressing priority of the moment is to launch a comprehensive, objective and impartial investigation into the relevant incidents in order to arrive at authoritative conclusions.China has consistently stood in favour of the peaceful settlement of disputes and opposed the routine use or threat of force in international relations. To take unilateral military action by circumventing the Security Council is inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and runs counter to the basic norms enshrined in international law and those governing international relations.Syria's sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity must be fully respected. We call on the parties concerned to remain calm, exercise restraint, refrain from any move that could lead to further escalation of the situation and resolve the issue peacefully through consultation and dialogue. China is convinced that there can be no military solution to the Syrian issue; the only way out is a political settlement. China supports the United Nations in playing an active role in safeguarding the authority and standing of the Organization and its Security Council.China calls on the international community to steadfastly continue its diplomatic efforts, tirelessly stay the course so as to settle the Syrian issue politically, give full play to the role of the United Nations as the main mediator, and resolve without delay the Syrian issue comprehensively, justly and adequately, in keeping with the provisions of the relevant Security Council resolutions.The people of the world yearn for peace and oppose war. The situation in Syria has ramifications for peace and stability in the Middle East and the world at large, as well as for the credibility and authority of the Council. At this critical juncture, the Council must rightfully discharge its sacred responsibility emanating from the Charter of the United Nations; act in line with the dictates of our times; build unity and consensus and do its utmost to maintain peace; leave no stone unturned in its efforts to prevent war; and live up to the trust and expectations of the international community.China is and has always been a builder of world peace, a contributor to global development and a defender of the international order. China stands ready to continue its unflagging efforts to safeguard peace and stability in the Middle East and the world at large, in a spirit of responsibility to history and to the peoples of the world.Mr. Delattre (France) (spoke in French): I thank the Secretary-General for his statement.We are meeting today to address the threats to international peace and security that have arisen as a result of the situation in Syria, six days after the latest chemical-weapons carnage, on 7 April in Douma.For seven years, the situation in Syria has without a doubt constituted a grave threat to international peace and security as defined in the Charter of the United Nations. The Security Council itself characterized this as such unanimously on 27 September 2013, when resolution 2118 (2013) was adopted in the wake of the appalling chemical-weapons attacks that had taken place in eastern Ghouta. The world then learned for the first time and with horror of the symptoms of large-scale chemical-weapons-related deaths in Syria.S/PV.8231 Threats to international peace and security 13/04/2018 8/22 18-10728 To counter those who are seeking to sow confusion, going so far as to accuse the Syrian people of having gassed themselves; those who are suggesting conspiracy theories; those who are endeavouring methodically to destroy our mechanisms for action on chemical weapons in Syria, we must come back to simple facts. Yes, the Syrian crisis represents a threat to international peace and security. This threat is related to the repeated, organized and systematic use of chemical weapons by the Bashar Al-Assad regime, which once again reached new levels of horror with the two attacks perpetrated in Douma on 7 April last. Those attacks claimed the lives of at least several dozen people and wounded hundreds of others. Many of the injured will continue to suffer throughout their lives from the serious respiratory and neurological aftereffects of the chemicals used.There is no doubt once again as to the responsibility of Damascus for this attack. The facts collected on the ground, the symptoms of the victims, the complexity of handling of the substances used, and the determination of the regime's forces to subjugate the last pockets of resistance in Douma as expeditiously as possible and using every means at their disposal, all point to this.This is a well-known and documented modus operandi, given that an independent mechanism, created at the initiative of the Security Council, had already established at least four times since 2015 that chemical weapons had been used by the Damascus regime in Sarmin, Talmenes, Qmenas and Khan Shaykun — an investigative mechanism that a permanent member of the Security Council decided last November to force into silence.The chemical-weapons policy of the Bashar Al-Assad regime is among the most serious violations of all the norms that guarantee our collective security. It is first and foremost a violation of all international obligations relating to the prohibition of chemical weapons under the Chemical Weapons Convention, to which Syria is a party.Secondly, it constitutes a violation of the very foundations of international humanitarian law, namely, the principles of distinction, precaution and proportionality.Thirdly, it constitutes a breach of successive Security Council resolutions: resolutions 2118 (2013), 2209 (2015) and 2235 (2015) and therefore a breach of the obligations incumbent upon Syria under the Charter of the United Nations.Lastly, the use of chemical weapons against civilians, which was banned in 1925 under the Geneva Protocol, constitutes a war crime under the Statute of the International Criminal Court.The Secretary-General in August 2013 called the use of chemical weapons a crime against humanity. That chemical war is a tool to accelerate a deliberate policy of submission by terror, which, in seven years, has caused the deaths of 400,000 people, the deliberate destruction of civilian and health infrastructure in entire regions, a massive exodus of refugees and displaced persons and has fuelled international terrorism. This frightening picture is that of one of the most blatant threats to international peace and security in the contemporary era. It is also the record of those who, against all odds, continue to support it.I will once again have to state the obvious: if Syria has continued to use toxic substances for military purposes, it is because it has retained the capacity to use and manufacture them, in contravention of its international commitments, of the guarantees provided by Russia in the framework of the 2013 Russian-American agreement and of Security Council resolutions.It has already been several years since the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) informed us of the major remaining doubts about the sincerity of Syria's initial declaration to the organization in 2013. Many of the OPCW's questions and requests for documents have gone unanswered. Syria has never provided a satisfactory explanation for the inspectors' discovery of substances and capabilities that Syria had never declared. We saw those capabilities again in action on 7 April, used to kill as many civilians as possible and terrorize the survivors to consolidate the definitive takeover of Douma by the Syrian regime.Beyond Syria, the prevailing impunity since 2013 affects the entire chemical non-proliferation regime, and with it the entire security system that we have collectively built since the Second World War. It is that collective security legacy, built to protect future generations from the outbreaks of violence in the two global conflicts, that the members of the Security Council have been mandated to protect. To allow the normalization of the use of chemical weapons without reacting is to let the genie out of the bottle. That would be a terrible setback to international order, for which we would all pay the price.13/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8231 18-10728 9/22 The Security Council, to which the Charter of the United Nations entrusts the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security on behalf of the entire international community, is therefore more than justified in meeting today. It is more than justified for the Council to note, once again, the violation of international law and its own resolutions, and the persistence of a proven threat to international peace and security. It is more than justified to urgently re-establish a mechanism for attributing responsibility for chemical attacks — that opportunity was given to the Council in vain, once again, on Tuesday (see S/PV.8228) with the American draft resolution (S/2018/321).The Council is more than justified in doing what it has committed itself to do, that is, to take measures under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. But in the face of the mass atrocities committed in Syria, the Council's action has been paralysed for several years by successive Russian vetoes. Russia vetoed 12 draft resolutions on Syria, including six on the chemical issue alone. Those vetoes had no other objective than to protect the Syrian authorities — to guarantee a regime of impunity, in defiance of all international standards. To allow the indefensible, Russia has deliberately chosen to sacrifice the ability of the Council to act, the most important tool of our collective security. We had proof of that again last Tuesday.On 7 April, Douma joined Ypres, Halabja and Khan Shaykhun in the litany of chemical massacres. I solemnly say that, in deciding to once again use chemical weapons, the regime reached a point of no return on 7 April. France will assume its responsibility to put an end to an intolerable threat to our collective security and to finally ensure respect for international law and the measures taken for years by the Security Council.A chemical attack like that of Douma, which consists in gassing the last inhabitants of a besieged enclave — even when it is about to fall, even when the last fighters are negotiating their surrender — is the height of cynicism. That is where we are after seven years of the regime's war against its people. This is the situation to which the world must provide a firm, united and resolute response. That is our responsibility today.It will also be essential to combat impunity for those responsible for the use of such weapons and, more broadly, for those who are responsible for the most serious crimes committed in Syria. France is fully committed to that endeavour. That is the purpose of the International Partnership against Impunity for the Use of Chemical Weapons, which we initiated last January. We will also continue to support and assist all international mechanisms in their work to investigate the most serious crimes committed against civilians in Syria.In addition to the chemical issue, continuing violations of international humanitarian law must cease without delay. We ourselves demanded it by unanimously adopting resolution 2401 (2018) — thwarted the day after its adoption by the resumption of bombardments by the regime with the active support of its allies, including those within the Council who had subscribed to the truce. Resolution 2401 (2018) has lost none of its relevance, quite the contrary — full and unhindered humanitarian access to help populations in distress must be implemented throughout the territory. It is essential and urgent that humanitarian convoys can reach eastern Ghouta safely and that civilians fleeing hostilities or in need of medical treatment can be protected.Finally, we can only sustainably resolve the Syrian crisis within the framework of a political solution and on the basis of the full implementation of resolution 2254 (2015). Only under those conditions can put an end to the suffering of the Syrian people, eradicate terrorism and work together for the stability of the Middle East. We have been calling for a political solution for seven years. May those who join us today in their concern about the consequences of the Syrian crisis finally force the regime to accept negotiations under the aegis of the United Nations.We cannot allow the most fundamental values and standards of humanity, such as those emanating from the Charter of the United Nations, be thwarted and flouted in front of our eyes without reacting. Those values and standards must be defended and protected. That is the reason behind our commitment — to restore the complete ban on chemical weapons set in stone within international conventions, and thereby consolidate the rule of law. It is the responsibility of those who believe, like France, in effective multilateralism led by a respected United Nations.We must stop the Syrian chemical escalation. We cannot allow a country to simultaneously defy the Council and international law. The ability of Damascus to violate all our norms constitutes a threat to international security. Let us put an end to it.S/PV.8231 Threats to international peace and security 13/04/2018 10/22 18-10728 Ms. Pierce (United Kingdom): The Secretary-General has presented a catalogue of danger in the Middle East, including Gaza, Yemen and Iraq. It is no disrespect to those issues that today, like other speakers, I will concentrate on Syria. The United Kingdom will be ready to put its shoulder to the wheel on those other issues when the time comes.The situation we face today and the reason we are in the Security Council today arise wholly and solely from the use of chemical weapons on the Syrian people, most probably by the Syrian regime — not just once, but consistently and persistently over the past five years. The highest degree of responsibility, to quote the Russian Ambassador, is indeed what the Council, and in particular its five permanent members, are for, and it is our duty to uphold.The British Cabinet met recently and concluded that the Al-Assad regime has a track record of the use of chemical weapons and that it is highly likely the regime is responsible for Saturday's attack. This is a further example of the erosion of international law in relation to the use of chemical weapons, as my French and American colleagues have set out, and it is deeply concerning. But more important than that, the use of chemical weapons cannot be allowed to go unchallenged. The British Cabinet has agreed on the need to take action to alleviate humanitarian distress and to deter the further use of chemical weapons by the Al-Assad regime. To that end, we will continue to work with our friends and allies to coordinate an international response.The Secretary-General mentioned the Cold War. Of course, the Cold War was bracketed by East-West cooperation. We have been on the same side as Russia. In April 1945, Russia liberated Vienna as part of our joint efforts to bring peace to Europe. In 1995, it passed the Dayton Accords at part of our joint efforts to bring peace and stability to Bosnia and Herzegovina. But in 2018 the Russians refuse to work with us to bring peace to Syria.Instead, since the first attack on Ghouta and chemical-weapons use, in 2013, the Joint Investigative Mechanism has ascribed two uses of mustard gas to Da'esh, three uses of chlorine to the Syrian regime and one use of sarin to the Syrian regime before the latest attack. As my French colleague has set out, the United Kingdom, the United States and France are members in good standing of the Chemical Weapons Convention. We are members and supporters of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and its Fact-finding Mission. In the debates in the Security Council earlier this week, we would have dispatched an investigative mission, had Russia and Bolivia not blocked that effort (see S/PV.8228).Syria is the latest pernicious chronology of Russia's disregard for international law and disrespect for the international institutions we have built together to keep us collectively safe. This is revealed in actions over Georgia 10 years ago, over Malaysia Airlines Flight MH-17 and over the attack in Salisbury, which we will return to next week.Let me repeat what I said in the Security Council last week. My Government and the British people are not Russophobic. We have no quarrel with the Russian people. We respect Russia as a country. We prefer a productive relationship with Russia, but it is Russia's own actions that have led to this situation.What has taken place in Syria to date is in itself a violation of the United Nations Charter. No purpose or principle of the Charter is upheld or served by the use of chemical weapons on innocent civilians. On the contrary: to stand by and ignore the requirements of justice, accountability and the preservation of the non-proliferation regime is to place all our security — not just that of the Syrian people — at the mercy of a Russian veto. We will not sacrifice the international order we have collectively built to the Russian desire to protect its ally at all costs.The Russian Ambassador set out what Russia is doing on the ground in Syria. He thought that might be inconvenient for me to hear. However, it is not inconvenient for me to point out that Russia has given $5.5 million to the United Nations appeal. The United Kingdom has given a $160 million, and this is part of a contribution totalling $3.5 billion in all. It is not inconvenient for me to say that; it may be inconvenient for the Russian Ambassador to hear it.The Russian Ambassador also asked why we were not joining in and trying to stabilize actions in Syria and bring about peace. We have tried. Indeed, we have tried very hard to support Staffan de Mistura in getting the Geneva political process under way, and we shall continue to so. But we do not join Russia, because, sadly, its efforts have not been to try and restart the Geneva process. Instead, their efforts have been to support Syria in the use of chemical weapons and the 13/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8231 18-10728 11/22 bombardment of the Syrian people. In the area known as T-4, they helped the regime liberate this area but they took their eye off the ball and Da'esh took it back. They took it again, but, sadly, foreign fighters have been able to re-establish themselves there. This is not de-escalation. This is not political progress. This is a gross distortion by Russia of what is actually happening on the ground.The circumstances that we face today are truly exceptional. My colleagues from the United States and France have set out in great detail the catalogue of awful things that are happening to the Syrian people. That catalogue goes to the heart of what the Geneva Conventions, the non-proliferation regime, the United Nations and the Security Council are for. It is not only dangerous what Russia is doing in vetoing our resolutions and in supporting the Syrian regime's actions against its own people. It is ultimately prejudicial to our security. Indeed, it will let Da'esh re-establish itself. It is something that we believe we need to take action to defend.Mr. Skoog (Sweden): I thank the Secretary-General for his briefing today, for his efforts and for his good offices.Last weekend, reports once again began to emerge of horrifying allegations of the use of chemical weapons in Syria, this time in Douma, with reports of a large number of civilian casualties. Like many others, we were alarmed by these extremely serious allegations, and we called for an immediate, impartial and thorough investigation to establish the facts. In that regard, we welcome the fact that the Fact-finding Mission of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which we fully support, has been deployed to Syria. Full access and cooperation by all parties must now be ensured.I want to reiterate once more that Sweden will spare no effort to combat the use and proliferation of chemical weapons by State or non-State actors anywhere in the world. We unequivocally condemn in the strongest terms the use of chemical weapons, including in Syria. It is a serious violation of international law, it constitutes a threat to international peace and security, and their use in armed conflict is a war crime. The international disarmament and non-proliferation regime must be safeguarded, which is best achieved through true multilateralism and broad international consensus.We share the outrage and the frustration of many in this Chamber about chemical-weapons use in Syria. Those responsible for such crimes must be held accountable. We cannot accept impunity.The conflict in Syria is in its eighth year, and we are at a dangerous moment. We fully share the deep concern expressed by the Secretary-General about the risks of the current impasse and the need to avoid the situation escalating and spiralling out of control and to pay further attention to the divides, tensions and fault lines in the region, as described again by the Secretary-General this morning.We remain deeply disappointed that the Security Council has been unable to agree and move forward on a substantial, swift, and unified response to the use of chemical weapons in Syria. We deeply regret that Russia once again used its veto and blocked the Council from taking action this week (see S/PV.8228). Over the past few days, we have tried to ensure that all peaceful means to respond have seriously been considered. We are working tirelessly to ensure that no stone is left unturned in efforts to find a way forward in the Security Council. The Secretary-General offered to support such efforts through his good offices, which is an opportunity that should be seized. That is why yesterday we circulated yet another proposal that asks for four things.First, it condemns in the strongest terms any use of chemical weapons in Syria and expresses alarm at the alleged incident in Douma last weekend, because the use of chemical weapons constitutes a serious violation of international law.Secondly, it demands full access and cooperation for the OPCW Fact-finding Mission, because we need facts and evidence about what happened in Douma last weekend.Thirdly, it expresses the Council's determination to establish a new impartial, objective and independent attribution mechanism based on a proposal by the Secretary-General, because the perpetrators of chemical-weapons attacks must be identified and held to account, and, to that end, we need a new mechanism.Fourthly, it requests the Secretary-General to dispatch immediately a high-level disarmament mission to Syria because we need to resolve all outstanding issues on chemical weapons and rid Syria once and for all possible chemical weapons that might still exist in S/PV.8231 Threats to international peace and security 13/04/2018 12/22 18-10728 the country. Such a mission would add political and diplomatic leverage to the necessary technical and professional work of the OPCW. We therefore call on all members of the Council to muster the political will and respond to the appeal by the Secretary-General so as to come together and move forward.The use of chemical weapons is a grave threat to international peace and security. It is indeed deplorable that the Council has not yet been able to come together and agree on a timely and firm response. Even though the use of chemical weapons in itself violates international law, any response must comply with international law and respect the Charter of the United Nations. The time has now come to urgently revert to a political process under United Nations auspices for a political solution in line with resolution 2254 (2015), and for Syria and the Astana guarantors to move forward without further delay and live up to their commitments so that resolution 2401 (2018), which demands the cessation of hostilities and humanitarian access, can be fully and urgently implemented. That is the only way to end to the suffering of the Syrian people and end the brutal seven-year-long conflict.We firmly believe that there is a way for the Council to shoulder its responsibilities under the Charter. We believe that there continues to be a way for the Council to come together. We believe that we need to ensure that we have exhausted every peaceful effort and every diplomatic option to stop further atrocities from being carried out in Syria, hold those responsible to account, come to terms once with the chemical-weapons issue in Syria, cease hostilities and find a political solution.Mr. Ndong Mba (Equatorial Guinea) (spoke in Spanish): First of all, on behalf of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea, I thank Secretary-General António Guterres for having illustrated for us the chaotic and dangerous situation currently prevailing in the Middle East by providing a detailed overview of every one of the conflicts in that vulnerable region, from Libya to the desolate and devastating crisis in Syria, which, as all evidence suggests, runs the imminent risk of dramatically deteriorating.In line with the statement of the Secretary-General, we reaffirm Equatorial Guinea's firm belief that in confronting such situations we must always have recourse to dialogue and establish and respect mechanisms intended for achieving the peaceful settlement of conflicts until such options are exhausted. A unilateral military response could be counterproductive, and, far from solving the problem, it would lead to more suffering and chaos than already present, as the Secretary-General indicated — and additional disorder as in case of Libya, with which we are well familiar in Africa, and the consequences of which affect the entire Sahel region and part of Central Africa. We stand categorically against the use of force with the sole exception that it be justified under the conditions set forth under the Charter of the United Nations Charter and that it be used as a last resort after all other means have been exhausted.We are concerned about the rhetoric that is being used. It sounds dangerously familiar to us, and we do not like where it might lead us. We appeal to Governments' sense of responsibility, and in particular to the permanent members of the Security Council, as we believe that they have the additional responsibility of defending the relevance of the Council.We would like to ask the following questions. Who benefits from the inability of the Security Council to make decisions? Are we contributing to delegitimizing the Council? Are we actively eroding the Council's relevance in the international political arena? If the Council is unable to take action, how long will it take before the international community withdraws its faith, hope and trust in the Council?There is no military solution to the Syrian issue. We must therefore continue to look for ways to solve the problem through diplomatic channels. All Council members must act responsibly and agree to establish an independent and impartial monitoring mechanism to ascertain what took place in Douma and ensure accountability and that the perpetrators are brought to justice.The Secretary-General stated his disappointment with the Council's failure to establish a mechanism that would identify and attribute responsibility to those using chemical weapons. We could not agree more with that statement. Only a few days ago, our delegation stated its frustration when the Council failed to adopt three draft resolution put to the vote (see S/PV.8228). The Secretary-General's offer concerning his good offices must be considered, and we must provide him with that opportunity.In conclusion, we reiterate the position of Equatorial Guinea in arguing against and condemning 13/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8231 18-10728 13/22 the use of chemical weapons and other weapons of mass destruction regardless of who uses them.Mr. Llorentty Solíz (Plurinational State of Bolivia) (spoke in Spanish): I thank you, Sir, for having convened this meeting. We welcome the presence of the Secretary-General among us. His assessments are always very precise and useful, and we thank him for the intensive work that he is doing for the benefit of upholding the purposes and principles of the Organization.For some reason, some members of the Security Council are avoiding addressing the main reason for convening this meeting, which is that one State Member has threatened the unilateral use of force in violation of the Charter of the United Nations. Much has been said about the use of chemical weapons, and Bolivia would like to make clear its total and absolute condemnation of the use of chemical weapons or the use of chemical agents as weapons as unjustifiable and criminal acts wherever, whenever and by whomever they are committed. For their use is a grave crime under international law and against the interests of international peace and security. Those responsible for committing those terrible and criminal acts must be identified, investigated, prosecuted and punished. We demand a transparent and impartial investigation that must identify those responsible for any act of the use of chemical weapons.Needless to say, it is essential that the Security Council ensures an independent, impartial, complete, conclusive and, above all, depoliticized investigation. We regret that the Security Council has as yet failed to achieve that objective. Nonetheless, we will support all work intended to accomplish that goal. It is crucial that the Council continue to discuss the issue of the use of chemical weapons, but I reiterate that what has brought us together at this meeting is the threat of one State Member' illegal use of force.Over the past 72 years, humankind has built a framework that is not only physical or institutional, but also juridical. Humankind has setup instruments of international law intended precisely to prevent the most powerful from attacking the weakest with impunity so as to establish a balance in the world and prevent grave violations to international peace and security. We have built an international system — the Security Council is clear evidence of it — based on rules. It is the duty of the Council and of all the organs of the United Nations to respect those rules and defend multilateralism. The Charter of the United Nations, which prohibits unilateral action, must be upheld.Another key detail to remember is that the Security Council is not representative of the five permanent members it comprises, nor of its 15 members seated around this table; rather, it represents the entire membership of 193 States, both the nations and their peoples. The Security Council must not be utilized as a sounding board for war propaganda nor interventionism. It should also not be made into a pawn to be sacrificed on the chessboard of war, geopolitics and petty interests.We have heard many stories from history about the prohibition of chemical weapons, and Bolivia is an active participant in that system, but I would like to talk about the story of our Charter. When one is unsure about how to act under certain circumstances, I read that the best way to settle such uncertainty is to recall the principles of the French Revolution and reflect on where the principles of liberty, equality and fraternity are upheld. Those principles form part of the genesis of the Charter. Another part comes from the Magna Carta, of course, which, for the first time in history, limited the exercise of power precisely to defend the weakest.Another antecedent to the Charter is the Yalta Conference. I read that the Conference established the system of control and checks and balances, which is the Security Council with its five permanent members. Bolivia did not attend the Conference. As I understand it, just Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin were present. The outcome of the Conference was ratified at the San Francisco Conference a few months later in 1945. That is the system that we have agreed to uphold, which is why I believe that is essential to understand the principles of our Charter. Our Charter is not words on page, meant to hand out to tourists visiting the United Nations Headquarters, but rather a set of norms that we have agreed to comply with and uphold. Article 2 states that"The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1, shall act in accordance with the following Principles."Principle 4 of Article 2 reads,"All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of S/PV.8231 Threats to international peace and security 13/04/2018 14/22 18-10728 any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."That is to say that any use of force must be authorized by the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter. Any form of unilateral action therefore contravenes international law and the purposes and principles of the Charter.Another point worth mentioning is that we have listened, with due respect, to our colleagues speak about the criminal use of chemical weapons, and we completely agree with them on that. However, it would be very dangerous to fight an alleged violation of international law with another violation of international law and the Charter. That is why, in this specific case, we hope that there is an independent, impartial, comprehensive and conclusive investigation.Allow me to offer a clarification to my dear colleague from the United Kingdom. While Bolivia voted against one draft resolution, it voted in favour of two others. It voted against the one because, regrettably, this platform was being exploited for political motives. Draft resolutions are presented for nothing more than the spectacle of it, for the television cameras. Draft resolutions are presented knowing that they will be vetoed, and not all efforts are put forth to reach consensus, though that is what we normally do for resolutions.We believe that this meeting is very important because we not only discussing an attack on a Member State, or the threat of a military strike against a Member State of the United Nations, whichever it may be, but rather because we are living at a time of constant attacks on multilateralism. Let us recall that the achievements in the Paris Agreement on Climate Change have been undermined. Let us recall that the gains reached with the Global Compact for Migration have been eroded. Let us recall that there is a clear policy and mindset of multilateralism subversion. What happens is that for some the discourse on human rights is used until it no longer serves their interests, and then they violate those rights.My region is a witness to that. We endured Operation Condor, as it was called, during the 1970s, which was planned by the intelligence services of some Member States. When democracy did not suit them, they financed coups d'etat. When they were unhappy with the discourse on human rights, they infringed human rights. When the discourse of democracy was no longer enough, they were ready to finance coups d'etat. The use of unilateral practices leaves behind unhealed wounds, despite the passage of time.Some of the members of the Council have spoken on the situation in Iraq and Libya, which I believe are some of the worst crimes that have been committed this century. The invasion of Iraq, with its dire consequences, left more than 1 million dead. The effects of the strikes against Libya and the regime-change policies imposed on it, which, as my colleague from Equatorial Guinea aptly said, they still feel, suffer and endure throughout the entire region of the Sahel and Central Africa. But no one wants to talk about the root causes of those conflicts, and no one will talk about the impunity enjoyed for those serious crimes. It warrants repeating. Those are the most serious crimes committed this century. We hope that all the members of the Security Council, given the high degree of responsibility we have — 10 of us elected by the membership and five enjoy the privilege to have a permanent seat on the Council with the power of veto — must lead by example for the rest of the membership on the fulfilment of the purposes and principles of the Charter.By way of conclusion, I would like to reiterate what former Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said in a similar situation in 2013: "The Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security". That is my appeal. Everything must be addressed within the framework of the Charter. The use of force is legal only in the exercise of the right to self-defence, in line with Article 51 of the Charter, or when the Security Council approves such action. That was the reason for the meeting, and Bolivia's position is to categorically condemn any threat or use of unilateral force.Mr. Alotaibi (Kuwait) (spoke in Arabic): At the outset, I would very much like to thank the Secretary-General for his valuable briefing today. We share his concern about the fact that the Middle East is experiencing crises and challenges that unquestionably represent threats to international peace and security. The situation will undoubtedly deteriorate if the Security Council resolutions are not implemented by the relevant parties.The question of Palestine, the practices of the Israeli occupation there and its continued violations of international humanitarian law, international human rights law and the relevant Security Council resolutions 13/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8231 18-10728 15/22 are testament to that. The most recent is its repression of peaceful protests in Gaza and the use of excessive force. That led to the deaths of dozens of civilians and injuries to hundreds as they exercised their legitimate right to demonstrate peacefully in support of the March of Return. Kuwait condemns those Israeli practices in the strongest terms. We regret that the Security Council has not taken action to condemn such acts of repression or to call on the Israeli occupation forces to end them. The Israeli occupying Power should not be an exception. Everyone should respect and abide by international law and the Charter of the United Nations and should implement the relevant Security Council resolutions with the aim of achieving a just, comprehensive and lasting peace that can fulfil the Palestinian people's legitimate political right to establish their own State on their own land, with East Jerusalem as its capital.We have had a number of meetings over the past few days. Today's meeting would not have taken place if we had been able to agree on a new mechanism to investigate the allegations of the use of chemical weapons in Syria. This disagreement has led to deep divisions among the members of the Security Council. We must step up our efforts to advance the stalled political process in Syria. We have been concerned about escalating tensions among all parties since the beginning of the year. Through the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018), which primarily calls for a cessation of hostilities throughout Syria for at least 30 days, we tried to improve the humanitarian situation. Unfortunately, however, it has not been implemented and has in fact been violated in flagrant disregard for the will of the international community.We share the concern and disappointment of the Secretary-General about the deteriorating situation in Syria and the ongoing allegations of the use of chemical weapons, and support his call for an agreement on a new mechanism to ensure accountability and end impunity in Syria. We reiterate our support for the efforts of the Fact-finding Mission of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to establish the facts surrounding the alleged use of chemical weapons in Douma, in eastern Ghouta, and emphasize that there must be accountability for the perpetrators of those crimes, if they are confirmed.In view of our responsibility as members of the Council, we should do our utmost and not lose hope, and we should continue our efforts to agree on the establishment of an independent, impartial and professional mechanism for attributing responsibility and ensuring accountability. The continued violations of international humanitarian law, international human rights law and the relevant Security Council resolutions, including resolution 2118 (2013), by the warring parties in Syria further convince us that, in the case of grave violations of human rights or crimes that amount to war crimes or crimes against humanity, there should be a moratorium on the use of the veto as a procedural matter, so that such tragedies for innocent civilians are not repeated.The State of Kuwait takes a principled and firm position, in line with that of the League of Arab States. We call for preserving the unity, sovereignty and independence of Syria, as well as for a cessation of the violence and hostilities in order to put an end to bloodshed, protect the Syrian people and achieve a peaceful settlement. This would be done under the auspices of the United Nations and through the efforts of the Secretary-General's Special Envoy to Syria, based on the Geneva communiqué of 2012 (S/2012/522, annex) and resolution 2254 (2015), with the aim of achieving a political transition agreed on by all sectors of Syrian society and of meeting their legitimate aspirations.Mr. Umarov (Kazakhstan): We join others in expressing our appreciation to the Secretary-General for his insightful briefing and personal presence at today's meeting. In our view, since his appointment as steward of this world Organization, he has ceaselessly promoted a very important approach, which is the use of amicable and preventive diplomacy.Following an alert to the world, the Security Council underlined in its first presidential statement of 2018, on preventive diplomacy and sustaining peace (S/PRST/2018/1), adopted during Kazakhstan's presidency of the Security Council, that the ways to address conflict may include measures to rebuild trust by bringing Member States together around common goals. That has been particularly important in situations where international relations have featured confrontations and tension behind which the contours of a global war are increasingly apparent. We are right now in a moment when we must exercise special caution and vigilance in making decisions about our actions, especially in the Middle East. We believe that it is time to tap into all the tools available for a comprehensive strategy of preventive diplomacy in order to avoid the very serious consequences of any S/PV.8231 Threats to international peace and security 13/04/2018 16/22 18-10728 military action that could have repercussions for global security and stability.The recent escalation of the rhetoric on Syria and the threat of the use of unilateral actions has left the delegation of Kazakhstan deeply concerned about the unfolding situation, which has the potential to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. We all bear a responsibility for complying with international law and order, and none of our countries has the right to violate the Charter of the United Nations or to act or threaten to act unilaterally with respect to a sovereign nation under any pretext, unless that is decided by the Security Council. The Security Council is a collective body and is designed to take balanced decisions with regard to the issues of peace and security. We can agree or disagree, but we are mandated to work together to achieve a decision for which we have to bear a collective responsibility.Kazakhstan believes that the most effective way to prevent conflicts is to use diplomacy and mediation, not military means. We look forward to the next round of talks to be held in Geneva and in our capital, Astana, when the parties will address the stepping up of efforts to ensure observance of their respective agreements, among other issues.In addressing the disputes over the issue of the alleged use of chemical weapons in Douma in Syria, which has provoked the most recent tension in international relations, we consider it necessary to state the following. Kazakhstan strongly condemns any use of chemical weapons, if confirmed. Impunity is not permissible. We should act resolutely to stop any further use of such inhuman weapons, but we should act on the basis of proven facts. In this particular case, where there are doubts about the actual use of a poisonous substance, Kazakhstan calls on the members of the Council to be patient, at least until the expert group of the Fact-finding Mission of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to Syria is deployed to the site of the alleged attack and can report on the findings of its investigation, particularly given that yesterday we learned that the Syrian Government has granted visas for the OPCW investigators and pledged to facilitate access to the sites of the alleged chemical attack. We should first establish and understand the scientifically and professionally ascertained facts, after which the Council should decide on the appropriate line of action to take.At this stage, any military action or threat of it without the prior approval of the Security Council is undesirable. It could have a long-lasting negative impact that would be very difficult to overcome and could result in unprecedented and unanticipated complications. Kazakhstan remains committed to the Charter of the United Nations and to all Security Council resolutions aimed at resolving the political and humanitarian aspects of the Syrian conflict. We believe it is crucial to exercise restraint and refrain from any rhetoric that might exacerbate the already fragile and volatile situation. Such a pause for reflection on the consequences is essential to preserving international peace and security.In the light of the prevailing circumstances, it is more critical than ever that all Council members implement resolution 2401 (2018). The crisis in Syria can be resolved only through an inclusive and Syrian-led political process, based on the Geneva communiqué of 30 June 2012 (S/2012/522, annex), subsequent Security Council resolutions and the relevant statements of the International Syria Support Group. Lastly, we fully endorse the views articulated by the Secretary-General on 11 April about the risks of the current impasse that we are witnessing today (see SG/SM/18984). We must at all costs avoid the situation spiralling out of control. Our ultimate goal should be to put an end to the horrific suffering of the Syrian people and to help them to move forward on a path of peace and progress.Once again, this is an alarming moment, and we need to work together to restore unity and effectiveness in the Security Council by rebuilding trust and consensus in order to preserve global peace and security. We need cooperation within the Council to establish a workable attribution mechanism, which we passionately advocated today in this Chamber. Let us make it happen and transform our words into real deeds. The delegation of Kazakhstan is ready for that and calls on its colleagues to go the extra mile in that direction.Mr. Alemu (Ethiopia): We thank the Secretary-General for his briefing and deeply appreciate his efforts to weigh in on the grave challenge that we are facing, in order to ensure that what should and must be avoided will not happen because of miscalculation or a lack of thoughtfulness or of appreciation for the tremendous responsibility that the Security Council, especially its permanent members, bears. The Cold War is back with a vengeance, the Secretary-General said, but this time, he went on to tell us, in a less managed 13/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8231 18-10728 17/22 manner. It is difficult to quarrel with him. His approach was quite comprehensive, focusing, as he said, on the multiplicity of dangerous conflicts that the Middle East is facing. While his approach may be better, I choose to focus on Syria because it is the current flashpoint.Following the alleged chemical attacks in Douma, it is regrettable that the Council was not able to adopt a resolution to create an independent, impartial and professional investigative mechanism for identifying those responsible for the use of chemical weapons in Syria. This is a problem that has been with us for some time and a reality that sadly reflects the lack of unity in the Council even on matters that are manifestly in the common interest of all. We certainly welcome the deployment of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Fact-finding Mission to Syria to establish the facts surrounding the alleged use of chemicals as weapons. We have repeatedly stated that using chemicals as weapons is inhumane, and we condemn their use by any actor under any circumstances. One matter remains, and that is establishing a mechanism for attribution. We hope that will be done as soon as possible, but that does not mean that in the meantime we should cease to exercise maximum restraint in the interests of peace.Right now, pragmatic considerations and simple rational calculation suggest that we must get our priorities right. We need to continue to live if we are to be able to fight evil. We have continued to express our deep concern about the current dynamics in Syria and their devastating implications for regional and international peace and security. We fully concur with the Secretary-General, who stressed in his statement of 11 April that it is vital to ensure that the situation does not spiral out of control (see SG/SM/18984). He stressed that legitimate concern again today. The Security Council, as the principal body responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security, should not and cannot allow that to happen. At a time when we are talking about preventive diplomacy — as well as after appointing a Secretary-General who told us, in his maiden speech to the Council (see S/PV.7857), that prevention is not merely a priority, but the priority — now is the time for the United Nations to undertake the search for diplomacy for peace in earnest. If we are seriously committed to moving our Organization from a culture of reaction to one of prevention, now is the time to stand firm, speak with one voice and take proactive and collective action that can be respected by all major stakeholders.That requires the Council to be united for global peace and security. We know that is difficult, but we believe that we have no other sane option. This is the time for the Security Council to stand up and be counted. The Security Council is the custodian of the Charter of the United Nations, which, growing out of the devastation of the Second World War, promised to save succeeding generations from that scourge. That is a clarion call the Council should heed and act on. The situation should not be allowed to spiral out of control. The Secretary-General is right and the Council should listen to him.Mr. Van Oosterom (Netherlands): We thank the Secretary-General for his comprehensive and insightful briefing. His statement rightly focused on the broader Middle East. However, I will focus on the most pressing issue at hand, the use of chemical weapons in Syria.The Charter of the United Nations starts with the words "We the peoples of the United Nations", and while the Russian Federation is blocking the Council from taking effective action on the crimes of Russia's ally Syria, all peoples of every nation are outraged by the continued unrestrained violence that the Syrian regime has unleashed against its own people. As the Secretary-General just said, the people of Syria have lived through a litany of horrors. No responsible Government can ignore the universal outrage that those horrors have provoked.Our collective incapacity in the Council to stop the crimes in Syria should weigh heavily on the conscience of all our members, but on the conscience of one permanent member in particular. It was our collective conscience that created the Charter of the United Nations. It was our collective conscience that created the Chemical Weapons Convention. The use of chemical weapons is unlawful in and of itself. It is a violation of the Charter of the United Nations. It is a serious violation of international law and may constitute a war crime and a crime against humanity.We strongly believe that the international community must fully uphold the standard that the use of chemical weapons is never permissible. As the Secretary-General just said, the norm against the use of chemical weapons must be upheld. The non-proliferation regime must be upheld. Accountability for the use of chemical weapons in Syria is therefore neither optional S/PV.8231 Threats to international peace and security 13/04/2018 18/22 18-10728 nor negotiable. The images of last weekend's attack in Douma are appalling. Atrocities have once again been inflicted on Syria's civilian population. Once again, dozens of innocent civilians have been killed and hundreds injured. The Kingdom of the Netherlands believes that it is highly likely that the Syrian regime is responsible for the attack. It has a proven history of such attacks, having used chemicals as a weapon against its own people in 2014, 2015 and 2017. It is unacceptable that four years after Syria joined the Chemical Weapons Convention, its declarations can still not be verified as accurate or complete.The Kingdom of the Netherlands is a long-time supporter of fighting impunity when it comes to chemical weapons. Regrettably, all attempts to achieve accountability in the Council have failed. Referral to the International Criminal Court was vetoed. The renewal of the mandate of the Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM) was also vetoed. This week, accountability was again vetoed. With its vetoes, the Russian Federation has assumed much responsibility for the crimes committed by the Syrian regime. The draft resolution for a new accountability mechanism that was vetoed this week remains the bare minimum of what is acceptable to the Kingdom of the Netherlands. We will not settle for anything less than an independent, impartial attribution mechanism that can ensure that the culprits of that vicious attack will be identified and held accountable.No veto can wipe from our memory the clear findings presented by the JIM on the use of chemical weapons by the Al-Assad regime and Da'esh. No veto can stop our compassion for the victims of the chemical-weapon attack last weekend. No veto can end our determination to achieve justice for the victims and for the people of Syria as a whole.In conclusion, the Kingdom of the Netherlands remains committed to fighting impunity. We reiterate our strong support for an international, impartial and independent mechanism, the Commission of Inquiry, the International Partnership against Impunity for the Use of Chemical Weapons and a referral of the situation in Syria to the International Criminal Court in The Hague, as the most appropriate path to accountability and justice. At the heart of our policy on Syria is a deep desire for peace and justice for its people. Impunity cannot and will not prevail.Let me end with warm words of appreciation to the Secretary-General and his tireless efforts for justice and the international legal order.Ms. Wronecka (Poland): I would like to thank the Secretary-General for his comprehensive briefing and to assure him of our full support in finding a political solution to all conflicts, not just the one in Syria.Since we are discussing the situation in the Middle East and in particular the current situation in Syria, let me begin with a very sad observation. Even with our unanimously adopted resolutions, such as resolution 2401 (2018), we are still not seeing any substantial change on the ground. The fighting is far from being over and the human suffering is tremendous. Taking into consideration the current situation and the growing risk of the loss of human life owing simply to a lack of food or medicine, we should try to do our utmost to find possible ways to ensure that life-saving aid convoys can reach those in need. Unfortunately, that applies not only to eastern Ghouta but also to Idlib and Aleppo provinces. We must find a way to alleviate the suffering of ordinary Syrians. The civilian population in Syria has already suffered too much.International public opinion is watching our meetings and sees our lack of agreement on the most basic principles under international humanitarian law. The Council bears enormous responsibility and will be held accountable for its actions. We therefore call on the Council to take the necessary steps to ensure that all the parties to the conflict, especially the regime and its allies, implement the ceasefire, enable humanitarian access and medical evacuations and fully engage in the United Nations-led talks in Geneva, in line with resolution 2254 (2015) and the 2012 Geneva communiqué (S/2012/522, annex), which represent the best path to peace.With regard to the issue of chemical weapons, a century ago that was a normal way to wage war. Just recently we commemorated the hundredth anniversary of the first use of chemical weapons, on the Western and Eastern fronts of the First World War alike. French, British, American and other Allied soldiers were targeted with chlorine in Ypres, while Russian soldiers were dying from the same gruesome weapons in Bolimów, now part of Polish territory. Now, a century later, we are being challenged by these ghastly weapons yet again. Our nations are seeing the effects of the same 13/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8231 18-10728 19/22 toxic gas through the images of civilians who sought refuge in basements in Ghouta and other areas in Syria.Chemical weapons were banned when the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) cam into effect in 1997. We had begun a new chapter in the history of non-proliferation and disarmament. All of us in this Chamber agree that the use of chemical weapons by anyone, anywhere is deplorable and unacceptable. Can we really allow the success story of the CWC to be reversed? Will the Security Council allow the vision of a world free of chemical weapons to be destroyed? It is regrettable that the establishment of an independent, impartial investigative mechanism on the use of chemical weapons in Syria was vetoed on Tuesday (see S/PV.8228), thereby enabling those responsible for chemical attacks to remain unpunished. Accountability for such acts is a requirement under international law and is central to achieving durable peace in Syria. As members of the Security Council, we must find a way to reach agreement on how to properly respond to chemical attacks in Syria. We hope to see the Fact-finding Mission of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) deployed to Douma as soon as possible. We reiterate our appreciation to the Director-General and staff of the OPCW for their commitment to its goals and work, often in particularly challenging circumstances.Mr. Tanoh-Boutchoue (Côte d'Ivoire) (spoke in French): The delegation of Côte d'Ivoire thanks Secretary-General António Guterres for his briefing on new developments in the critical situation in several countries in the Middle East, in particular Syria, since the Security Council considered the issue on 9 and 10 April (see S/PV. 8225 and S/PV. 8228).Despite the relative lull in the fighting in Syria, the humanitarian situation remains troubling in the light of the allegations of the recurring use of chemical weapons by parties to the conflict. As a result of its internal divisions, despite our goodwill, the Council has failed to ensure the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018), which we adopted unanimously in order to deliver humanitarian assistance to people in need. In the light of the continuing reports of the use of chemical weapons in Douma, the Council was unable to reach an agreement on a statement that at the very least would have conveyed our solidarity to the Syrian people at this difficult time. The delegation of Côte d'Ivoire remains concerned by the current impasse in the Security Council, which has, unfortunately, prevented it from reaching agreement on a mechanism to combat impunity vis-à-vis the use of chemical weapons in Syria.In this context, we reiterate our support for the impartial, transparent, independent investigation to be conducted by the Fact-finding Mission of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons with the aim of shedding light on allegations of the use of chemical weapons in Douma, in eastern Ghouta.Côte d'Ivoire reiterates its strong condemnation of any use of chemical weapons, by any party, during peacetime or during wartime. Once again we beseech members of the Council to unite so as to set aside their differences and successfully set up an accountability mechanism to ensure that those who use chemical weapons are held accountable.We remain alarmed by the tensions stemming from the current political impasse, and we encourage the Secretary-General to make use of his good offices with stakeholders to restore peace and calm, in order to prevent any further escalation of the situation. To that end, my country invites all parties to exercise restraint so as to peacefully resolve this issue and in so doing safeguard international peace and security, which is our shared legacy.Côte d'Ivoire reaffirms our conviction and our principled position that there can be no military response to the crisis in Syria. The solution needs to be sought through dialogue and an inclusive political process, as stipulated in the road map set out by resolution 2254 (2015). My country remains convinced that dialogue alone will lead us to an equitable settlement of the conflict in Syria.The President (spoke in Spanish): I shall now make statement in my capacity as the representative of Peru.We would like to express our gratitude for the briefing by Secretary-General António Guterres and to thank him for his willingness to help to achieve a solution to the impasse in which the Security Council currently finds itself. We encourage him to continue to spare no effort in this respect, in line with the prerogatives conferred upon him by the Charter of the United Nations.Peru expresses its deep-rooted concern at the divisions that have emerged in the Council, in particular between its permanent members, and at the regrettable use of the veto, which limits our capacity to maintain S/PV.8231 Threats to international peace and security 13/04/2018 20/22 18-10728 international peace and security and to resolve the humanitarian conflicts and crises that form our agenda.We note with alarm the fact that the conflict in Syria continues to involve atrocity crimes committed with impunity and that it has deteriorated into a serious threat to regional and global stability, to the point where it is giving rise to serious tensions.With respect to reports of the further use of chemical weapons in Douma, we believe it necessary to resume, as a matter of urgency and in a renewed spirit of compromise, negotiations that will lead to ensuring full access, as required, for the Fact-finding Mission of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, which is being deployed in Syria to determine what happened; and to create a dedicated, independent, objective and impartial mechanism to attribute responsibility.On that understanding, we believe it important to recall once again that there can be no military solution to the Syrian conflict and that any response to the barbaric events taking place in that country must be in keeping with the norms of international law and the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.We recall also that in its resolution 2401 (2018), the Council ordered a humanitarian ceasefire throughout the entire Syrian territory, and that it is urgent to make headway in the political process in line with resolution 2254 (2015) and the Geneva communiqué (S/2012/522, annex). As the Secretary-General himself said, of particular concern is the potential threat posed by the current deadlock. We must at all costs prevent the situation from spiralling out of control. This must not occur given that our duty is to put an end to the suffering of millions of people and to impunity for atrocity crimes.Peru reiterates its commitment to living up to the lofty responsibility that the maintenance of international peace and security entails. My delegation will continue to work towards a solution to the conflict and protect the Syrian people, in keeping with the Charter of the United Nations and international law.I now resume my functions as President of the Council.I would like to recall the statement by the President of the Security Council contained in document S/2017/507, on the length of interventions.Mr. Ja'afari (Syrian Arab Republic) (spoke in Arabic): First, I should like, on behalf of my Government, to express our condolences to the people and the Government of Algeria in connection with the tragic military plane crash that claimed the lives of 247 passengers.Secondly, I welcome the participation of the Secretary-General in this very important meeting. I thank him for his comprehensive and accurate briefing, which made clear that he and others in the Council did in fact understand this meeting's agenda item. He spoke in a manner commensurate with the threats to international peace and security posed by the allegations and accusations against my country and its allies.My colleague the Ambassador of Sweden said that the use of chemical weapons is a war crime. This is true. I agree with him, as does my Government. However, I would ask him whether he believes that war in itself is a crime and needs to be stopped and prevented. Perhaps this would be a very good title for a book by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, and perhaps this would make clear to Member States that war in itself is a crime.My colleague the representative of the United States said that the Syrian chemical weapons that killed civilians had been used 50 times; that is what she said. Chemical weapons were used 50 times and killed 200 civilians. Imagine that — the Syrian Government reversed the course of the global terrorist war against my country by killing only 200 civilians after having used chemical weapons 50 times. Are these not the words of amateurs? This is a scenario for DC Comics' Superman series. Is that how the White House strategists think — that a certain Government has used chemical weapons 50 times to kill 200 civilians? How is that logical?My American colleague overlooked one important detail — that her country, on board the MV Cape Ray, destroyed the Syrian chemical stockpiles in the Mediterranean, along with ships from Denmark and Norway. How could it be that the experts in the United States delegation did not tell her that Ms. Sigrid Kaag told the Security Council in June 2014 that there were no more chemical stockpiles in Syria. Could they have simply forgotten all of that?Some believe that the massive western military forces in the eastern Mediterranean are due to a Sufi Western affection for a handful of terrorist yobs in 13/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8231 18-10728 21/22 Douma. By the way, those yobs were chased out to the North, as the Council is aware. They are now on their way to Saudi Arabia and thence to Yemen. They will be recycled and used on other fronts, including Yemen. No, the massive military forces in the Mediterranean do not target that handful of terrorists. They target the State of Syria and its allies. That should be the topic discussed today in this meeting.My colleague the American Ambassador was not horrified that her country used 20 million gallons of Agent Orange in Viet Nam in 1961, killing and injuring 3 million Vietnamese. Four hundred thousand children are born with deformities every year due to the use of Agent Orange at that time. She was not horrified by her country's forces killing thousands of Syrians in Raqqa and thousands of Iraqis in Fallujah and Mosul through the use of white phosphorus, which is a chemical weapon. I ask my colleague, the Ambassador of Sweden: Is that not a war crime?I would like to read a remark of the former Defence Minister of Britain, Mr. Doug Henderson. He spoke of the use by his country and the United States of white phosphorus in Iraq. I would ask my friend the British Ambassador to listen to this. Mr. Henderson said that it was unbelievable that the United Kingdom would occupy a country — meaning Iraq — to look for chemical weapons and at the same time use chemical weapons against that very same country.George Orwell, the well-respected and ethical Western author said: "In a time of universal deceit, telling the truth is a revolutionary act". The truth that needs to be told today is that three permanent members of the Security Council are dragging the entire world once again towards the abyss of war and aggression. They seek to obstruct the Council's work in maintaining international peace and security, which is the main principle agreed upon and endorsed by our founding fathers when they adopted the Charter of the United Nations in San Francisco on 26 June, 1945. Even though my colleague, the Ambassador of Bolivia has already read it out, I would like to once again remind the Council of paragraph 4 of Article 2 of the Charter:"All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations".The truth that needs to be told today is that those three States have a legacy based on fallacies and fabricated narratives in order to launch wars, occupy States, control their resources and change their governing systems. The truth that needs to be told today is that the entire world and the Council stand witnesses to the invasion, occupation and destruction of Iraq based on a United States lie in this very Chamber 14 years ago. They stand witnesses to France's exploitation of the Council to destroy Libya under the pretext of protecting civilians while ending the future of an entire people for the very simple reason that its President at the time, Mr. Sarkozy, wanted a cover up for his financial corruption. This is an ongoing case, of which members are all aware. However, some countries still fall for those lies promoted by those very same States in order to attack my country, Syria.God bless the days when France the policies of Charles de Gaulle in the Council followed and repudiated the aggression of the United States and Britain against Iraq. We yearn for those days. France no longer respects the policies of Charles de Gaulle and is now one of the countries that launch attacks against other countries.The truth that needs to be told today is that the international community has not sought to rein in those who are reckless and undermine international relations, subjecting them to disaster time and again since the establishment of this international Organization. Our biggest fear is that if the international community does not come together to end the abuse of those who are reckless, then the Organization will die in circumstances very similar to that which led to the death of the League of Nations.The truth that needs to be told today is that after the failure of the United States, Britain, France and their proxies in our region to achieve their objectives in Syria through providing all forms of support to the armed terrorist groups, we see them today tweeting and bragging about their nice, new and smart rockets, and defying international legitimacy from the Council Chamber. They dispatch war planes and fleets to achieve what their terrorists have failed to achieve over the past seven years.The truth that needs to be told today is that the Syrian Government liberated hundreds of thousands of civilians in eastern Ghouta from the practices of armed terrorist groups that used them as human shields, held S/PV.8231 Threats to international peace and security 13/04/2018 22/22 18-10728 them hostage for years and prevented any medical or food assistance from reaching them. The terrorist groups used the schools, homes and hospitals of those civilians as military bases to launch attacks on 8 million civilians in Damascus.The truth that needs to be told today is that some reckless people are pushing international relations towards the abyss based on a fake video prepared by the terrorist White Helmets, pursuant to instructions by Western intelligence.The truth that needs to be told today is that the so-called international alliance used its war planes to serve Da'esh in order to block the victory of the Syrian Arab Army and its allies against that terrorist organization. That international alliance made the White Helmets its media division to fabricate and falsify incidents in order to benefit the Al-Qaida terrorist organization.The government of my country took the initiative to invite the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to dispatch its Fact-finding Mission to visit Syria and the alleged site of the incident in Douma. The Government of my country has provided all the facilitation needed for the team to work in a transparent and accurate manner. The team is supposed to start its work in a few hours. This invitation was issued out of strength, confidence and diplomatic experience, not because we are weak or afraid and giving in to bullying or threats.The Syrian Arab Republic condemns in the strongest terms the Governments of these three States for launching their threats to use power in a flagrant violation of Article 1 of the Charter of the United Nations, which identifies the primary purpose of the United Nations as the maintenance of international peace and security and the suppression of acts of aggression and other breaches to peace.With the exception of the United States, Britain and France, we all understand that the Security Council is the organ charged with the maintenance of international peace and security and should stand against attempts to impose the law of the jungle and the rule of the powerful. However, some Member States think that the United Nations is just a private business company that works on the basis of pecuniary interests, market rules and the principle of supply and demand to determine the fate of peoples and States, and that use it as a platform for cheap theatrics and the dissemination of lies. This is the truth that disappoints the hopes and aspirations of the peoples of the world.I am not reinventing the wheel in this Chamber. The history of our relations with those States is filled with agony, pain and bitterness as a result of their very well-known policies of aggression. Another more important and shocking truth that should be told today is that the silence of the majority with respect to those aggressive policies does not constitute collusion with these States, but it does arise from fear of their arrogance and political blackmail, economic pressure and aggressive record. Those States do not blink when they go after anyone who is telling the truth.In conclusion, if those three States — the United States, Britain and France — think they can attack us and undermine our sovereignty and set out to do so, we would have no other choice but to apply Article 51 of the Charter, which gives us the legitimate right to defend ourselves. This is not a threat the way they do; it is a promise. This is a promise. We will not let anyone attack our sovereignty.Why do I say that this is a promise? I say this because a thought commonly ascribed to the great United States leader George Washington, who lived more than 200 years ago comes to mind — the sound that is louder than that of the cannons is the sound of the truth that emanates from the heart of a united nation that wants to live free. We in Syria also have leaders and prominent figures as great as George Washington. They are doing the same thing for Syria — protecting the unity and sovereignty of their country.The meeting rose at 12.25 p.m.
BASE
Blog: Theory Talks
Daniel Deudney on Mixed Ontology, Planetary Geopolitics, and Republican Greenpeace
This is the second in a series of Talks dedicated to the technopolitics of International Relations, linked to the forthcoming double volume 'The Global Politics of Science and Technology' edited by Maximilian Mayer, Mariana Carpes, and Ruth Knoblich
World politics increasingly abrasions with the limits of state-centric thinking, faced as the world is with a set of issues that affect not only us collectively as mankind, but also the planet itself. While much of IR theorizing seems to shirk such realizations, the work of Daniel Deudney has consistently engaged with the complex problems engendered by the entanglements of nuclear weapons, the planetary environment, space exploration, and the kind of political associations that might help us to grapple with our fragile condition as humanity-in-the world. In this elaborate Talk, Deudney—amongst others—lays out his understanding of the fundamental forces that drive both planetary political progress and problems; discusses the kind of ontological position needed to appreciate these problems; and argues for the merits of a republican greenpeace model to political organization.
Print version of this Talk (pdf)
What is, according to you, the biggest challenge / principal debate in current IR? What is your position or answer to this challenge / in this debate?
The study of politics is the study of human politics and the human situation has been—and is being—radically altered by changes in the human relationships with the natural and material worlds. In my view, this means IR and related intellectual disciplines should focus on better understanding the emergence of the 'global' and the 'planetary,' their implications for the overall human world and its innumerable sub-worlds, and their relations with the realization of basic human needs. The global and the planetary certainly don't comprise all of the human situation, but the fact that the human situation has become global and planetary touches every other facet of the human situation, sometimes in fundamental ways. The simple story is that the human world is now 'global and planetary' due to the explosive transformation over the last several centuries of science-based technology occurring within the geophysical and biophysical features of planet Earth. The natural Earth and its relationship with humans have been massively altered by the vast amplifications in dispersed human agency produced by the emergence and spread of machine-based civilization. The overall result of these changes has been the emergence of a global- and planetary-scale material and social reality that is in some ways similar, but in other important ways radically different, from earlier times. Practices and structures inherited from the pre-global human worlds have not adequately been adjusted to take the new human planetary situation into account and their persistence casts a long and partially dark shadow over the human prospect.
A global and planetary focus is also justified—urgently—by the fact that the overall human prospect on this planet, and the fate of much additional life on this planet, is increasingly dependent on the development and employment of new social arrangements for interacting with these novel configurations of material and natural possibilities and limits. Human agency is now situated, and is making vastly fateful choices—for better or worse—in a sprawling, vastly complex aggregation of human-machine-nature assemblies which is our world. The 'fate of the earth' now partly hinges on human choices, and helping to make sure these choices are appropriate ones should be the paramount objective of political scientific and theoretical efforts. However, no one discipline or approach is sufficient to grapple successfully with this topic. All disciplines are necessary. But there are good reasons to believe that 'IR' and related disciplines have a particularly important possible practical role to play. (I am also among those who prefer 'global studies' as a label for the enterprise of answering questions that cut across and significantly subsume both the 'international' and the 'domestic.')
My approach to grappling with this topic is situated—like the work of now vast numbers of other IR theorists and researchers of many disciplines—in the study of 'globalization.' The now widely held starting point for this intellectual effort is the realization that globalization has been the dominant pattern or phenomenon, the story of stories, over at least the last five centuries. Globalization has been occurring in military, ecological, cultural, and economic affairs. And I emphasize—like many, but not all, analysts of globalization—that the processes of globalization are essentially dependent on new machines, apparatuses, and technologies which humans have fabricated and deployed. Our world is global because of the astounding capabilities of machine civilization. This startling transformation of human choice by technological advance is centrally about politics because it is centrally about changes in power. Part of this power story has been about changes in the scope and forms of domination. Globalization has been, to state the point mildly, 'uneven,' marked by amplifications of violence and domination and predation on larger and wider scales. Another part of the story of the power transformation has been the creation of a world marked by high degrees of interdependence, interaction, speed, and complexity. These processes of globalization and the transformation of machine capabilities are not stopping or slowing down but are accelerating. Thus, I argue that 'bounding power'—the growth, at times by breathtaking leaps, of human capabilities to do things—is now a fundamental feature of the human world, and understanding its implications should, in my view, be a central activity for IR scholars.
In addressing the topic of machine civilization and its globalization on Earth, my thinking has been centered first around the developing of 'geopolitical' lines argument to construct a theory of 'planetary geopolitics'. 'Geopolitics' is the study of geography, ecology, technology, and the earth, and space and place, and their interaction with politics. The starting point for geopolitical analysis is accurate mapping. Not too many IR scholars think of themselves as doing 'geography' in any form. In part this results from of the unfortunate segregation of 'geography' into a separate academic discipline, very little of which is concerned with politics. Many also mistake the overall project of 'geopolitics' with the ideas, and egregious mistakes and political limitations, of many self-described 'geopoliticans' who are typically arch-realists, strong nationalists, and imperialists. Everyone pays general lip service to the importance of technology, but little interaction occurs between IR and 'technology studies' and most IR scholars are happy to treat such matters as 'technical' or non-political in character. Despite this general theoretical neglect, many geographic and technological factors routinely pop into arguments in political science and political theory, and play important roles in them.
Thinking about the global and planetary through the lens of a fuller geopolitics is appealing to me because it is the human relationship with the material world and the Earth that has been changed with the human world's globalization. Furthermore, much of the actual agendas of movements for peace, arms control, and sustainability are essentially about alternative ways of ordering the material world and our relations with it. Given this, I find an approach that thinks systematically about the relations between patterns of materiality and different political forms is particularly well-suited to provide insights of practical value for these efforts.
The other key focus of my research has been around extending a variety of broadly 'republican' political insights for a cluster of contemporary practical projects for peace, arms control, and environmental stewardship ('greenpeace'). Even more than 'geopolitics,' 'republicanism' is a term with too many associations and meanings. By republics I mean political associations based on popular sovereignty and marked by mutual limitations, that is, by 'bounding power'—the restraint of power, particularly violent power—in the interests of the people generally. Assuming that security from the application of violence to bodies is a primary (but not sole) task of political association, how do republican political arrangements achieve this end? I argue that the character and scope of power restraint arrangements that actually serve the fundamental security interests of its popular sovereign varies in significant ways in different material contexts.
Republicanism is first and foremost a domestic form, centered upon the successive spatial expansion of domestic-like realms, and the pursuit of a constant political project of maximally feasible ordered freedom in changed spatial and material circumstances. I find thinking about our global and planetary human situation from the perspective of republicanism appealing because the human global and planetary situation has traits—most notably high levels of interdependence, interaction, practical speed, and complexity—that make it resemble our historical experience of 'domestic' and 'municipal' realms. Thinking with a geopolitically grounded republicanism offers insights about global governance very different from the insights generated within the political conceptual universe of hierarchical, imperial, and state-centered political forms. Thus planetary geopolitics and republicanism offers a perspective on what it means to 'Think Globally and Act Locally.' If we think of, or rather recognize, the planet as our locality, and then act as if the Earth is our locality, then we are likely to end up doing various approximations of the best-practice republican forms that we have successfully developed in our historically smaller domestic localities.
How did you arrive at where you currently are in IR?
Like anybody else, the formative events in my intellectual development have been shaped by the thick particularities of time and place. 'The boy is the father of the man,' as it is said. The first and most direction-setting stage in the formation of my 'green peace' research interests was when I was in 'grade school,' roughly the years from age 6-13. During these years my family lived in an extraordinary place, St Simons Island, a largely undeveloped barrier island off the coast of southern Georgia. This was an extremely cool place to be a kid. It had extensive beaches, and marshes, as well as amazing trees of gargantuan proportions. My friends and I spent much time exploring, fishing, camping out, climbing trees, and building tree houses. Many of these nature-immersion activities were spontaneous, others were in Boy Scouts. This extraordinary natural environment and the attachments I formed to it, shaped my strong tendency to see the fates of humans and nature as inescapably intertwined. But the Boy Scouts also instilled me with a sense of 'virtue ethics'. A line from the Boy Scout Handbook captures this well: 'Take a walk around your neighborhood. Make a list of what is right and wrong about it. Make a plan to fix what is not right.' This is a demotic version of Weber's political 'ethic of responsibility.' This is very different from the ethics of self-realization and self-expression that have recently gained such ground in America and elsewhere. It is now very 'politically incorrect' to think favorably of the Boy Scouts, but I believe that if the Scouting experience was universally accessible, the world would be a much improved place.
My kid-in-nature life may sound very Tom Sawyer, but it was also very Tom Swift. My friends and I spent much of our waking time reading about the technological future, and imaginatively play-acting in future worlds. This imaginative world was richly fertilized by science fiction comic books, television shows, movies, and books. Me and my friends—juvenile technological futurists and techno-nerds in a decidedly anti-intellectual culture—were avid readers of Isaac Asimov, Arthur C. Clarke, Ray Bradbury, and Robert Heinlein, and each new issue of Analog was eagerly awaited. While we knew we were Americans, my friends and I had strong inclinations to think of ourselves most essentially as 'earthlings.' We fervently discussed extraterrestrial life and UFOs, and we eagerly awaited the day, soon to occur, we were sure, in which we made 'first contact.' We wanted to become, if not astronauts, then designers and builders of spaceships. We built tree houses, but we filled them with discarded electronics and they became starships. We rode bicycles, but we lugged about attaché cases filled with toy ray guns, transistor radios, firecrackers, and homemade incendiary devices. We built and fired off rockets, painstaking assembled plastic kit models of famous airplanes and ships, and then we would blow them apart with our explosives. The future belonged to technology, and we fancied ourselves its avant garde.
Yet the prospect of nuclear Armageddon seemed very real. We did 'duck and cover' drills at school, and sat for two terrifying weeks through the Cuban Missile Crisis. My friends and I had copies of the Atomic Energy Commission manuals on 'nuclear effects,' complete with a slide-rule like gadget that enabled us to calculate just what would happen if near-by military bases were obliterated by nuclear explosions. Few doubted that we were, in the words of a pop song, 'on the eve of destruction.' These years were also the dawning of 'the space age' in which humans were finally leaving the Earth and starting what promised to be an epic trek, utterly transformative in its effects, to the stars. My father worked for a number of these years for a large aerospace military-industrial firm, then working for NASA to build the very large rockets needed to launch men and machines to the moon and back. My friends and I debated fantastical topics, such as the pros and cons of emigrating to Mars, and how rapidly a crisis-driven exodus from the earth could be organized.
Two events that later occurred in the area where I spent my childhood served as culminating catalytic events for my greenpeace thinking. First, some years after my family moved away, the industrial facility to mix rocket fuel that had been built by the company my father worked for, and that he had helped put into operation, was struck by an extremely violent 'industrial accident,' which reduced, in one titanic flash, multi-story concrete and steel buildings filled with specialized heavy industrial machinery (and everyone in them) into a grey powdery gravel ash, no piece of which was larger than a fist. Second, during the late 1970s, the US Navy acquired a large tract of largely undeveloped marsh and land behind another barrier island (Cumberland), an area 10-15 miles from where I had lived, a place where I had camped, fished, and hunted deer. The Navy dredged and filled what was one of the most biologically fertile temperate zone estuaries on the planet. There they built the east coast base for the new fleet of Trident nuclear ballistic missile submarines, the single most potent violence machine ever built, thus turning what was for me the wildest part of my wild-encircled childhood home into one of the largest nuclear weapons complexes on earth. These events catalyzed for me the realization that there was a great struggle going on, for the Earth and for the future, and I knew firmly which side I was on.
My approach to thinking about problems was also strongly shaped by high school debate, where I learned the importance of 'looking at questions from both sides,' and from this stems my tendency to look at questions as debates between competing answers, and to focus on decisively engaging, defeating, and replacing the strongest and most influential opposing positions. As an undergraduate at Yale College, I started doing Political Theory. I am sure that I was a very vexing student in some ways, because (the debater again) I asked Marxist questions to my liberal and conservative professors, and liberal and conservative ones to my Marxist professors. Late in my sophomore year, I had my epiphany, my direction-defining moment, that my vocation would be an attempt to do the political theory of the global and the technological. Since then, the only decisions have been ones of priority and execution within this project.
Wanting to learn something about cutting-edge global and technological and issues, I next went to Washington D.C. for seven years. I worked on Capitol Hill for three and a half years as a policy aide, working on energy and conservation and renewable energy and nuclear power. I spent the other three and a half years as a Senior Researcher at the Worldwatch Institute, a small environmental and global issues think tank that was founded and headed by Lester Brown, a well-known and far-sighted globalist. I co-authored a book about renewable energy and transitions to global sustainability and wrote a study on space and space weapons. At the time I published Whole Earth Security: a Geopolitics of Peace (1983), in which my basic notions of planetary geopolitics and republicanism were first laid out. During these seven years in Washington, I also was a part-time student, earning a Master's degree in Science, Technology and Public Policy at George Washington University.
In all, these Washington experiences have been extremely valuable for my thinking. Many political scientists view public service as a low or corrupting activity, but this is, I think, very wrong-headed. The reason that the democratic world works as well as it does is because of the distributive social intelligence. But social intelligence is neither as distributed nor as intelligent as it needs to be to deal with many pressing problems. My experience as a Congressional aide taught me that most of the problems that confront my democracy are rooted in various limits and corruptions of the people. I have come to have little patience with those who say, for example, rising inequality is inherent in capital C capitalism, when the more proximate explanation is that the Reagan Republican Party was so successful in gutting the progressive tax system previously in place in the United States. Similarly, I see little value in claims, to take a very contemporary example, that 'the NSA is out of control' when this agency is doing more or less what the elected officials, responding to public pressures to provide 'national security' loudly demanded. In democracies, the people are ultimately responsible.
As I was immersed in the world of arms control and environmental activism I was impressed by the truth of Keynes's oft quoted line, about the great practical influence of the ideas of some long-dead 'academic scribbler.' This is true in varying degrees in every issue area, but in some much more than others. This reinforced my sense that great potential practical consequence of successfully innovating in the various conceptual frameworks that underpinned so many important activities. For nuclear weapons, it became clear to me that the problem was rooted in the statist and realist frames that people so automatically brought to a security question of this magnitude.
Despite the many appeals of a career in DC politics and policy, this was all for me an extended research field-trip, and so I left Washington to do a PhD—a move that mystified many of my NGO and activist friends, and seemed like utter folly to my political friends. At Princeton University, I concentrated on IR, Political Theory, and Military History and Politics, taking courses with Robert Gilpin, Richard Falk, Barry Posen, Sheldon Wolin and others. In my dissertation—entitled Global Orders: Geopolitical and Materialist Theories of the Global-Industrial Era, 1890-1945—I explored IR and related thinking about the impacts of the industrial revolution as a debate between different world order alternatives, and made arguments about the superiority of liberalist, internationalist, and globalist arguments—most notably from H.G. Wells and John Dewey—to the strong realist and imperialist ideas most commonly associated with the geopolitical writers of this period.
I also continued engaging in activist policy affiliated to the Program on Nuclear Policy Alternatives at the Center for Energy andEnvironmental Studies (CEES), which was then headed by Frank von Hippel, a physicist turned 'public interest scientist', and a towering figure in the global nuclear arms control movement. I was a Post Doc at CEES during the Gorbachev era and I went on several amazing and eye-opening trips to the Soviet Union. Continuing my space activism, I was able to organize workshops in Moscow and Washington on large-scale space cooperation, gathering together many of the key space players on both sides. While Princeton was fabulously stimulating intellectually, it was also a stressful pressure-cooker, and I maintained my sanity by making short trips, two of three weekends, over six years, to Manhattan, where I spent the days working in the main reading room of the New York Public Library and the nights partying and relaxing in a world completely detached from academic life.
When it comes to my intellectual development in terms of reading theory, the positive project I wanted to pursue was partially defined by approaches I came to reject. Perhaps most centrally, I came to reject an approach that was very intellectually powerful, even intoxicating, and which retains great sway over many, that of metaphysical politics. The politics of the metaphysicians played a central role in my coming to reject the politics of metaphysics. The fact that some metaphysical ideas and the some of the deep thinkers who advanced them, such as Heidegger, and many Marxists, were so intimately connected with really disastrous politics seemed a really damning fact for me, particularly given that these thinkers insisted so strongly on the link between their metaphysics and their politics. I was initially drawn to Nietzsche's writing (what twenty-year old isn't) but his model of the philosopher founder or law-giver—that is, of a spiritually gifted but alienated guy (and it always is a guy) with a particularly strong but frustrated 'will to power' going into the wilderness, having a deep spiritual revelation, and then returning to the mundane corrupt world with new 'tablets of value,' along with a plan to take over and run things right—seemed more comic than politically relevant, unless the prophet is armed, in which case it becomes a frightful menace. The concluding scene in Herman Hesse's Magister Ludi (sometimes translated as The Glass Bead Game) summarized by overall view of the 'high theory' project. After years of intense training by the greatest teachers the most spiritually and intellectually gifted youths finally graduate. To celebrate, they go to lake, dive in, and, having not learned how to swim, drown.
I was more attracted to Aristotle, Hume, Montesquieu, Dewey and other political theorists with less lofty and comprehensive views of what theory might accomplish; weary of actions; based on dogmatic or totalistic thinking; an eye to the messy and compromised world; with a political commitment to liberty and the interests of the many; a preference for peace over war; an aversion to despotism and empire; and an affinity for tolerance and plurality. I also liked some of those thinkers because of their emphasis on material contexts. Montesquieu seeks to analyze the interaction of material contexts and republican political forms; Madison and his contemporaries attempt to extend the spatial scope of republican political association by recombining in novel ways various earlier power restraint arrangements. I was tremendously influenced by Dewey, studying intensively his slender volume The Public and its Problems (1927)—which I think is the most important book in twentieth century political thought. By the 'public' Dewey means essentially a stakeholder group, and his main point is that the material transformations produced by the industrial revolution has created new publics, and that the political task is to conceptualize and realize forms of community and government appropriate to solving the problems that confront these new publics.
One can say my overall project became to apply and extend their concepts to the contemporary planetary situation. Concomitantly reading IR literature on nuclear weapons, I was struck by fact that the central role that material realities played in these arguments was very ad hoc, and that many of the leading arguments on nuclear politics were very unconvincing. It was clear that while Waltz (Theory Talk #40) had brilliantly developed some key ideas about anarchy made by Hobbes and Rousseau, he had also left something really important out. These sorts of deficiencies led me to develop the arguments contained in Bounding Power. I think it is highly unlikely that I would have had these doubts, or come to make the arguments I made without having worked in political theory and in policy.
I read many works that greatly influenced my thinking in this area, among them works by Lewis Mumford, Langdon Winner's Autonomous Technology, James Lovelock's Gaia, Charles Perrow's Normal Accidents (read a related article here, pdf), Jonathan Schell's Fate of the Earth and The Abolition, William Ophul's Ecology and the Politics of Scarcity... I was particularly stuck by a line in Buckminster Fuller's Operating Manual for Spaceship Earth (pdf), that we live in a 'spaceship' like closed highly interconnected system, but lack an 'operating manual' to guide intelligently our actions. It was also during this period that I read key works by H.G. Wells, most notably his book, Anticipations, and his essay The Idea of a League of Nations, both of which greatly influenced my thinking.
This aside, the greatest contribution to my thinking has come from conversations sustained over many years with some really extraordinary individuals. To mention those that I have been arguing with, and learning from, for at least ten years, there is John O'Looney, Wesley Warren, Bob Gooding-Williams, Alyn McAuly, Henry Nau, Richard Falk, Michael Doyle (Theory Talk #1), Richard Mathew, Paul Wapner, Bron Taylor, Ron Deibert, John Ikenberry, Bill Wohlforth, Frank von Hippel, Ethan Nadelmann, Fritz Kratochwil, Barry Buzan (Theory Talk #35), Ole Waever, John Agnew (Theory Talk #4), Barry Posen, Alex Wendt (Theory Talk #3), James der Derian, David Hendrickson, Nadivah Greenberg, Tim Luke, Campbell Craig, Bill Connolly, Steven David, Jane Bennett, Daniel Levine (TheoryTalk #58), and Jairus Grove. My only regret is that I have not spoken even more with them, and with the much larger number of people I have learned from on a less sustained basis along the way.
What would a student need to become a specialist in IR or understand the world in a global way?
I have thought a great deal about what sort of answers to this question can be generally valuable. For me, the most important insight is that success in intellectual life and academia is determined by more or less the same combination of factors that determines success more generally. This list is obvious: character, talent, perseverance and hard work, good judgment, good 'people skills,' and luck. Not everyone has a talent to do this kind of work, but the number of people who do have the talent to do this kind of work is much larger than the number of people who are successful in doing it. I think in academia as elsewhere, the people most likely to really succeed are those whose attitude toward the activity is vocational. A vocation is something one is called to do by an inner voice that one cannot resist. People with vocations never really work in one sense, because they are doing something that they would be doing even if they were not paid or required. Of course, in another sense people with vocations never stop working, being so consumed with their path that everything else matters very little. People with jobs and professions largely stop working when they when the lottery, but people with vocations are empowered to work more and better. When your vocation overlaps with your job, you should wake up and say 'wow, I cannot believe I am being paid to do this!' Rather obviously, the great danger in the life paths of people with vocations is imbalance and burn-out. To avoid these perils it is beneficial to sustain strong personal relationships, know when and how to 'take off' effectively, and sustain the ability to see things as an unfolding comedy and to laugh.
Academic life also involves living and working in a profession. Compared to the oppressions that so many thinkers and researchers have historically suffered from, contemporary professional academic life is a utopia. But academic life has several aspects unfortunate aspects, and coping successfully with them is vital. Academic life is full of 'odd balls' and the loose structure of universities and organization, combined with the tenure system, licenses an often florid display of dubious behavior. A fair number of academics have really primitive and incompetent social skills. Others are thin skinned-ego maniacs. Some are pompous hypocrites. Some are ruthlessly self-aggrandizing and underhanded. Some are relentless shirkers and free-riders. Also, academic life is, particularly relative to the costs of obtaining the years of education necessary to obtain it, not very well paid. Corruptions of clique, ideological factionalism, and nepotism occur. If not kept in proper perspective, and approached in appropriate ways, academic department life can become stupidly consuming of time, energy, and most dangerously, intellectual attention. The basic step for healthy departmental life is to approach it as a professional role.
The other big dimension of academic life is teaching. Teaching is one of the two 'deliverables' that academic organizations provide in return for the vast resources they consume. Shirking on teaching is a dereliction of responsibility, but also is the foregoing of a great opportunity. Teaching is actually one of the most assuredly consequential things academics do. The key to great teaching is, I think, very simple: inspire and convey enthusiasm. Once inspired, students learn. Once students take questions as their own, they become avid seekers of answers. Teachers of things political also have a responsibility to remain even-handed in what they teach, to make sure that they do not teach just or mainly their views, to make sure that the best and strongest versions of opposing sides are heard. Teaching seeks to produce informed and critically thinking students, not converts. Beyond the key roles of inspiration and even-handedness, the rest is the standard package of tasks relevant in any professional role: good preparation, good organization, hard work, and clarity of presentation.
Your main book, Bounding Power: Republican Security Theory from the Polis to the Global Village (2007), is a mix of intellectual history, political theory and IR theory, and is targeted largely at realism. How does a reading and interpretation of a large number of old books tell us something new about realism, and the contemporary global?
Bounding Power attempts to dispel some very large claims made by realists about their self-proclaimed 'tradition,' a lineage of thought in which they place many of the leading Western thinkers about political order, such as Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Rousseau, and the 'global geopoliticans' from the years around the beginning of the twentieth century. In the book I argue that the actual main axis of western thinking about political order (and its absence) is largely the work of 'republican' thinkers from the small number of 'republics', and that many of the key ideas that realists call realist and liberals call liberal are actually fragments of a larger, more encompassing set of arguments that were primarily in the idioms of republicanism. This entails dispelling the widely held view that the liberal and proto-liberal republican thought and practice are marked by 'idealism'—and therefore both inferior in their grasp of the problem of security-from violence and valuable only when confined to the 'domestic.' I demonstrate that this line of republican security thinkers had a robust set of claims both about material contextual factors, about the 'geopolitics of freedom', and a fuller understanding of security-from-violence. The book shows how perhaps the most important insights of this earlier cluster of arguments has oddly been dropped by both realists (particularly neorealists) and liberal international theorists. And, finally, it is an attempt to provide an understanding that posits the project of exiting anarchy on a global scale as something essentially unprecedented, and as something that the best of our inherited theory leaves us unable to say much about.
The main argument is contained in my formulation of what I think are the actual the two main sets of issues of Western structural-materialist security theory, two problematiques formulated in republican and naturalist-materialist conceptual vocabularies. The first problematique concerns the relationship between material context, the scope of tolerable anarchy, and necessary-for-security government. The second problematic concerns the relative security-viability of two main different forms of government—hierarchical and republican.
This formulation of the first problematic concerning anarchy differs from the main line of contemporary Realist argument in that it poses the question as one about the spatial scope of tolerable anarchy. The primary variable in my reconstruction of the material-contextual component of these arguments is what I term violence interdependence (absent, weak, strong, and intense). The main substantive claim of Western structural-materialist security theory is that situations of anarchy combined with intense violence interdependence are incompatible with security and require substantive government. Situations of strong and weak violence interdependence constitute a tolerable (if at times 'nasty and brutish') second ('state-of-war') anarchy not requiring substantive government. Early formulations of 'state of nature' arguments, explicitly or implicitly hinge upon this material contextual variable, and the overall narrative structure of the development of republican security theory and practice has concerned natural geographic variations and technologically caused changes in the material context, and thus the scope of security tolerable/intolerable anarchy and needed substantive government. This argument was present in early realist versions of anarchy arguments, but has been dropped by neorealists. Conversely, contemporary liberal international theorists analyze interdependence, but have little to say about violence. The result is that the realists talk about violence and security, and the liberals talk about interdependence not relating to violence, producing the great lacuna of contemporary theory: analysis of violence interdependence.
The second main problematique, concerning the relative security viability of hierarchical and republican forms, has also largely been lost sight of, in large measure by the realist insistence that governments are by definition hierarchical, and the liberal avoidance of system structural theory in favor of process, ideational, and economic variables. (For neoliberals, cooperation is seen as (possibly) occurring in anarchy, without altering or replacing anarchy.) The main claim here is that republican and proto-liberal theorists have a more complete grasp of the security political problem than realists because of their realization that both the extremes of hierarchy and anarchy are incompatible with security. In order to register this lost component of structural theory I refer to republican forms at both the unit and the system-level as being characterized by an ordering principle which I refer to as negarchy. Such political arrangements are characterized by the simultaneous negation of both hierarchy and anarchy. The vocabulary of political structures should thus be conceived as a triad-triangle of anarchy, hierarchy, and negarchy, rather than a spectrum stretching from pure anarchy to pure hierarchy. Using this framework, Bounding Power traces various formulations of the key arguments of security republicans from the Greeks through the nuclear era as arguments about the simultaneous avoidance of hierarchy and anarchy on expanding spatial scales driven by variations and changes in the material context. If we recognize the main axis of our thinking in this way, we can stand on a view of our past that is remarkable in its potential relevance to thinking and dealing with the contemporary 'global village' like a human situation.
Nuclear weapons play a key role in the argument of Bounding Power about the present, as well as elsewhere in your work. But are nuclear weapons are still important as hey were during the Cold War to understand global politics?
Since their arrival on the world scene in the middle years of the twentieth century, there has been pretty much universal agreement that nuclear weapons are in some fundamental way 'revolutionary' in their implications for security-from-violence and world politics. The fact that the Cold War is over does not alter, and even stems from, this fact. Despite this wide agreement on the importance of nuclear weapons, theorists, policy makers, and popular arms control/disarmament movements have fundamental disagreements about which political forms are compatible with the avoidance of nuclear war. I have attempted to provide a somewhat new answer to this 'nuclear-political question', and to explain why strong forms of interstate arms control are necessary for security in the nuclear age. I argue that achieving the necessary levels of arms control entails somehow exiting interstate anarchy—not toward a world government as a world state, but toward a world order that is a type of compound republican union (marked by, to put it in terms of above discussion, a nearly completely negarchical structure).
This argument attempts to close what I term the 'arms control gap', the discrepancy between the value arms control is assigned by academic theorists of nuclear weapons and their importance in the actual provision of security in the nuclear era. During the Cold War, thinking among IR theorists about nuclear weapons tended to fall into three broad schools—war strategists, deterrence statists, and arms controllers. Where the first two only seem to differ about the amount of nuclear weapons necessary for states seeking security (the first think many, the second less), the third advocates that states do what they have very rarely done before the nuclear age, reciprocal restraints on arms.
But this Cold War triad of arguments is significantly incomplete as a list of the important schools of thought about the nuclear-political question. There are four additional schools, and a combination of their arguments constitutes, I argue, a superior answer to the nuclear-political question. First are the nuclear one worlders, a view that flourished during the late 1940s and early 1950s, and held that the simple answer to the nuclear political question is to establish a world government, as some sort of state. Second are the populist anti-nuclearists, who indict state apparatuses of acting contrary to the global public's security interests. Third are the deep arms controllers, such as Jonathan Schell, who argue that nuclear weapons need to be abolished. Fourth are the theorists of omniviolence, who theorize situations produced by the leakage of nuclear weapons into the hands of non-state actors who cannot be readily deterred from using nuclear weapons. What all of these schools have in common is that they open up the state and make arguments about how various forms of political freedom—and the institutions that make it possible—are at issue in answering the nuclear-political question.
Yet one key feature all seven schools share is that they all make arguments about how particular combinations and configurations of material realities provide the basis for thinking that their answer to the nuclear-political question is correct. Unfortunately, their understandings of how material factors shape, or should shape, actual political arrangements is very ad hoc. Yet the material factors—starting with sheer physical destructiveness—are so pivotal that they merit a more central role in theories of nuclear power. I think we need to have a model that allows us to grasp how variations in material contexts condition the functionality of 'modes of protection', that is, distinct and recurring security practices (and their attendant political structures).
For instance, one mode of protection—what I term the real-state mode of protection—attempts to achieve security through the concentration, mobilization, and employment of violence capability. This is the overall, universal, context-independent strategy of realists. Bringing into view material factors, I argue, shows that this mode of protection is functional not universally but specifically—and only—in material contexts that are marked by violence-poverty and slowness. This mode of protection is dysfunctional in nuclear material contexts marked by violence abundance and high violence velocities. In contrast, a republican federal mode of protection is a bundle of practices that aim for the demobilization and deceleration of violence capacity, and that the practices associated with this mode of protection are security functional in the nuclear material context.
What emerges from such an approach to ideas about the relation between nuclear power and security from violence is that the epistemological foundations for any of the major positions about nuclear weapons are actually much weaker than we should be comfortable with. People often say the two most important questions about the nuclear age are: what is the probability that nuclear weapons will be used? And then, what will happen when they are used? The sobering truth is that we really do not have good grounds for confidently answering either of those two questions. But every choice made about nuclear weapons depends on risk calculations that depend on how we answer these questions.
You have also written extensively on space, a topic that has not recently attracted much attention from many IR scholars. How does your thinking on this relate to your overall thinking about the global and planetary situation?
The first human steps into outer space during the middle years of the twentieth century have been among the most spectacular and potentially consequential events in the globalization of machine civilization on Earth. Over the course of what many call 'the space age,' thinking about space activities, space futures, and the consequences of space activities has been dominated by an elaborately developed body of 'space expansionist' thought that makes ambitious and captivating claims about both the feasibility and the desirability of human expansion into outer space. Such views of space permeate popular culture, and at times appear to be quite influential in actual space policy. Space expansionists hold that outer space is a limitless frontier and that humans should make concerted efforts to explore and colonize and extend their military activities into space. They claim the pursuit of their ambitious projects will have many positive, even transformative, effects upon the human situation on Earth, by escaping global closure, protecting the earth's habitability, preserving political plurality, and enhancing species survival. Claims about the Earth, its historical patterns and its contemporary problems, permeate space expansionist thinking.
While the feasibility, both technological and economic, of space expansionist projects has been extensively assessed, arguments for their desirability have not been accorded anything approaching a systematic assessment. In part, such arguments about the desirability of space expansion are difficult to assess because they incorporate claims that are very diverse in character, including claims about the Earth (past, present, and future), about the ways in which material contexts made up of space 'geography' and technologies produce or heavily favor particular political outcomes, and about basic worldview assumptions regarding nature, science, technology, and life.
By breaking these space expansionist arguments down into their parts, and systematically assessing their plausibility, a very different picture of the space prospect emerges. I think there are strong reasons to think that the consequences of the human pursuit of space expansion have been, and could be, very undesirable, even catastrophic. The actual militarization of that core space technology ('the rocket') and the construction of a planetary-scope 'delivery' and support system for nuclear war-fighting has been the most important consequence of actual space activities, but these developments have been curiously been left out of accounts of the space age and assessments of its impacts. Similarly, much of actually existing 'nuclear arms control' has centered on restraining and dismantling space weapons, not nuclear weapons. Thus the most consequential space activity—the acceleration of nuclear delivery capabilities—has been curiously rendered almost invisible in accounts of space and assessments of its impacts. This is an 'unknown known' of the 'space age'. Looking ahead, the creation of large orbital infrastructures will either presuppose or produce world government, potentially of a very hierarchical sort. There are also good reasons to think that space colonies are more likely to be micro-totalitarian than free. And extensive human movement off the planet could in a variety of ways increase the vulnerability of life on Earth, and even jeopardize the survival of the human species.
Finally, I think much of space expansionist (and popular) thinking about space and the consequences of humans space activities has been marked by basic errors in practical geography. Most notably, there is the widespread failure to realize that the expansion of human activities into Earth's orbital space has enhanced global closure, because the effective distances in Earth's space make it very small. And because of the formidable natural barriers to human space activity, space is a planetary 'lid, not a 'frontier'. So one can say that the most important practical discovery of the 'space age' has been an improved understanding of the Earth. These lines of thinking, I find, would suggest the outlines of a more modest and Earth-centered space program, appropriate for the current Earth age. Overall, the fact that we can't readily expand into space is part of why we are in a new 'earth age' rather than a 'space age'.
You've argued against making the environment into a national security issue twenty years ago. Do the same now, considering that making the environment a bigger priority by making it into a national security issue might be the only way to prevent total environmental destruction?
When I started writing about the relationships between environment and security twenty years ago, not a great deal of work had been done on this topic. But several leading environmental thinkers were making the case that framing environmental issues as security issues, or what came to be called 'securitizing the environment', was not only a good strategy to get action on environmental problems, but also was useful analytically to think about these two domains. Unlike the subsequent criticisms of 'environmental security' made by Realists and scholars of conventional 'security studies', my criticism starts with the environmentalist premise that environmental deterioration is a paramount problem for contemporary humanity as a whole.
Those who want to 'securitize the environment' are attempting to do what William James a century ago proposed as a general strategy for social problem solving. Can we find, in James' language, 'a moral equivalent of war?' (Note the unfortunately acronym: MEOW). War and the threat of war, James observed, often lead to rapid and extensive mobilizations of effort. Can we somehow transfer these vast social energies to deal with other sets of problems? This is an enduring hope, particularly in the United States, where we have a 'war on drugs', a 'war on cancer', and a 'war on poverty'. But doing this for the environment, by 'securitizing the environment,' is unlikely to be very successful. And I fear that bringing 'security' orientations, institutions, and mindsets into environmental problem-solving will also bring in statist, nationalist, and militarist approaches. This will make environmental problem-solving more difficult, not easier, and have many baneful side-effects.
Another key point I think is important, is that the environment—and the various values and ends associated with habitat and the protection of habitat—are actually much more powerful and encompassing than those of security and violence. Instead of 'securitizing the environment' it is more promising is to 'environmentalize security'. Not many people think about the linkages between the environment and security-from-violence in this way, but I think there is a major case of it 'hiding in plain sight' in the trajectory of how the state-system and nuclear weapons have interacted.
When nuclear weapons were invented and first used in the 1940s, scientists were ignorant about many aspects of their effects. As scientists learned about these effects, and as this knowledge became public, many people started thinking and acting in different ways about nuclear choices. The fact that a ground burst of a nuclear weapon would produce substantial radioactive 'fall-out' was not appreciated until the first hydrogen bomb tests in the early 1950s. It was only then that scientists started to study what happened to radioactive materials dispersed widely in the environment. Evidence began to accumulate that some radioactive isotopes would be 'bio-focused', or concentrated by biological process. Public interest scientists began effectively publicizing this information, and mothers were alerted to the fact that their children's teeth were become radioactive. This new scientific knowledge about the environmental effects of nuclear explosions, and the public mobilizations it produced, played a key role in the first substantial nuclear arms control treaty, the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, which banned nuclear weapons testing in the atmosphere, in the ocean, and in space. Thus, the old ways of providing security were circumscribed by new knowledge and new stakeholders of environmental health effects. The environment was not securitized, security was partially environmentalized.
Thus, while some accounts by arms control theorists emphasize the importance of 'social learning' in altering US-Soviet relations, an important part of this learning was not about the nature of social and political interactions, but about the environmental consequences of nuclear weapons. The learning that was most important in motivating so many actors (both within states and in mass publics) to seek changes in politics was 'natural learning,' or more specifically learning about the interaction of natural and technological systems.
An even more consequential case of the environmentalization of security occurred in the 1970's and 1980's. A key text here is Jonathan Schell's book, The Fate of the Earth. Schell's book, combining very high-quality journalism with first rate political theoretical reflections, lays out in measured terms the new discoveries of ecologists and atmospheric scientists about the broader planetary consequences of an extensive nuclear war. Not only would hundreds of millions of people be immediately killed and much of the planet's built infrastructure destroyed, but the planet earth's natural systems would be so altered that the extinction of complex life forms, among them homo sapiens, might result. The detonation of numerous nuclear weapons and the resultant burning of cities would probably dramatically alter the earth's atmosphere, depleting the ozone layer that protects life from lethal solar radiations, and filling the atmosphere with sufficient dust to cause a 'nuclear winter.' At stake in nuclear war, scientists had learned, was not just the fate of nations, but of the earth as a life support system. Conventional accounts of the nuclear age and of the end of the Cold War are loath to admit it, but it I believe it is clear that spreading awareness of these new natural-technological possibilities played a significant role in ending the Cold War and the central role that nuclear arms control occupies in the settlement of the Cold War. Again, traditional ways of achieving security-from-violence were altered by new knowledges about their environmental consequences—security practices and arrangements were partly environmentalized.
Even more radically, I think we can also turn this into a positive project. As I wrote two decades ago, environmental restoration would probably generate political externalities that would dampen tendencies towards violence. In other words, if we address the problem of the environment, then we will be drawn to do various things that will make various types of violent conflict less likely.
Your work is permeated by references to 'material factors'. This makes it different from branches of contemporary IR—like constructivism or postmodernism—which seem to be underpinned by a profound commitment to focus solely one side of the Cartesian divide. What is your take on the pervasiveness and implications of this 'social bias'?
Postmodernism and constructivism are really the most extreme manifestations of a broad trend over the last two centuries toward what I refer to as 'social-social science' and the decline—but hardly the end—of 'natural-social science'. Much of western thought prior to this turn was 'naturalist' and thus tended to downplay both human agency and ideas. At the beginning of the nineteenth century—partly because of the influence of German idealism, partly because of the great liberationist projects that promised to give better consequence to the activities and aspirations of the larger body of human populations (previously sunk in various forms of seemingly natural bondages), and partly because of the great expansion of human choice brought about by the science-based technologies of the Industrial Revolution—there was a widespread tendency to move towards 'social-social science,' the project of attempting to explain the human world solely by reference to the human world, to explain social outcomes with reference to social causes. While this was the dominant tendency, and a vastly productive one in many ways, it existed alongside and in interaction with what is really a modernized version of the earlier 'natural-social science.' Much of my work has sought to 'bring back in' and extend these 'natural-social' lines of argument—found in figures such as Dewey and H.G. Wells—into our thinking about the planetary situation.
In many parts of both European and American IR and related areas, Postmodern and constructivist theories have significantly contributed to IR theorists by enhancing our appreciation of ideas, language, and identities in politics. As a response to the limits and blindnesses of certain types of rationalist, structuralist, and functional theories, this renewed interest in the ideational is an important advance. Unfortunately, both postmodernism and constructivism have been marked by a strong tendency to go too far in their emphasis of the ideational. Postmodernism and constructivism have also helped make theorists much more conscious of the implicit—and often severely limiting—ontological assumptions that underlay, inform, and bound their investigations. This is also a major contribution to the study of world politics in all its aspects.
Unfortunately, this turn to ontology has also had intellectually limiting effects by going too far, in the search for a pure or nearly pure social ontology. With the growth in these two approaches, there has indeed been a decided decline in theorizing about the material. But elsewhere in the diverse world of theorizing about IR and the global, theorizing about the material never came anything close to disappearing or being eclipsed. For anyone thinking about the relationships between politics and nuclear weapons, space, and the environment, theorizing about the material has remained at the center, and it would be difficult to even conceive of how theorizing about the material could largely disappear. The recent 're-discovery of the material' associated with various self-styled 'new materialists' is a welcome, if belated, re-discovery for postmodernists and constructivists. For most of the rest of us, the material had never been largely dropped out.
A very visible example of the ways in which the decline in appropriate attention to the material, an excessive turn to the ideational, and the quest for a nearly pure social ontology, can lead theorizing astray is the core argument in Alexander Wendt's main book, Social Theory of International Politics, one of the widely recognized landmarks of constructivist IR theory. The first part of the book advances a very carefully wrought and sophisticated argument for a nearly pure ideational social ontology. The material is explicitly displaced into a residue or rump of unimportance. But then, to the reader's surprise, the material, in the form of 'common fate' produced by nuclear weapons, and climate change, reappears and is deployed to play a really crucial role in understanding contemporary change in world politics.
My solution is to employ a mixed ontology. By this I mean that I think several ontologically incommensurate and very different realities are inescapable parts the human world. These 'unlikes' are inescapable parts of any argument, and must somehow be combined. There are a vast number of ways in which they can be combined, and on close examination, virtually all arguments in the social sciences are actually employing some version of a mixed ontology, however implicitly and under-acknowledged.
But not all combinations are equally useful in addressing all questions. In my version of mixed ontology—which I call 'practical naturalism'—human social agency is understood to be occurring 'between two natures': on the one hand the largely fixed nature of humans, and on the other the changing nature composed of the material world, a shifting amalgam of actual non-human material nature of geography and ecology, along with human artifacts and infrastructures. Within this frame, I posit as rooted in human biological nature, a set of 'natural needs,' most notably for security-from-violence and habitat services. Then I pose questions of functionality, by which I mean: which combinations of material practices, political structures, ideas and identities are needed to achieve these ends in different material contexts? Answering this question requires the formulation of various 'historical materialist' propositions, which in turn entails the systematic formulation of typologies and variation in both the practices, structures and ideas, and in material contexts. These arguments are not centered on explaining what has or what will happen. Instead they are practical in the sense that they are attempting to answer the question of 'what is to be done' given the fixed ends and given changing material contexts. I think this is what advocates of arms control and environmental sustainability are actually doing when they claim that one set of material practices and their attendant political structures, identities and ideas must be replaced with another if basic human needs are to going to continue to be meet in the contemporary planetary material situation created by the globalization of machine civilization on earth.
Since this set of arguments is framed within a mixed ontology, ideas and identities are a vital part of the research agenda. Much of the energy of postmodern and many varieties of critical theory have focused on 'deconstructing' various identities and ideas. This critical activity has produced and continues to produce many insights of theorizing about politics. But I think there is an un-tapped potential for theorists who are interested in ideas and identities, and who want their work to make a positive contribution to practical problem-solving in the contemporary planetary human situation in what might be termed a 'constructive constructivism'. This concerns a large practical theory agenda—and an urgent one at that, given the rapid increase in planetary problems—revolving around the task of figuring out which ideas and identities are appropriate for the planetary world, and in figuring out how they can be rapidly disseminated. Furthermore, thinking about how to achieve consciousness change of this sort is not something ancillary to the greenpeace project but vital to it. My thinking on how this should and might be done centers the construction of a new social narrative, centered not on humanity but on the earth.
Is it easy to plug your mixed ontology and interests beyond the narrow confines of IR or even the walls of the ivory tower into processes of collective knowledge proliferation in IR—a discipline increasingly characterized by compartimentalization and specialization?
The great plurality of approaches in IR today is indispensible and a welcome change. The professionalization of IR and the organization of intellectual life has some corruptions and pitfalls that are best avoided. The explosion of 'isms' and of different perspectives has been valuable and necessary in many ways, but it has also helped to foster and empower sectarian tendencies that confound the advance of knowledge. Some of the adherents of some sects and isms boast openly of establishing 'citation cartels' to favor themselves and their friends. Some theorists also have an unfortunate tendency to assume that because they have adopted a label that what they actually do is the actually the realization of the label. Thus we have 'realists' with limited grasp on realities, 'critical theorists' who repeat rather than criticize the views of other 'critical theorists,' and anti-neoliberals who are ruthless Ayn Rand-like self aggrandizers. The only way to fully address these tendencies is to talk to people you disagree with, and find and communicate with people in other disciplines.
Another consequence of this sectarianism is visible in the erosion of scholarly standards of citation. The system of academic incentives is configured to reward publication, and the publication of ideas that are new. This has a curiously perverse impact on the achievement of cumulativity. One seemingly easy and attractive path to saying something new is to say something old in new language, to say something said in another sect or field in the language of your sect or field, or easiest of all, simply ignore what other people have said if it is too much like what you are trying to say. George Santyana is wide quoted in saying that 'those who forget the past are condemned to repeat it.' For academics it can unfortunately be said, 'those who can successfully forget what past academics said are free to say it again, and thus advance toward tenure.' When rampant sectarianism and decline in standards of citation is combined with a broader cultural tendency to valorize self-expression and authenticity, academic work can become an exercise in abstract self expressionism.
Confining one's intellectual life within one 'ism' or sect is sure to be self-limiting. Many of the most important and interesting questions arise between and across the sects and schools. Also, there are great opportunities in learning from people who do not fully share your assumptions and approaches. Seriously engaging the work and ideas of scholars in other sects can be very very valuable. Scholars in different sects and schools are also often really taking positions that are not so different as their labels would suggest. Perhaps because my research agenda fits uncomfortably within any of the established schools and isms, I have found particularly great value in seeking out and talking on a sustained basis with people with very different approaches.
My final question is about normativity and the way that normativity is perceived: In Europe and the United States, liberal Internationalism is increasingly considered as hollowed out, as a discursive cover for a tendency to attempt to control and regulate the world—or as an unguided idealistic missile. Doesn't adapting to a post-hegemonic world require dropping such ambitions?
American foreign policy has never been entirely liberal internationalist. Many other ideas and ideologies and approaches have often played important roles in shaping US foreign policy. But the United States, for a variety of reasons, has pursued liberal internationalist foreign policy agendas more extensively, and successfully, than any other major state in the modern state system, and the world, I think, has been made better off in very important ways by these efforts.
The net impact of the United States and of American grand strategy and particularly those parts of American brand strategy that have been more liberal internationalist in their character, has been enormously positive for the world. It has produced not a utopia by any means, but has brought about an era with more peace and security, prosperity, and freedom for more people than ever before in history.
Both American foreign policy and liberal internationalism have been subject to strong attacks from a variety of perspectives. Recently some have characterized liberal internationalism as a type of American imperialism, or as a cloak for US imperialism. Virtually every aspect of American foreign policy has been contested within the United States. Liberal internationalists have been strong enemies of imperialism and military adventurism, whether American or from other states. This started with the Whig's opposition to the War with Mexico and the Progressive's opposition to the Spanish-American War, and continued with liberal opposition to the War in Vietnam.
The claim that liberal internationalism leads to or supports American imperialism has also been recently voiced by many American realists, perhaps most notably John Mearsheimer (Theory Talk #49). He and others argue that liberal internationalism played a significant role in bringing about the War on Iraq waged by the W. Bush administration. This was indeed one of the great debacles of US foreign policy. But the War in Iraq was actually a war waged by American realists for reasons grounded in realist foreign policy thinking. It is true, as Mearsheimer emphasizes, that many academic realists criticized the Bush administration's plans and efforts in the invasion in Iraq. Some self-described American liberal internationalists in the policy world supported the war, but almost all academic American liberal internationalists were strongly opposed, and much of the public opposition to the war was on grounds related to liberal internationalist ideas.
It is patently inaccurate to say that main actors in the US government that instigated the War on Iraq were liberal internationalists. The main initiators of the war were Richard Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld. Whatever can be said about those two individuals, they are not liberal internationalists. They initiated the war because they thought that the Saddam Hussein regime was a threat to American interests—basically related to oil. The Saddam regime was seen as a threat to American-centered regional hegemony in the Middle East, an order whose its paramount purpose has been the protection of oil, and the protection of the regional American allies that posses oil. Saddam Hussein was furthermore a demonstrated regional revisionist likely to seek nuclear weapons, which would greatly compromise American military abilities in the region. Everything else the Bush Administration's public propaganda machine said to justify the war was essentially window dressing for this agenda. Far from being motivated by a liberal internationalist agenda the key figures in the Bush Administration viewed the collateral damage to international institutions produced by the war as a further benefit, not a cost, of the war. It is particularly ironic that John Mearsheimer would be a critic of this war, which seems in many ways a 'text book' application of a central claim of his 'offensive realism,' that powerful states can be expected, in the pursuit of their security and interests, to seek to become and remain regional hegemons.
Of course, liberal internationalism, quite aside from dealing with these gross mischaracterizations propagated by realists, must also look to the future. The liberal internationalism that is needed for today and tomorrow is going to be in some ways different from the liberal internationalism of the twentieth century. This is a large topic that many people, but not enough, are thinking about. In a recent working paper for the Council on Foreign Relations, John Ikenberry and I have laid out some ways in which we think American liberal internationalism should proceed. The starting point is the recognition that the United States is not as 'exceptional' in its precocious liberal-democratic character, not as 'indispensible' for the protection of the balance of power or the advance of freedom, or as easily 'hegemonic' as it has been historically. But the world is now also much more democratic than ever before, with democracies old and new, north and south, former colonizers and former colonies, and in every civilizational flavor. The democracies also face an array of difficult domestic problems, are thickly enmeshed with one another in many ways, and have a vital role to play in solving global problems. We suggest that the next liberal internationalism in American foreign policy should focus on American learning from the successes of other democracies in solving problems, focus on 'leading by example of successful problem-solving' and less with 'carrots and sticks,' make sustained efforts to moderate the inequalities and externalities produced by de-regulated capitalism, devote more attention to building community among the democracies, and make sustained efforts to 'recast global bargains' and the distribution of authority in global institutions to better incorporate the interests of 'rising powers.'
Daniel Deudney is Associate Professor and Director of Undergraduate Studies in Political Science at Johns Hopkins University. He has published widely in political theory and international relations, on substantive issues such as nuclear weapons, the environment as a security issue, liberal and realist international relations theory, and geopolitics.
Related links
Deudney's Faculty Profile at Johns Hopkins
Read Deudney & Ikenberry's Democratic Internationalism: An American Grand Strategy for a Post-exceptionalist Era (Council on Foreign Relations Working Paper, 2012) here (pdf)
Read Deudney et al's Global Shift: How the West Should Respond to the Rise of China (2011 Transatlantic Academy report) here (pdf)
Read the introduction of Deudney's Bounding Power (2007) here (pdf)
Read Deudney's Bringing Nature Back In: Geopolitical Theory from the Greeks to the Global Era (1999 book chapter) here (pdf)
Read Deudney & Ikenberry's Who Won the Cold War? (Foreign Policy, 1992) here (pdf)
Read Deudney's The Case Against Linking Environmental Degradation and National Security (Millennium, 1990) here (pdf)
Read Deudney's Rivers of Energy: The Hydropower Potential (WorldWatch Institute Paper, 1981) here (pdf)
Print version of this Talk (pdf)
Esta Semana: Comunicado de Departamento del Tesoro de los EE.UU. El 13 de julio el titular del Departamento del Tesoro de Estados Unidos, Henry M. Paulson, Jr, emitió un comunicado sobre la caída y rescate de los gigantes inmobiliarios Fannie Mae y Freddy Mac. Les acercamos el comunicado extraído del Departamento de Prensa del Tesoro americano. El pasado 25 de julio se produjo la Cumbre Unión Europea - Sudáfrica. En la oportunidad y como resultado de la misma los participantes emitieron una declaración conjunta. Véala aquí Les acercamos este informe del Alto Comisionado de Derechos Humanos de la ONU sobre Derechos Humanos y Terrorismo que nos pareció de gran interés. Véalo aquíRadovan Karadzic en La Haya.Responsable por uno de los genocidios mas sangrientos de la historia reciente, Radovan Karadzic, el ex jefe político de los serbobosnios comparecerá ante el Tribunal Penal Internacional para ex Yugoslavia. Karadzic fue trasladado en la noche del pasado martes a La Haya. Horas antes del traslado, tenía lugar una manifestación organizada por la oposición nacionalista serbia en el centro de Belgrado, que degeneró al final en altercados entre unos centenares de jóvenes y la policía. Varios medios informan al respecto: "El Mercurio" de Chile: "Masiva protesta antes de su traslado en las calles de Belgrado: Karadzic fue extraditado a La Haya":http://diario.elmercurio.com/2008/07/30/internacional/internacional/noticias/B46C4AF2-02E3-4C90-823E-ECC1FC5E98D2.htm?id={B46C4AF2-02E3-4C90-823E-ECC1FC5E98D2}"El País" de Madrid: "Karadzic llega al Tribunal de La Haya: Serbia envía de noche al presunto criminal de guerra a las dependencias penitenciarias internacionales.- Será juzgado por genocidio y otros crímines por el Tribunal Penal Internacional para la ex Yugoslavia": http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Karadzic/llega/Tribunal/Haya/elpepuint/20080730elpepuint_4/Tes"New York Times": "Karadzic Arrives in Hague After Protest by Loyalists":http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/31/world/europe/31hague.html"CCN": "Karadzic set to make first court appearance":http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/europe/07/30/karadzic.deportation/index.html"Karadzic appeal not received by court"http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/europe/07/28/karadzic.deportation/index.html"Karadzic to defend himself in war crimes court":http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/europe/07/23/serb.arrest/index.html"Thousands protest Karadzic arrest":http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/europe/07/29/karadzic.deportation/index.html"Time":"Karadzic Wants No Lawyer":http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1827424,00.html"Le Monde": "Radovan Karadzic comparaîtra jeudi devant le TPI"http://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2008/07/30/radovan-karadzic-est-arrive-a-la-haye_1078522_3214.html#ens_id=1075781"Los Ángeles Times": "War crimes suspect Karadzic extradited to The Hague":http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-serbs30-2008jul30,0,2903253.story"MSNBC": "Karadzic in U.N. custody in Netherlands: Ex-fugitive flown to the Netherlands following violent protest in Belgrade":http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25887949/"Thousands protest in Belgrade for Karadzic: U.S. Embassy warns Americans to avoid protest amid fears of violence":http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25890371/"Paper: Karadzic lawyer tries to stop extradition: Appeal meant to prevent war-crime suspect from being sent to U.N. court":http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25859649/"Times":"Radovan Karadzic extradited to The Hague":http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article4427730"La Nación": "Está acusado de genocidio: Radovan Karadzic, a disposición de La Haya. El ex líder serbio llegó a Holanda para ser juzgado en el Tribunal Penal Internacional":http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1034845"Avanza su extradición: Karadzic será llevado a La Haya en secreto": http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1034388"El Tiempo" de Colombia: "Radovan Karadzic fue llevado a La Haya, Holanda, para ser juzgado por crímenes de guerra":http://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/europa/home/radovan-karadzic-fue-llevado-a-la-haya-holanda-para-ser-juzgado-por-crimenes-de-guerra_4416080-1"The Economist":"Arrest of a bearded man": http://www.economist.com/world/europe/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11792314"El Universal" de Méjico: "Karadzic queda en poder de la ONU en Holanda":http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/notas/526234.htmlAMERICA LATINA"El Mercurio" publica: "Reclaman la restitución del Ejército: Ex militares haitianos ocupan un antiguo cuartel":http://diario.elmercurio.com/2008/07/30/internacional/internacional/noticias/B0B07BB4-211D-4F05-9FEB-6704AF47278D.htm?id={B0B07BB4-211D-4F05-9FEB-6704AF47278D}"La Nación" publica: "Uribe pide "discreción"":http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1034424"MSNBC" informa: "Woman suspected of being FARC's Europe link: Maria Remedios Garcia Albert, 57, was the alleged rebel liaison":http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25873981"The Economist" analiza: "Energy reform in México: Crude and oily. A controversial referendum and the future of the state oil company":http://www.economist.com/world/americas/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11791596"MSNBC" anuncia: "Mexican military losing drug war support: Border residents report abuse, violence by soldiers sent to curb narcotics": http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25851906/"El País" de Madrid publica: "El presidente electo de Paraguay ya no es sacerdote: El Papa ha suspendido definitivamente a Fernando Lugo porque las profesiones de obispo y gobernante de un país no son compatibles http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/presidente/electo/Paraguay/sacerdote/elpepuint/20080730elpepuint_8/Tes"El País" de Madrid informa: "Chávez: "Bush quiere revivir la guerra fría". El presidente venezolano dice, en una carta enviada a Fidel Castro, que EE UU planea agredir a Cuba http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Chavez/Bush/quiere/revivir/guerra/fria/elpepuint/20080728elpepuint_14/Tes"The Economist" anuncia: "Argentina: Et tu, Julio? :The president suffers a heavy defeat at the hands of her number two":http://www.economist.com/world/americas/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11791614"La Nación" informa: "Bolivia: ratifican el referéndum. Pese a los pedidos de suspensión, la Corte Electoral dijo que se celebrará el 10 de agosto":http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1034389ESTADOS UNIDOS / CANADA"New York Times" informa: " U.S. Military Says Soldiers Fired on Civilians":http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/28/world/middleeast/28iraq.html?ref=world"El País" de Madrid anuncia: "La Casa Blanca pronostica un déficit presupuestario récord para 2009: Sería de 482.000 millones de dólares, aproximadamente el 3,5% de la economía": http://www.elpais.com/articulo/economia/Casa/Blanca/pronostica/deficit/presupuestario/record/2009/elpepueco/20080728elpepueco_8/Tes"La Nación" publica: "La economía enfrenta a Obama y McCain: El candidato demócrata advirtió que Estados Unidos está en "emergencia económica"; fuertes críticas de su rival republicano":http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1034414"The Economist" analiza: "It's the economy again, stupid.John McCain and Barack Obama are offering profoundly different prescriptions, though economic and political realities will limit their ambitions": http://www.economist.com/world/unitedstates/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11792500"El País" de Madrid informa: "Republicanos y demócratas se enfocan en la economía: Barack Obama convoca a un panel de lujo para revisar sus propuestas.- John McCain mantiene contactos con las autoridades monetarias": http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Republicanos/democratas/enfocan/economia/elpepuint/20080728elpepuint_13/Tes"El Mercurio" de Chile anuncia: "Le queda menos de un mes antes de ser proclamado oficialmente en la Convención Demócrata: Obama entra en la recta final para decidir quién será su candidato a Vicepresidente":http://diario.elmercurio.com/2008/07/30/internacional/_portada/noticias/CAE4A8B7-3485-4112-8844-D31E89023938.htm?id={CAE4A8B7-3485-4112-8844-D31E89023938}"Time" informa: "Obama's Vice-Presidential Dilemma":http://www.time.com/time/politics/article/0,8599,1827714,00.html"Time" publica su sitio con links sobre las elecciones en los Estados Unidos: http://thepage.time.com/EUROPA"El País" de Madrid informa: "Erdogan llama a la unidad tras los atentados de ayer en Turquía: La explosión consecutiva de dos bombas sacude un barrio obrero de Estambul.- La cifra de muertes sube a 17 y hay unos 150 heridos, una decena de ellos de gravedad.- La policía sospecha de los independentistas kurdos": http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Erdogan/llama/unidad/atentados/ayer/Turquia/elpepuint/20080728elpepuint_4/Tes"New Yorrk Times2 anuncia: "Police Investigate Istanbul Bombings":http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/29/world/europe/29turkey.html?ref=world"Time" publica: "Fatal Bombings in an Edgy Turkey":http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1827056,00.html"El País" de Madrid informa: "Comienza el proceso para ilegalizar el partido de Erdogan": http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Comienza/proceso/ilegalizar/partido/Erdogan/elpepuint/20080728elpepiint_6/Tes"El País" de Madrid anuncia: "El Tribunal Constitucional de Turquía rechaza ilegalizar al partido de Gobierno":http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Tribunal/Constitucional/Turquia/rechaza/ilegalizar/partido/Gobierno/elpepuint/20080730elpepuint_9/Tes"Le Monde" publica: "Turquie : la justice n'interdit pas le parti au pouvoir":http://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2008/07/30/turquie-la-justice-n-interdit-pas-le-parti-au-pouvoir_1078861_3214.html"Time" analiza: "Who Was Behind the Turkish Blasts?":http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1827398,00.htmlEl País" de Madrid informa: "Las peores inundaciones en Ucrania en 100 años se cobran la vida de 13 personas. Las fuertes lluvias han destruido más de 21.000 casas y 20.000 hectáreas de cultivos, y han dejado inutilizadas 2.020 kilómetros de carreteras y más de un centenar de puentes": http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/peores/inundaciones/Ucrania/anos/cobran/vida/personas/elpepuint/20080728elpepuint_5/Tes"MSNBC" publica: "Ukraine floods kill 22, force 20,000 to flee: Damages estimated at $800 million, but few funds available to clean up":http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25887744/"Time" informa: "Thousands of British Passports Stolen": http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1827501,00.html"La Nación" publica: "Los que huyen de la miseria. Actos desesperados de los ilegales en España para no ser deportados: Viajes riesgosos y casamientos arreglados":http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1034426"MSNBC" informa: "7 jailed for genocide over Srebrenica massacre. War crimes court orders Bosnian Serbs to serve sentences of up 42 years":http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25908708/"The Economist" analiza: "France: The reformist president. Quietly but determinedly, Nicolas Sarkozy is pressing ahead with reforms in France-all without provoking huge strikes and street protests":http://www.economist.com/world/europe/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11792306ASIA – PACÍFICO /MEDIO ORIENTE"New York Times" informa: "Bomb Attacks in Baghdad and Kirkuk Kill Dozens": HTTP://WWW.NYTIMES.COM/2008/07/29/WORLD/MIDDLEEAST/29IRAQ.HTML?REF=WORLD"El País" anuncia: "Tres mujeres suicidas causan al menos 28 muertos en Bagdad. Miles de peregrinos llenan Bagdad con motivo de una importante festividad chií.- En Kirkuk, otro atentado suicida deja 22 muertos": HTTP://WWW.ELPAIS.COM/ARTICULO/INTERNACIONAL/MUJERES/SUICIDAS/CAUSAN/28/MUERTOS/BAGDAD/ELPEPUINT/20080728ELPEPUINT_9/TES"La Nación" publica: "Cuatro mujeres suicidas atacaron en Irak:: Hicieron detonar los explosivos que llevaban y mataron a 57 personas; hay por lo menos 300 heridos":http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1034419"MSNBC" informa: "Female suicide bombers kill 57, wound dozens. Attackers target Shiite pilgrimage in Baghdad, Kurdish rally in Kirkuk": http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25880699/"New York Times" anuncia: "Olmert to Resign After September Vote": HTTP://WWW.NYTIMES.COM/2008/07/31/WORLD/MIDDLEEAST/31MIDEAST.HTML?_R=1&HP&OREF=SLOGIN"CNN" publica: "Ahmadinejad: The big powers are going down":HTTP://EDITION.CNN.COM/2008/WORLD/MEAST/07/29/IRAN.AIDS.AP/INDEX.HTML"Time" informa: "Ahmadinejad: 'Powers' Going Down": HTTP://WWW.TIME.COM/TIME/WORLD/ARTICLE/0,8599,1827377,00.HTML"The Economist analiza: "Iran: Who runs it?": http://www.economist.com/world/mideast-africa/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11792348"La Nación" anuncia: "Irán criticó a la ONU ante los Países No Alineados. Ahmadinejad aseguró en la cumbre de cancilleres que el organismo actúa "a favor de las grandes potencias"; pidió crear un fondo para financiar proyectos del bloque":http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1034530"CNN" informa: "Pakistani militants abduct 30 police": http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/07/29/pakistan.abductions/index.html"Time" anuncia: "Cambodia Reelects Longtime Leader": http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1827054,00.html"MSNBC" publica: "Typhoon slams Taiwan, triggering floods, slides: At least one killed, air traffic disrupted; Typhoon Fung Wong heads to China": http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25881000/"The Economist" analiza: "The Beijing Olympics:Five-ring circus": http://www.economist.com/world/asia/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11792915"El Mercurio" publica: "Denuncias a días de la inauguración de los Juegos Olímpicos: China no cumple promesas y mantiene censura a la prensa y faltas a DD.HH.": HTTP://DIARIO.ELMERCURIO.COM/2008/07/30/INTERNACIONAL/_PORTADA/NOTICIAS/CB8049AE-EDCE-4C33-AF25-F7337A8C08B6.HTM?ID={CB8049AE-EDCE-4C33-AF25-F7337A8C08B6}"El País" informa: "Ni los Juegos Olímpicos pueden con la censura en China: El COI no logra convencer al país asiático para que los periodistas tengan acceso libre a Internet": HTTP://WWW.ELPAIS.COM/ARTICULO/INTERNET/JUEGOS/OLIMPICOS/PUEDEN/CENSURA/CHINA/ELPPGL/20080730ELPEPUNET_3/TES"New York Times" anuncia: "China to Limit Web Access During Games":HTTP://WWW.NYTIMES.COM/2008/07/31/SPORTS/OLYMPICS/31CHINA.HTML?HP"China Daily" publica: "WTO talks collapse amid farm row": HTTP://WWW.CHINADAILY.COM.CN/CHINA/2008-07/30/CONTENT_6887475.HTM"CNN" informa: "China rebuffs human rights report":http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/07/29/china.humanrights/index.html"CNN" publica: "India: Police defuse 18 bombs at market":http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/07/29/india.bombs.ap/index.html+"Time" anuncia: "India: The Terrorists Within": http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1826950,00.htmlAFRICA"New York Time" informa: "Sudan Rallies Behind Leader Reviled Abroad":http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/28/world/africa/28sudan.html?ref=world"CNN" publica: "U.S. expands Zimbabwe sanctions":http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/africa/07/25/zimbabwe.sanctions/index.html"MSNBC" publica: "Officials say Zimbabwe talks break off: Mugabe insists he remain president":http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25887595/"MSNBC" informa: "Cash crisis, inflation worsen in Zimbabwe: Bank chief plans new currency reforms to tackle inflation and shortages":http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25869792/"CNN" anuncia: "Nigerian militants: We'll destroy oil pipelines":http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/africa/07/23/nigeria.oil/index.htmlECONOMIA"The Economist" analiza: "World trade: Dried up. Talks over the Doha round of global trade talks have collapsed":http://www.economist.com/finance/displayStory.cfm?story_id=11831960&source=features_box_main"The Economist" publica su informe semanal: "Business this week":http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11793527&CFID=15321684&CFTOKEN=24001901"New York Times" informa: "Stock Indexes Continue to Slip":http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/29/business/29stox.html?_r=1&ref=business&oref=slogin"El País" de Madrid informa: "El FMI alerta del empeoramiento de la crisis crediticia: La institución internacional achaca este empeoramiento a la ralentización de la economía mundial.- Subraya la caída de los precios de la vivienda en España": http://www.elpais.com/articulo/economia/FMI/alerta/empeoramiento/crisis/crediticia/elpepueco/20080728elpepueco_7/Tes"CNN" publica: "Global trade deal falls apart":http://edition.cnn.com/2008/BUSINESS/07/29/wto.collapse.ap/index.html"CNN" informa: "High oil price boosts BP profit":http://edition.cnn.com/2008/BUSINESS/07/29/bp.profit.ap/index.html"La Nación" publica: "La liberalización del comercio mundial. Anunciaron el fracaso de la Ronda de Doha. El director general de la Organización Mundial del Comercio, Pascal Lamy, confirmó que las negociaciones quedaron truncas; declaró estar "profundamente consternado"":http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1034531La caída del crudo impulsa a Wall Street: "La Bolsa de Nueva York muestra fuertes avances; el petróleo bajó más de tres dólares y se negocia en US$ 121 el barril en el mercado estadounidense": http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1034574OTRAS NOTICIAS"Time" publica: "Beijing Cites Many Olympic Threats": http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1827353,00.html"MSNBC" publica: "Olympic threats fuel unease about security: China says heavy defense will secure Games, but clampdown is smothering":http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25890371/"Time" informa: "A Video Threat to the Olympics?":http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1826953,00.html"The Economist" analiza: "Global Islam: Unusual guests, a most unusual host. A new breeze may be blowing very softly from the Saudi sands":http://www.economist.com/world/international/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11792340
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In this dissertation I explore the co-emergence of multinational corporations and the consolidation of the discourse on human rights at the level of the United Nations throughout the second half of the twentieth century and analyse the resulting conceptual gap that created tensions in the international legal order. Despite attempts by developing countries to alleviate this imbalance through the New International Economic Order (NIEO), a multitude of soft law initiatives and the reluctance to address human rights issues in MNCs at the level of the United Nations failed to make MNCs incorporate human rights standards in their operations. The merging of the two concepts became increasingly more challenging throughout the 70s and 80s when the world was faced with the oil crisis and the rise of neoliberalism. This shift in the global legal architecture forced the Third World to take a new approach to tackle the conceptual gap, this resulted in the emergence of the Third generation of human rights and ultimately, the concept of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). CSR is a concept of international private business self-regulation that aims at merging human, socio-economic, and political rights into the world of the corporation. As a response to the concerns for human rights violations by corporate actors, CSR slowly came to the forefront of the global business scene to enable the continuation of the operation of multinational enterprises. CSR presented a platform for global soft law initiatives to minimise the conceptual gap they had created over throughout the preceding decades. This allowed people such as John Ruggie to develop the Guiding Principles, the most successful initiative to date. This dissertation will provide its readers with a fruitful understanding of the crucial role that international law played in this development and further, what implications this had on the political and economic level. - Introduction In the words of Sundhya Pahuja and Anna Saunders, the second half of the twentieth century staged a 'series of encounters between rival practices of world making, each of which travelled with rival accounts of international law'.[1] Anti-colonial disputes, the Cold War, the rise of developmental issues and the increasing popularity of neoliberalism are only some of the events that generated these competing views of the international legal order. These events brought different coalitions across the Global North and Global South, and different 'alliances of interest between 'public' and 'private' actors'.[2] At the heart of the system that emerged lie two fundamental elements: the modern multinational corporation and human rights. How to conceptualize multinational corporations (MNCs) and how to define their relation to the law and the State was part of these rival stories. In this paper I explore the co-emergence of multinational corporations and the consolidation of the discourse on human rights at the level of the United Nations throughout the second half of the twentieth century and analyze the resulting conceptual gap that created tensions in the international legal order. In particular, I examine how this encounter, which became evident as calls for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) were being advanced within the UN, came to produce the idea of 'Corporate Social Responsibility' (CSR). I show that CSR emerged from the failure of the NIEO, particularly in relation to the roles and responsibilities of private actors in the global economy and how this can be traced to the limits of initiatives addressing the tensions between human rights claims and the interests of multinational corporations. In so doing I provide an understanding of the crucial role that international law played in this development and the implications this had at the political and economic level. The first section of this essay examines the lack of direct use of human rights language in the UN literature focusing on MNCs and their role in world development from the 1960s to the 1970s. This includes an analysis of the report entitled 'Multinational Corporations in World Development'.[3] I demonstrate the emphasis and enthusiasm for multinational corporations displayed at the level of the United Nations and how the concepts of the corporation and human rights were kept separate due to their respective supporters during the Cold War. I then focus on the attempts by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the International Labor Organization (ILO) and the 'Group of 77' (G77) to bridge this conceptual gap through the imposition of policies and initiatives, though without major success. The second section analyzes the influence of the oil crisis and the rise of neoliberalism on the shift of the global legal architecture, ultimately promoting the birth of the new developmental state. Here concern is with the new legal structures' attempt to merge the concepts of multinational corporations and human rights through a third generation of human rights, [4] and I engage in theoretical approaches by legal scholars such as Samuel Moyn and Antonia Darder. In the third section investigates the concept of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and analyzes its application and limitations. CSR is a concept of international private business self-regulation that aims at merging human, socio-economic, and political rights into the world of the corporation. As a response to the concerns for human rights violations by corporate actors, CSR slowly came to the forefront of the global business scene to enable the continuation of the operation of multinational enterprises. I demonstrate how CSR aspired to close a gap between human rights and corporate action in a way that would harmonize them through a multitude of soft law initiatives. This leads to the question of whether direct regulations can apply to MNCs under international law and a discussion of the UN Global Compact, at the time the world's largest and most far-reaching CSR initiative.[5] Finally, this paper closes with the most recent developments in the global legal order designed to tackle the conceptual gap between MNCs and human rights, namely through the United Nations Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises[6] and the development of the Guiding Principles. Dawn of co-existence The United Nations lies at the heart of the international regime with its normative, institutional and procedural human rights activities.[7] By adopting the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, the UN created a milestone document in the history of human rights. The Declaration has had an enormous influence on the world both in terms of 'spreading the philosophy of human rights, and in terms of inspiring legal texts and decisions'.[8] New states have used the Declaration as a basis for their constitutions, while domestic and international courts have invoked the Declaration in their judgments.[9] As human rights law developed, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, followed by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, were both drafted under the auspices of the United Nations, adopted in 1966 and entered into force in 1976. Together, these three instruments make up the 'International Bill of Human Rights'.[10] Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the world became a stage for global changes that altered the legal order. The end of colonialism dawned in the Global South, and during the height of the Cold War the West faced the Soviet Bloc and its mission of 'exporting revolution'.[11] Leaders of nationalist resistance movements received military as well as financial aid from the Soviet Bloc which intensified anti-colonial mobilization for self-determination.[12] Simultaneously, globalization was increasing rapidly, with multinational corporations emerging onto the global scene with heightened awareness of their existence as an entity with legal personality. As outlined by Sornarajah, their distinct bases of power allowed them to assert their interests through the law. With economic resources often exceeding those of their host state, MNCs had the ability to sculpt and manipulate legal outcomes through arbitration processes concerning foreign investment protection. This was done by exerting lobbying pressure on a host state which might be reluctant or even unable to object to the activities of MNCs.[13] The 'Multinational Corporations in World Development', report drafted by the UN Secretariat's Department on Economic and Social Affairs in 1973, considers 'the role of multinational corporations and their impact on the process of development, especially that of developing countries [.] [and] international relations'.[14] From the outset, the Report identifies the emerging phenomenon of the MNC in international economic affairs, how its size and spread has increased, and identifies the wide array of its activities and its use of natural resources which 'rival traditional economic exchanges between nations'.[15] It is surprising therefore, that a Report from the Department on Economic and Social Affairs, does not contain the term 'human rights' throughout the entire document. In the Report's introduction the UN makes a clear distinction between the differing views of impacts MNCs have on host countries. While 'depicted in some quarters as key instruments to maximizing world welfare, [they] are seen in others as dangerous agents of imperialism'.[16] The fact the United Nations recognized the potential neo-colonial nature of multinational corporations further highlights the need for guidance on human rights violations by MNCs. Yet the Report's reluctance to engage in the area of human rights provides a first glimpse into the divergence of the concepts of multinational corporations and human rights. An explanation for this can be identified by analyzing the Conventions, on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, with the UN's reluctance to avoid tensions between the supporters of both Conventions, respectively the United States and the Soviet Union. The US pushed for the development of civil and political rights, reflecting the protection of the freedom and liberties of individuals. Stemming from a Western philosophy, John Locke identified that in a 'state of nature' humans had 'natural rights' including the right to life, liberty and property. Similarly, French legal philosophers such as Rosseau, Montesquieu and Voltaire argued that such rights emerge from the inherent nature and virtue of man.[17] As Joseph and Castan argue, 'natural rights theories were highly influential [.] particularly in the revolutionary fervor of the United States'.[18] The advancement of civil and political rights reflects the capitalist ideology of the United States, conforming to the libertarian nature of Western capitalist societies.[19] In contrast, the Soviet Union pushed for the advancement of economic, social and cultural rights. These included the right to work, the right to an adequate standard of living, and the right to physical health. Contrary to the civil and political rights, these rights were based on the idea of equality, one deeply rooted in the political ideology of socialism. As the US would not commit to a proposition that there is a right to social goods, the US has never ratified this Convention.[20] The Soviet Bloc promoted the right of self-determination by providing military and financial aid to indigenous political activists in their fight for independence; an idea enshrined in Article 1 of the Covenant which states that: 'All peoples have the right to self-determination'.[21] For the Soviets 'national self-determination was an adjunct to revolutionary communism'.[22] They envisioned self-determination as the tool for the transition from dismantling a colonial empire to establishing a socialist state.[23] However, while the United Nations was reluctant to adhere to human rights in the framework of multinational corporations, other international institutions were motivated to develop this area. The OECD attempted to impose human rights on MNCs by adopting the Guidelines for MNCs (hereinafter 'OECD Guidelines') in 1976.[24] These were 'voluntary recommendations for business practices relating to human rights, disclosure of information, anti-corruption, labour relations, taxation, the environment and consumer protection'.[25] The Guidelines were intended to strengthen the international investment climate by improving the relationship and confidence between MNCs and host countries. National Contact Points (NCPs) were created that bore the responsibilities of enforcing and promoting the Guidelines, and any natural person could make a claim related to the violation of the Guidelines.[26] This aspect of the Guidelines provided an enforcing mechanism accessible to the public. But although the Guidelines were formally adopted by member states as a corporate responsibility instrument, they were subject to widespread criticism in the international legal order. As explained by Cernic, the Guidelines are ambiguous while the NCPs are limited in their influence on host states. Even though they outlined the need to respect human rights, the obligations were not framed in mandatory terms.[27]. Since the Guidelines lacked legal basis, the OECD was unable to assert sanctions on non-compliant corporations, and critics labeled them weak and ineffective. However, it was the intention of the OECD to guide rather than to legislate, because they saw voluntary versus legally binding standards as less of a dichotomy and more a continuum.[28] Although voluntary, corporations would be under scrutiny and potentially harm their reputation if they violated the Guidelines.[29] Yet, the Guidelines were hardly successful in the international legal order. A year later, in 1977, the ILO attempted to bridge this gap by adopting the Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning MNCs and Social Policy. These also attempted to 'encourage the positive contribution the MNEs can make to economic and social progress'.[30]. Article 8 emphasizes the respect for the Universal Declaration and the International Covenants. However, its voluntary and non-binding nature, as well as its weak monitoring process made this instrument as frail as the OECD Guidelines.[31] The lack of responsibility and perseverance stemming from international organizations and their disappointing attempt at bridging the gap between multinational corporations and human rights forced national and regional change. On the one hand, developing nations began taking matters into their own hands. To portray unity and solidarity throughout the 'Third World' the G77 coalition, formed in 1964 by developing member countries with the primary intention of promoting its members' economic and humanitarian interests through cooperation at the level of the United Nations, took a strong initiative. In the late 1970s the Group expressed its concern at the 'imbalance of negotiating power between TNCs [transnational corporations] and their host countries and inability on the part of the latter to control the activities of the TNCs within their territories'.[32] Simultaneously, home countries wanted to ensure their investments abroad would be protected, 'specifically from expropriation without a commitment to compensation based on international law'.[33] In accordance with the principles and concerns of the freshly adopted NIEO, developing countries raised the issue of the dominance of MNCs over natural resources and strongly urged the UN for a reaffirmation of their sovereignty over their resources. The NIEO was an attempt by Third World developing states, in the wake of decolonization, to deploy international law to achieve economic justice and improvements in the areas of development and socio-economic rights.[34] Pushed by the G77, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) member states devised a set of NIEO proposals in 1974 including (1) that developing states are entitled to control and regulate all activities of MNCs within their territory; and (2) that international trade must be based on equitable, stable and remunerative prices for raw materials.[35] Despite its impressive aims and careful compilation, the NIEO was unsuccessful. It failed 'to displace the power and advantage held by influential states', it failed to alter international law which favoured the economic interests of capital-exporting states and, most importantly, it demonstrated the Third World's acceptance of the economic ideology of the capitalist mindset, inflating the value of foreign capital including the exploitation of local labour in developing countries.[36] Consequently, the UN set up the United Nations Commission on Transnational Corporations which drafted a code of conduct for TNCs, one of the first formalized instruments drafted by the UN that set an obligation upon MNCs to respect human rights in host countries.[37] However while developing countries insisted on the idea of adopting an international instrument that was binding on MNCs, developed countries were not prepared to go beyond the voluntary sets of guidelines already in place.[38] On the other hand, due to the ineffectiveness of the international institutions, some MNCs that sought to abide by human rights law attempted to create some provisions themselves. An example is the Sullivan principles designed by Leon Sullivan, former member of the General Motors' Board of Directors. These principles included the elimination of discrimination based on race, and the concept of equality in the workplace. The objective was that by engaging in human rights concepts like dignity and respect, MNCs could be a lever for the elimination of apartheid in South Africa. However, like the previously established soft law on obligations on multinational corporations, these principles were voluntary and unlike the OECD Guidelines which had the NCPs, there was no enforcement mechanism. The great majority of MNCs that adopted his principles did so with the sole motive of being able to continue to prosper in South Africa.[39] In summary, throughout the 1960s and 1970s, there were attempts at a variety of levels to bring together the concepts of human rights and multinational corporations. Though it was largely absent on the level of the United Nations until the late 1970s there were many first steps by international institutions to bridge this gap. The NIEO was the first set of concrete economic principles that were prescribed in international law 'articulating a form of justice based not on domination of one people over another'.[40] It was an 'effort to assert the sovereign autonomy of the non-western world',[41] exemplifying the importance of linking human rights and development, and the fundamental values of duties of international cooperation. However, there was still much to be done as the new decade of the 1980s saw a drastic restructuring of the global trade and investment system - ultimately ending in massive international debt and a dramatic increase in foreign direct investment. A Change in the Global Legal Architecture An accumulation of capital obtained by the main oil producing states in the Middle East led to the establishment of the Organization for Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) Cartel in 1972. With the intention of creating a monopoly and obtaining major profits, OPEC raised the price of oil by approximately 400%, with its members keeping revenue in US or European banks, from which developing countries regularly borrowed in the form of aid and loans.[42] However, banks were now lending at higher interest rates to these countries as they were deemed less creditworthy. As a result of sovereign debt and the surplus problem in the international banking system, developing states were forced to rely on foreign direct investment (FDI), as opposed to private borrowing. The very principle that developing states wanted to control with the establishment of the NIEO was now negated by Western states selling MNCs to the developing world as necessary for their survival.[43] Simultaneously to the effects of the oil crisis, the political ideology of neoliberalism emerged on the global scene. Conservative governments gained power in western countries, communism collapsed in Eastern Europe with a move towards market economics, and Latin America implemented stabilization policies to boost their economies.[44] This process saw neoliberalism became an enemy for structural equality, political inclusion, economic access and human rights.[45] Prior to the implementation of neoliberal policies, the relationship between multinational corporations and their host state was formed through the conflict between the host country's national developmental interests as opposed to the corporation's global investment interests. The state being the more powerful actor, attempted 'to channel its private investments to serve its own developmental objectives'.[46] However, as Michael Peters argues, neoliberalism provides 'a universalist foundation for an extreme form of economic rationalism'[47], which according to Paul Haslam, was a re-forming of the modern state rather than the perceived notion of the state 'unambiguously withering away'.[48] As a result, power shifted from host countries towards multinational corporations as the era was characterized by liberalization of foreign investment rules.[49] As the United Nations World Investment Report of 2000 showed, out of the 1035 changes made in national legislation regarding Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from 1991 to 1999, only 5.9% were directed at restricting FDI.[50] Now more than ever before, the existence and nature of human rights were jeopardized in the sphere of multinational corporations led by neoliberal politics. Yet when analyzing human rights and neoliberalism, the two concepts have a plethora of similarities that run counter to this assertion. Samuel Moyn states that human rights and neoliberalism share (1) a predecessor and (2) a target, namely the welfarist West and the post-colonial nation state seeking economic autarky respectively.[51] Both concepts emerged and were formalized in the West. As a target, developing countries need both economic (neoliberalism) and social (human rights) elements to establish economic control. Furthermore, the two concepts share key foundational building blocks. Firstly, the principle of prioritizing the individual 'whose freedoms matter more than the collectivist endeavours' and secondly, their shared antipathy toward the state due to their rejection of its moral credentials.[52] As described by Darder, neoliberalism is characterized by a rampant greed that subsumes any notions of equality and public responsibility.[53] At the heart of this lies the ultimate subversion of human rights. When faced with the powers of global capitalism, human rights struggle to maintain themselves in the Third World. A prime example countering this thesis is the idea that human rights are a handmaiden to neoliberal policies. The argument follows that human rights are so tightly related to the role of a freely functioning market that there could be no socio-economic rights without extreme capitalism.[54] Unfortunately under this notion, human rights fall victim to being seen as dependent upon the capitalist order, creating the illusion that multinational corporations enhanced and promoted human rights in the developing World. What Wolfgang Streeck termed as 'non-market notions of social justice' became impossible to secure. Any attempt to place social commitments over economic ones were expelled, leaving market pressures to form human obligations and be governed by the dictatorship of neoliberalism.[55] The World Bank and the IMF, backed by the United States and other western states, became key in the project for liberalization, privatization, and market-friendly policies, known as the Washington Consensus. MNCs were given the protection they needed to flourish, be it proprietary or intellectual property rights. The interests of human rights on the other hand were not regarded. Though excelling and growing more than ever before, human rights had done so 'on a discrete track spearheaded internationally through the UN'.[56] Directed by developing states, human rights were intentionally dealt with by the United Nations while international economic law was being dealt with by the international institutions where they hold the balance of power.[57] Simultaneously, the developing world saw the third generation of human rights emerge as a result of anti-colonialist movements in the post-Second World War era. Newly born independent nations voiced their concerns over repeating their colonial past and demanded a new set of rights. These included the right to self-determination, the right to a healthy environment and the right to participation in cultural heritage. These are reflected in Declarations and Conventions such as the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples of 1960, the Proclamation of Teheran of 1968 and the Stockholm Declaration of 1972.[58] What makes this generation of human rights exceptional however is that while they reflect neither the traditional individualistic approach of the first generation, nor the socialist tradition of the second generation, they simultaneously demand certain recognitions from the state while being able to be invoked against the state. Most importantly though, as articulated by Vasak, the third generation of human rights 'can be realized only through the concerted efforts of all the actors in the social scene: the individual, the State, public and private bodies and the international community'.[59] In other words, these rights belong to the community as a collective, rather than to an individual.[60] Drafted in 1986 by the UNGA, the Declaration on the Right to Development [61] (DRD) calls for effective international cooperation towards development objectives through the enhancement of human rights and the distribution of benefits.[62] The DRD gained inspiration from the NIEO as it relied on providing equal national opportunity through measures of fair distribution of natural resources and income. Alongside neoliberal policies, the two contradicting concepts were forced to work in tandem. Foreign investment in the developing world could proceed under the neoliberal ideology as long as it did not infringe the DRD. Interestingly, the right to development was coined by the former UN Independent Expert on the Right to Development, Arjun Sengupta, as 'growth with equity'. Growth should not only focus on the economic aspect, but also emphasize human rights and the principles of justice. This focus on equity, would require a 'a change in the structure of production and distribution in the economy to ensure growth was equitable', including the required international cooperation and not having to rely on the market.[63] Though the United Nations are promoting and enhancing the development of human rights, they are disregarding the fact that their work should be focused more on the human rights aspects entailed in the market, rather than solving human rights issues outside of the market framework. The development of human rights and the regulatory frameworks supporting multinational corporations attended very different interests. The new global legal architecture born of the oil crisis and rise of neoliberalism reorganized the relations between the Global South and Global North. At this point human rights and the regulation of corporations, with their distinctive genealogies, were forced to come together, but the failure of this exercise could not be challenged until the late 1980s when the third generation of human rights provided another opportunity for the merging of the two concepts. The outcomes of these new sets of discussions produced a more clearly defined relationship between human rights and multinational corporations which, although more sophisticated, was still unable to produce a satisfactory result. Nevertheless, the right to development began to take root in the corporate world. For the sake of their reputations, corporations were forced to appreciate the power held by vulnerable individuals that could act together as a strong collective.[64] As Claire Dickerson argues, multinationals became more aware of their relationship with human rights not only in regards to the individual, but rather to the society as a collective.[65] These were the first formalized steps to the recognition of what came to be known as Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). The Heterodox Approach What became apparent in the sphere of business and human rights were two situations, (1) that states were either unable or unwilling to implement human rights; and (2) that multinational corporations acting in such states were unprepared to deal with the risks of harming human rights through their activities. This was seen especially in the private extracting sector, such as oil, gas and coal, using aggressive means to exploit remote areas and leaving large physical and social 'footprints'. Local communities began resisting the activities by the multinationals and the language of human rights became increasingly popular in challenging corporate norms.[66] Some of the world's largest MNCs had become culprits of violating human rights standards, including Nike, Shell or Yahoo. Nike was guilty of using child labour, while Shell misused public funds to practice corruption and theft at all levels.[67] The effects were reflected in local communities that resorted to violence and criminal behaviour, significantly affecting the living conditions of these areas. In the early 1990s, some corporations began adopting measures to comply with responsible business conduct. CSR was a voluntary form of business self-regulation that attended the current societal goals. It involved the creation of monitoring schemes that regulated the workplace standards and policies of the global supply chains. However, what caused CSR to emerge, was not only pressure exerted by nations that felt their human rights had been impinged, but also a wider global political ethos. With its emphasis on privatization and deregulation, neoliberalism promoted CSR initiatives in order for corporations to gain self-control and rely less on direct government initiatives. Due to its voluntary nature, CSR was not conceived as a regulatory instrument but as a learning forum to promote strategies that enhanced socially responsible policies. This included the enhancement of human rights, environmental protection and anti-corruption efforts. [68] CSR had now progressed to the forefront of the global business scene by morphing out of corporate philanthropy.[69] Corporations began adopting voluntary schemes that not only adhered to social policy, but at times even went beyond the standard set by local requirements, which occasionally created conflict between the two.[70] Unilateral corporations produced company codes, with companies such as Gap and Nike adopting theirs in 1992. This involved internal audit teams and ethics officers to be established, verifying that contractors were complying with their company's codes of conduct. Gradually, social audit teams emerged onto the global scene. As one of the most prominent, the Fair Labour Association (FLA) monitored the working conditions for some of the top athletic brands such as Nike, Puma and Patagonia. In the food industry, the label of Fair Trade emerged, ensuring for local farmers the social, economic and environmental standards they deserved. Corporations adopted CSR measures mainly to improve their reputation. However, perhaps a greater incentive for corporations to adopt CSR measures lies in the financial risks posed by community pushback as a result of human rights violations. These pushbacks cause delays in design, operation, construction, siting, granting of permits etc. Further, they can create problems and relations with local labour markets, higher costs for financing, insurance and reduced output.[71] In a study of a large multinational company that wished to remain anonymous, Goldman Sachs found that it had accrued $6.5 billion in such costs over a two year period.[72] A great percentage of these costs could be related back to the staff time in managing conflicts that arise in communities as a result of human rights violations. In some instances between 50% and 80% of an assets manager's time can be devoted to these issues. Thus, it is clear that in this lose-lose situation, where MNCs violate human rights and thus incur losses, it makes sound corporate sense to adopt some sort of CSR measures.[73] Despite the improvements and the clear step forward the business world took in addressing human rights, CSR involved limitations and fragmentations that challenged its success. It was built on the assumption that it is an effective mechanism for a corporation to positively reconnecting with the community it is based in. Thus, in practice, CSR operates under the presumption that society has granted authority to corporations with naturally applying legal responsibilities.[74] In 2000 John Ruggie conducted research in the Fortune Global 500 and a wider range of corporations to assess the extent and success of voluntary initiatives promoting human rights. Staff monitoring schemes had evolved, demands by socially responsible investors had grown, and large public sector funds all aided in this development. However, the research also found 'company-based initiatives fell short as a stand-alone approach'.[75] Most companies still did not have the capabilities of managing human rights risks and instead were acting on a reactive based notion. Moreover, it was within the company's discretion to decide which human rights the company would address and furthermore how to define its measures. Thus, their voluntary nature could often be used as a camouflage to delay real reform.[76] A logical response to such a broad limitation would be to impose direct obligations under international law upon MNCs. Though only states and international organizations have legal standing in international law, the general view on this contention is that it would be possible to impose obligations upon MNCs due to their major economic and political influence as explained earlier, and their capabilities of influencing the enjoyment of human rights.[77] However, as explained by Zerk, the challenge lies in 'developing jurisprudence which refines and makes precise the vague aspirational statements [.] in the CSR debate'.[78] However, as the law stands, the most promising and efficient method for applying obligations on multinational corporations remains to be the national courts. Yet the fact that claims must be raised as a tort-based litigation proving a violation of domestic tort principles rather than claiming a violation under international human rights casts doubt over this method. An interesting exception to this is the US Alien Tort Statute of 1789. The tort states that district courts 'have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violations of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States'.[79] The original intention of the statute was to establish a civil remedy for violation of international law norms such as piracy, mistreatment of ambassadors and the violation of safe conducts.[80] This piece of legislation lay dormant until the 1980s when human rights lawyers discovered its potential for foreign plaintiffs to raise a claim for certain human rights abuses against an individual of any nationality, or a corporation as long as they had a presence in the United States. The question whether the Act could be enforced against a corporation was considered in 2012 in the U.S. Supreme Court case of Kiobel.[81] The court held that there was a presumption against extraterritoriality applying to claims under the Statute. There is therefore no application of the statute abroad unless it is explicitly stated in the international law which is the subject of the claim.[82] As stated by John Ruggie in his advice to the Human Rights Council in 2007 'no single silver bullet can resolve the business and human rights challenge. A broad array of measures is required, by all relevant actors.'[83] Ultimately, as a measure to seek guidance on the matter, this led to the UN Global Compact in 2000, the largest global CSR initiative.[84] The UN Global Compact was a strategic policy initiative posed by the former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan that aimed at improving corporate conditions in areas such as human rights, environmental protection and labour rights.[85] It was a prospective and hopeful initiative that was designed as a learning forum to develop, implement and disclose sustainability principles among corporate actors.[86] At its time, the Global Compact was the most far-reaching, non-governmental set of policies aimed at catalyzing the voluntary nature in the corporate citizenship movement.[87] Legal scholars such as Meyer and Stefanova felt the Global Compact could shape the relationship between MNCs and human rights through 'rewarding responsible TNCs [MNCs], while shaming at least some of the irresponsible TNCs [MNCs] into better promoting human rights'.[88] Their only concern about the extent of the success of the Global Compact lay, in the Global Compact's voluntary nature. Comparing it to the OECD Guidelines implemented 25 years earlier, an initiative like the Global Compact will only be successful if there is commitment to the initiative at all levels of the international system. Thus, the main task is to put a human face on globalization through the values and principles shared by the people, the corporation and the state.[89] However, Aravalo and Fallon dispute this. Published in 2008, their Report uses the Compact Quarterly and UNGC Annual Review to critique the Global Compact's activities and practices throughout its eight years of existence. Published by local networks and the UN respectively, they evaluate new businesses adhering to the Global Compact, as well as Global Compact practices and responses. Aravalo and Fallon found that after evaluating the various progress reports, the Global Compact falls short of being a successful initiative. According to the UNGC Annual Review, there are a multitude of gaps existing in the Global Compact framework. Research instruments for instance, under the principles of human rights and labour protection, have been deemed as inadequate as participants have failed to voice their concern over the protection of such rights within their corporation. The Global Compact has solely used online surveys to administer data, which smaller businesses are often unwilling or unable to provide. The methodology applied by the Global Compact was ambiguous and did not show the extent of the success of CSR initiatives.[90] Alavaro and Fallon argue that it would be highly beneficial for the Global Compact to re-think its methodology process of evaluating its success by introducing a chronological component into its future research models. [91] It would allow for a clearer comparison not only for participants of the Global Compact, but also for the comparison with non-Compact companies in the area of corporate responsibility.[92] As a result of this poor research methodology, the Global Compact has difficulty assessing its direct influence on the broad and voluntary concept of CSR. There are key principles of CSR that fail to receive the attention they deserve in the scope of the Global Compact. However, this is not to say that the Global Compact has been an outright failure. The Annual Review, though lacking quantifiable data, has provided a wide array of case studies providing evidence for the practical influence of the Global Compact on participants. These include programs in education and working relationships the Global Compact has encouraged and facilitated. It can be said therefore, that the Global Compact is making a difference, even if only in these cases. Until shortly after the turn of the millennium, neither company codes nor multilateral initiatives such as Global Compact, successfully achieved the necessary, concrete obligations in regard to human rights and environmental protection demands. This was set to change with the arrival of the United Nations Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises (Norms). Drafted in 2003, the United Nations Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights attempted to merge the concepts of MNCs and human rights and transform these newly developed principles into hard law. The intention was to impose human rights obligations upon companies through the domestic legal systems of their host countries. The Norms clearly express that 'states retain primary, overarching responsibility for human rights protection' and that corporations are identified as 'Duty-bearers' based on that expectation of following human rights principles.[93] The expectations expressed by the Norms are supported by enforcement mechanisms for their implementation which address the requirements that MNCs must adopt in terms of their internal practice. Furthermore, there are a multitude of rights that go beyond what is traditionally accepted as international human rights law. Examples include rights associated with consumer protection, the environment or corruption which are covered by different areas of the law.[94] However, the Norms failed to achieve promising results. Described as a 'train wreck' by John Ruggie, the Norms fell under heavy criticisms for a plethora of reasons. Firstly, the Norms fall under heavy scrutiny for attempting to impose obligations upon corporations, while simultaneously imposing parallel obligations on the state. The intention was to address the fact that MNCs operate in a legal vacuum due to their status of acting as a multinational. To alleviate this issue, it was thought that binding MNCs to hard international law would be the best option. On the one hand, minimalists argue that binding multinational corporations to international law is not an appropriate method as this would go beyond the concept of soft law initiatives such as Global Compact. This argument is developed by stating that binding corporations to international law would 'privatise human rights'. The Norms would be placing obligations on an entity that was never democratically elected, nor eligible to make reasonable decisions in regard to human rights at the level of international law.[95] On the other hand, maximalists lobby for a judicial body solely focused on the practice of multinational corporations and argue that corporations should be bound by international law.[96] Secondly, there was severe backlash against the Norms from states, corporations and businesses who argued that there was a lack of consultation from the Sub-Commission when drafting the Norms. However, this argument has since been disputed by institutions such as the Corporate Europe Conservatory or the scholars Weissbrodt and Kruger.[97] In regard to the discontent presented by states, many argued that there was a lack of involvement on their behalf in the Norms' development. As stated by Kinely, Nolan and Zerial, it is of vital importance that in issues revolving around CSR and their wide variety of stakeholders, everyone's voice must be heard when protecting human rights.[98] Thirdly, issues were raised regarding the language used by the Norms. Terms like 'sphere of influence'[99] and 'complicity' were deemed as vague and unclear.[100] It is agreed upon, even by supporters of the Norms, that such terms must be defined more definitively and where possible, draw definitions from more grounded areas of the law like criminal law, tort or contract law. This attitude towards the Norms from corporations shows the extent of their distrust and the scare factor used to attempt to dismantle the Norms.[101] However, even though the Norms failed as a concept, as Kinley, Nolan and Zerial maintain, 'the Norms have been a beneficial and fruitful initiative, reinvigorating debate on business and human rights'.[102] Previous to the imposition of the Norms, CSR had found itself in a position that was stagnant, focusing solely on codes of conduct that should be implemented by corporations using a bottom-up approach. The Norms altered the position of CSR to now provide a top-down approach and provided human rights activists with hope that human rights protection in regard to multinational corporations was now in the hands of the United Nations. However, the reactions to the Norms from the CSR community varied. CSR had been a newly emerging concept which was still unclear when fitted into the international legal order. It was still in its early years of development with highly broad-reaching initiatives in the fields of both soft and hard law. The playing field for CSR was simply too big for such an underdeveloped concept to handle. Further, it was attempted to implement CSR through domestic laws and quasi-legal initiatives raised to the level of international law. It is therefore often perceived that the implementation of the Norms were an attempt to remedy CSR by uniting these various aspects into one document at the level of the United Nations. The Norms conjoined national and international levels of CSR while maintaining that states continued to hold the primary responsibility of ensuring that businesses protect human rights. The world was a 'deeply divided arena of discourse and contestation lacking shared knowledge, clear standards and boundaries; fragmentary and often weak governance systems concerning business and human rights in states and companies alike'.[103] A range of governments still expressed their demand for further attention to be given to the relationship between human rights and the practices of multinational corporations. Thus, the United Nations appointed a team led by John Ruggie to establish the Guiding Principles. Rather than establishing a new international framework as was previously attempted with the Norms, Ruggie was 'urged [.] to focus on identifying and promoting good practices and providing companies with tools to enable them to deal voluntarily with the complex cluster of business and human rights challenges'.[104] Ruggie moved away from the traditional 'mandatory approach' which involved the compliance of national laws in correspondence to a corporation's voluntary measures and practices, to a heterodox approach. This heterodox approach was devised to create an environment of mixed reinforcing policy measures that provided cumulative change and large-scale success. The Guiding Principles lay on three foundations: (1) the state duty to protect against human rights abuses; (2) the responsibility by corporations to respect human rights and the implied obligation of acting in due diligence; and (3) the need for greater access to remedies for victims. However, there are two things that the Guiding Principles fail to accomplish. Firstly, to create binding international law and instead rely on normative contributions which further elaborate the implications of existing standards. Secondly, the Guiding Principles 'fail to ensure the right to an effective remedy and the need for States' measures to prevent abuses committed by their companies overseas'.[105] Amnesty International goes further by reiterating that aside from lacking accountability measures, the Guiding Principles should mandate a due diligence approach rather than only recommending it, as this would solve internal as well as extraterritorial accountability issues. Alongside Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch criticized the Guiding Principles for not adopting a global standard in corporate responsibility, and instead resort to a 'sliding scale' based on a corporation's size and geographic location.[106] However, when compared to other governance regimes in the past and present, the Guiding Principles seem to be a robust framework. Although various human rights organizations and NGOs identify neglect of human rights in the framework of MNCs, the Guiding Principles reiterate business as an instrument to contribute to societal welfare.[107] Thus, it acts as a basis for the empowerment of society and a benchmark to judge practices and conduct of corporations and governments.[108] Conclusion The discourse of the co-emergence of multinational corporations and human rights took the world by storm. The ongoing globalization of multinational corporations and the evolution of the concept of human rights were born attending different aims in the global legal order. Their greatest challenge however was not necessarily their harmonization and co-existence, but more importantly co-existing under the intentional gap created through the world's largest and most influential actor, the United Nations. This was clearly visible in the 1960s and 1970s. Throughout the various Reports and Declarations that were passed through the international institution, the two concepts were kept separate. While the United Nations was enthusiastic for the growth of both MNCs and human rights, it intentionally avoided discussing the harmonization of both concepts. Due to the underlying pressures imposed on the United Nations by the tensions from the Cold War, the UN was left in a legal vacuum unable to merge the two distinctive genealogies. The global international legal order was unaware of the extent of the importance of such a gap being eradicated before adopting a resolution as complex as the NIEO. Thus, from this point onwards, the NIEO was therefore already bound to be unsuccessful. Not only had international law not developed enough to impose such obligations upon MNCs, the corporations themselves were not aware of the ramifications and necessity for abiding human rights obligations as I showed in the third section of this dissertation. Enthusiasm for further initiatives such as the push by the G77 or the United Nations Commission on Transnational Corporations was only short lived. The events of the 1980s greatly disrupted the already turbulent environment of the global international legal order creating a greater gap between the concepts of multinational corporations and human rights. The 1980s became a stage which saw a great change in the global legal structure. The NIEO was an already broken concept from the outset as the conceptual gap had already created a disparity in the relationship between MNCs and human rights. This meant that although they were not aware of it at the time, the Global South could not rely on the imposition of the NIEO. Fostering the Western neoliberal policies, the conceptual gap between MNCs and human rights was now well established. For human rights to become a globally instructed concept, MNCs are a useful tool to spread, promote and enhance human rights across the globe. This of course is under the condition that the MNC does not violate human rights. From the other perspective MNCs rely on human rights in terms of their societal and financial risks. It becomes clear that when this is not realized by the proponents of both concepts, it can lead to major discrepancies and disparities as was proven in the Global South during this period. If there had not been this conceptual gap, and instead there had been a clear and devised relationship between MNCs and human rights, the effects of the oil crisis and neoliberalism would not have left the detrimental mark in developing countries that they did, potentially allowing the NIEO to prevail. However, the ongoing persistence of developing countries and their call for the third generation of human rights to gain prominence forced MNCs to catch up with their relationship to human rights. What emerged, were essentially the first initiatives and practices of CSR. CSR was heavily affected by the fact that it relied on the voluntary nature of businesses to adhere to as well as practice CSR. Even though corporations had an incentive to adopt CSR measures, weak monitoring systems allowed violations to still occur on a grand scale. The issue was that the multinational corporation as a concept was still unclear and lacked definition and that tying MNCs down with hard international law was not possible due to the diversity of MNCs. CSR allowed for too large a divergence from the issue at hand and required to approach human rights at a different angle. This was the key reason for the partial success of the Guiding Principles. Ruggie's unconventional, heterodox approach provided clarity and distinct concepts that individuals, business and states could adhere to. Although the conceptual gap has still not vanished, the UN has after an array of various attempts, managed to narrow the gap that it had created almost sixty years ago by continuously forcing society to rethink and redefine the relationship. What exactly lies in the future is uncertain and impossible to foresee. It can be said with great certainty however, that if initiatives such as Global Compact or the Guiding Principles are enhanced and given more attention, the world will be faced with a much clearer and concise relationship between multinational corporations and human rights. Focusing on monitoring mechanisms, methodological research and greater transparency and accountability among all actors involved will undoubtedly seal the conceptual gap that has caused the international legal order to experience such unsettling times. [1] Pahuja, Sundhya. Saunders, Anna. Rival Worlds and the place of the Corporation in International Law in Dann and Von Bernstorff (eds). Decolonisation and the Battle for International Law (OUP, 2018) p.1 [2] Ibid. [3] UN, Multinational Corporations in World Development ST-ECA/190 [4] Linarelli, John. Salomon, Margot. Sornarajah M. The Misery of International Law. (OUP, 2018) p.245 [5] Ruggie, John. Just Business. (W.W. Norton & Company, 2013) p.70 [6] United Nations Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 [7] Alston, Philip. Mégret, Frédéric. (eds) The United Nations and Human Rights: A Critical Appraisal (Second Edition, OUP, 2020) p.1 [8] Clapham, Andrew. Human Rights: A Very Short Introduction (OUP, 2007) p.42 [9] (n.8) p.108. [10] ibid . p.109 [11] Allina, Eric. Imperialism and the Colonial Experience in Paul A. Haslam, Jessica Schafer and Pierre Beaudet, Introduction to International Development (3rd Edition, OUP, 2017), pp. 24-42. p.39 [12] Ibid. p. 40 [13] Sornarajah M. International Law on Foreign Investment (CUP, 2010) p.5 [14] United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Multinational Corporations in World Development, 1973 ST-ECA/190 p.VI [15] ibid. p.1 [16] ibid. [17] Joseph, Sarah. Castan, Melissa. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Cases, Materials. (3rd Edition, OUP, 2013) p.4 [18] ibid. p.5 [19] ibid. [20] Alston, Philip. U.S. Ratification of the Covenant on Economic, Social And Cultural Rights: The Need for an Entirely New Strategy. The American Journal of International Law Vol.84, No.2 (CUP,1990) pp.365-393, p.4 [21] UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966, Article 1 [22] Simpson, Gerry. The Diffusion of Sovereignty: Self-Determination in the Post-Colonial Age (Ashgate Publishing, 2000) p.266 [23] Ibid. [24] Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 1976 [25] Carasco, Emily. Singh, Jang. Towards Holding Transnational Corporations Responsible for Human Rights. European Business Review Vol.22, No.4, (Emerald Publishing Group, 2010). p.4 [26] Cernic, Jernei. Corporate Responsibility for Human Rights: A Critical Analysis of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises Hanse Law Review, Vol.4, No.1, (2008). p.16 [27] Ibid. p. 12 [28] Sanchez, Juan Carlos Ochoa. "The Roles and Powers of the OECD National Contact Points Regarding Complaints on an Alleged Breach of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises by a Transnational Corporation." Nordic Journal of International Law (2015) Vol.84, No.1, pp: 89-126 p. 18 [29] Bolt, Cassidy. "Leveraging Reputation in Implicit Regulation of MNEs: An Analysis of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises' Capacity to Influence Corporate Behavior." Corporations and International Law, 20 Jan. 2018, Available at: sites.duke.edu/corporations/2018/01/20/leveraging-reputation-in-implicit-regulation-of-mnes-an-analysis-of-the-oec
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An impressive trend in global financial markets is the growth of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs), some of which purport to invest ethically by considering the social and environmental impact of their financing. Yet, like private investors, these funds primarily view themselves as financial institutions interested in enhancing investment returns. A significant tension, therefore, may emerge between the ethical and financial expectations of SWFs. This article investigates two contrasting cases, the Norwegian Government Pension Fund - Global (NGPF-G) and the New Zealand Superannuation Fund (NZSF), in order to evaluate how they address any tensions between being both virtuous and prosperous. These SWFs have legislative mandates to invest ethically, and have been hailed by some researchers as having among the most progressive approaches in this area.1 But neither fund yet manages its entire portfolio comprehensively to promote sustainable development. Increasingly, nation-states are establishing SWFs in a trend that seemingly defies an era in which many governments have sought to deregulate or otherwise limit their hand in the market.2 In their governance, formally SWFs are public institutions but functionally they are generally expected to be private actors. They invest large pools of state-owned assets in the market to meet macro-economic policy objectives,3 such as to buffer the sponsoring state's budget and economy against swings in international markets, or to build savings to meet future financial burdens such as pension payments. SWFs are typically funded through either commodity-based earnings, such as from a country's natural resources sector, or by noncommodity- based resources, such as foreign exchange reserves and general taxation revenue.4 The NGPF-G is a commodity-based fund, built on Norway's large oil reserves, while the NZSF is supported by non-commodity financing. Such concentration of wealth has made SWFs, an institutional phenomenon that began in the mid-1950s, influential actors in the global economy.5 According to the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, as of May 2011 there were 52 SWFs worldwide, with assets of some US$4.3 trillion.6 A recent survey by the Monitor Group, published in July 2011, put Norway's SWF as the largest (with US$560 billion in assets), while New Zealand's was ranked 20th (valued at US$15.8 billion).7 With SWFs' assets expected to at least double within the next decade,8 and growing awareness of their economic clout and capacity to project state political power, international efforts to create voluntary behavioural codes for such funds have grown. The principal achievement to date is the Santiago Principles,9 which emphasise transparency, clarity, and equivalent treatment with private funds similarly operated. In addition to these issues, the socially conscious goals of some SWFs has stirred debate about the wisdom of mixing ethical investment with wealth maximisation goals, and attempting to influence corporate social and environmental behaviour.10 SWFs share several characteristics which might lead them more than private sector financiers to invest in sustainable development. Their ownership or control by a state can enmesh them in the machinery of government, and thereby render them instruments of public policy. Further, because of their sheer size and government backing, SWFs tend to have higher risk tolerances and might therefore bear investment strategies eschewed by private financiers. Thirdly, SWFs tend to have longer-term financial considerations than the private sector, which may encourage investing that is mindful of threats such as climate change. However, few states so far have obliged SWFs to invest ethically. While regulations to encourage socially responsible investment ("SRI," as ethical investment is sometimes known) in the private sector are appearing, such as taxation incentives and corporate governance reforms, explicit duties to practice SRI have only been imposed on public financial institutions.11 The first precedents were adopted in the 1980s by some states and municipalities in the United States, which restricted government pension funds from investing in firms operating in the discriminatory milieu of South Africa12 or Northern Ireland.13 Since 2000, the SWFs of Sweden, Norway, New Zealand and France have been subject to legislative direction to invest ethically, with more comprehensive and ambitious obligations than the American precedents. Ethical investment by SWFs is controversial. Some observers believe that investment should be based only on economic and financial grounds and, especially in the case of SWFs, there is further concern that SRI could be a means for sponsoring states to insinuate their social and environmental policies globally.14 For instance, a 2009 survey of 146 asset managers having routine dealings with SWFs reported that most "did not think governments should have any influence over investment decisions despite the fact that SWFs are managing governments' money."15 But such concerns misunderstand the changing rationale and aims of SRI. A long-standing movement that once had few adherents,16 SRI is attracting investors who are reassessing the financial relevance of social and environmental behaviour. No longer is SRI pursued largely as a matter of ethical compulsion, as in the 1970s divestment campaign led by religious groups against South Africa's apartheid regime,17 and their earlier admonitions against investment in tobacco, alcohol and other "sin" stocks.18 Rather, many social investors today, in both the institutional and retail sectors, take a more comprehensive view of business conduct through the lens of sustainable development. Sustainable development (or "sustainability" as the concept is sometimes known) is an ideal widely endorsed in theory as a goal of states, international bodies and businesses, and has been enshrined as an objective of the European Union treaty.19 It seeks to curb unfettered economic exploitation of nature by ensuring consumption of renewable resources within their rate of regeneration, limiting waste and pollution to the assimilative capacity of the biosphere, and conserving the biodiversity of the planet.20 Some investors recognise the financial materiality of sustainability, such as when corporate polluters create financial risks or, conversely, firms pioneer innovative environmental technologies and services.21 Although, often the nexus between environmental and financial returns is misunderstood or overlooked by financiers. For large institutional investors, including SWFs, the sustainability imperative has mostly fluently been theorised through the concept of the "universal owner." Hawley and Williams hypothesise that institutional investors who invest widely across the market will benefit financially by taking into account the social and environmental externalities in their portfolios.22 As economy-wide investors, they should "have no interest in abetting behavior by any one company that yields a short-term boost while threatening harm to the economic system as a whole."23 Acting as a universal investor implies that any "externality" at the level of an individual company may result in a costly "internality" for an investor's global portfolio. Such sentiments have underpinned the proliferation of codes of conduct for SRI,24 such as the United Nations Principles for Responsible Investment (UNPRI)25 and the Equator Principles.26 Although adherence to such benchmarks is ostensibly voluntary, they have garnered many signatories, including the NGPF-G and the NZSF, and thereby helped standardise and disseminate SRI norms and practices.27 Some interesting research has begun to measure the cost of environmental externalities to universal investors. A report prepared for the UNPRI Secretariat evaluated the price of environmental damage worldwide to which the companies in a representative investment portfolio contribute, and estimated these in 2008 to be US$6.6 trillion or 11% of global GDP.28 The report expects such costs by 2050 to grow to US$28.6 trillion (18% of projected global GDP).29 The rest of this article takes up these themes by examining the SRI policies and practices of the Norwegian and New Zealand SWFs. In comparing how they attempt to reconcile their ethical and financial aspirations, the article highlights the importance of governance frameworks. While there are some salient differences in how each SWF is governed, each has, especially in their early years, focused on avoiding complicity in unethical conduct or social and environmental harm. This stance represented a rather narrow approach to ethical investment, which limited the capacity of these SWFs to promote environmentally sustainable development. More recently, both funds have begun to accept the business case for SRI, and reconceptualised ethical investment as a means of promoting long-term financial returns. But neither the NGPFG nor the NZSF is mandated to actively promote sustainable development or to seek improvements in corporations' sustainability performance. In the future evolution of SWFs, the creation of explicit duties to invest in sustainability is perhaps the next logical step if they are to influence benignly the global economy.
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Blog: Responsible Statecraft
Update 9/15: The Biden Administration announced Thursday that it will only withhold $85 million of its committed military aid to Egypt, releasing $235 million of aid that had been conditioned on improving human rights in the country. The administration had withheld $130 million in 2021 and 2022.Today, the State Department must decide whether to withhold some of the $1.3 billion in military support that the U.S. gives to Egypt each year. Under normal circumstances, this would have been an easy decision. Washington has given Cairo more than $50 billion in weapons aid since 1978, a testament to the long and close relationship between the two countries.But the past few years have been more complicated. As President Abdel Fatah Al-Sisi has increasingly cracked down on dissent in the country, a growing group of Democratic lawmakers has fought to reduce aid to his government. The Biden administration withheld $130 million each of the last two years in response to heavy congressional pressure, and the State Department announced on Monday that it would block at least $85 million in aid this year. But lawmakers are determined to go further."Over the last year, Egypt's human rights record has continued to deteriorate, despite the Egyptian government's claims to the contrary," wrote a group of leading Democratic senators in July. "Therefore, we urge you to withhold the full amount of $320 million.""[T]he bilateral security relationship can be effectively sustained at a reduced level of assistance while upholding our values," argued the lawmakers, which included prominent progressives like Chris Murphy (D-Conn.) and Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.) as well as centrist leaders like Tim Kaine (D-Va.) and Dick Durbin (D-Ill.).To better understand the factors influencing today's decision and the history of the relationship, RS spoke with retired Maj. Gen. F.C. "Pink" Williams, who served as the U.S. defense attaché to Egypt from 2008 to 2011. Williams recently wrote a chapter on the history of U.S.-Egypt military relations in an edited volume entitled "Security Aid in the Middle East." The following conversation has been edited for length and clarity.RS: The State Department is set to decide whether it will withhold up to $320 million in military aid to Egypt, citing human rights concerns. How should the Biden administration think about that decision?Williams: It's a mixed bag whether this does any good or not. Over the years, we've threatened to withhold aid. Sometimes we've carried through with that; sometimes we haven't. My personal opinion is that it hasn't had any broad effect on governance or the human rights situation in Egypt.There are those that would argue that it's somewhat effective around the edges, and I could probably support that. When Sisi releases a few political prisoners, some people will say, "well, that's in part because of the pressure we applied on the funds." I think that's hard to assess, but I do believe that withholding of funds is not going to make any substantive change in how Sisi acts.RS: Something you talked about in your chapter in this recent book is this idea that Egypt and the U.S. have pretty different views of the military relationship. Can you spell that out a little bit?Williams: Given that the whole relationship was initially built around the Camp David Accords, Egypt decided that the funding was basically a reward, or a bribe, if you want to put it that way. They've never really moved away from that. They're not trying to change the world here. They're trying to, frankly, get money for their regime and their government.Now, we, on the other hand, began to move away from the Camp David [approach] as we saw that it was unlikely that another conflict would occur between the Israelis and the Egyptians. We don't see the aid anymore as needed to get the Egyptians to keep the peace because it's clearly in their best interest to do so anyway. So then we started coming up with other reasons why we're giving the aid. As human rights and democracy became tied more and more to foreign aid, it was only natural that we would go down that road. So we started with some differences anyway, but then they widened quite a bit over time.RS: In the long sweep, how has U.S. military aid in particular affected the shape of politics and the political system in Egypt?Williams: I don't think it's had very much effect. We tend to forget that nations and regimes act in their perceived best interest. It's only natural that they would do so. Of course, we see support for democracy and human rights as not just an altruistic goal but also something that's in our best interest. However, when you push those themes in other countries with other cultures and other backgrounds, I think you have to be careful. From the Egyptian point of view, the regime's going to do what it thinks it needs to to strengthen itself and to ensure its longevity. Unfortunately, many authoritarian regimes see repression as a tool for staying in power. It's just that simple. So the idea that, for any amount of money, a dictator is going to do something that he thinks is going to weaken his position is pretty far-fetched.RS: What most surprised you about the relationship during your time in Cairo? Did Egypt's military and that relationship meet the expectations you had going in?Williams: I'm a fighter pilot by trade, and when we sold Egypt the F-16 back in 1980, I was part of that program. They sent two of us to Egypt as instructors for a year. When I returned many years later, I was not surprised at the state of the Egyptian military or their ability to effectively use the equipment that we had provided because I had the background from early on.What surprised me quite a bit was the shallowness of the relationship. We really didn't — and do not, as far as I know, to this day — have any significant knowledge of the Egyptian planning processes, their strategic plans. We're still just giving them money and equipment, and they're keeping the peace. They are doing other things for us too that I shouldn't give short shrift in terms of intelligence, but I was very surprised that we didn't have a deeper relationship after all those years.RS: Can you talk more about what the U.S. does get out of the relationship? It's kind of striking that you're saying that our influence appears limited.Williams: Some of that comes back to expectations. The idea of influence is that we'll give them this money, and we'll guide them. Again, you go back to differences in culture and differences in perceived interest. This idea that you're going to have all this influence because you give them money — which is a very widespread opinion in Washington in my experience — is unrealistic.However, on a practical level, the intelligence situation is not something we can go into in any depth, but obviously they are positioned and have resources that we don't have that can provide some decent information to us. And on the counterterrorism front, I think they've been quite helpful. And the Suez Canal priority and the overflight [permissions] that they provide us save us all kinds of time and money.RS: You were stationed in Egypt during the Arab Spring protests. How did that political turmoil affect your work and affect the country's ties with the US?Williams: Everything didn't come to a complete standstill, but it really ground down. All the non-essential personnel were evacuated from the embassy. There were roughly 400 embassy personnel on a normal day, and we were down a little bit below 100.We had various bases scattered about Egypt, where we had small contingents of American pilots and maintainers and other advisers. We pulled all those people in from those bases, and they were either subsequently evacuated or they worked work for me in the embassy. So all the interaction and advising at the outlying sites came to a halt. From the point of normal day-to-day interaction, it was pretty much nil.Now there was a lot of interaction because there was, of course, great concern in Washington about what the Egyptian military was going to do with all this. If you recall, they weren't doing anything initially. They were trying to stay out of it initially. When people wanted to talk to the Egyptians, they generally would come through my office because they knew that we could get contact with them and access to them, and we could set up phone calls. The way they were doing it was that they would have a counterpart call their counterpart. In other words, they would have Robert Gates, who was secretary of defense, and he would want to talk to the Egyptian defense minister [Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein] Tantawi.They were trying to maintain this contact and get some assurances from these guys that there's not going to be a bloodbath out there in Tahrir Square. The majority of those contacts were negotiated and coordinated by the Office of Military Cooperation because we had the access. So what do we get for all this money? Well, we at least got them to take our phone calls. And they were not taking [other calls]. There were ambassadors from other countries calling me saying, "What do you know? What is happening?"That is not the same thing as me claiming that we materially influenced the actions of the [Egyptian Armed Forces] in that time. They are sitting there assessing the situation and saying, "What is in our best interest? How do we get through this and still be an intact military and an intact regime on the other side?"RS: That's a really good example of an acute moment where there's an attempt to have an influence in favor of democracy, in favor of human rights. Do you think over the long term that U.S. aid to Egypt has had a positive effect on human rights in the country?Williams: It's probably had some good effect in individual cases. In other words, we're bringing pressure, and Sisi or [former President Hosni] Mubarak is looking to get us off his neck, so he releases some political prisoners. For those people, that's a big, big outcome. Not being in Egyptian prison is a really good thing.I would not ever claim that it has resulted in some philosophical shift in the outlook of either the Mubarak regime or the Sisi regime or the [Mohamed] Morsi regime for that matter. They view things differently, and they run governments differently than we do.I'll give you an example. During the revolt, of course, we were right there. We were very close to Tahrir square. I walked into work one morning, and I get a photo. My staff says, "Look at this." It's a photo taken from the embassy looking out, and there's an Egyptian tank with some soldiers, and they've got this guy strung up by his heels on the gun barrel there. I don't know what he did or what caused the situation, but there he was, and he's alive and everything. So I take this over to the Egyptians and say, "Hey, guys, this is exactly the kind of thing that you don't need to be doing. You don't need to hurt yourself with this." And that was a theme we were talking to them about. We were talking to them about these stories coming through of interior forces abusing people, and that's bad. Frankly, [we told them] "That's bad press. It hurts your cause, and you should not be doing this." Well, I show him this photo, and what are they interested in? They were taken at night, right? What they're interested in is "How did you get that photo? What is that technology?" They didn't even blink about this guy strung up from his heels on this tank. It just kind of shows you the mindset.RS: How should we handle the future of US aid to Egypt?Williams: First, we need to stay engaged. When people say, "Why are we doing all that for Egypt?" I say, "look at a map. You can't change geography." Same reason we have to put up with Turkey. You can't change geography. So we need to stay engaged. Russian influence building, Chinese influence building, the perception throughout the region that we can't be trusted — all these things only make it harder to try to engage and have any influence at all. Nevertheless, I think we have to try.To the money, we're not talking about a ton of money here. I would continue to fund it. You can tie it to human rights, but I wouldn't go through this exercise of conditioning the funds or taking away the funds once a year. They know we're interested in human rights. We can have those discussions. But I don't know that tying the funds has had any substantive effect.So I would stay engaged, I would be careful about tying the aid to their human rights performance, and I would try to assure them that, as we have been there through the years for the long haul, we're still going to be there for the long haul.
L'article a pour objectif de rappeler toutes les mesures administratives, de nature informative ou juridique, qui existent dans le champ réglementaire du Code de l'Environnement, puis de présenter les ZNIEFF, enfin de dresser la liste exhaustive de tous les milieux naturels qui bénéficient d'un statut de protection. L'accent est plus particulièrement mis sur les espaces forestiers, mais sont également mentionnés les sites littoraux ou périurbains. Enfin, quelques éléments de présentation et de réflexion sont donnés pour faire valoir, d'une part, que la connaissance scientifique est encore bien loin d'avoir étudié l'ensemble de la richesse biologique de la forêt tropicale humide et, d'autre part, que les dispositions de protection de la nature font intégralement partie de l'aménagement du territoire et du développement à réaliser en Guyane.
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THE CHOICE OF WORDS, TRANSITIVITY, AND IDEOLOGY OF THE HEADLINES IN THE JAKARTA POST REPORTING APEC IN INDONESIA 2013 Lydia Anggar Wati Language and Literature Department, Faculty of Languages and Arts, Surabaya State University lydia82012@gmail.com Lisetyo Ariyanti, S.S., M.Pd Language and Literature Department, Faculty of Languages and Arts, Surabaya State University lisetyo.a@yahoo.com ABSTRAK Penelitian ini fokus dalam menganalisa headlines mengenai berita APEC karena headlines menyimpan informasi penting dari peristiwa di dunia. Rumusan masalah diantaranya (1) apa saja word choice dalam headlines di Koran The Jakarta Post pemberitaan APEC di Indonesia 2013, (2) apa saja transitivity yang ditemukan di headlines The Jakarta Post pemberitaan APEC di Indonesia 2013, (3) sikap ideologis apa pada word choices dan transitivity di headlines The Jakarta Post pemberitaan APEC di Indonesia 2013. Penelitian ini menggunakan deskriptif kualitatif. Data dikumpulkan dari koran harian The Jakarta Post mengenai APEC tanggal 9 September 2013 sampai 9 Oktober 2013 (31 hari). Hasil penelitian ini: 1) word choice yang ditemukan dalam headlines ditulis dalam bentuk simple present tense menunjukkan peristiwa yang baru saja terjadi. Headlines ditulis dalam bentuk klausa penuh yang terdiri dari sedikitnya subjek dan kata kerja. Pada headlines terdapat bentuk omisi dari verba bantu be agar penulisan berita lebih efektif, 2) proses verba sebagian besar menggunakan material process. Sirkumtansi dalam headlines ditulis oleh frase nomina dan frase kata kerja. APEC sering disebutkan sebagai aktor atau pelaku dalam headlines yang memiliki verba positif seperti vows, talks, hopes, changers. Dari kata kerja tersebut terlihat kekuatan dominasi aktor pada tujuan. Kata Kunci: headlines, word choice, transitivity, ideology ABSTRACT This study focuses on the analysis of the headlines newspaper in APEC news event because headlines provide the main important information of the events in the world. The research questions are (1) what the word choice is found in the headlines of The Jakarta Post reporting APEC in Indonesia 2013, (2) what the transitivity is found in the headlines of The Jakarta Post reporting APEC in Indonesia 2013, (3) what ideological in word choice and transitivity found in the headlines of The Jakarta Post reporting APEC in Indonesia 2013. The study is descriptive qualitative. The data was collected The Jakarta Post daily newspaper about APEC news event from September 9th, 2013 until October 9th, 2013 (31 days). The study found: 1) word choice is found in headlines is written in simple present tense form to show the immediate past happening. The headlines are written by full clause form which consist of minimal a subject and a verb. There is omission in headlines as the aim of the effectiveness headlines writing, 2) the process of the verbs are mostly material process. The circumstances of the headlines are written by noun phrase and verb phrases. APEC is mostly mentioned as the actor or the doer in the headlines that has positive verbs such as vows, talks, hopes, changers. From those verbs that is seen dominance power in actor for the goal. Keywords: headlines, word choice, transitivity, ideology INTRODUCTION Language is very important in human life to make good interaction, people need language to communicate with other. The language in use for communication is called discourse (Cook, 1989:6). It means that all of the language to use for communicating with other people is named "discourse". In the recently times, Linguists' interest in discourse focus on the linguistic structure of the text into how texts draw in the social process. The reason is linguists' want to get satisfied more than analyzing linguistic text which focused in linguistic features only. The knowledge of understanding in grammar, syntax, morphology, semantic and phonology of the text have not need of understanding in a text. The rhetoric intent, the coherence, and the worldview that the author and receptor convey the similarity essential of the text (Kaplan, 1990) as cited in Taiwo (2007:218). Texts always produce and read in real world with all the complexity, not in the isolation area. Consequently, language can show the reality. Language delivers from word by word in written or oral a broad sense of meanings and the meaning delivers with those words in social, political, and historical condition. Language can bring the power that shows in written or spoken. Mass media, it means that delivery message. It has two types of mass media. There are printed mass media and electronic mass media. Printed media are newspaper, tabloids, and magazines. Electronic mass media includes radio, smart-phone, and television. It is used to communicate with other political as the instrument to convey idea, message, and political work program. It has hidden of power relation. As one of the printed mass media, newspaper become as one of the most popular mass media. It occurs because newspapers contain many variant of news every day. By using actions of outstanding figures and statement, newspapers have formed. Opinion leaders, government, newspaper editors, etc, play crucial role in shaping the issue in the society and setting the boundaries of what is talked about, how is talked about (Taiwo, 2007: 218). However, the critical reader frequently takes the new granted. The analysis focused on the analysis of the headline newspaper because the headline summarize the content of the news, and attract the reader to read the article. The writer of newspaper always makes the headline short but in a headline can describe the core of the complicated new story in a few words. In Richardson (2007), Van Dijk (1988) says that news headlines are particularly key for the way readers understand of news text, they stakes that monitor attention, perception and reading process. The study concerned on headlines since daily newspaper provides the main important information of events in the world. Nevertheless, it is difficult for readers to read all of the news articles in the daily newspapers because all the variant news are very interesting and the time restraint. Therefore, they have to be selective by looking on the headline. The main function of news headline is to make the readers easily to know the main content of the news and the general picture of the news stories although they do not read all news stories. The study chooses The Jakarta Post daily newspaper as the sources of data since The Jakarta Post is the leading daily English language newspaper in Indonesia that published since 1983. The newspaper was launched on April 25th 1983. The paper is owned by PT Bina Media Tenggara, and the head office is in the nation's capital, Jakarta. It is the largest English language newspaper in Indonesia with an average circulation of around 50,000 copies. (www.wikipedia.com/jakarta-post). The analysis of headlines reporting APEC (Asia-Pacific Economy Cooperation) 2013 in Bali, Indonesia was the focus of the research since the news in September 2nd 2013 until October 14th 2013. In that day, Indonesia prepare everything what is needed to annual meeting of APEC in this year held in Nusa Dua, Bali, Indonesia. APEC is established in 1989 which has the aim to strengthen economic growth and strengthen the community of nations in the Asia Pacific. In the annual meeting in this year, APEC generate seven agreement. APEC have the important role in economic global. In that meeting, there are delegates 21 state leader who are important people in their country as presidents and a hundreds business people from whole the world. However, there are many particular world of economy-politic that they used. (http://id.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kerja_Sama_Ekonomi_Asia_Pasifik) The study has There are two similar studies. First, a similar studies was conducted by Kirana (2009). She conducted a study entitled "Critical Discourse Analysis of Headlines in The Jakarta Post Reporting Invasion in Gaza". Kirana's study and this study are quite similar on the analysis of headlines. The difference is sited of the data. She uses the data of the event of conflict in Gaza. However, this study analyzes headlines in story event of APEC 2013 that held in Indonesia. Second, a study was conducted by Yunianti (2010). She conducted a study entitled "Critical Discourse Analysis in The Jakarta Post Reporting Ruhut's Behavior During Parliament Inquiry Session On The Bank Century". The difference between this study and Yunianti's study, we have the same case (power and ideology), but this study analysis newspaper headlines while her study analyses newspaper's article. In the end of her study, she found ideological value that is showed by kinds of syntactical and word choice features utilized by articles The Jakarta Post newspaper. Furthermore, this study analyzes the headlines as the aim was attempt to look at how the language is used headlines to show particular social ideologies and power relations. Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) as the method of Discourse Analysis was used as the approach to show development of linguistics features which is used in the headlines focused in studying and analyzing the linking between linguistics analysis and social analysis, the ideology, and power relations. The analysis headlines are produced by actual and social matters. CDA was considerably useful to show the source of power, dominance, abuse, inequality and bias and how these sources are initiated, maintained, reproduced and transformed within specific social, economic, political and historical context. More specifically, the study focused on the analysis of ideological representation in the headline present in examining the word choice and transitivity, particularly transitivity of the headlines. Therefore, this study is written to know the ideological distance underlying the linguistics forms existed in the headlines in The Jakarta Post newspaper reporting APEC in Indonesia. Hence, the study wants to analyze the word choice and transitivity of the headlines in The Jakarta Post newspaper reporting APEC in Indonesia 2013 so that the research questions are as follows: 1)What word choice is found in the headlines of The Jakarta Post reporting APEC in Indonesia 2013?, 2)What transitivity is found in headlines of The Jakarta Post reporting APEC in Indonesia 2013?, 3)What ideological stance in the word choice and transitivity found in headlines of The Jakarta Post reporting APEC in Indonesia 2013?. Moreover, the purposes of the study are: 1)To describe the word choice found of headlines in The Jakarta Post reporting APEC in Indonesia 2013. 2)To describe the transitivity found of the headlines in The Jakarta Post reporting APEC in Indonesia 2013. 4)To reveal the ideological stance in the word choice and transitivity found of headlines in The Jakarta Post reporting APEC in Indonesia 2013. The study intends to analyze word choice items and transitivity of the headlines APEC in The Jakarta Post by using CDA theory. The study is expected to be able to give theoretical and practical contribution to the area of applied linguistics and CDA. By conducting this study, the study greatly expects that the finding will be useful to enrich the awareness of how language assists especially through mass media in the particular social ideology and power relations. METHODE The study will be conducted by using qualitative research. The study approaches to Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). Furthermore, Fairclough (1989:26) states that CDA has three dimension, or stages, of critical discourse analysis: which include the relationship between texts, interactions, and contexts. Thus, there are three steps in analyzing discourse are through description, interpretation, and explanation. Data analysis in this study was also done in three steps which then results in three forms of analysis: first, the analysis of the text; second the analysis of the discourse practice which refers to the process of text production, text distribution and text consumption as commonly happen in the culture in which the writer and the participants live; third, the analysis of the social practice of the society in which the writer and participants live. The source of data in this study is taken from The Jakarta Post newspaper on alternate days from September 9th, 2013 until October 9th, 2013 (31 days). The data are the headlines which taken from The Jakarta Post newspaper. The study chooses the story event of APEC 2013 which held gathering in Indonesia. The data consist of 10 headlines. The data analysis technique in this research was applied descriptive analysis. The aim of the study was to describe certain phenomena occurred in this research setting. The certain phenomena probably occurred in terms of linguistic features. The stages of CDA are proposed by Fairclough (1989:26) was used in this research in the following procedure: 1)Description, In this stage which is concerned with formal properties of the text. There are several steps to describe the texts: Analyzing the word choice: the choices meaning of words used in the headlines, including all types of words, but particularly nouns, adjectives, verbs, and adverbs which carry connoted and denoted meanings. Analyzing the transitivity: sentence construction. There are three components to discuss in transitivity, they are the participant, the process, and the circumstance; 2)Interpretation, It is focused in relationship between text and interaction by seeing of the text as the product of a process of interpretation, notice that is used as the term interpretation for both the interactional process and a stage of analysis; 3)Explanation, It is focused in relationship between interaction and social context by determination of social process of production and interpretation, and their social effects. Then, the data collect based on the focus of this research. After that the data are analyzed based on word choice and transitivity. Thus, the data are interpreted descriptively and argumentatively by using critical discourse analysis devices in order to reveal the ideological stance of headlines of The Jakarta Post newspaper reporting APEC 2013 in Indonesia. DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION In line with study, the research question one, two, and three will be answered in this section. The data consist of 10 headlines which are displayed by three parts. In part A, the data will be analyzed by word choice, then part B analyzes transitivity and the last is part C that the data will be investigated by the ideological stance. Data 1: Protest in motion amid poor security (The Jakarta Post, Monday, September 30, 2013) In data 1, the situation is three days before APEC summit. APEC was held in Bali that got negative response from the activists and students Hundreds of activists and students came together on Sunday to plan protests against the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Bali amid signs of heightened security at the venues that will host the powwow of 21 Pacific-rim leaders this week. Activist Ni Luh Gede Yastini from the Bali Legal Aid Foundation, confirmed that hundreds of activists from more than 30 local and international non-governmental organizations under the Indonesian People's Alliance would carry out protests against the summit. They had not been determined because they were aware that security forces could possibly block the moves as they could be considered a disturbance to the summit. In addition, the alliance will probably raise issues such as the environment, migrant workers, human rights and fair trade. Other issues will also include religious intolerance, unsolved killings of activists, alleged human rights abuses in Papua and foreign occupations of domestic natural resources. Activists reject "the liberalization of investments" which would provide red carpets to foreign businesses to easily exploit Indonesia's natural resources. Dozens of students had already staged a small "anti-APEC" rally outside the Ketapang Port in Banyuwangi, East Java, on Sunday. The port is the gateway for those who travel by land from Java to Bali. (The Jakarta Post) a. Word choice The headline in data 1 is written in simple present tense which omits being of the verb. The headline (3) may read: Protests in motion [is] amid poor security. The omitting being of the verb (is) as the aim to make the headline writing more effective so that it can shows clear, short, and interesting. The headline (3) consists of a subject protest in motion as noun phrase and the complement object amid poor security as prepositional phrase. The word protest means that to the expression strong disagreement with or opposition to something. Protest refers to the act that doing by hundreds activists and students who against APEC summit 2013 in Bali. b. Transitivity The headline in data 1 is written in active sentence which uses relational process. The headline (3) consist of a carrier protest in motion (noun phrase) and attributive amid poor security (prepositional phrase). The omission (is) is classified into relational processes, process of being abstract relations such as have, seem, and be (is), which involve an agent and attributive (e.g. 'You are x'; I have y'). The carrier is protest in motion and the attributive amid poor security. In the other written, it can be said that protest in motion is among poor security. Look at the fraction below: Protest in motion [is] Amid poor security Carrier Process: relational Attributive c. Ideological stance The headline in data 1 is negative side for delegates of APEC, 21 state leaders. In this case, it can unsafe for them. The summit is crucial to discuss economy growth. The headline tries to show protest motion that is done by hundreds activist and student to against APEC summit. Dozens of students had already staged a small "anti-APEC" rally outside the Ketapang Port in Banyuwangi, East Java, on Sunday. The port is the gateway for those who travel by land from Java to Bali. In the text tells who is the doer, the one who against APEC summit. Data 2: No game changers at APEC summit (The Jakarta Post, Wednesday, October 02, 2013) In data 2, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) officials may drive a hard bargain to produce new tangible trade policies as the bloc's prestigious annual summit kicked off on Tuesday amid perturbing signs in the US economy that, once again, sent jitters across the globe. For the duration of the concluding senior officials meeting (CSOM), which will run from Oct. 1 to 2, officials from the 21 Pacific-rim economies would have to show their commitment to the "Bogor Goals" of free, open trade and investment. Officials expect no "big surprises" in the attempt to progress on the liberalization of trade, but are aware of several contentious issues that have the potential to hurt Indonesia and other emerging economies, if not addressed properly during the negotiations. According to documents obtained by The Jakarta Post, there are five deliverables to be discussed as first priorities of the summit. These include Indonesia's initiative to include crude palm oil (CPO) and natural rubber on the list of environmental goods subject for liberalization. Indonesia, which holds the rotating APEC chairmanship, has several requirements for businesses to use local products for certain industries, such as oil and gas. Economist Sri Adiningsih of Gadjah Mada University's APEC study center said Indonesia should focus on taking advantage of existing commitments rather than trying to push for a new agenda. While the summit is likely to produce few benefits for domestic interest, it is crucial to help facilitate other APEC priorities such as commitments to help avoid another round of impasse in the upcoming World Trade Organization (WTO) ministerial conference in December in Bali. APEC accounts for about 55 percent of the world's gross domestic product (GDP), some 44 percent of global trade and 40 percent of the world's population (The Jakarta Post). a. Word choice The headline in data 1 is written in full clause, consists of a subject no game (noun phrase), a verb changers (infinitive +s) and an complement at APEC summit. No classified in adverb, it means that used with a following adjective to imply a meaning expressed by the opposite positive statement, game (common noun) means a physical or mental activity or contest that has rules and that people do for pleasure, the verb changers means to replace with another. The verb summit means international meeting; a meeting or series of meetings between the leaders of two or more governments, so that the complement at APEC summit means that International organization meeting. b. Transitivity The headline in data 1 is written in active sentence. According to SFL: Transitivity, the process of the sentence is intransitive action which consists of only one participant no game, the actional verb changers which is intransitive verb which does not need object and circumstance at APEC summit, an additional information of the purpose of the action. The processes of doing in the physical world are shown in material processes that show the power of the doer of doing something to the real world, unlike mental processes which are abstract. Look at fraction below: No game Changers At APEC summit Actor Process: material Circumstance: purpose c. Ideological Stance The headline in data 6 is positive toward APEC. the word no as the negation of the verb game. APEC is the International organization. In this case no game can be changers in this International meeting. Indonesia no longer pushes for green goods. Another summit priority, is the US initiative to discuss barriers to trade, which includes opposition against local-content requirements implemented by several APEC members, including Indonesia. Indonesia, which holds the rotating APEC chairmanship, has several requirements for businesses to use local products for certain industries, such as oil and gas. While the summit is likely to produce few benefits for domestic interest, it is crucial to help facilitate other APEC priorities such as commitments to help avoid another round of impasse in the upcoming World Trade Organization (WTO) ministerial conference in December in Bali. The headline is definitely positive toward APEC. To know furthermore of the information, the study classified the analysis of the headline in the table below. No Headlines Word Choice NP FC Process Ideology 1. Competitive SMEs 'crucial' to APEC's growth Compe-titive SMEs - P Relational process Positive 2. Nusa Dua closed for tourists during APEC Nusa dua - P Relational process Positive 3. Protest in motion amid poor security Protests - P Relational process Negative 4. SBY to have bilateral talks with Obama in Bali SBY - P Verbal process Positive 5. APEC agrees to joint efforts to develop renewable energy APEC - P Material process Negative 6. No game changers at APEC summit No game - P Material process Positive 7. RI hopes for deal on rubber shattered RI - P Mental process Negative 8. Challengers force APEC to adjust Challen-gers - P Material process Positive 9 Giants exert clout at APEC Giants - Material process Negative 10 APEC vows to avoid mishaps APEC - Material process Positive Table 1. Word Choice, Transitivity, and Ideology *Note: NP= (Noun Phrase); FC= (Full Clause) Discussions Table 1 the word choice, transitivity and ideology of the headlines into who is the actor or doer, writing headlines, involving in which process, in the end of the analysis it can conclude that what the ideology inside of headlines. First is classified into who is the doer in that event which can show the subject or the doer regularly appear in headline newspaper. Here are the headlines which actors are APEC, it shows in headline in data 5 and data 10. Data 5: APEC agrees to joint efforts to develop renewable energy Data 6: APEC vows to avoid mishap APEC is classified in proper noun which is abbreviation from Asia Pacific Economy Cooperation. Proper noun is a word which is the name of person (e.g. Lisa, John, Marry, etc), a place (e.g. Surabaya, California, Sydney, etc.), an institution (State University of Surabaya, Oxford University, etc.), etc. And it is written with a Capital Letter wherever its located in a sentence. In these headline, the proper noun APEC refers to the International economy meeting summit. The member of APEC consist of Australia, Canada, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, United States, Chinese Taipei, Hongkong, China, Mexico, Papua New Guinea, Chile, Peru, Russia, Vietnam. Meanwhile, APEC as the doer or participants above, it is essentially useful to quantify the types of clause and verb processes used and their distribution across sampled newspaper. The table above is clearly that shows the principle difference between the headline: the ratio of noun phrase (NP) headlines to choose containing full clause (FC). All the headlines APEC summit 2013 in Bali are written in full clause, no one of the headline is written in noun phrase. Full clause consist of minimal one subject and one verb. The headline is written in full clause as the aim to give emphasize the actor or the doer who does the action towards the goal, not only states the noun phrase of the doer, the goal or the result that the doer does. Furthermore, classifying into processes that the processes which have four main verb processes across the headline. The process has four type which consist of material process, verbal process, mental process, and relational process. Look at the headlines below: Data 1: Competitive smes 'crucial' to APEC Data 2: Nusa dua closed for tourists during APEC Data 3: Protest in motion amid poor security The example of headlines above is classified in relational process which can show the typically retain the source responsible for the statement. The headlines is written in shorter, punchier headlines, and the omission of be (is, am, are) as the aim to make effectiveness in headline writing is classifies into relational process, process of being in the world abstract relations. According SFL: Transitivity, the abstract relationships generally finds between two participants associated with the process is regarded, however it is different from material process, a participant does not influence the other participant in a physical sense. The omission (is) is classified into relational processes, process of being abstract relations such as have, seem, and be (is), which involve an agent and attributive (e.g. 'You are x'; I have y'). The verbal process is used in this headline: Data 4: SBY to have bilateral talks with Obama in Bali The word talks is classified in verbal processes, a process of saying such as speaking, shouting, or singing. The word "talk" support of (Halliday 1994: 107) that the verbal process expresses the relationship between ideas constructed in human consciousness and the ideas enacted in the form of language. A verbal process is the process of saying, and it exists on the borderline between mental and relational processes. The participants roles associated with verbalization processes are the sayer, the individual who is speaking and that of the target, the addressee to whom the process is directed. This may be added with verbiage, that which is said. The mental process is used in this headline: Data 7: RI hopes for deal on CPO rubber shattered. From the headline in data 7, it can be shown that the headline includes Mental processes. That is the fact that theory from (Halliday, 1994: 117) that Mental processes are "internalized" processes which exists in processes of doing and speaking. The example are such as thinking, dreaming, and deciding. Mental process by encode the meaning of feeling or thinking. Mental process verbs can be subcategorized into three types; Cognition (verbs of thinking, knowing, understanding), Affection (verbs of liking, loving, fearing, heating), and Perception (verbs of seeing, hearing). The word "hopes" includes in dreaming as the article of the text tells that RI has dream or hopes to lift barriers to the trade in Crude Palm Oil (CPO). The material process is used in this headline below: Data 5: APEC agrees to joint efforts to develop renewable energy Data 6: No game changers at APEC summit Data 8: Challenges force APEC to adjust Data 9: Giants exert clout at APEC Data 10: APEC vows to avoid mishap According SFL: Transitivity, the headlines above belongs to the material process, processes of doing in the physical world. Material processes have two inherent participants involved in them. The first of these Actors, which is an obligatory element and expresses the doer of the process. The second is the Goal, which is an optional element and expresses the doer of the process. In addition to these two inherent participant roles, there is an extra element called Circumstance, which provides additional information on the "when, where, how, and why" of the process. Furthermore, the circumstance associated with the process also contribute to an ideological representation of the APEC summit. In the sampled headlines, the circumstance regularly exists in prepositional phrase which can be used to modify both noun and verb phrases, providing extra details on the time, place or the manner in which the action described in the process. They are identified by a preposition (e.g. 'in', 'of', 'on', 'for', 'to', 'with', 'as' etc). The use of preposition in each of these headlines is highly ideological. In each case, the prepositional phrase is underlined: Competitive smes 'crucial' to APEC Challenges force APEC to adjust The reporters or the publication is most often positive toward APEC. The headlines state APEC as the doer which has dominate power which does the actions towards the goal. It can be shown of 10 headline that the headlines writer does not want to cover or hide the subjects or the doers or the actions even the circumstances of the events. Actually, it is the fact that the way of reporting is very ideological since wants the readers to be clear on who is the doer is, the action and the effected entity. The writer wants the readers have the same thinks. Thus, most of the sample headlines have positive ideology towards APEC. Besides APEC, to increase the economy of 21 economies in Asia Pacific, there is Small and Medium Enterprises to unleash economic potential and drive growth. Smes is very useful to the advancement of the ASEAN community and the global community in 2020. Most of all the 21 APEC leaders had proposed bilateral meetings with Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono as the president of Indonesia. APEC was held in Indonesia has positive towards Indonesia so that's way the ideological stance is shown of the headline writer, in this case the editor of The Jakarta Post who represents the ideological stance of the institution. The Jakarta Post newspaper is daily English newspaper in Indonesia has budget of selection news which is showed for world so that people in the world will know Indonesia actually with reading The Jakarta Post newspaper. It is built in 1982 as the collaboration between four Indonesian media under the demanding of minister of information Ali Moertopo and politician Mr. Jusuf Wanandi, who represented the government-backed Golkar newspaper Suara Karya. Minister Moertopo mentioned the possibility of publishing an English-language newspaper of the highest editorial quality. The Jakarta Post newspaper is more than a decade of opening up the economy to the global community but more importantly one that would be able to provide an Indonesian perspective to counter the highly unbalanced Western-dominated global traffic of news and views. CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTION Conclusion The data consist of 10 headlines about news event of APEC. The study finds word choice in headlines that the headlines are written in simple present tense that is shown the immediately past event. The headlines that consist of 10 headlines are written by full clause (FC) form which consist of minimal a subject and a verb. The subject or the doer of the headlines are mostly APEC which can be seen that the focus of news reporting is APEC. From the subject or the doer of headlines, APEC is shown as active doer that has dominance power in APEC news event that APEC summit 2013 in Nusa dua, Bali. The most dominance verbs are mostly infinitive+s with singular subject that consist of such as the verbs talks, efforts, changers, hopes, vows. From the verbs are describe the active action for the power relation in the doer and the goal. Furthermore, the process of the verbs are mostly material process which have two inherent participant involved in them. According SFL: Transitivity material process is process of doing in the physical world. There are some omission in headlines as the aim of the writing of headlines more effective. The circumstance in the headlines are written by noun phrase and verb phrases, supplying extra details on the time, place or the manner in which the action described in the process. They are identified by a preposition (e.g. 'in', 'of', 'on', 'for', 'to', 'with', 'as' etc). The use of preposition in each of these headlines is highly ideological which concluded of the analysis in headlines that the study has positive appreciation, feeling, and judgment with APEC summit 2013 in Bali. APEC is mostly mentioned as the actor or the doer in the headlines that has positive verbs such as vows, talks, hopes, changers. From those verb that is seen dominance power in actor for the goal. Suggestion The study analyzes the headlines in The Jakarta Post newspaper which is as the object of study. The headlines are elaborated based on the word choice features, transitivity, and the end of the analysis can be investigated the ideological distance. It can be shown by the object of sentence in headlines. For the future, the study hopes the deeper investigation to have a more critical analysis and useful for studying critical analysis to be better. REFERENCES Brown, Gillian and Yule, George. 1983. Discourse Analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Cook, Guy. 1992. 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