We restate and clarify the idea of the "cartel party," a concept that has found considerable traction in studies of parties throughout the democratic world, including those far from the original research site and data on which the cartel model was based. The cartel party thesis holds that political parties increasingly function like cartels, employing the resources of the state to limit political competition and ensure their own electoral success. The thesis has been subject to varied empirical testing and to substantial theoretical evaluation and criticism. Against this background, we look again at the cartel party thesis in order to clarify ambiguities in and misinterpretations of the original argument. We also suggest further refinements, specifications and extensions of the argument. Following a background review of the original thesis, we break it down into its core components, and then clarify the terms in which it makes sense to speak of cartelization and collusion. We then go on to explore some of the implications of the thesis for our understanding of contemporary democracies and patterns of party organization and party competition and we identify a possible agenda for future research in party scholarship.
Embodied cognition research has shown how actions or body positions may affect cognitive processes, such as autobiographical memory retrieval or judgments. The present study examined the role of body balance (to the left or the right) in participants on their attributions to political parties. Participants thought they stood upright on a Wii(™) Balance Board, while they were actually slightly tilted to the left or the right. Participants then ascribed fairly general political statements to one of 10 political parties that are represented in the Dutch House of Representatives. Results showed a significant interaction of congruent leaning direction with left- or right-wing party attribution. When the same analyses were performed with the political parties being divided into affiliations to the right, center, and left based on participants' personal opinions rather than a ruling classification, no effects were found. The study provides evidence that conceptual metaphors are activated by manipulating body balance implicitly. Moreover, people's judgments may be colored by seemingly trivial circumstances such as standing slightly out of balance.
In: Acta politica: AP ; international journal of political science ; official journal of the Dutch Political Science Association (Nederlandse Kring voor Wetenschap der Politiek), Band 35, Heft 1, S. 37-63
In an influential article on party identification, Jacques Thomassen (1976) rejects the directional component of party identification as meaningless in European party systems, but finds the strength component to be meaningful. Here, the conclusion is criticized, because the theory considers party identification to be a lifelong property, & has no mechanism to handle changes in party identification. Further, "independent" voters are left out in the analysis. It is demonstrated -- using Dutch & Norwegian data -- that the directional component is closely related to party choice; however, the analysis suggests that party identification may be separated from party choice regarding long-term properties. This finding, ensures that the widely used strength component is indeed a measure for lasting identification & voter alignments. 7 Tables, 45 References. Adapted from the source document.
In: Acta politica: AP ; international journal of political science ; official journal of the Dutch Political Science Association (Nederlandse Kring voor Wetenschap der Politiek), Band 29, Heft 2, S. 217-234
In: Acta politica: AP ; international journal of political science ; official journal of the Dutch Political Science Association (Nederlandse Kring voor Wetenschap der Politiek), Band 26, Heft 4, S. 449
Explores the degree of trust & commitment to political parties by citizens in postcommunist Europe, & examines forms of party competition, the depth of party identification, & the effectiveness of political party action. Interviews carried out in 1993 -- with 2,141 voters in Russia, 1,000 in Ukraine, 988 in Hungary, 667 in the Slovak Republic, & 973 in the Czech Republic -- reveal a significant degree of hostility to & comparatively low identification with political parties; however, there was no indication that the public wanted to see an end to party competition. There were indications that the future of party systems may be affected more by political elites than the general population, although, unlike the situation in Hungary, the Slovak Republic, & the Czech Republic, Boris Yeltsin has managed to bypass the new parliament in Russia. At present, political parties often play a less significant role than competing factions within government structures. 1 Table, 6 Figures, 1 Appendix, 5 References. J. Lindroth
Political patronage is defined as political actors appointing individuals at their discretion to key positions in the public sector. The book examines this practice in the bureaucracies of 11 Asian countries through the use of a typological framework of patronage types. The framework is based on two key criteria: basis of trust and the major role of political appointees. Several countries with well-developed civil service systems showed minimal levels of patronage (Japan, Singapore and South Korea). Two countries with a weak civil service showed very high levels of patronage appointments (Bangladesh and India). Sandwiched between those extremes are countries with formal civil service systems that are heavily influenced by political parties and by social ties to society (Vietnam, Kazakhstan, and China). The book concludes that not all patronage is the same and what is important is the tasks being performed by appointees and the nature of the trust relationship.
Zugriffsoptionen:
Die folgenden Links führen aus den jeweiligen lokalen Bibliotheken zum Volltext:
In: Political analysis: PA ; the official journal of the Society for Political Methodology and the Political Methodology Section of the American Political Science Association, Band 17, Heft 4, S. 418-434
Although the presidential coattail effect has been an object of frequent study, the question of whether popular congressional candidates boost vote shares in return for their parties' presidential candidates remains unexplored. This article investigates whether so-called "reverse coattails" exist using a regression discontinuity design with congressional district-level data from presidential elections between 1952 and 2004. Taking incumbency to be near-randomly distributed in cases where congressional candidates have just won or lost their previous elections, I find that the numerous substantial advantages of congressional incumbency have no effect on presidential returns for these incumbents' parties. This null finding underscores my claim that the existing coattail literature deserves greater scrutiny. My results also prompt a rethinking of the nature of the advantages that incumbents bring to their campaigns and may help deepen our understanding of partisanship in the United States.
In: Acta politica: AP ; international journal of political science ; official journal of the Dutch Political Science Association (Nederlandse Kring voor Wetenschap der Politiek), Band 20, Heft 2, S. 177
How political parties select their candidates for public office profoundly affects the types of people who are elected as well as how these people behave in office. This selection process also provides important insights on how parties function internally & on where political power is located within a country. Only a few comparative studies of nomination procedures exist, & none explain why some parties at some points in time select candidates via direct primaries & others do not. The authors analyze an original data set of 6l0 district-level nomination processes for the biennial Argentine Chamber of Deputies elections held between 1983 & 2001. They conclude that several specific institutional & partisan features have a prominent effect on the probability that a political party will choose its candidates at the ballot box (direct primary) rather than in a smoke-filled back room (elite arrangement). 3 Tables, 1 Appendix, 38 References. [Copyright 2002 Sage Publications, Inc.]