Suchergebnisse

In the spring of 2011, large scale public demonstrations took place in several countries across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). At the same time, civil unrest caused massive demonstrations in European countries such as Spain, Greece, and Portugal. In this same period, northern and eastern European countries did not experience such massive and widespread social protests. Do both sides of the Mediterranean share the same mindset? Are common challenges and aspirations molding these protests? Without any desire to delineate the complex thread of motivations underlying these demonstrations and protests, we will analyze their socio-economic context using data from ILO reports, UNESCO-ESCWA reports, World Bank statistics and the Barro-Lee database. We will show that high unemployment rates among young educated people coincided with the weakening of legitimacy of national governments. ; Pendant le printemps 2011, d'importantes manifestations ont eu lieu dans plusieurs pays du Moyen Orient et d'Afrique du Nord (MENA). Parallèlement, des manifestations de masse se sont déroulées au sud de l'Europe – Espagne, Grèce, Portugal –, tandis que les pays du nord et l'est de l'Europe n'ont pas connu de telles manifestations. Est-ce que l'on trouve des deux côtés de la Méditerranée, les mêmes aspirations ou les mêmes frustrations ? Sans prétendre démêler l'écheveau complexe des motivations qui sous-tendent ces actions, on se propose d'analyser le contexte socio-économique dans lequel elles ont émergé en s'appuyant sur des données fournies par le BIT, les rapports de l'UNESCO (ESCWA), les statistiques de la Banque Mondiale et la base de données sur l'éducation Baro-Lee. Un contexte favorable à des manifestations de masse résulte, au nord comme au sud de la méditerranée, de la conjonction d'un taux de chômage élevé des jeunes les plus éduqués et de l'affaiblissement de la légitimité des gouvernants.

In the spring of 2011, large scale public demonstrations took place in several countries across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). At the same time, civil unrest caused massive demonstrations in European countries such as Spain, Greece, and Portugal. In this same period, northern and eastern European countries did not experience such massive and widespread social protests. Do both sides of the Mediterranean share the same mindset? Are common challenges and aspirations molding these protests? Without any desire to delineate the complex thread of motivations underlying these demonstrations and protests, we will analyze their socio-economic context using data from ILO reports, UNESCO-ESCWA reports, World Bank statistics and the Barro-Lee database. We will show that high unemployment rates among young educated people coincided with the weakening of legitimacy of national governments. ; Pendant le printemps 2011, d'importantes manifestations ont eu lieu dans plusieurs pays du Moyen Orient et d'Afrique du Nord (MENA). Parallèlement, des manifestations de masse se sont déroulées au sud de l'Europe – Espagne, Grèce, Portugal –, tandis que les pays du nord et l'est de l'Europe n'ont pas connu de telles manifestations. Est-ce que l'on trouve des deux côtés de la Méditerranée, les mêmes aspirations ou les mêmes frustrations ? Sans prétendre démêler l'écheveau complexe des motivations qui sous-tendent ces actions, on se propose d'analyser le contexte socio-économique dans lequel elles ont émergé en s'appuyant sur des données fournies par le BIT, les rapports de l'UNESCO (ESCWA), les statistiques de la Banque Mondiale et la base de données sur l'éducation Baro-Lee. Un contexte favorable à des manifestations de masse résulte, au nord comme au sud de la méditerranée, de la conjonction d'un taux de chômage élevé des jeunes les plus éduqués et de l'affaiblissement de la légitimité des gouvernants.

Comments on recent civil unrest and economic problems in Madagascar.

Examines current political situation resulting from civil unrest initiated by the Islamic Salvation Front to protest electoral laws they claim were devised to deny them victory in parliamentary elections originally scheduled for June 1991; prospects for an alternative between a police state and an Islamic republic.

Article available online at: http://rhr.revues.org/7546 in 1 702, the camisarde insurgency inaugurated in Languedoc was a time of religious unrest. The revolt turns into a polymorph conflict. Here we look at the development of the duels that mirror political, clergy and people, and the entry of a society at war. The approach highlights the multiplicity of violence — physical, ideals, languages — and patterns of sectarian clashes. On the basis of unprecedented archives, the thesis calls for an overall reconsideration of the unrest by including a third strictly civilian actor and by promoting the study of a war in its system. With this protest challenge, which is unique in revocative history, she also questions the state of the southern Catholicism which has come to an end. ; International audience ; Article available online at: http://rhr.revues.org/7546 in 1 702, the camisarde insurgency inaugurated in Languedoc was a time of religious unrest. The revolt turns into a polymorph conflict. Here we look at the development of the duels that mirror political, clergy and people, and the entry of a society at war. The approach highlights the multiplicity of violence — physical, ideals, languages — and patterns of sectarian clashes. On the basis of unprecedented archives, the thesis calls for an overall reconsideration of the unrest by including a third strictly civilian actor and by promoting the study of a war in its system. With this protest challenge, which is unique in revocative history, she also questions the state of the southern Catholicism which has come to an end. ; Article disponible en ligne à l'adresse : http://rhr.revues.org/7546 En 1702 l'insurrection camisarde inaugure en Languedoc un temps de troubles religieux. La révolte mute en un conflit polymorphe. On examine ici la déclinaison des duels qui mirent aux prises instances politiques, clergé et populations, et l'entrée d'une société en guerre. L'approche souligne la multiplicité des violences – physiques, idéelles, langagières –, et des modalités ...

International audience Since the fall of the Siad Barre regime in 1991, the Somali state has disappeared and given way to a long-lasting civil war that has allowed the rise of jihadist groups. The transition process started in 2004 officially ended in 2012 with the establishment of the Federal Government of Somalia. However, the foundations of reconstruction and reconciliation were not laid by this government resulting from a contested electoral process and which failed to put in place the administrations essential to the functioning of the State beyond the capital. This had the effect of prolonging conflict between the clans and allowed al-Shabaab to gain prominence. The election of President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed in 2017 did not accelerate the overhaul of political institutions, still governed by a provisional constitution. Following these elections, al-Shabaab carried out several attacks against government and public service targets with the aim of destabilizing and discrediting the government. In addition, civil unrest regularly agitates the country, leading to often violent protests, and the food crisis and military operations have led to the displacement of thousands of people, which allows criminal gangs to flourish. ; Depuis la chute du régime de Siad Barre en 1991, l'Etat somalien a disparu et laissé place à une guerre civile de longue durée ayant permis la montée de groupes djihadistes. Le processus de transition entamé en 2004 se termine officiellement en 2012 avec l'instauration du Gouvernement Fédéral de Somalie. Seulement, les bases de la reconstruction et de la réconciliation n'ont pas été posées par ce gouvernement issu d'un processus électoral contesté et qui n'a pas su remettre en place les administrations indispensables au fonctionnement de l'Etat au-delà de la capitale. Cela a eu pour effet de prolonger les conflits entre les clans et a permis à al-Shabaab de prendre de l'importance. L'élection du Président Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed en 2017 n'a pas accéléré la refonte des institutions ...

International audience ; Since the fall of the Siad Barre regime in 1991, the Somali state has disappeared and given way to a long-lasting civil war that has allowed the rise of jihadist groups. The transition process started in 2004 officially ended in 2012 with the establishment of the Federal Government of Somalia. However, the foundations of reconstruction and reconciliation were not laid by this government resulting from a contested electoral process and which failed to put in place the administrations essential to the functioning of the State beyond the capital. This had the effect of prolonging conflict between the clans and allowed al-Shabaab to gain prominence. The election of President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed in 2017 did not accelerate the overhaul of political institutions, still governed by a provisional constitution. Following these elections, al-Shabaab carried out several attacks against government and public service targets with the aim of destabilizing and discrediting the government. In addition, civil unrest regularly agitates the country, leading to often violent protests, and the food crisis and military operations have led to the displacement of thousands of people, which allows criminal gangs to flourish. ; Depuis la chute du régime de Siad Barre en 1991, l'Etat somalien a disparu et laissé place à une guerre civile de longue durée ayant permis la montée de groupes djihadistes. Le processus de transition entamé en 2004 se termine officiellement en 2012 avec l'instauration du Gouvernement Fédéral de Somalie. Seulement, les bases de la reconstruction et de la réconciliation n'ont pas été posées par ce gouvernement issu d'un processus électoral contesté et qui n'a pas su remettre en place les administrations indispensables au fonctionnement de l'Etat au-delà de la capitale. Cela a eu pour effet de prolonger les conflits entre les clans et a permis à al-Shabaab de prendre de l'importance. L'élection du Président Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed en 2017 n'a pas accéléré la refonte des institutions ...

International audience ; Since the fall of the Siad Barre regime in 1991, the Somali state has disappeared and given way to a long-lasting civil war that has allowed the rise of jihadist groups. The transition process started in 2004 officially ended in 2012 with the establishment of the Federal Government of Somalia. However, the foundations of reconstruction and reconciliation were not laid by this government resulting from a contested electoral process and which failed to put in place the administrations essential to the functioning of the State beyond the capital. This had the effect of prolonging conflict between the clans and allowed al-Shabaab to gain prominence. The election of President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed in 2017 did not accelerate the overhaul of political institutions, still governed by a provisional constitution. Following these elections, al-Shabaab carried out several attacks against government and public service targets with the aim of destabilizing and discrediting the government. In addition, civil unrest regularly agitates the country, leading to often violent protests, and the food crisis and military operations have led to the displacement of thousands of people, which allows criminal gangs to flourish. ; Depuis la chute du régime de Siad Barre en 1991, l'Etat somalien a disparu et laissé place à une guerre civile de longue durée ayant permis la montée de groupes djihadistes. Le processus de transition entamé en 2004 se termine officiellement en 2012 avec l'instauration du Gouvernement Fédéral de Somalie. Seulement, les bases de la reconstruction et de la réconciliation n'ont pas été posées par ce gouvernement issu d'un processus électoral contesté et qui n'a pas su remettre en place les administrations indispensables au fonctionnement de l'Etat au-delà de la capitale. Cela a eu pour effet de prolonger les conflits entre les clans et a permis à al-Shabaab de prendre de l'importance. L'élection du Président Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed en 2017 n'a pas accéléré la refonte des institutions ...

One often imagines him removed in its tower to caress the muses and to elaborate a timeless wisdom. But Montaigne can not be reduced to the image of the philosopher devoted to contemplation. He is a lord at the head of a vast estate, with his peasants, his vineyards and his fields. A gentleman steeped in a noble culture, whose certainties he braved to replace them with an original ideal: to conquer greatness in the "mediocrity" of an ordinary existence. A former magistrate also, penetrated with a rich legal knowledge, that he put for a time in work in the Parliament of Bordeaux, city of which he will become the mayor. A political actor especially, caught up in the turmoil of the wars of religion, the violence of denominational hatred and the fear of death that bloody France. One cannot understand, writes Arlette Jouanna, the singular destiny of this exceptional man without mirroring the different figures that make up his personality and the historical terroir in which they take root. It is with a historian's eye that one must rediscover his tumultuous itinerary and the fascinating diversity of a thought that is always in motion. If Montaigne still speaks to us, it is because, in the midst of civil unrest, he calls on "public reason" to transcend intolerance; it is an invitation to free the mind from the weight of agreed conventions and invincible prejudices. Neither the vestige of a bygone past, nor the preacher of hedonistic individualism, but simply our contemporary.--Translation of page 4 of cover by Gallimard

The Republic of Haiti occupies one-third of the island of Hispaniola, located between the Caribbean Sea and the North Atlantic Ocean. The island is located in the hurricane belt and is exposed to severe storms from June to October. Total area of the country is 27 750 square km, with land boundaries of 275 km with the Dominican Republic. Arable land and permanent crops cover about 40 per cent of total land area, with 18 per cent of permanent pastures and the rest being mountains (63 per cent). Irrigated area is about 70 000 hectares, only 2 per cent of total land. Climate is considered tropical, but Haiti's geographical position and hilly relief determine a high variability of ecosystems, from dry and semiarid areas in the north-west with less than 1000 mm of rain per year to very humid mountains in the south and centre with about 2000 mm of rain per year. More than 20 years of internal conflicts and political instability have devastated Haiti's economy and inflicted severe hardship to the population. The recent political crisis started at the beginning of 2004 with an unresolved dispute over May 2000 legislative elections. In February 2004, growing civil unrest followed by an armed rebellion culminated with the President Aristide resigning and leaving the country. At the aftermath of the conflict, a transitional government was formed to lead the country to regional, parliamentary, and presidential elections, which are scheduled for 2005. The immediate tasks of the government are to restore security, rehabilitate government infrastructure damaged during the conflict and to stabilize the economy. ; Text in English and French

Cet article propose une analyse des liens entre les espaces virtuels des jeux vidéo et les espaces physiques des manifestations. Les récents mouvements élucident l'importance de la compréhension de l'espace, que ce soit par les manifestants ou par la police pour occuper ou contrôler un espace contesté. Récemment et en réponse aux manifestations de masse, de nombreux créateurs de jeux et activistes ont développé des jeux vidéo pour soutenir les manifestants dans leur quête de justice. Cette recherche présume que l'espace du jeu peut offrir aux mouvements sociaux un moyen d'actualiser leur conscience collective de l'espace et donc agir en tant qu'outil de littératie spatiale. Par conséquent, cette recherche pose deux questions : est-ce que le répertoire actuel contient des jeux qui mettent en considération le rôle l'espace joue dans les manifestations ? En outre, est-ce que Les créateurs de jeux de protestation sont conscients de la dimension spatiale lors de la construction de leurs jeux ? Afin de répondre aux questions de recherche, nous commençons par définir la littératie spatiale comme le niveau de conscience spatiale et d'engagement spatial qu'un jeu peut comprendre. Utilisant trois points de vue : le mode de représentation, la spatialité et la pédagogie, cette recherche étudie trois cas impliquant le jeu, la protestation et la ville. Les trois cas sont 1979 Revolution: Black Friday (2016), OccupyGezi (2013) et Riot: Civil Unrest (2019). La recherche a conclu que les créateurs des jeux étaient partiellement conscients de la dimension spatiale d'une manifestation, mais ils n'ont pas réussi à imbriquer les espaces construits dans le récit du jeu et à engager les joueurs dans l'espace du jeu ; et par conséquent, les jeux présentés ne parviennent pas à agir comme un outil de littératie spatiale. Bien que les cas actuels aient principalement négligé la dimension spatiale, cette recherche croit toujours au potentiel de l'espace de jeu en tant qu'outil de littératie spatiale. Ainsi, nous proposons l'intégration des technologies géospatiales dans la construction d'espaces de jeu dans l'espoir qu'ils puissent servir à la littératie spatiale des manifestants. ; This article proposes an analysis of the links between the virtual space of video games and the physical spaces of protest. The recent movements elucidate the importance of spatial understanding, whether by the protesters or the police to occupy or control a contested space. Recently and in response to the mass protests, many game makers and activists have developed video games to support protesters in their quest for justice. This research argues that gamespace can offer for social movements a way to actualise their collective conscious and to act as a tool of spatial literacy. Therefore, this research poses two questions: Does the existing library contain games that put into consideration the role space plays in protests? Moreover, are the game makers aware of the spatial dimension when building their games? To answer the research questions, we start by defining spatial literacy as the level of spatial awareness and spatial engagement that a game can comprise. Using three analytical lenses: Representation, spatiality, and pedagogy, this research studies three cases that engage with gameplay, protest, and the city. The Three cases are 1979 Revolution: Black Friday (2016), OccupyGezi (2013) et Riot: Civil Unrest (2019). The research concluded that games makers were partially aware of the spatial dimension of a protest, but they failed to interweave the constructed spaces with the game narrative and to engage players in the game space, and consequently, the presented games fall short in acting as a tool for spatial literacy. Although the present cases mostly neglected the spatial dimension, this research still believe in the potential of the gamespace to act as a tool of spatial literacy; thus, we propose the integration of geospatial technologies in the construction of gamespaces in the hope that they can serve as a spatial literacy tool for protesters. ; Peer reviewed

International audience ; Since the fall of the Siad Barre regime in 1991, the Somali state has disappeared and given way to a long-lasting civil war that has allowed the rise of jihadist groups. The transition process started in 2004 officially ended in 2012 with the establishment of the Federal Government of Somalia. However, the foundations of reconstruction and reconciliation were not laid by this government resulting from a contested electoral process and which failed to put in place the administrations essential to the functioning of the State beyond the capital. This had the effect of prolonging conflict between the clans and allowed al-Shabaab to gain prominence. The election of President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed in 2017 did not accelerate the overhaul of political institutions, still governed by a provisional constitution. Following these elections, al-Shabaab carried out several attacks against government and public service targets with the aim of destabilizing and discrediting the government. In addition, civil unrest regularly agitates the country, leading to often violent protests, and the food crisis and military operations have led to the displacement of thousands of people, which allows criminal gangs to flourish. ; Depuis la chute du régime de Siad Barre en 1991, l'Etat somalien a disparu et laissé place à une guerre civile de longue durée ayant permis la montée de groupes djihadistes. Le processus de transition entamé en 2004 se termine officiellement en 2012 avec l'instauration du Gouvernement Fédéral de Somalie. Seulement, les bases de la reconstruction et de la réconciliation n'ont pas été posées par ce gouvernement issu d'un processus électoral contesté et qui n'a pas su remettre en place les administrations indispensables au fonctionnement de l'Etat au-delà de la capitale. Cela a eu pour effet de prolonger les conflits entre les clans et a permis à al-Shabaab de prendre de l'importance. L'élection du Président Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed en 2017 n'a pas accéléré la refonte des institutions politiques, toujours régies par une Constitution provisoire. Suite à ces élections, al-Shabaab a mené plusieurs attaques contre des cibles gouvernementales et du service public dans le but de déstabiliser et discréditer le gouvernement. En outre, des troubles civils agitent régulièrement le pays, entrainant des manifestations souvent violentes, et la crise alimentaire ainsi que les opérations militaires ont induit le déplacement de milliers de personnes ce qui permet à des bandes criminelles de prospérer.

In December 2003, President Conté was re-elected through an electoral process that was boycotted by the opposition. The international community hardly reacted to the regime's manipulations, judging that the regime in place was a useful rampart against regional instability. Nonetheless, the "longevity" of Conté's regime has a cost: economic demise and the rise of social tensions. If, in the very short term, stability is preserved in Guinea, the country could be affected by unprecedented violence in the medium term. (Polit afr/DÜI)

A long time presented as a haven of peace in a continent characterized by chronic instability, Cote d'Ivoire goes through an unrest period punctuated with the coup d'Etat of December 1999, then with new attempt in September 2002 which, de facto, led to country partition & to a lasting "neither war nor peace" situation. Our assumption is that rise of instability is, to some extent, due to international financial institutions intervention, which, through successive adjustment programs, tried to impose the neoliberal model, upsetting former balances, without producing new compromises likely to ensure social & political stability. In this sense, the Ivorian conflict appears, at least partially, as the result of failures in the Washington (post) consensus implementation. Adapted from the source document.