The article illustrates the competition in politics which takes place in two parallel dimensions, i.e. during regular electoral campaigns and during the period of debating the final version of the legislation. One of the ways to the appropriate treatment of competition in politics is focusing research efforts on the analysis of political entrepreneurs behavior. It involves obtaining an advantage over players aiming to achieve identical objectives through the use of various instruments which exert influence on the preferences of political consumers as well as public decision of politicians and bureaucrats. The author argues that these behaviors are an adjustment to the conditions in which competition takes place on the political market. The methodology adopted in the study based on the hypothesis that individuals make public choices thus affecting the final outcome of the political process, and a direct relationship between the private cost and private benefit, which is a fundamental feature of the market selection, can be transferred to the analysis of public sphere.
The article illustrates the competition in politics which takes place in two parallel dimensions, i.e. during regular electoral campaigns and during the period of debating the final version of the legislation. One of the ways to the appropriate treatment of competition in politics is focusing research efforts on the analysis of political entrepreneurs behavior. It involves obtaining an advantage over players aiming to achieve identical objectives through the use of various instruments which exert influence on the preferences of political consumers as well as public decision of politicians and bureaucrats. The author argues that these behaviors are an adjustment to the conditions in which competition takes place on the political market. The methodology adopted in the study based on the hypothesis that individuals make public choices thus affecting the final outcome of the political process, and a direct relationship between the private cost and private benefit, which is a fundamental feature of the market selection, can be transferred to the analysis of public sphere.
What are the implications of Big Data and Big Analytics on competition policy? EU and US competition authorities are currently grappling with this question. The EU Commission has recently issued preliminary results of its e-commerce sector inquiry. The European Data Protection Supervisor and the UK House of Lords, among others, have issued reports and convened roundtables on the issue. The OECD will host in late 2016 an enforcer roundtable on this subject. The significance of these inquires cannot be overstated, as their conclusions will determine the dynamics of future technology markets and level of antitrust intervention.
Corporate tax levels have fallen substantially in Europe during the last decades. A broad literature has identified tax competition as one reason for this decline in corporate tax levels. However, none of these studies explicitly asks the question whether tax competition within regions is different from tax competition across regions, e.g. due to global regionalism of foreign direct investments. This is a crucial question to answer in order to discuss the desirability of tax harmonization in a distinct region, for example, within the European Union. Therefore, the study aims to give hints on the question whether the decline in corporate tax levels in Europe is mainly driven by tax competition between EU member states or by pressure from other world regions. The results of this study, which makes use of tax reaction functions, indicate that there is evidence for tax competition within Europe, whereas there is no robust evidence that European countries compete with countries from other world regions.
Das Issue Competition Comparative Project (ICCP) ist ein vergleichendes Forschungsprojekt zum Thema Parteienwettbewerb. Ziel ist es, den Parteienwettbewerb aus der Perspektive des Themenwettbewerbs zu analysieren, d.h. politische Parteien und Führer als rationale, stimmmaximierende politische Unternehmer zu konzipieren, die die verfügbaren Themenmöglichkeiten in einem Kontext, in dem die Wähler über ideologische Grenzen hinweg verfügbar sind, strategisch nutzen. Die erste ICCP-Datenerhebungsrunde erstreckte sich auf sechs westeuropäische Länder (Niederlande, Frankreich, Vereinigtes Königreich, Deutschland, Österreich und Italien), die 2017 und 2018 Parlamentswahlen abgehalten haben. Der Wahlkampf von politischen Parteien und Parteiführern wurde untersucht, indem ihre Aktivitäten auf Twitter in den vier Monaten vor dem Wahltag beobachtet, gesammelt und analysiert wurden. Für jede Partei in den 6 ICCP-Ländern wurde die Überwachungstätigkeit auf dem öffentlichen Profil der Partei und auf dem öffentlichen Profil der wichtigsten Spitzenreiter/Führungskräfte der Partei durchgeführt.
1. Umfragedatensatz Themen: Politikinteresse; Wahlabsicht; Bewertung der aktuellen wirtschaftlichen Situation; erwartete wirtschaftliche Situation in 12 Monaten; Wahlbereitschaft verschiedener politischer Parteien; Parteiidentifikation; Stärke der Parteiidentifikation; Parteinähe zu verschiedenen Parteien; Partei, die für das Erreichen unterschiedlicher politischer Ziele glaubwürdig ist; Befragter weist dem politischen Ziel eine hohe, durchschnittliche oder niedrige Priorität zu; Position zu Positionierungsfragen (Selbstplatzierung auf einer Skala von 1-6, mit Werten 1-3, die einem Ziel entsprechen, und Werten 4-6, die dem rivalisierenden Ziel entsprechen); gemeinsame politische Ziele (Wertigkeitsprobleme); links-rechts Selbstplatzierung; Anerkennung oder Missbilligung der bisherigen Regierungsbilanz; Kandidatenmerkmale (Kenntnisse über Politik, stark, ehrlich und vorsichtig) waren anwendbar.
Demographie: Geschlecht; Alter (Geburtsjahr, Altersklasse); Kirchgangshäufigkeit; Bildung; Ortsgröße; Beruf; Sektor; Selbstbewertung der sozialen Klasse; Lebensstandard.
Themen: Studie (Land und Jahr); Abkürzung der Partei; Issue ID (innerhalb des Landes); Issue Typ (Positional oder Valence); Dimension (kulturell oder wirtschaftlich); Issue (Kurzbeschreibung); rivalisierendes Ziel (zum Thema), das der klassischen linken Orientierung zugeordnet ist; rivalisierendes Ziel (zum Thema), das der klassischen rechten Orientierung zugeordnet ist; rechtes Positionsziel; systematische Issue Salience; absolute Anzahl der Tweets der Partei, die dem Thema gewidmet sind; Gesamtzahl der themenbezogenen Partei-Tweets; Gesamtzahl der Partei-Tweets, die den positionellen Themen gewidmet sind; Gesamtzahl der Partei-Tweets, die den Valenzfragen gewidmet sind; Anteil der Partei-Tweets, die die Partei dem Issue widmet, über die Gesamtzahl der themenbezogenen Tweets; Ausrichtung (links/rechts) des Ziels mit einem höheren Ertragsergebnis für die Partei; Parteigröße in der Umfragestichprobe; Gesamtstichprobe und innerhalb der Partei: Zielunterstützung für Positionsprobleme; ganze Stichprobe und innerhalb der Partei: Glaubwürdigkeit der Partei im Hinblick auf das Ziel (glaubwürdigkeitsgewichtet) Issue Yield für Ziel; Issue Yield Cross-Party-Ranking.
Corporate tax levels have fallen substantially in Europe during the last decades. There is a broad literature on tax competition which has been identified as one reason for the decline in corporate tax levels. However, none of these studies explicitly ask the question whether tax competition within regions is di erent from tax competition across regions, e.g. due to "global regionalism" of foreign direct investments. This is a crucial question to answer in order to discuss the desirability of (local) tax harmonization, for example, within the European Union. Therefore, the study aims to give hints on the following questions: Is the decline in corporate tax levels in Europe mainly driven by inner-European tax competition? Or is it (also) due to pressure from other world regions? The results of this study which makes use of tax reaction functions (spatial econometrics) indicate that there is evidence for tax competition within Europe (with respect to effective average tax rates) whereas there is no evidence that European countries compete with countries from other regions.
This paper explores the historical background of the political and economic relations between the Republic of Moldova and the European Union, presenting an overview of relevant documents such as the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement and the Association Agreement. Special emphasis is put on the development of competition law in Moldova as one of the main instruments for ensuring the function of a market economy. In this context, the paper also addresses the process of adjustment of Moldova's relevant legislation to the European Union competition law, describing the range of legal instruments and institutions involved in this process and the monitoring thereof by the European Union.
This monograph provides a coherent and systematic explanation of China's regional economic development from the perspective of regional government competition. It gives an almost unknown exposition of the mechanisms of China's regional economic development, with numerous supporting cases drawn from both China and elsewhere. This book is an invaluable resource for anyone interested to learn more particularly the development and transformation of China's regional economy from both the Chinese and global perspectives.
This article employs cultural political economy to explore, interpret, and explain the articulation of competition, competitiveness, and competition policies in Asia in the current neo-liberal era. It describes how this approach explores social order and change in terms of the interaction between semiosis and structuration in the context of four types of selectivity: structural, agential, discursive, and technological. It then outlines an analytical framework and methodology to apply this approach to the chosen case study. This concerns how these modes of selectivity have operated since the 1997 'Asian Crisis' to produce changes in the policy discourses and practices of the World Bank and its Asian regional agencies with the declared aim of reducing poverty, enhancing competitiveness, and promoting corresponding forms of competition policy. Next it examines how these discourses and practices are assembling a new dispositive around an emerging disciplinary and governmentalized socioeconomic-cum-legal order in the wake of the Doha conjuncture in Asia. The concluding remarks address some tensions and challenges in the making of this competitiveness order in Asia.
In almost all European Union countries, the gender wage gap is increasing across the wage distribution. In this 2008 presidential lecture I briefly survey some recent studies aiming to explain why apparently identical women and men receive such different
In almost all European Union countries, the gender wage gap is increasing across the wage distribution. In this 2008 presidential lecture I briefly survey some recent studies aiming to explain why apparently identical women and men receive such different
I am going to focus on the future, but first we must glance bricf1y at the era immediately following World War II. Competition in the Pacific basin can reasonably be divided in to three separate areas-military, political, and economic.
This study investigates if the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) distorted price competition in U.S. banking. Political indicators reveal bailout expectations after 2009, manifested as beliefs about the predicted probability of receiving equity support relative to failing during the TARP disbursement period. In addition, the TARP affected the competitive conduct of unsupported banks after the program stopped in the fourth quarter of 2009. The risk premium required by depositors was lower, and loan rates were higher for banks with higher bailout expectations. The interest margins of unsupported banks increased in the immediate aftermath of the TARP disbursement but not after 2010. These effects are economically very small though. No effects emerged for loan or deposit growth, which suggests that protected banks did not increase their market shares at the expense of less protected banks.
In a two-country economy we analyze how tax competition differs from the standard all-Nashian tax competition, if one or both countries are Kantians in Roemer's sense. Kantians are shown to choose a higher tax rate than Nashians for any given tax rate of the other country, which indicates that they seek to mitigate the (Nashian) race to the bottom. We avoid dealing with multiple equilibria by assuming that capital is sufficiently scarce, and we find for symmetric countries that the all-Kantian tax competition is efficient and that the inefficient race to the bottom is weakened in economies with a Nashian and a Kantian. That confirms the intuitive idea that countries following the Kantian categorical imperative avoid or at least soften the socially undesirable impact of (Nashian) self-interest. We also investigate the incentives of opportunistic countries to choose Nashian or Kantian behavior out of self-interest and find that either both governments choose to behave as Kantians or that - under different conditions - the robust Nashian selfinterest supersedes Kantian moral principles such that the inefficient all-Nashian tax competition results.
Die Dissertation handelt über Wettbewerbsökonomie. Kapitel 1 betrachtet eine Fusion zwischen zwei regulierten Firmen, die in getrennten Märkten agieren und jeweils mit unregulierten Firmen konkurrieren. Die optimale Fusionspolitik für regulierte Firmen hängt von der Intensität des Wettbewerbs zwischen den unregulierten Firmen ab, verschärfter Wettbewerb zwischen den unregulierten Firmen induziert eine mildere Fusionspolitik. Das Gegenteil gilt, wenn die regulierten Firmen in ein wettbewerbsfähiges Marktsegment expandieren und die regulierten und unregulierten Waren komplementär sind. Kapitel 2 untersucht die optimale Fusionspolitik zwischen zwei wettbewerbsfähigen Firmen. Unter den strukturellen Auflagen, die sich am effektivsten herausgestellt haben um einen wirksamen Wettbewerb wiederherzustellen, gibt es eine die sich stark hervorhebt, nämlich die Veräußerung von differenzierten Marken an andere Wettbewerber. Dies ist eine effektive Möglichkeit, um die Marktmacht der neuen Firma zu verringern und sie kann die Möglichkeiten für privat und sozial wünschenswerte Fusionen erhöhen. Vor allem wenn die Güter annähernd perfekt substituierbar sind, ist der Bereich der Effizienzgewinne, die eine Fusion unter Auflagen erlauben, größer. Kapitel 3 untersucht die allgemein etablierte Feststellung, dass Einzelhandelspreise sich schneller anpassen, wenn Input Preise steigen, als wenn sie fallen. Durch die Anwendung eines dynamischen zwei Perioden Preiswettbewerb Modells zeigt sich das Folgende für die Angebotsseite für asymmetrische Preisanpassung: die Existenz von profitablen Lagerungsmöglichkeiten ermöglicht es wettbewerbsfähigen Firmen sich glaubhaft zu verpflichten, ihre Preise umgehend über die marginalen Kosten zu setzen, wenn sie höhere Input Preise antizipieren. Dies lockert den Wettbewerb sodass Firmen positive Gewinne erzielen. Wenn erwartet wird das Input Preise sinken, landen die Firmen im Bertrand Paradoxon und die Preisanpassung erfolgt langsamer. ; This thesis is about competition economics. Chapter 1 considers a merger between two regulated firms operating in two separate markets, and in each market there are unregulated competitors. The optimal merger policy for regulated firms depends on the intensity of competition between unregulated firms, fiercer competition between unregulated firms induces a more lenient merger policy. These results are reversed if the regulated firms expand into a competitive segment of the market and the regulated and unregulated goods are complements. Chapter 2 studies the optimal merger policy between two competitive firms. Among the structural remedies which have being treated as the most effective manners to restore effective competition, there is one relevant type, namely, the divestiture of differentiated brands to other competitor(s). It is a powerful tool to lessen the merged entity''s market power and can increase the scope for privately and socially desirable mergers. In particular, when goods are closer to perfect substitutability, the range of the efficiency gains which allows the merger with remedies to be approved is larger. Chapter 3 investigates the well-established observation that retail prices adjust faster when input costs rise than when they fall. From the supply side to asymmetric price adjustments, using a model of two-period dynamic price competition, it shows that the presence of profitable storing allows competitive firms to credibly commit to immediately increase their prices above current marginal costs when they anticipate higher input costs. This relaxes competition and firms earn positive profits. If input costs are expected to decline, the firms are trapped in the Bertrand paradox and price adjustment is slower.
