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"The author intends to present legal socialization - the concept of the sociology of law - which describes attitudes to norms, law and law enforcement institutions. For law to be effective, any individual in a given community needs to internalize a number of values and attitudes. The attitude to law will influence its application; its effectiveness will depend on the perspective adopted by the legal norm addressees who could either accept binding regulations or ignore them. An adequate legal policy helps construe legal norms in a manner to prevent costs of interventions which need to be taken when law is not convergent with social expectations." (author's abstract)

General Introduction -- 1. Status of Religious Communities -- 2. Relations between the State and Islam -- 3. State Support for Islamic Religious Communities -- 4. Islamic Community -- 5. Muslims in Integration Law -- 6. Mosques and Prayer Houses -- 7. Burialand Cemeteries -- 8. Education and Schools -- 9. Further and Higher (Tertiary) Education -- 10. Islamic Chaplaincy in Public Institutions -- 11. Employment and Social Law -- 12. Islamic Slaughter and Food Regulation -- 13. Islamic Dress -- 14. Criminal Law -- 15. Concluding Remarks -- Bibliography -- Index.

Rozdział prezentuje teoretyczna analizę relacji zachodzącej między prawem a kontrolą społeczną przedstawiając w jaki sposób prawo jako narzędzie kontroli społecznej określa nastawienia wobec prawa.

In the context of the Human Rights Dialogue between the European Union and the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Bristih Institute of International and Comparative Law undertook a project on "Human Rights in International Law and Iran". One of the outputs of this project is the publication of the present book, designed as a practical guide and reference book for foreign jurists and human rights defenders ... (Quelle: Text Verlagseinband / Verlag)

Preliminary Material /A. Layish -- Introduction One Tribal Arbitrators' Documents As A Source Of Legal History /A. Layish -- Introduction Two The Sedentary Bedouin Of The Judean Desert /A. Layish -- Introduction Three Tribal Judiciary And Customary Law /A. Layish -- Document One Submission, Tribal Award And Registration With Notary Public (1978) /A. Layish -- Document Two Murder with No Witnesses and Exculpatory Oath at al-Aqṣā Mosque (1954) /A. Layish -- Document Three Blood-Money Pact Reducing Tribal Liability (1966) /A. Layish -- Document Four Dissociation From Blood Group's Liability On Individual's Initiative (1963) /A. Layish -- Document Five Unintentional Vehicular Homicide And Reconciliation In The Presence Of A Qāḍī And A Muftī (1955) /A. Layish -- Document Six Unintentional Homicide Entailing Diya Muḥammadiyya (1975) /A. Layish -- Document Seven Diya Muḥammadiyya In The Presence Of A Sharʿī Qāḍī (1957) /A. Layish -- Document Eight An Eye For An Eye Or Monetary Compensation (1956) /A. Layish -- Document Nine Amputation Of The Hand Or Compensation Of One-Third Of A Diya Of A Person (1973) /A. Layish -- Document Ten Abduction, Marriage And Closure Of Criminal File (N.D.) /A. Layish -- Document Eleven Offense Against A Woman's Chastity Ṣā'iḥat Al-Ḍuḥā (1956) /A. Layish -- Document Twelve Cutting Down Trees, Damage To A Well, Etc. (1976) /A. Layish -- Document Thirteen Tribal Agreement On Regulations Relating To Corn Theft (1949) /A. Layish -- Document Fourteen Mukhtārs' Petition Concerning Shar'ī Marriage (N.D.) /A. Layish -- Document Fifteen Shar'ī Confirmation Of A Customary Marriage (1956) /A. Layish -- Document Sixteen Shar'ī Marriage Contract (1958) /A. Layish -- Document Seventeen Resort To Tribal Qāḍī Following The Harī'a Court's Failure To Solve A Dispute (1963) /A. Layish -- Document Eighteen Prompt Mahr Given To A Bride's Mother In Trust (1934) /A. Layish -- Document Nineteen Acknowledgment Of Mahr As Debt (1934) /A. Layish -- Document Twenty Agreement Between Brothers On Mobilizing Mahr Out Of The Estate (1957) /A. Layish -- Document Twenty-One Tribal Agreement On Mahr (1940) /A. Layish -- Document Twenty-Two Shar'ī Judgment Granting Maintenance (1964) /A. Layish -- Document Twenty-Three Bayt Shar'ī, Obedience And Divorce In The Sharī'a Court (1970) /A. Layish -- Document Twenty-Four Customary Khul': Compensation To Divorcing Husband On His Wife's Remarriage (1959) /A. Layish -- Document Twenty-Five Khul' Prior To Consummation To Be Effected In The Sharī'a Court (1966) /A. Layish -- Document Twenty-Six Consensual Divorce With Sureties To Be Effected In The Sharī'a Court (1974) /A. Layish -- Document Twenty-Seven Tribal Award Of Separation To Be Accomplished By Shar'ī Ṭalāq (1972) /A. Layish -- Document Twenty-Eight "Renunciation Divorce" On The Wife's Initiative In The Sharī'a Court (1962) /A. Layish -- Document Twenty-Nine Shar'ī Legal Opinion On Oath Of Suspended Divorce (N.D.) /A. Layish -- Document Thirty Agreement On Child's Custody And Maintenance (1979) /A. Layish -- Document Thirty-One Replacement Of Guardian Of Minors' Property By A Shar'ī Qāḍī (1904) /A. Layish.

The prestige of law is one of the most crucial issues addressed in the sociology of law. The awareness of the degree of acceptance of the law by its addressees is a fundamental factor in the introduction of possible changes in the legal system.The notion of "prestige of law" was introduced to empirical sociology by Adam Podgórecki in the research he conducted in Poland in 1964.A new perspective in the study was to go beyond classical socio-demographic variables and put an emphasis on personality variables. It was also one of the first such studies internationally. In the fifty years that have passed since A. Podgórecki's research, similar studies, even using exactly the same questions, have been repeated many times in both nation-wide and local studies. It should be assumed that the changes taking place in Poland and in the consciousness of its citizens during that time, such as the change of the system, increasing civil rights and freedoms, Poland's accession to international organizations, etc., might be reflected in the increasing level of the prestige of law. But did it happen? Unfortunately not. The analysis of empirical research devoted to the prestige of law in the following article, especially after the political transformation that took place in 1989, but also nowadays, is an attempt to explain the reasons for its persistently low level. ; Prestiż prawa to jedno z najważniejszych zagadnień podejmowanych w socjologii prawa. Wiedza na temat stopnia akceptacji prawa przez jego adresatów jest czynnikiem podstawowym dla wprowadzenia ewentualnych zmian w porządku prawnym. Pojęcie prestiżu prawa zostało wprowadzone do socjologii empirycznej przez Adama Podgóreckiego w badaniach pod tym tytułem, które przeprowadził w Polsce w 1964 r. Nowym ujęciem w przeprowadzonych badaniach było wyjście poza klasyczne zmienne socjodemograficzne i położenie nacisku na zmienne osobowościowe. Było to też jedno z pierwszych takich badań w skali międzynarodowej. W ciągu pięćdziesięciu lat, które minęły od badań A. Podgóreckiego, podobne badania, nawet przy użyciu dokładnie tak samo sformułowanych pytań, powtarzane były wiele razy, zarówno w badaniach ogólnokrajowych, jak i lokalnych. Należy założyć, że zmiany zachodzące w Polsce i w świadomości jej obywateli przez ten czas, takie jak zmiana ustroju, zwiększenie praw i swobód obywatelskich, wstąpienie Polski do organizacji międzynarodowych itp., mogą mieć odzwierciedlenie w zwiększającym się poziomie prestiżu prawa. Czy jednak tak się stało? Niestety nie. Przeprowadzona w niniejszym artykule analiza badań empirycznych poświęconych prestiżowi prawa, zwłaszcza po transformacji ustrojowej, jaka miała miejsce w 1989 r., ale również w czasach obecnych, stanowi próbę wyjaśnienia przyczyn stale utrzymującego się jego niskiego poziomu.

The issue analysed by the author is that of the institution of Presidential immunity pertaining to the President of the Republic of Poland, and operating in such a way that a sitting President cannot be held criminally liable before a common court for acts tantamount to offences. Inclining towards the essence of this solution and its consequences when it comes to respect for constitutional principles of legalism and equality before the law, the author at the same time seeks to assess the completeness of the provisions in effect in Poland, in so doing identifying a lack of clear directives as to how a former President (i.e. one who has left office) is to be held criminally liable. The conclusion reached by the author can be said to boil down to a recognition that the liability of a former President before Poland's Tribunal of State for offences or crimes committed is of an accessory nature where common courts are concerned, with the condition underpinning recognition of the Tribunal's primacy in matters of jurisdiction being the National Assembly's adoption of a Resolution holding a former President liable constitutionally, and potentially at the same time initiating action in respect of given offences. Any lack of such a National Assembly Resolution must give rise to a particular kind of reactivation – in respect of the former President – of jurisdiction in the dispensing of justice by common courts, given the fact that one of the negative procedural premises has ceased to be non-applicable. Thus, unlike in the case of a President still holding office, the cognition of the Tribunal of State in relation to a former President is neither exclusive nor automatic. Such observations have also stimulated work by the author to develop de lege ferenda postulates regarding the subject matter, as set against the wider background of Poland's political and constitutional system.

The purpose of the article is to present the legal situation of a slave under Roman criminal law. The analysis conducted proves that the approach towards slaves changed along with the transformation of the government system of ancient Rome. In the Period of the Republic, criminal liability of slaves evolved in two directions. The dominica potestas was exercised by owners, as well as the collegial body – tresviri capitales. From the Principate period, Roman jurists were convinced that the legal status of a slave and a free person was identical under criminal law. The difference between these offenders was non-exercise of leges criminales with a penalty that would be inadequate for their legal status, or ruling and exercising of more severe penalties against slaves. ; Artykuł ma na celu przedstawienie sytuacji prawnej niewolnika na gruncie rzymskiego prawa karnego. Przeprowadzone rozważania dowodzą, że podejście do niewolników ulegało zmianie wraz z ewolucją systemu władzy w starożytnym Rzymie. W okresie republiki odpowiedzialność karna niewolników kształtowała się dwutorowo. Jurysdykcję w ramach dominica potestas wykonywali ich właściciele, a także kolegialny urząd – treviri capitales. Juryści rzymscy, począwszy od epoki pryncypatu, nie mieli żadnych wątpliwości, że status prawny niewolnika i osoby wolnej był na gruncie prawa karnego tożsamy. Różnica dotyczyła niestosowania wobec nich leges criminales z sankcją karną nieadekwatną do ich statusu prawnego czy też orzekania i wykonywania surowszej kary wobec niewolnika.

The institution of self-defence comprises both provisions of the General Part (art. 36 and 37:self defence and imaginary self defence) and the Special Part (art. 118 and 124: intentional killing,causing grievous bodily harm as a result of exceeding the borders of self defence or using excessivemeasures necessary to catch the perpetrator) of the Criminal Code of Ukraine.There are diverse opinions in Ukrainian jurisprudence concerning the problem of how selfdefenceand other circumstances eliminate the illegality of a forbidden act. The aim of this paper isto present the main attitudes to these problems. The approach considering self-defence in the lightof legality is the most popular view. There is also an approach according to which one distinguishesthe prerequisites for self-defence and the elements of such self-defence taking into account elementssuch as: the subject – the aim – the objective side – the subjective control. The socially harmfulattack which justifies the use of self-defence should be analysed using both of these approaches.The features of a legitimate self-defence are: the subject – a private person; the aim – to causeinjuries to the attacker (the direct aim) in order to repel or stop the attack (the indirect aim) in orderto defend legally protected rights and interests of a person, interests of the society or the state (thefinal aim); the object – the attacker, his rights and interests; the objective side – actions casually connectedwith the causing of harm to the attacker, commensurable with the harmfulness of the attackand the state of the defence; subjective control – proper realisation by the subject of the prerequisitesand features of the defence and the will to cause commensurable harm to the attacker.Two types of exceeding the borders of self-defence are distinguished in the paper: exceedingthe borders of acceptable harm and exceeding the borders of adequate harm. Criminal responsibilityfor exceeding the borders of self-defence arises only in cases clearly provided for in art. 118 and 124of the Criminal Code of Ukraine. The sanctions in these articles are much more lenient than in thecase of corresponding offences not committed while exceeding of the borders of self-defence (art.115, 119 and 121 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine). ; Artykuł nie zawiera abstraktu w języku polskim