Suchergebnisse

Die Studie analysiert Aspekte der militärischen Zusammenarbeit in der Multinational Task Force Southeast (MNTF SE), die vom Dezember 2004 bis April 2007 im Rahmen der EUFOR-Operation Althea in Bosnien-Herzegowina als Friedenstruppe der Europäischen Union (EU) eingesetzt wurde. Wesentliches Ziel der Untersuchung war es, die Kommunikation und Interaktion zwischen den Soldaten der aus Italien, Frankreich, Spanien und Deutschland für die Friedensmission entsandten Truppenkontingente zu erforschen und daraus Folgerungen für die Verbesserung der Kooperation bei zukünftigen "Operations other than War" abzuleiten. Es galt, das Zusammenwirken behindernde und fördernde Faktoren zu identifizieren und dann die Voraussetzungen für eine "multinationale militärische Integration" aus europäischer Sicht zu definieren. Die auf Beobachtungen im Camp Mostar-Otijes, dem Standort des Hauptquartiers der MNTF SE, sowie auf Befragungen der Soldaten im Zeitraum zwischen August und Oktober 2006 basierenden Ergebnisse der Studie werden in zwei Schritten vorgestellt. Zunächst beschreiben die Autoren die Wesensmerkmale der vier nationalen Truppenteile, wie zum Beispiel die Stationierungsbedingungen, die Einsatzerfahrung und Motivation der Soldaten, die nationalen militärischen Standards und Regelungen sowie die sozialen und kulturellen Hintergründe. Darauf aufbauend diskutieren sie die Auswirkungen dieser Faktoren auf die multinationale Zusammenarbeit. Ihre Schlussfolgerungen und Empfehlungen fassen sie in sechs Punkten zusammen. ; Between December 2004 and April 2007, Italy, France, Spain and Germany were sharing responsibility for the Multinational Task Force Southeast (MNTF SE) within EUFOR operation Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the first large scale military mission carried out by the European Union (EU). Against this background, the Bundeswehr Institute of Social Sciences (SWInstBW) in Strausberg (Germany) in co-operation with the Chair of Sociology of Peace Processes/Master of Peacekeeping and Security Studies - University Roma TRE in Rome (Italy), the Centre d'études en sciences sociales de la défense (C2SD) in Paris (France) and the Unidad de Sociologia del Ejercito de Tierra (USET) in Madrid (Spain) conducted a research project on multinational co-operation within this Task Force. The aim of the study was to examine interaction and communication processes between soldiers of the four countries, to identify factors which encourage and/or hinder co-operation, and thus to define and evaluate conditions of multinational military integration from a specifically European perspective. The field research, based on a quantitative survey by questionnaire among soldiers of the four countries as well as participant observation and qualitative interviews on site, took place in 2006 (August-October) at camp Mostar-Otiješ where the HQ of the MNTF SE was located. The results of this research are presented in two forms: First, the characteristics of the four national contingents of the MNTF SE are described respectively. Secondly, the attitudes of Italian, French, German and Spanish soldiers regarding dynamics of multinational co-operation, national stereotypes, military leadership, motivation and cohesion as well as future European military integration are analysed and discussed in comparative perspective. (AUT)

This paper evaluates the planning capacity of two Common Security and Defence (CSDP) missions (EULEX Kosovo and EUFOR Althea) in order to assess the effectiveness of CSDP planning process. Both missions suffer due to partial interests within the EU and low positioning of CSDP on political agendas of the member states. Compared to NATO, EU missions' political control is more much detailed once the mission is deployed. CSDP planning architecture has been considerably reformed since the inception of the first missions in 2003, however the supervision by the member states is still present in all phases of restructuring and implementation. EULEX planning process includes a well elaborated lessons learnt process, however the implementation of the findings on the operational level is rather weak whereas EUFOR Althea profited mostly from the access to NATO planning assets. CSDP missions are political missions and their effectiveness seems to be of secondary importance to the EU member states.

States have different strategic cultures when it comes to legitimating the use of military force and its relation with other foreign policy instruments. However, increasingly, military operations are conducted in multilateral forums; EU military operations are one of the most notable examples of this development. While some claim that these operations reflect power relations between nations with different strategic cultures, others argue that these common missions involve states in a process of collective learning and convergence of interests. Drawing upon an advocacy coalition approach, this paper confronts the competing hypotheses in the case of European Union Force (EUFOR) Althea in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH), as the EU's longest running military operation (since 2004). On the basis of policy documents and semi-structured interviews with policymakers and politicians, this paper concludes that the evolution of EUFOR Althea has been primarily the result of the power politics of different coalitions, but there have also been a few instances of learning.

States have different strategic cultures when it comes to legitimating the use of military force and its relation with other foreign policy instruments. However, increasingly, military operations are conducted in multilateral forums; EU military operations are one of the most notable examples of this development. While some claim that these operations reflect power relations between nations with different strategic cultures, others argue that these common missions involve states in a process of collective learning and convergence of interests. Drawing upon an advocacy coalition approach, this paper confronts the competing hypotheses in the case of European Union Force (EUFOR) Althea in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH), as the EU's longest running military operation (since 2004). On the basis of policy documents and semi-structured interviews with policymakers and politicians, this paper concludes that the evolution of EUFOR Althea has been primarily the result of the power politics of different coalitions, but there have also been a few instances of learning.

This article assesses the EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in the Western Balkans, with a focus on EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). Althea is a military operation that conducts mainly civilian functions as well as the training of the Bah Armed Forces; its 'civilianisation' is symptomatic of CSDP's orientation as a mainly civilian crisis management instrument. Althea works within the framework of the Union's 'comprehensive approach' to regional development and the accession process of the Western Balkans to the EU. I argue that the mission displays the bureaucratic modus operandi of CSDP and not a Grand Strategy approach. Nevertheless, CSDP's incremental, lowest-common-denominator, low cost, low risk bureaucratic politics have enabled a form of emergent strategy that complements the Union's multi-instrument and comprehensive approach to development throughout the Western Balkans. I further suggest that the EU Global Strategy (EUGS) and the newly activated Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) provides opportunities for EU member states to build on low key emergent strategy to ensure that CSDP develops the substance and actor ness needed to address current threats.

On December 2, 2004, the European Union took over from NATO the main peacekeeping forces that had been deployed in Bosnia-and-Herzegovina since the signature of the Dayton Accords. The launch of EU military operation Althea was presented by its supporters as a major test for the ESDP, especially as it pertained to a wider Europeanization of post-conflict management in Bosnia. Against this background, Althea provides a fruitful locus to assess one of the EU's most frequent claims - that it possesses a specific know-how when it comes to combining the military and the civilian aspects of post-conflict management. In this study, Althea is primarily approached through the way it is viewed by both its participants and by Bosnians. Several issues are addressed: First, how do historical legacies of the international presence in Bosnia weigh upon the very definition of mission Althea, its implementation and its local receptions? Second, coordination of the various European actors present on the field has emerged as one of the major challenges the EU needs to face. Third, the study draws attention to the possible discrepancy between various understandings (among Althea personnel and Bosnian people) of what a European military mission entails. Last but not least, the study highlights complex rationalities at work when phasing out an operation like Althea. EU exit strategies seem to derive rather from bureaucratic logic than objective assessment of stability in Bosnia ; Le 2 décembre 2004, dans le cadre de l'opération militaire multinationale Althea, l'Union européenne a pris la relève des forces déployées en Bosnie-Herzégovine par l'OTAN après la signature des Accords de Dayton. Ce déploiement militaire européen, présenté par ses initiateurs comme un test majeur pour la PESD, s'inscrit dans une dynamique d'européanisation des dispositifs internationaux déployés dans le pays. A travers l'analyse d'Althea, il s'agit de réfléchir ici à l'émergence de savoir-faire européens en matière de gestion militaire et civile des sorties ...

On December 2, 2004, the European Union took over from NATO the main peacekeeping forces that had been deployed in Bosnia-and-Herzegovina since the signature of the Dayton Accords. The launch of EU military operation Althea was presented by its supporters as a major test for the ESDP, especially as it pertained to a wider Europeanization of post-conflict management in Bosnia. Against this background, Althea provides a fruitful locus to assess one of the EU's most frequent claims - that it possesses a specific know-how when it comes to combining the military and the civilian aspects of post-conflict management. In this study, Althea is primarily approached through the way it is viewed by both its participants and by Bosnians. Several issues are addressed: First, how do historical legacies of the international presence in Bosnia weigh upon the very definition of mission Althea, its implementation and its local receptions? Second, coordination of the various European actors present on the field has emerged as one of the major challenges the EU needs to face. Third, the study draws attention to the possible discrepancy between various understandings (among Althea personnel and Bosnian people) of what a European military mission entails. Last but not least, the study highlights complex rationalities at work when phasing out an operation like Althea. EU exit strategies seem to derive rather from bureaucratic logic than objective assessment of stability in Bosnia ; Le 2 décembre 2004, dans le cadre de l'opération militaire multinationale Althea, l'Union européenne a pris la relève des forces déployées en Bosnie-Herzégovine par l'OTAN après la signature des Accords de Dayton. Ce déploiement militaire européen, présenté par ses initiateurs comme un test majeur pour la PESD, s'inscrit dans une dynamique d'européanisation des dispositifs internationaux déployés dans le pays. A travers l'analyse d'Althea, il s'agit de réfléchir ici à l'émergence de savoir-faire européens en matière de gestion militaire et civile des sorties ...

On December 2, 2004, the European Union took over from NATO the main peacekeeping forces that had been deployed in Bosnia-and-Herzegovina since the signature of the Dayton Accords. The launch of EU military operation Althea was presented by its supporters as a major test for the ESDP, especially as it pertained to a wider Europeanization of post-conflict management in Bosnia. Against this background, Althea provides a fruitful locus to assess one of the EU's most frequent claims - that it possesses a specific know-how when it comes to combining the military and the civilian aspects of post-conflict management. In this study, Althea is primarily approached through the way it is viewed by both its participants and by Bosnians. Several issues are addressed: First, how do historical legacies of the international presence in Bosnia weigh upon the very definition of mission Althea, its implementation and its local receptions? Second, coordination of the various European actors present on the field has emerged as one of the major challenges the EU needs to face. Third, the study draws attention to the possible discrepancy between various understandings (among Althea personnel and Bosnian people) of what a European military mission entails. Last but not least, the study highlights complex rationalities at work when phasing out an operation like Althea. EU exit strategies seem to derive rather from bureaucratic logic than objective assessment of stability in Bosnia ; Le 2 décembre 2004, dans le cadre de l'opération militaire multinationale Althea, l'Union européenne a pris la relève des forces déployées en Bosnie-Herzégovine par l'OTAN après la signature des Accords de Dayton. Ce déploiement militaire européen, présenté par ses initiateurs comme un test majeur pour la PESD, s'inscrit dans une dynamique d'européanisation des dispositifs internationaux déployés dans le pays. A travers l'analyse d'Althea, il s'agit de réfléchir ici à l'émergence de savoir-faire européens en matière de gestion militaire et civile des sorties ...

This report is about the background of Stabilization Force(SFOR) and peace stabilization duties handed over to a European Union force(EUFOR).

'Im Juni 1999 beschlossen die Staats- und Regierungschefs der damals 15 EU-Staaten den Aufbau einer 'Gemeinsamen Europäischen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik' (ESVP). Um externen Bedrohungen europäischer Sicherheit wirkungsvoll entgegentreten zu können, wollten sich die EU-Mitgliedstaaten künftig verstärkt im internationalen Krisenmanagement engagieren und zu diesem Zweck eigene zivile Missionen und militärische Operationen entsenden. Zehn Jahre später hat sich die ESVP als wichtiger Bestandteil europäischer Außenpolitik etabliert. Davon zeugen nicht zuletzt die 23 zivilen, militärischen und zivil-militärischen Einsätze, die in den vergangenen Jahren im Balkan, in Subsahara-Afrika, im Nahen und Mittleren Osten und sogar in Asien durchgeführt wurden. Auf den ersten Blick scheint es, als erfülle die EU mit diesen Einsätzen die Ziele, die sie sich im Rahmen der Europäischen Sicherheitsstrategie gesetzt hat. Eine detaillierte Analyse zeigt jedoch, dass die EU noch weit davon entfernt ist, ein effektiver und strategischer Akteur im internationalen Krisenmanagement zu sein. Diese Studie untersucht Stärken und Schwächen bisheriger ESVP-Einsätze. Zwölf Fallbeispiele bilden die empirische Grundlage. Die Autorinnen und Autoren gehen jeweils drei Fragen nach: Wie kamen die Einsätze zustande und welches Mandat liegt ihnen zugrunde? Wie wurde das Mandat umgesetzt? Welchen Beitrag haben die Einsätze kurz- und langfristig zum Krisenmanagement bzw. zur nachhaltigen Regelung eines Konflikts geleistet? ESVP-Einsätze werden bislang nicht strategisch geplant. Die einzelnen Missionen und Operationen verlaufen sehr unterschiedlich, insbesondere im Hinblick auf die Implementierung ihrer Mandate und den Beitrag, den sie zur Stabilisierung im jeweiligen Einsatzgebiet leisten. Es lässt sich auch nicht feststellen, dass die EU mit bestimmten Missionstypen grundsätzlich erfolgreicher wäre als mit anderen.' (Autorenreferat). Inhaltsverzeichnis: Problemstellung und Empfehlungen (5-7); Muriel Asseburg, Ronja Kempin: Einleitung: Eine systematische Bestandsaufnahme von ESVP Missionen und -Operationen (9-16); Marco Overhaus: EUFOR Althea und EUPM in Bosnien-Herzegowina: Umsetzung des umfassenden Ansatzes (17-31); Solveig Richter: Rechtsstaatlichkeit fördern, ohne Eigenstaatlichkeit zu stärken: Schafft die EULEX-Mission im Kosovo die Quadratur des Kreises? (32-49); Denis M. Tull: EUFOR RD Congo: ein Erfolg, aber kein Erfolgsmodell (50-61); Patrick Berg: EUFOR Tchad/ RCA: die EU als Agent französischer Interessen (62-76); Annette Weber: Die Marineoperation der EU im Golf von Aden (EU NAVFOR Atalanta): vorbei am Problem _ die Piraterie nimmt zu, die Ursachen bleiben (77-91); Muriel Asseburg: Die ESVP-Missionen in den palästinensischen Gebieten (EUPOL COPPS, EU BAM Rafah): Frieden durch Sicherheit? (92-109); Felix Heiduk: Die ESVP in Asien: die Aceh Monitoring Mission in Indonesien (110-123); Uwe Halbach: Die Europäische Beobachtungsmission in Georgien: Friedenssicherung auf umstrittener Grundlage (124-137); Guido Steinberg: Die Integrierte EU-Rechtsstaatsmission EUJUST LEX im Irak: Politikersatz mit Potential (138-149); Ronja Kempin, Stefan Steinicke: EUPOL Afghanistan: Europas ziviles Engagement am Rande des Glaubwürdigkeitsverlustes (150-163); Muriel Asseburg, Ronja Kempin: Schlussfolgerungen und Empfehlungen (164-177); Fallbeispiele im Überblick (178-183).