Suchergebnisse

This article analyzes the civil society dimension and pays particular attention to the role of civil society's organizations within the EU's Eastern Partnership's governance and networking processes. The study is based on the EU's documents' analysis and the data of qualitative interviews conducted between 2011-2014 from the respondents of the EU's institutions (European Commission, EEAS, EP), member states' representations in Brussels, and the members of the Eastern Partnership civil society forum created in 2009. The study shows that the representatives of civil society organizations are seeking to be involved and are existent in most of the stages and interactional modes of the EU's relations with the Eastern Partnership countries, and this process predicts the conditions for the emergence of international governance in the Eastern neighborhood space. On the other hand, the representatives of CSOs are complaining about not being involved enough in the negotiations deciding over the Association or other kind of agreements between the EU and their (EaP) country.

This article analyzes the civil society dimension and pays particular attention to the role of civil society's organizations within the EU's Eastern Partnership's governance and networking processes. The study is based on the EU's documents' analysis and the data of qualitative interviews conducted between 2011-2014 from the respondents of the EU's institutions (European Commission, EEAS, EP), member states' representations in Brussels, and the members of the Eastern Partnership civil society forum created in 2009. The study shows that the representatives of civil society organizations are seeking to be involved and are existent in most of the stages and interactional modes of the EU's relations with the Eastern Partnership countries, and this process predicts the conditions for the emergence of international governance in the Eastern neighborhood space. On the other hand, the representatives of CSOs are complaining about not being involved enough in the negotiations deciding over the Association or other kind of agreements between the EU and their (EaP) country.

This article analyzes the civil society dimension and pays particular attention to the role of civil society's organizations within the EU's Eastern Partnership's governance and networking processes. The study is based on the EU's documents' analysis and the data of qualitative interviews conducted between 2011-2014 from the respondents of the EU's institutions (European Commission, EEAS, EP), member states' representations in Brussels, and the members of the Eastern Partnership civil society forum created in 2009. The study shows that the representatives of civil society organizations are seeking to be involved and are existent in most of the stages and interactional modes of the EU's relations with the Eastern Partnership countries, and this process predicts the conditions for the emergence of international governance in the Eastern neighborhood space. On the other hand, the representatives of CSOs are complaining about not being involved enough in the negotiations deciding over the Association or other kind of agreements between the EU and their (EaP) country.

The article furthers the research on the relation of democratizing states with their former non-democratic regimes by focusing on the situation in the Central and Eastern Europe's re-established democracies. The author utilizes his previously introduced research framework, based on the assessment (and interplay) of the type of the regime and the manner in which it ended. This serves to emphasize differences in the democratic transition of the region's states and, accordingly, the various paths chosen by new leaders in dealing with the problem of Communist party activist responsibility. The article also touches upon structural and psychological legacy of Communism. Along with glaring commonalities of the former Communist bloc, there were specific issues as well. In short, the findings reflect the following: 1 ) The transition of Hungary, in many aspects, replicates the "reforma pactada" formula. Partially, this holds true for Poland, too, but its position was complicated by limits on democratic representation set via the pact, that ring more of those achieved by military hierarchy in the event of extrication. The two states may be viewed as hardly favorable to the purge of old apparatus, despite the Poles' formal lustration laws. 2) In the Czech Republic and former East Germany (GDR), the situation became favorable to the prosecution of regime's activists, as the stagnating post-totalitarianism simply collapsed in those countries leaving a power vacuum, without a possibility to mobilize in self-defence. However, the broad range purges, that ensued in these states, much too often came in contradiction with the principles of rule of law and universal human rights. 3) The Baltic states (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia) did not experience direct collapse of the system, even though they also had just gone through stagnation.[.].

The article furthers the research on the relation of democratizing states with their former non-democratic regimes by focusing on the situation in the Central and Eastern Europe's re-established democracies. The author utilizes his previously introduced research framework, based on the assessment (and interplay) of the type of the regime and the manner in which it ended. This serves to emphasize differences in the democratic transition of the region's states and, accordingly, the various paths chosen by new leaders in dealing with the problem of Communist party activist responsibility. The article also touches upon structural and psychological legacy of Communism. Along with glaring commonalities of the former Communist bloc, there were specific issues as well. In short, the findings reflect the following: 1 ) The transition of Hungary, in many aspects, replicates the "reforma pactada" formula. Partially, this holds true for Poland, too, but its position was complicated by limits on democratic representation set via the pact, that ring more of those achieved by military hierarchy in the event of extrication. The two states may be viewed as hardly favorable to the purge of old apparatus, despite the Poles' formal lustration laws. 2) In the Czech Republic and former East Germany (GDR), the situation became favorable to the prosecution of regime's activists, as the stagnating post-totalitarianism simply collapsed in those countries leaving a power vacuum, without a possibility to mobilize in self-defence. However, the broad range purges, that ensued in these states, much too often came in contradiction with the principles of rule of law and universal human rights. 3) The Baltic states (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia) did not experience direct collapse of the system, even though they also had just gone through stagnation.[.].

The article furthers the research on the relation of democratizing states with their former non-democratic regimes by focusing on the situation in the Central and Eastern Europe's re-established democracies. The author utilizes his previously introduced research framework, based on the assessment (and interplay) of the type of the regime and the manner in which it ended. This serves to emphasize differences in the democratic transition of the region's states and, accordingly, the various paths chosen by new leaders in dealing with the problem of Communist party activist responsibility. The article also touches upon structural and psychological legacy of Communism. Along with glaring commonalities of the former Communist bloc, there were specific issues as well. In short, the findings reflect the following: 1 ) The transition of Hungary, in many aspects, replicates the "reforma pactada" formula. Partially, this holds true for Poland, too, but its position was complicated by limits on democratic representation set via the pact, that ring more of those achieved by military hierarchy in the event of extrication. The two states may be viewed as hardly favorable to the purge of old apparatus, despite the Poles' formal lustration laws. 2) In the Czech Republic and former East Germany (GDR), the situation became favorable to the prosecution of regime's activists, as the stagnating post-totalitarianism simply collapsed in those countries leaving a power vacuum, without a possibility to mobilize in self-defence. However, the broad range purges, that ensued in these states, much too often came in contradiction with the principles of rule of law and universal human rights. 3) The Baltic states (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia) did not experience direct collapse of the system, even though they also had just gone through stagnation.[.].

This article deals with the property tax reform that was carried out in Lithuania as well as in other Eastern and Central European countries since the 1990s. Since the beginning of the 1990s most countries of this region have reshaped their national systems from command to free market economy, created a stabile market and some of them joined the European Union. Most of the new EU Member States from Eastern and Central Europe have taken much effort to make their national taxation more consistent and attractive for investors. In particular, these countries have already diminished or consider diminishing the rates of corporate, income and some other taxes. On the other hand, the decreased revenue should be collected from other sources. In this context, property taxes are supposed to be a proper alternative to reimburse the loss of revenue. Furthermore, property taxes are also appreciated due to their nonfiscal functions (e.g.role of property taxation for sustainable urbanisation, effective use of land, land improvement). Major economic and legal reforms in Eastern and Central European countries since the 1990s as well as their implication to the reform of property taxation are observed in this article. The author elucidates privatization, restitution (reestablishment of property rights), reforms of national tax systems, local governance, etc. It is concluded that not all the anticipated reforms have been carried out as quickly as they were planned. The protracted reform of modernisation of property taxes was partly stipulated by undeveloped real estate markets, lack of relevant data, delayed reestablishment of property rights as well as some other objective factors. On the other hand, the politicians were afraid to loose political support if they increase a tax burden. Moreover, lack of consistent national strategies on local taxes and local governance has contributed to successful finalization of property taxation.

This article deals with the property tax reform that was carried out in Lithuania as well as in other Eastern and Central European countries since the 1990s. Since the beginning of the 1990s most countries of this region have reshaped their national systems from command to free market economy, created a stabile market and some of them joined the European Union. Most of the new EU Member States from Eastern and Central Europe have taken much effort to make their national taxation more consistent and attractive for investors. In particular, these countries have already diminished or consider diminishing the rates of corporate, income and some other taxes. On the other hand, the decreased revenue should be collected from other sources. In this context, property taxes are supposed to be a proper alternative to reimburse the loss of revenue. Furthermore, property taxes are also appreciated due to their nonfiscal functions (e.g.role of property taxation for sustainable urbanisation, effective use of land, land improvement). Major economic and legal reforms in Eastern and Central European countries since the 1990s as well as their implication to the reform of property taxation are observed in this article. The author elucidates privatization, restitution (reestablishment of property rights), reforms of national tax systems, local governance, etc. It is concluded that not all the anticipated reforms have been carried out as quickly as they were planned. The protracted reform of modernisation of property taxes was partly stipulated by undeveloped real estate markets, lack of relevant data, delayed reestablishment of property rights as well as some other objective factors. On the other hand, the politicians were afraid to loose political support if they increase a tax burden. Moreover, lack of consistent national strategies on local taxes and local governance has contributed to successful finalization of property taxation.

Land restitution in Eastern Lithuania has been rather slow, only in Vilnius district (which is the closest to Vilnius city) the restitution was exceptionally fast. Almost in all municipalities the percentage of lands returned to their owners was similar (ranging from 97% to 99%), but in Vilnius district municipality such lands comprised only 88%. Land restitution in Vilnius district is complicated, because a direct impact of Vilnius city is felt in this territory. The presence of Vilnius city increases the price of land in the areas closer to the city. There are some political factors involved as well.

Land restitution in Eastern Lithuania has been rather slow, only in Vilnius district (which is the closest to Vilnius city) the restitution was exceptionally fast. Almost in all municipalities the percentage of lands returned to their owners was similar (ranging from 97% to 99%), but in Vilnius district municipality such lands comprised only 88%. Land restitution in Vilnius district is complicated, because a direct impact of Vilnius city is felt in this territory. The presence of Vilnius city increases the price of land in the areas closer to the city. There are some political factors involved as well.

Land restitution in Eastern Lithuania has been rather slow, only in Vilnius district (which is the closest to Vilnius city) the restitution was exceptionally fast. Almost in all municipalities the percentage of lands returned to their owners was similar (ranging from 97% to 99%), but in Vilnius district municipality such lands comprised only 88%. Land restitution in Vilnius district is complicated, because a direct impact of Vilnius city is felt in this territory. The presence of Vilnius city increases the price of land in the areas closer to the city. There are some political factors involved as well.

Land restitution in Eastern Lithuania has been rather slow, only in Vilnius district (which is the closest to Vilnius city) the restitution was exceptionally fast. Almost in all municipalities the percentage of lands returned to their owners was similar (ranging from 97% to 99%), but in Vilnius district municipality such lands comprised only 88%. Land restitution in Vilnius district is complicated, because a direct impact of Vilnius city is felt in this territory. The presence of Vilnius city increases the price of land in the areas closer to the city. There are some political factors involved as well.

Land restitution in Eastern Lithuania has been rather slow, only in Vilnius district (which is the closest to Vilnius city) the restitution was exceptionally fast. Almost in all municipalities the percentage of lands returned to their owners was similar (ranging from 97% to 99%), but in Vilnius district municipality such lands comprised only 88%. Land restitution in Vilnius district is complicated, because a direct impact of Vilnius city is felt in this territory. The presence of Vilnius city increases the price of land in the areas closer to the city. There are some political factors involved as well.