Suchergebnisse

Den norske klimapolitikken blir stadig tettere knyttet til EUs klimaregelverk. Denne artikkelen analyserer hvordan og hvorfor Norge har koblet klimapolitikken opp mot EU og hvilket handlingsrom samarbeidet med EU gir norske myndigheter. Gjennom EØS-avtalen har det europeiske kvotesystemet (EU ETS) siden 2008 dekket omtrent halvparten av de norske utslippene, i hovedsak fra industri og petroleumsvirksomhet. Siden 2021 er også de ikke-kvotepliktige utslippene fra transport, landbruk, bygg og avfall omfattet av en egen tidsavgrenset avtale med EU, som et tillegg til EØS-avtalen. Dette samarbeidet forplikter Norge til å kutte utslipp hvert år fram til 2030. Avtalen binder også Norge til å følge EUs regelverk for opptak av klimagasser knyttet til skog og annen arealbruk. I praksis er Norge fullt medlem av EUs klimapolitiske samarbeid fram til 2030. Analysen viser at denne tette tilknytningen har økt det politiske presset for å kutte klimagassutslipp innenlands. Samtidig har Norge valgt å holde alle fleksibilitetsmuligheter åpne for å gjennomføre kuttene i EU i stedet. Hvorvidt disse mulighetene vil bli benyttet er i stor grad et politisk spørsmål som trolig vil prege klimadebatten frem mot 2030. Den endelige utformingen og innretningen på EUs grønne giv og Norges tilknytning til denne vil også påvirke handlingsrommet for klimakutt hjemme versus ute.
Abstract in English:Ever Closer Union? Norway's Climate Collaboration with the EUNorwegian climate policy has increasingly become closely linked to EU climate regulations. This article analyzes how and why Norway has linked its climate policy to the EU's and what room for maneuvering the cooperation with the EU gives Norwegian authorities. Through the EEA agreement, the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) has covered about half of Norway's emissions, mainly from industry and the petroleum sector, since 2008. Since 2021, non-ETS emissions from transport, agriculture, construction and waste have also been covered by a separate time-limited agreement with the EU, as a supplement to the EEA agreement. This cooperation obliges Norway to cut emissions every year until 2030. The agreement also binds Norway to comply with EU regulations for the emissions and uptake of greenhouse gases related to forests and other land use. In practice, Norway is fully obliged to comply with the EU's climate policy regulations until 2030. The analysis shows that this close connection has increased the political pressure to cut greenhouse gas emissions domestically. At the same time, Norway has chosen to keep all flexibility options open to implement the cuts in the EU instead. Whether these opportunities will be used is largely a political question that probably will shape the climate debate until 2030. The final design and structure of the EU's Green Deal and Norway's connection to it will also affect the maneuvering room for climate cuts at home versus abroad.

Twenty percent of the Swedish laws & amendments are directly governed by binding EC decisions, directives & regulations. Another 10 percent are connected with the EU or the EC. That is the result of a study examining all new laws & amendments passed by the Swedish Parliament during the years 1998-2003. By investigating the government bills behind the 3,449 acts, the researcher has analyzed to what extent the bills are designed to implement binding EC legislation or remove obstacles & conflicts between national & EC law, & to what extent the legislation is in any way influenced by the EU membership. This is one of few studies that make a quantitative survey of the power that the European Union wields over Swedish democratic institutions. After ten years of EU membership, the "power transferred from Stockholm to Brussels" is still a big issue in the domestic debate concerning the European Union. Tables, Figures, References. Adapted from the source document.

This article deals with the allez and retour provisions (Claes 2005: 84 f) of the Swedish constitution in relation to IU membership. What are the rules governing the transfer of sovereignty to the Union? And what are the provisions for assessing the constitutionality of the incoming tide of Union law into the domestic legal order? I have three objects in this essay. First, to describe how these two groups of constitutional rules were actually modified in the 2010 revision of the 1974 Instrument of Government. 1 find that neither was changed in any material way. Second, to try to explain the apparent reluctance of the parties involved to clarify the constitutional implications of EU membership. I find that this reluctance is rooted in a belief that European integration is not furthered if the rules contained in the allez and retour provisions are made stricter and more precise. Third, to confront a question conspicuously omitted by the parties in their revision: namely, by what criterion should the allez. and retour provisions be intertwined, if an optimum of hi-level constitutionalism is to be achieved? I argue that, in the end, the underlying issue is whether Swedish citizens want to see the principle of free movement applied as widely as possible. Do they want this principle to be applied across the board? Or would they prefer instead to restrict its application to the case of capital and goods, thus leaving them free to structure the labour market and welfare state as they themselves see fit? Adapted from the source document.

The theory of social choice has recently benefited much from advances within the power index approach in game theory. One may start from the classical Wicksell framework of a unanimity regime & proceed to state the advantages of deviations from his model. A case can be stated for quantitative voting using some majority voting scheme, as it empowers the choice participants, also providing for blocking power. The power distinctions generated from the power index framework may be applied to the institutional evolution of the Council of Ministers with the EC or EU. It allows one to state in a concise manner the comparative advantages & disadvantages of alternative regimes for the European Community or Union. Tables, Figures, Appendixes, References. Adapted from the source document.

In Sweden, there is a consensus that Swedish membership of substantial parts of the European Union (EU) entails cooperation that at least in parts implies supranationalism. Due to this consensus one may assume that there is also some sort of common understanding of the concept of supranationalism. However, while many researchers includes majority voting in their definition of supranationalism, this is rejected outright by others. As shown, both sides have a point and this article, therefore, suggests that three dimensions are noteworthy when it comes to supranationalism: (1) when states have transferred the right to exercise public power to an organization the states cannot make decisions alone, (2) the institution is autonomous and makes binding decisions, (3) the decisions taken by the institution have effective precedence over national ones. Adapted from the source document.

This study takes its starting -point in the Swedish referendum about a membership in the European monetary union. The purpose of the study is to explain the differences that became visible during the EMU-referendum, by thoroughly explore macro-factors & their importance to the voting against a membership at a municipal level. In earlier pursued research concerning voting behaviour & public opinion differences general explanations appear which work as an initial position for this study, the creation of three alternative explanation models & the macro factors to be tested. This study has a statistical design & its intention is to study macro-factors in the 290 municipals of Sweden through collecting material from several sources. The material has been compiled to analytical aggregate data & will be analysed through bivariate- & multivariate regressions. The result shows that the differences that became visible concerning the EMU-referendum can be explained from economic factors & economic structural differences between the municipals. Tables, Figures, References. Adapted from the source document.

A world government based on democratic principles would be ideal, but this is unlikely to come about any time soon. However, the mere impossibility of immediately implementing an idea does not make that idea wrong. Meanwhile one can work through existing institutions such as the UN and European Union to improve accountability in the arena of world politics. Adapted from the source document.

Political commitments in our time are often described as characterized by political de-collectivization & increasing individualism. In the article this polarity between individualism & collectivism is addressed. Empirically, it is based on a survey which 1066 global justice movement activists participated in. Among these, activism has both strong individual & collective orientations. Personal commitment & individual political action is emphasized at the same time as the activism aims at reforming institutions & is carried out in collective contexts, involving traditional political actors as parties & trade unions. Furthermore, this is done despite a low degree of trust in political institutions & traditional political actors, especially among activists who participated in the events during the EU summit meeting in Gothenburg 2001. Tables, Diagrams, References. Adapted from the source document.