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Analyzes challenges to the "separation of powers" doctrine that encompasses executive orders and presidential signing statements. Presidential signing statements are issued to accompany the signing of legislation passed by Congress into law, often addressing the policy issues involved.

A comprehensive regional study of women in the political executive power.

Intro -- Foreword -- Acknowledgements -- Contents -- Table of Cases -- Table of Legislation -- PART I: EXECUTIVE POWER IN AUSTRALIA -- 1. Introduction -- I. The Scope of this Book -- II. Overview and Structure of the Book -- 2. The Executive Power of the Commonwealth -- I. Section 61 of the Australian Constitution -- II. Sources of Commonwealth Executive Power -- III. A Framework of Analysis: The 'Breadth' and 'Depth' of Commonwealth Executive Power -- IV. Conclusion -- PART II: THE SCOPE OF THE NATIONHOOD POWER -- 3. The Development of the Nationhood Power in the Australian Case Law -- I. The Nationhood Power, Appropriations and Spending in the Australian Assistance Plan Case -- II. The Development of the Nationhood Power in Davis v Commonwealth -- III. The Nationhood Power and Commonwealth Spending -- IV. Limitations on the Nationhood Power -- V. Conclusion -- 4. The Nationhood Power and the Use of the Armed Forces During Emergencies -- I. The Constitutional Framework -- II. The Statutory Framework: Part IIIAAA of the Defence Act 1903 (Cth) -- III. Use of the ADF During Civil Emergencies in Australia -- IV. Scope of Commonwealth Executive Power to Use the ADF During Emergencies -- V. Conclusion -- 5. The Nationhood Power and Border Protection -- I. The Tampa Case -- II. The Tampa Case: Expanding the 'Depth' of the Executive Power? -- III. The Relationship between Commonwealth Executive Power and the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) -- IV. Conclusion -- PART III: LIMITATIONS ON THE NATIONHOOD POWER -- 6. Federalism as a Limit on the Nationhood Power -- I. Substantive Conception of Federalism Underpinning the Nationhood Power Cases -- II. Competition with State Executive Competence -- III. Availability of Other Constitutional Mechanisms and the Relevance of State Consent -- IV. Conclusion -- 7. Conclusion -- Bibliography -- Index.

This essay examines some of the challenges to the doctrine of separation of powers posed by two facets of presidential power: the executive order and the presidential signing statement. Unilateral presidential action through executive orders calls into question the distinction between legislative and executive functions as provided in the U.S. Constitution. The innovative use of the presidential signing statement as an opportunity for the executive to declare portions of legislation to be unconstitutional also blurs the distinction between these separate branches of government. Contemporary exercise of executive power poses challenges to the Madisonian model of government and to concomitant democratic norms.

Latin America is experiencing the longest democratic period in its history, yet power is still heavily concentrated in the executive. In fact, presidents are exercising power to extend their terms and enhance control over elections, often through completely democratic means. This phenomenon challenges our understanding of the relationship between democracy and the rule of law. This dissertation combines institutional and agency approaches to ask why and when presidents gained and exercised power over elections, arguably the most critical component of democracy. I focus on Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela, three Andean countries that share certain historic and cultural contexts, yet vary greatly in their democratic development. First, I conceptualize, measure, and analyze the transformation of executive power over elections in formal law, or "institutionalized executive power" (IEP), since transition to democracy (1979 – 2013). Colombia witnessed consistent decline in IEP, Ecuador's trend was mixed, and Venezuela demonstrated an overall increase. Based on qualitative analysis of an original dataset, I argue that institutional factors are the key causal components explaining variation in formal executive powers over elections: configuration (government entities with authority over electoral management, which can be centralized or decentralized); and constraints (restrictions on changing electoral law, which can be weak or strong).The logical next question is how and when presidents exercised their powers. I developed a measure of "exercised executive power" (EEP) over elections and traced presidents' actions over two decades (1993 – 2013). I found that EEP increased over time in all three countries. This was driven largely by political factors, but within the institutional context. I argue that presidents with strong mandates – particularly a majority in the legislature – most often exercised power over elections (and succeeded in their efforts) because of their ability to overcome institutional configuration and constraints. Despite decades of democratization, weak institutions continue to facilitate actions of strong presidents, compromising democratic quality. However, insights from Colombia demonstrate that balance of power among government entities and legal safeguards can temper even the most popular presidents. These findings inform our theoretical understanding of processes that contribute to democratic strength or decline.