Suchergebnisse

The Paper Presents political position of the Russian Federation State Duma and its internal Structure. The power and principles of operation of the Lower House of the Russian Parliament internal bodies are discussed, Particular attention is paid to political groups represented in the Duma. The fractions and groups of deputies have a profound influence on the parliament operations, They affect the mode of operation of the House and its results. The conflict or convergence of interests causes individual groups of deputies to enter into alliances. These alliances, however, are not permanent in character and result from tactical movements. The Lower House of the Russian Federation plays a significant role in the system of State offices. Nevertheless, the state political system is constructed so that the actual authority lies in the hands of the President of the Russian Federation. Strong political Position of the head of the state results both from the stipulations in the constitution and also from a certain distribution of political power in the country. The system lacks a Strong Political group that would be able to oppose the president. Therefore central administration is beyond the control of parliament. In Russia there is no practical dependence of the government on the parliament. The Duma has little influence over the executive power.

In actual legal and political conditions in Poland it has been assumed that in decision-making processes in an enterprise in the first place participate, as representatives of the employees' interests: a self-government of a crew, a Party organization, a trade union. In economic praxis, it created complicated problems, since it is very difficult to draw distinct lines separating the areas of activity of those organizations. The research indicates that despite quite large competences of a self-government, its participation in management activities is not big (a very big influence on decision-making: a general assembly of a crew and the employees' council — 8.9% of answers). The most important decisive body is a chief executive director — 35.3°/o of answers. In effect, formal institutions which might have created conditions to develop industrial democracy do not function according to the expectations and consequently, an increase in the position and authority of an enterprise director has been noted in 1988 in comparison with previous years. As a result of those changes, cooperation between a director, a Party organization and a trade union does not develop adequately. The cooperation is the best between a director and a Party organization — 16.6% of positive indications. Among workers a view prevails that the organizations which are to be the workers' representations in decision-making processes do not meet such expectations. It was only o 9% of respondents who indicated that a party organization represents the workers' interests. 12.9% of respondents were of the same opinion with respect to a self-government of a crew and the employees' council. At the same time workers declare little interest in taking posts in self-government organs; in effect, not always the best people are candidates for seats in the employees' council. The workers, however, want to have a much greater influence than they have now on decisions concerning their workplaces (26.9%) as well as on their participating in taking decisions concerning the collective work (30.6%). It seems apparent that the increase in employees' democracy depends on organizational and legal conditions and, in the first place, requires the change of attitudes among workers and the managing staff. It is also necessary to increase the self-dependence of enterprises in financial matters and to reduce the degree of their subordination to the economic center. Moreover, there arises the need to establish self-government structures on a supra-enterprise level, eg. the Self-Government Chamber in the Sejm (Parliament). ; Digitalizacja i deponowanie archiwalnych zeszytów RPEiS sfinansowane przez MNiSW w ramach realizacji umowy nr 541/P-DUN/2016