Suchergebnisse

Pri analizi dvaju suprotstavljenih narativa povezanih s temom uspostave vojske Europske unije (EU) u europskom medijskom i političkom prostoru u ovome radu upotrebljava se teorija sekrutizacije te se temeljem analize diskursa i javnog mnijenja dokazuje da suprotstavljeni narativi ispunjavaju uvjete da ih prema definiciji Kopenhagenske škole svedemo pod pojam sekuritizacije. Prema autorima Kopenhagenske škole, sekuritizacija je govorni čin kojim provoditelj sekuritizacije do tada nepolitizirani odnosno politizirani predmet debate prikazuje kao egzistencijalnu prijetnju prema referentnom objektu koja zahtijeva hitne mjere. Prvi narativ koji rad analizira je neizvjesna sigurnosna situacija u Europi i oko nje koja bi mogla prerasti u egzistencijalnu prijetnju društvu Europske unije i europskom identitetu zbog nepostojanja vojske Unije. Drugi, tome oprečni narativ pak interpretira uspostavu vojske Europske unije kao egzistencijalnu prijetnju NATO savezu i suverenitetu država članica Unije. Rad postavlja pitanje je li sekuritizacija upotrebljiva poluga u nastojanju provođenja odnosno blokiranja čvršće intergracije EU na području obrane. Analizom diskursa glavnih aktera, provoditelja sekuritizacije i sigurnosnih strategija EU, Velike Britanije i Sjedinjenih Američkih Država te analizom prihvaćanja narativa od strane publike, rad zaključuje da su ti oba narativa činovi sekuritizacije. Prvi narativ, sekuritiziran od strane europskih federalista na čelu s predsjednikom Europske komisije Jean-Claudeom Junckerom, kao referentne objekte koji se pod hitno moraju zaštiti postavlja društvo EU i europski identitet. Egzistencijalna prijetnja referentnim objektima dolazi od ruske politike, ali i neizvjesne sigurnosne situacije u neposrednom susjedstvu EU-a. Ovaj narativ kao rješenje nameće uspostavu vojske EU-a. Drugi narativ, sekuritiziran od strane euroskeptika, NATO saveza te političkih elita Velike Britanije, SAD-a i Rusije, kao referentne objekte koji se pod hitno moraju zaštititi postavlja suverenitet država članica EU i opstanak NATO saveza koji se nalaze u egzistencijalnoj prijetnji od strane uspostave vojske Europske unije, čija bi uspostava oduzela nacionalne vojske tj. suverenitet država članica u području obrane, a postojanje NATO saveza učinilo izlišnim ; The thesis proves that around the establishment of the European Union army, we can infer two opposing narratives in European Union's media and political space and that both meet the conditions to be called a securitization. The first narrative (positive securitization) that the thesis analyses argues that the precarious the security situation in and around Europe could become an existential threat to the society of European Union (EU) and European identity because of the paucity of the EU army. The second narrative (negative securitization) that the thesis analyses interprets the establishment of the EU army as an existential threat to the North Atlantic Alliance (NATO) and the sovereignty of EU member states. Securitization is defined through the Theory of Securitisation by the scientists belonging to Copenhagen School (Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde) as a speech act by which an actor (securitizing actor) presents a specific issue, until then only politicised in the political or public space, as an existential threat to the referent object that requires extraordinary measures. For a speech act to be an act of securitization and not just an attempt of securitisation, public (or a target group) needs to accept the speech as such. Thus, the Theory of Securitization affirms that the chosen narratives are acts of securitizations through discourse analysis and public opinion analysis. Elements of securitization are before mentioned securitization actor, referent object and public, as well as functional actors, which indirectly affect security decisions by lobbing or directing the securitization actors, and context, as a speech act cannot be an independent factor in the securitization process but is dependent on historical, political, societal, economic, geographic, and other variables. The principal difference between Theory of Securitisation and the mainstream security theories: Traditional Security Studies (TSS) and Critical Security Studies (CSS), is that Theory of Securitization is not concerned if the issue that a speech act wants to present as a security issue, really is a security issue, but how a speech act presents the issue as a security issue. Unlike the Theory of Securitisation, TSS is a realistic security theory that examines is the issue a real security threat while CSS is a constructive security theory that examines the reality of security threat. Both, TSS and CSS, analyze already present security threat, while Theory of Securitisation analyses the creation of the security threat. Positive securitisation, the precarious security situation in and around Europe that could become an existential threat to the society of the EU because of the paucity of the EU army, is securitised by European federalists headed by European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker and HR/VP Federica Mogherini. Referent objects that are in urgent need of protection are the EU society and the European identity (values and principles) that are in the existential threat of Russia and uncertain security situation in the immediate neighbourhood of the EU. As a solution for the existential threat, securitising actors impose the establishment of the EU army. Functional actors of positive securitisation are stakeholders in the European defence industry who have a purely economic reason for the backing of positive securitisation, and European elite which advocates the federalisation of the European Union. The prime public, core target group, for the positive securitisation should be the Heads of 28 EU member states who make decisions concerning Common Security Defence Policy (CSDP). As the decisions concerning CSDP must be unanimous, and some member states, mostly United Kingdom (UK), steadily use the instrument of veto to block further development of the CSDP, the thesis assumes that the securitising actors of positive securitisation decided to expand the target group for their securitisation onto European Union society as a whole. Reasons behind the expansion of the target public, which thus makes the whole society of the European Union a the public is a pressure onto the Heads of EU member states since the citizens of the EU have a very favourable opinion about the further development of the CSDP and mostly positive opinion regarding the establishment of the EU army. Negative securitisation, which interprets the establishment of the EU army as an existential a threat to the NATO and the sovereignty of EU member states, is a complex form of securitisation. Instead of one securitising actor or one group of securitising actors with the same motive (European federalist with Juncker as champion in positive securitisation), negative securitisation is securitised by several securitising actors without the leading champion with sometimes the same and sometimes different motives: Eurosceptics, NATO, decision-makers in the United Kingdom, the United States (US) and Russia. Furthermore, negative securitisation accumulates the referent objects that are in urgent need of protection: the sovereignty of the EU member states and the survival of the NATO alliance. The only element of the negative securitisation that is unambiguous is the existential threat from the establishment of the EU army whose establishment would take away the national armies, i.e. the sovereignty of the EU member states and made the NATO alliance vulnerable. Hence, for the sake of simplicity of understanding the elements of negative securitisation and their synergy, the thesis uses the Classical Security Complex Theory (CSCT) for the proper consideration of the patterns of the security connections. Using discourse analysis of the speech acts and official documents the thesis shows how the decision-makers in the US (regardless of their political affiliation) securitise the establishment of the EU army as an existential threat to NATO and future of Atlantic security cooperation. Same is evident with the NATO as a securitising actor. The decision-makers in the UK (mostly conservatives) securitise the establishment of the EU army and further development of CSDP as an existential threat to the national sovereignty of EU member states. Russia too securitises the establishment of the EU army as an existential threat to the national sovereignty of EU member states but does the deed backstage financially supporting nationalist and Eurosceptic EU parties and via cyber-attacks and disinformation campaign. Functional actors of negative securitisation are stakeholders in the non-EU defence industry and other industries which prosper due to unstable global security situation, private military organisations, non-independent think thanks, etc. The public for the negative securitisation is the Eurosceptic part of the EU society, but the core target group are the citizens of the UK. Securitising actors of the negative securitisation narrowed the public of their securitisation for the same reason why the securitising actors of the positive securitisation broaden theirs – decisions concerning CSDP must be unanimous. Consequently, the securitising actors of the negative securitisation to be successful in their securitisation need to persuade only citizens of the UK that their narrative is correct. As already mentioned, the Theory of Securitisation analyses the creation of the security threat, so very important for the understanding of the results of discourse analysis is the context behind the construction of the securitisation. In the case of the securitisations analysed in the thesis, the contexts of both narratives have foundations in the conflict between neorealist and neoliberal doctrines in foreign politics, different security strategies of the countries, and change in a global security system, as well as historical, political, societal, economic, geographic and other variables. No EU member state can be a superpower on its own in today's world. This notion and aim to hinder the possibility of another armed conflict in Europe prompted the creation of the Union. After more than 60 years of enlargement and integration, the EU is an economic superpower. Nevertheless, to protect its economic superiority as well as to impose its doctrine in foreign politics and expand its multilateral security strategy, the EU needs to be and defence union. This idea is not a new one but exists and was attempted to be implemented from the beginning of the EU existence. The securitising actors of the positive securitisation believe that with the establishment of the EU army, the EU can keep the US hegemony in the global security system and the Russian renewal of bloc-system aspirations under control. Some securitising actors of the positive securitisation also believe that the further integration of the EU is necessary to prevent the disintegration. Above all, is the strong desire of the EU elite for the federation of the EU. Expectedly, not least because of the postulate of the security dilemma, the US and Russia are afraid of the military-strong EU which could change the current global security system, while the UK believes that with the strengthening of the EU its military and political strength will wane or disappear. As the UK is the EU member state and its citizens are the most Eurosceptic the public in the EU, both and the US and Russia focused most of their securitisation's efforts toward the UK's citizens. The US also uses the UK as a tool of disruption in the EU – it's right to veto decisions about the further development of CSDP, integration of the EU in the defence field and the establishment of the EU army. The thesis hypothesises that the two opposed narratives that the thesis considers to be securitisations have generated the status quo in the development of CSDP. Through the discourse analysis of speech acts and the official documents of securitising actors of both narratives as well as analysis of the acceptance of narratives by the audience (public opinion analysis), the thesis positively answers the research question: Is the securitisation theory usable the instrument in the effort to implement/block more effective EU integration?

Utemeljen na polazištima kritički orijentiranih sigurnosnih studija i studija terorizma, rad propituje metodološke, epistemološke pa i ontološke aspekte fenomena državnog terorizma. Tvrdi se kako je državni terorizam sustavno zanemareno područje znanja o terorizmu, iako je empirijski vrlo evidentan fenomen. U prvom dijelu rada propituje se klasična i suvremena politološka, sociološka, pravna i filozofska misao važna za razumijevanje države, sigurnosti, terorizma i državnog terorizma. Počevši od Weberove definicije države kao nositeljice monopola na nasilje i njegova koncepta razlikovanja vladavine (Herrschaft) i sile (Macht) tvrdi se da monopol na silu ne podrazumijeva korištenje svakog oblika sile i da država ne može biti ekskulpirana u situacijama kada koristi silu koja ima sva obilježja terorizma. Upravo za ključnim obilježjima terorizma traga se u drugom dijelu rada gdje se analizira postojeće znanje o terorizmu i državnom terorizmu. Na temelju postojećih definicija koje čine bazu od ukupno 373 definicije, sadržajnom i frekvencijskom analizom, dolazi se do operacionalne definicije terorizma i državnog terorizma. Izlučenih šest konstitutivnih elemenata terorizma ukazali su da je državni terorizam organizirana upotreba sile i nasilja ili prijetnja upotrebom nasilja kojom se posredstvom intencionalnog širenja straha odnosno terora, a na temelju anticipiranih reakcija širih psiholoških učinaka, nastoje ostvariti politički ciljevi, a kojega provodi i/ili sponzorira država. U fokusiranoj studiji s mnogo slučajeva u trećem dijelu analizira se državni terorizam na empirijskim primjerima dvadeset i jedne države (N=21). Slučajevi su selektirani na stogodišnjem dijakronijskom kontinuumu, počevši od 1914. godine i sarajevskog atentata na austro-ugarskog prijestolonasljednika Franju Ferdinanda pa do recentnih primjera protuterorističkih politika. Kroz povijesnu perspektivu, komparativnom metodom uz primjenu dizajna najrazličitijih slučajeva, potvrđena je polazna pretpostavka: terorizam jest ciljno racionalno sredstvo za postizanje političkih ciljeva država i njegova je pojavnost neovisna o tipu političkog režima. Kvalitativna i kvantitativna obilježja državnog terorizma nerijetko se razlikuju kako između tako i unutar triju poduzoraka (režima), no usprkos kontekstualnim razlikama, može se utvrditi da je u totalitarnim režimima državni terorizmu ekstremnih razmjera i predstavlja važnu polugu vladavine, dok je u autoritarnima, a napose u demokratskima riječ o fokusiranijem državnom nasilju, najčešće sa specifičnim oblicima djelovanja. ; The basis of this doctoral work rests on the fact that the state terrorism is ignored in the context of mainstream security and terrorism knowledge. Security studies as well as rapidly growing terrorism studies are predominantly focused on non-state terrorism. Critical voices which indicating the importance of the state terrorism phenomenon have emerged in the mid-1990s. Based on the starting points of critically oriented security studies and terrorism studies, this work analyzes the methodological, epistemological and even ontological aspects of the phenomenon of state terrorism. It is argued that the state terrorism is systematically neglected area of knowledge, although it is very evident phenomenon. In the first part of this doctoral work the classical and the contemporary political, social, philosophical thought and jurisprudence important for the understanding of the state security, terrorism and state terrorism have been examined. Max Weber's concept of the state and difference between legitimate domination (Herrschaft) and coercive power (Macht) in the exercise of sovereign state functions is at the center of theoretical discussions. We claim that this distinction remained outside of much Western scholarship. Their concepts are based on logic of what the state and its relations to society should be not what it is. In contrast to this mainstream normative oriented model we examine the empirical reality which is laden of state terrorism examples. Therefore, the second part of this work is dedicated to analysis of existing knowledge about terrorism and state terrorism. The emphasis is on the definitions of terrorism, so for this purpose the database of 373 terrorism definitions was constructed. Definitions collected from the scientific and academic sources, the expert sources, the available official sources of various institutions and organizations, news, etc. were subjected to content and frequency analysis. Those analyses indicated six key elements used for defining state terrorism, which is relevant to the selection of empirical cases. It is found that the state terrorism is the use of organized force and violence or threat to use violence as a means of intentional spreading fear and terror based on the anticipated reactions of broader psychological effects which seeks to achieve political objectives and which is conducted and/or sponsored by the state. It is not an ideology, but the strategy and tactic that can be used by all, including the states. Despite the fact that the most of the definitios are actor-neutral and that their contents coincide, there is no unified definition. According to such understanding, the third part is a focused study with a lot of cases (N=21) where the unit of analysis was state terrorism and analytical sub-units were states (cases) selected from the one century time span (1914th-2014th) complemented with the most recent cases (until the end of 2016th). Thus, it is a diachronic analysis (cross-historical analysis). Since the selected cases differ in several relevant independent variables (social, economic, geographic, cultural) the comparative analysis is based on the most different systems research designs. The basic criterion of comparison was the regime (totalitarian, authoritarian and democratic) in accordance with the tipology of Juan Linz. The main aim of such typology and case selection was to test the general thesis: terrorism is an integral instrument of state action that occurs in all types of political regimes and which states used/use as a form of rational choice to achieve their goals. The third part includes political and sociological analysis of primary and secondary sources for each case (state). The analysis of state terrorism included Italy during Mussolini, Nazi Germany, Lenin and Stalin Russia/Soviet Union, communist Poland, Mao Zednog's China, North Korea regime and Idi Amin's Uganda as a totalitarian regimes. The second group of states are, according to Linz proposal, authoritarian regimes. Here is a Serbian example of state sponsored terrorism in Sarajevo 1914 and assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand. Another example is Yugoslavia from the mid of 1960 even if it is not purely clear is it predominantly totalitarian or authoritarian regime. Other examples are the rule of Francisco Franco in Spain, death squad in Argentina, Gaddafi's Libya, the rule of Shah Reza Pahlavi in Iran and Suadi Arabia sponsoring of terrorism. Within a democratic cluster the United States of America, Israel, United Kingdom, France, Russian Federation, modern Turkey and Macedonia were analysed. The main findings in turn suggest that the state terrorism was/is practiced in totalitarian, authoritarian and democratic systems, was/is used in war or peace, was/is used by the rich and the poor countries of different cultural, political, economic, geographic and other features. In other words, terrorism is an universal form of state action, but the specific context of each of the analyzed cases does not provide the right to generalize or compare countries according to the basic independent variables - the type of regime. Divided societies and various social cleavages like political (ideological), ethnic, cultural, language, religious, economic and other are evident in the most of the internal state terrorism cases. Although the contexts of countries are quite heterogeneous, in each case analyzed rationality is a common feature of state terrorism. Statet are trying to achieve political goals in the most effective way, what is decisively for using a specific form of violence or threats of violence that we call terrorism. Although it is one of the most frequently used terms in the social sciences, it is evident that terrorism is not conceptually cleared. It is deeply socially constructed concept which depends on a variety of interests. This also affects the contemporary counterterrorism policy. Within the science and policy, terrorism is predominantly viewed as a war and/or criminal. Terrorism is not treated as a phenomenon that is generated from the political area and counterterrorism policies do not target the real causes of terrorism. The perspective of terrorism as a war and crime which is imposed by politics that cooperates with science, leads to a spiral of violence. Illegal and immoral state counterterrorism actions lead to the even more brutal reactions of non-state groups. This trend is especially noticeable from September 9/11 when the "war on terror" started. From this moment it is especially evident that in the name of national security, the degradation of democratic values and endangering human rights and civil liberties have begun. This is best reflected in the new security policies, counterterrorism laws and the state of emergency institute. Also, the democratic deficits are obvious in the examples of interventions in other countries. Illegal character of the war in Iraq shows that international law is not a guarantee nor law nor justice. Those are some contemporary examples of state illegal actions which could be classified as state terrorism in democratic states, but the history is full of state terrorism evidence. Totalitarian and authoritarian regimes in the 20th century, as well as some actual examples, suggesting that the scientific community is biased and ignores the important historical facts as well as contemporary trends. By securitization of terrorism concept, the state harnessed science to its own interest – first of all creating counterterrorism policies. Instrumented science can act only within the limits defined by the state. The main characteristic of the joint state and scientific activity is hypocrisy where identical phenomena do not have identical names. State and science are taking a morally superior position, so state terrorist actions are called "necessary security measures", and terrorism as a pejorative term is reserved only for non-state actors. Further scientific and political ignoring of state terrorism topic, denying a unique definition of terrorism, refusing the recognition of state crimes that fall into the category of terrorism and insistence on counterterrorism as war strategy only feeds the modern evil of non-state terrorism. As long as there is not a change of paradigm in which the force will be firmly under the auspices of the law and policy of double standards will not exist, it is not realistic to expect that the state will eliminate the problem of contemporary non-state terrorism.

Posljednjih je godina teorijska literatura o međunarodnim odnosima znatno napredovala u proširivanju i preciziranju tipologije revizionističkih država – država koje teže preraspodjeli moći u međunarodnom sistemu i/ili promjeni normativnog poretka. Istovremeno je malo pozornosti posvećeno pojmu status quo države, kojim se označava država koja teži zadržavanju moći i očuvanju postojećeg stanja. Status quo država uglavnom se svodi na status quo predrasudu koja se odnosi na države koje imaju averziju prema riskiranju u vanjskopolitičkim odlukama i ne sudjeluju aktivno u oblikovanju međunarodne politike ili pak na države koje nastoje egzistencijalno preživjeti u anarhičnom sustavu. Literatura pritom previđa ono bitno u opreci kategorija: sukob revizionističke i status quo države. Naime, otvoreno suparništvo s revizionističkom državom i agresivno pružanje otpora promjeni redovito se označava kao još jedan vid revizionizma. U ovom se radu pokazuje da kategorija status quo države nije slučajno u "mrtvom kutu" teorije međunarodnih odnosa. Razlog je tomu što uvjet njezine mogućnosti – konsenzualni međunarodnopravni poredak – u suvremenim okolnostima nije prisutan. Povijesno iskustvo pokazuje da u određenim, veoma rijetkim uvjetima konsenzualnoga međunarodnopravnog poretka države s agresivnim motivima i nerijetko ofenzivnim sredstvima mogu biti status quo države. Pokazat će se da su u moderno doba samo dva razmjerno kratkotrajna međunarodna poretka činila status quo državu mogućom: europski vestfalski sustav ravnoteže snaga u 18. stoljeću i hladnoratovski detant u drugoj polovici 20. stoljeća. ; In recent years, the International Relations theoretical literature has made significant progress in expanding and refining the typology of revisionist states – states that seek to redistribute power in the international system and/or change the normative order. At the same time, little attention is paid to the notion of the status quo state, which denotes a state that strives to retain power and preserve the status quo. The category of status quo states is mainly reduced to either status quo bias referring to the states that have an aversion to risk in foreign policy decisions and do not actively participate in international politics or to the states that seek to survive in the anarchic system. At the same time, the literature overlooks the key aspect of the opposing categories: the conflict between the revisionist state and the status quo state. Namely, open rivalry with the revisionist state and aggressive resistance to change is regularly labeled as another form of revisionism. This paper shows that the category of the status quo state is not accidentally in the IR theoretical "blind spot". The reason for this is that the condition of its possibility – a consensual international legal order – is not present in modern circumstances. Historical experience shows that in certain and very rare conditions of a consensual international legal order, states with aggressive motives and often offensive means can be categorized as status quo states. It will be shown that in the modern age only two relatively short-lived international orders made the status quo possible: the European Westphalian system of balance of powers in the 18th century and the Cold War détente in the second half of the 20th century.

Odlukom Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva da napusti Europsku uniju, kao i usporavanjem procesa proširenja Europske unije na zemlje Zapadnog Balkana i Tursku, pojavila se nova fraza u europskom političkom rječniku: Europa izvan Europske unije. Ta fraza, koju promoviraju tvorci britanske vanjske politike, vraća na dnevni red raspravu o europskom identitetu. U ovom članku analiziraju se kompleksni i različiti odgovori na pitanja kao što su tko je, što je, kad je i gdje je Europa, gdje je njezina granica i tko su Drugi u odnosu na nju. Pitanju identiteta Europe pristupa se iz konstruktivističke perspektive, kroz analizu definiranja Sebstva i Drugosti. Iako je Europa nakon Hladnog rata proklamirala kao svoj cilj ujedinjenje i emancipaciju od Drugih, ona je ostala vezana uz Sjedinjene Američke Države kroz koncept euroatlantizma, a u nekim aspektima i uz Rusiju kroz ideju o Euroaziji. U suvremenim okolnostima Europska je unija sve udaljenija od ideala o jednoj i ujedinjenoj Europi. Umjesto toga, ona više liči na lȕk, sa svojim jezgrom, unutarnjom i izvanjskoj periferijom, kao i s vanjskim akterima koji su polupovezani s Europom zbog povijesnih i strateških razloga. Zbog toga se postavlja pitanje je li Europu uopće moguće definirati kao cjelinu u odnosu na njezine susjede i na druge zainteresirane aktere (Rusiju, SAD i Tursku) ili je njezin identitet određen upravo nemogućnošću takvoga jednoznačnog definiranja. ; Following the decision of the United Kingdom to leave the European Union and in the light of the slowing down of the EU enlargement in the Western Balkans and Turkey, a new phrase emerged in the European political vocabulary – Europe outside the European Union. This phrase, promoted by British foreign policy designers, brings the issue of the European identity back on the agenda. Who, what, when and where is Europe, and who are the Others in relation to Europe? In this article, we analyse the complex and mutually divergent replies to the question of the European identity by using a constructivist approach, based on the definitions of the European Self and Other. Despite proclaiming an ambition to unite and emancipate itself from the Others, Europe remained connected to the United States after the Cold War through the concept of Euro Atlanticism. The competing concept of Eurasia – marking a link between Europe and Russia – is also becoming popular in the areas of European inner and external peripheries. Contemporary Europe is far from being "united in diversities" – it looks more like an onion instead with its core countries, internal and external peripheries and influential external stakeholders that are semi-detached to it for historical and strategic reasons. The author therefore puts forward a question of whether it is at all possible to define Europe as the Other to its neighbours and other external stakeholders such as Russia, the US and Turkey. Would it not be more appropriate to define Europe through a permanent notion of being in-between its own Others, rather than through its own clearly marked and defined Self?

Na osnovu analize izvornih arhivskih dokumenata i propisa objavljenih u službenim listovima, opisuje se djelokrug, ustroj i sastav Prezidijuma Sabora NRH. Njegovi temelji postavljeni su u radu Zemaljskog antifašističkog vijeća narodnog oslobođenja Hrvatske (ZAVNOH), odnosno njegova Predsjedništva, koje je kao uže tijelo plenuma osnovano 9. svibnja 1944. godine. Na Četvrtom zasjedanju održanom 24. i 25. srpnja 1945. u Zagrebu, ZAVNOH je promijenio naziv u Narodni sabor Hrvatske, a njegovo Predsjedništvo od tada djeluje kao Predsjedništvo Narodnog sabora Hrvatske. U razdoblju 1945.–1953. njegovo djelovanje može se podijeliti u četiri mandatna razdoblja: Predsjedništvo Narodnog sabora Hrvatske/Prezidijum Sabora NRH (25. srpnja 1945.–30. studenoga 1946.), Prezidijum Ustavotvornog sabora NRH (30. studenoga 1946.–20. siječnja 1947.), Prezidijum Sabora NRH prvoga saziva (20. siječnja 1947.–4. prosinca 1950.) i Prezidijum Sabora NRH drugoga saziva (4. prosinca 1950.–6. veljače 1953.). U prvom dijelu rada opisuje se osnivanje i prestanak rada Prezidijuma Sabora, u drugom njegov djelokrug, a u trećem ustroj i sastav po mandatnim razdobljima. Njegov ustroj i djelokrug uspoređeni su s ustrojem i djelokrugom Prezidijuma Narodne skupštine FNRJ i prezidijuma drugih jugoslavenskih republika. Rezultati istraživanja prezentirani su kombinacijom tematskog i kronološkog pristupa, a dijelom su sistematizirani u obliku tabelarnih prikaza. ; This paper describes the scope, structure and the composition of the Presidium of Parliament of the People's Republic of Croatia (PRC) which was active as a political governmental body in Croatia from 1945 to 1953. According to the Yugoslav constitutional system of government, the same political body existed on the federal level as the Presidium of the People's Assembly of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia (FPRY), as well as in every republic-member of the Yugoslav federation and the scope, organization and composition of the Presidium of Parliament are compared with the scope, organization and composition of those bodies. The foundations of the activities of the Presidium of Parliament, as well as other central governmental institutions in Croatia (namely, Parliament, Government, and Supreme Court) were laid in the work of the State Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Croatia (ZAVNOH) i.e. its Presidency, since until the end of the war they together performed the legislative, executive and judiciary government. During the 4th session that took place in Zagreb from 24 to 25 July 1945 ZAVNOH changed is title to the People's Parliament of Croatia and since then its Presidency worked as the Presidency of the People's Parliament of Croatia. In the period from 1945 to 1953 its activity can be divided into four mandate periods: the Presidency of the People's Parliament of Croatia/the Presidium of the Parliament of the PRC (25 July 1945–30 November 1946), the Presidium of the Constituent Parliament of the PRC (30 November 1946–20 January 1947), the Presidium of the 1st Session of the Parliament of the PRC (20 January 1947–4 December 1950) and the Presidium of the 2nd Session of the Parliament of the PRC (4 December 1950–6 February 1953). Its existence in the system of governmental power is the result of taking over the Soviet constitutional solutions about organizing the state and governmental institutions in the 1946 constitution of the FPRY and through it also in the constitutions of each federal unit. It was the main legislative body in the period until the constituting of the Constituent Parliament of the PRC, since the Parliament of the PRC only had a single short five-day session in late August 1946. This is confirmed by the information about 29 laws passed by the Presidium of Parliament in the period from 8 September 1945 to 20 November 1946. Besides legislative, it also performed other functions from the jurisdiction then belonging to the Parliament. The constitution of the PRC from 1946 bestowed upon it performing tasks that are usually given to the president of the state (representing in the country the people's and state sovereignty of the PRC, calling the general elections, granting pardons, awarding medals and recognitions), as well as other executive tasks partly closely linked to the legislative activities. The special function pertained to supervising the people's committees. The important difference in the scope in relation to the Presidium of the People's Assembly of the FPRY was that it did not have the authority in the area of foreign affairs. Even though the constitution of the PRC from January 1947 lists it together with the Parliament in the chapter on the highest bodies of the governmental power in Croatia, the sources and constitutional-legal texts of the time, in accordance with the principle of unity of power, define it as a body which "stems from the Parliament" and is subordinated to it. Also, despite being formally constitutionally defined as one of the highest bodies of governmental power in Croatia, in reality it was the Party's transmission, since the actual power and monopoly in decisionmaking was in the hands of the bodies of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia/the League of Communists of Yugoslavia i.e. the Communist Party of Croatia/the League of Communists of Croatia. It was a collegiate body comprised of members of the Parliament. The decision of its composition was formally passed by the Parliament, but based on the conclusions reached during sessions of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Croatia. It was elected for the same term as the Parliament, but it continued to perform its duties after the dissolution of the Parliament, until the election of the new Presidium of Parliament. From 1945 to 1953 the total of 45 MPs were included in its activities. 13 of them were members during all four mandate terms, 11 during two and 14 during only one. The structure and the way of work were determined by the Rulebook dated from 7 August 1947. They were the exact copy of the structure and the way of work of the Presidium of the People's Assembly of the FPRY, with differences deriving from different jurisdictions (federal, republic) of these two bodies.

Vlada demokratskog jedinstva nastala je u početcima otvorene velikosrpske agresije na Hrvatsku, ali i usred krize strateško-obrambene koncepcije. Tuđmanova politika čekanja i kupovanja vremena te izbjegavanja frontalnog i općeg sukoba s JNA, doveli su do javnog kritiziranja njegove obrambene politike od strane oporbe i dijela HDZ-a. U okolnostima sveobuhvatne agresije i, prema nekim navodima, očekivanja raskola u hrvatskoj politici, sredinom srpnja počela je rekonstrukcija postojeće Vlade. Novi mandatar Franjo Gregurić okupljao je kadrove za sastavljanje Vlade, a u tom razdoblju javila se ideja o potrebi proširenja Vlade i nekim nestranačkim kandidatima pa i predstavnicima oporbe. U samo dva-tri dana pregovora postignut je nacionalni konsenzus i potpisan Sporazum saborskih stranaka, čime je stvorena Vlada demokratskog jedinstva. Vlada se sastojala od devet parlamentarnih stranaka, od kojih je osam imalo svoje predstavnike u Vladi. Unatoč činjenici da je 1990-ih godina u Hrvatskoj na snazi bio polupredsjednički sustav koji je predsjedniku Republike davao prilično široke ovlasti, Vlada je na području obrambene i vanjske politike pokazivala određeni stupanj samostalnosti. Prema nekim tvrdnjama Vrhovno državno vijeće je ograničavalo slobodu djelovanja Vlade tako da se za svog jednogodišnjeg mandata Vlada trebala često boriti za veću samostalnost i slobodu djelovanja. S druge strane, Vlada je imala potpunu slobodu u unutarnjim poslovima, primjerice u njezinoj politici prema prognanicima i izbjeglicama, kao i u gospodarskoj politici. Unatoč tvrdnjama o "nestanku" oporbe u vrijeme te višestranačke vlade, s obzirom na to da su potpisivanjem Sporazuma o Vladi demokratskog jedinstva saborske stranke od oporbenih formalno postale koalicijske, dostupni izvori navode na drukčiji zaključak. Naime, predstavnici pojedinih oporbenih i ujedno koalicijskih stranaka od listopada 1991. godine često su kritizirali neke odluke vlasti, koje su se posebno odnosile na vanjsku politiku. Predmet njihovih kritika bile su ujedno Vladine i Tuđmanove uredbe sa zakonskom snagom. Vlada je posljednjih šest mjeseci svog mandata bila izložena pritiscima oporbe i dijela HDZ-a. Međunarodno priznanje Hrvatske i priprema za nove parlamentarne i predsjedničke izbore uzrokovali su pritiske na Vladu demokratskog jedinstva, što se prije svega očitovalo u odlascima određenih nestranačkih i oporbenih ministara, a kasnije dovelo i do velike travanjske rekonstrukcije Vlade u kojoj je u znatnoj mjeri promijenjen njezin sastav u korist HDZ-a. Vlada demokratskog jedinstva nastavila je djelovati do kolovoza, kad je nakon novih parlamentarnih izbora formirana nova, jednostranačka HDZ-ova vlada. ; After the democratic elections in Croatia in the spring of 1990 and the victory of Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), the new Croatian Government faced the Serbian insurgency which expressed approval for the Milošević's Greater-Serbian policy. The insurgency was supported by the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) that had disarmed Croatia just after the elections in May 1990. In the summer of 1991, the Yugoslav crisis aggravated. Previous occasional and sporadic conflicts between Croatian police forces and the Serbian insurgents escalated into the open aggression of Serbia, Montenegro and JNA against Croatia. In such conditions, Croatian leadership was conflicted about the defense policy. The disagreement caused the appearance of some fractions in the parliament parties, especially in HDZ. Some participants of Croatian politics in the early 1990s today assert that there were at least two main fractions in HDZ – the "moderate" one that supported Tuđman's policy based on avoiding head-on conflict with JNA, and the "radical" one that wanted to declare JNA and Serbia the aggressors on Croatia and to fight back. Some claim that the "radical" fraction even wanted to bring down Tuđman and replace him with someone else. There isn't enough evidence to verify such statements. It probably was the case of dissatisfaction with the situation on the battlefield. Some write about wide discontent and criticism of Tuđman regarding his defense policy, which was evident at the meetings of the main Board of HDZ in the middle of July, Supreme State Council in the end of July and parliamentary session in the beginning of August 1991. Regarding the attitude towards Tuđman, there is a widespread and simplified opinion that his party turned its back on him and that the opposition expressed him support. Exactly the opposite, the opposition, especially heads of the parties Croatian Social-Liberal Party (HSLS), Croatian democratic party (HDS), and Croatian People's party (HNS) expressed equal, or even more severe, criticism of Tuđman's defense policy. In that kind of atmosphere, the reconstruction of the Government resulted in the national consensus – Democratic Unity Government was formed. It was the third democratic Government and the first multiparty Government after the democratic elections. It is an example of a Grand coalition formed during the war in many countries. The main goal of the new Government was to create more effective defense policy that would gather all the necessary political and military structures and establish the unified command structure. That resulted in entering of the Crisis Staff into the Government and forming of the General Staff of the Croatian Army. In the first two months of its mandate, the Government proposed and adopted measures for emergency readiness in order to organize life in the crisis areas. One of those measures included the blockade of the JNA barracks which Tuđman approved September 13 1991. With the blockade, the previous measured and careful attitude of the Croatian leadership towards JNA shifted from passive to active. One part of the research discussed the role of the Government in defense of the cities of Vukovar and Dubrovnik. Regarding Vukovar, there are some controversies embodied in widespread claims that Croatian leadership "betrayed" and "sacrificed" Vukovar by not sending enough weaponry and ammunition. However, available sources, primarily transcripts and records of the Government sessions, suggest that Vukovar was the priority in the supply of weaponry and ammunition. Furthermore, some members of the Government and other representatives of the Croatian leadership visited Vukovar and Eastern-Slavonian battlefield. In the context of all the crisis areas on the Croatian battlefield, Vukovar was the most dominant topic at the Government sessions. At the session held November 17, the Government adopted a series of decisions pertaining to the protection of Vukovar civilians. In the appeals to the international organizations, Vukovar and Dubrovnik were the two most mentioned cities. As was the case with Vukovar, the Government sent weaponry and other military equipment, transported humanitarian aid to Dubrovnik and appealed for help. It is worth mentioning convoy "Libertas" which supplied humanitarian aid to the surrounded Dubrovnik and broke the naval blockade. Also, some Government members came by the convoy to Dubrovnik to show their support. At the end of November 1991, Government sent three of its ministers to Dubrovnik where they had to represent the Government and facilitate its operation in Southern Dalmatia, maintain contacts with the international organizations, negotiate with the JNA representatives and maintain communication with the Croatian Army. The three ministers Davorin Rudolf, Petar Kriste and Ivan Cifrić were situated in Dubrovnik during its heaviest attack and the day after they agreed to a truce with the JNA representatives. The Government supported the negotiations between the city military and civil representatives and JNA because it wanted to procrastinate with the attacks and buy some time to strengthen the military and international position of Croatia. On the other hand, the Government and Tuđman strongly opposed to intentions of "demilitarization" of Dubrovnik which would surrender its arms to the JNA under the supervision of representatives of the international community, i.e. surrender of the city to the aggressor. Second most important task of the Government was the struggle for international recognition. The establishment of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs showed all the problems of the political structures that young democratic state had to face. Such problems refer to lack of experience as well as technical and financial resources. The Government cooperated with the European Community and the United Nations. Although, Tuđman was the designer of the Forreign Affairs and the Government often had to put into action his decisions, during the Conference of peace in Hague it showed some differentiation, such as declaring it would abort the attending of the Conference unless JNA left Croatia. After the arms embargo in September 1991, the Croatian Government deprived of the right of representation of Croatia in the UN Budimir Lončar and Darko Šilović, due to their role in instigating the decision of the UN regarding embargo. The Government Memorandum, addressed to ministerial Council of the EC in November 22, stated that economic sanctions of the Roman declaration of November 8 would affect mostly Croatia. Such view showed a certain degree of independence of the Democratic Unity Government. The Government accepted the Vance plan but argued the methods of its implementation. The activity of the Government in Forreign Affairs reflects in numerous official and unofficial meetings and encounters with various politicians and statesmen. The main task of the Government members was to appeal to stop the war and recognize Croatia, but they also had to struggle against Serbian propaganda which spread lies about rehabilitation of Ustasha and Independent State of Croatia (NDH) and portrayed president Tuđman and the Croatian Government as anti-Semitic. In that context, some think that the Croatian Government and leadership in general, provided insufficient to the international public. In this research, I also analyzed social politics of the Democratic Unity Government, that is, politics towards Croatian displaced persons and refugees as well as Bosnian-Herzegovinian refugees during 1991 and 1992. At the very beginning of the aggression against Croatia, new Croatian Government had to face refugee crisis. Forcible relocations of the Croatian civilians, among which some moved into safe areas in Croatia, while others left the country, induced Government to, with the term "refugee", which refers to those persons who had to emigrate their own country, introduce another one – "displaced persons", which referred to those civilians who hadn't left Croatia, only were displaced to some other territory within the country. Government also adopted some measures to secure accommodation for the displaced persons and refugees by emptying hotels and resorts and founding of the Office for the displaced persons and refugees in November 1991. Funds for the displaced persons and refugees Government secured mostly from the state budget, while all requests for financial help from the international community were unsuccessful. Consequently, in that period Croatia funded also Bosnian-Herzegovinian refugees from its budget, while the international community helped only with humanitarian help. In this chapter the Government activity in prevention of persecution of the civilian population was discussed through several examples. In that aspect, its activities were mostly limited to addressing the international community. In the case of Ilok, from where in October 1991 approximately 10.000 people were banished, Government founded the Commission of the Parliament and Government to try to stop the persecution, but it failed to achieve its goal, since the persecution had already begun. After the fall and occupation of Vukovar in November 1991, the Government organized evacuation of approximately 15.000 people, but it was carried out only partially. The Government didn't have control over the war zone, which means that its opportunities for safe and efficient evacuation were highly limited. One of the main plans for the displaced persons and refugees was Government's Return Program, which began its realization only after the end of the war and peaceful reintegration of Podunavlje in 1998. Economic politics of the Democratic Unity Government was reflected in its independence from Serbia. Following measures and decisions of the previous Croatian Government, on the day of its establishment, Democratic Unity Government broke off economic relations with Serbia, however only partially. Those companies with strong business ties with some companies in Serbia, had liberty to continue their cooperation. The export to Serbia and Montenegro was limited only to some "strategic" raw materials and products, such as petroleum. The Government also introduced its own currency, hrvatski dinar (HRD). One of the main achievements of the Government was that it avoided the transit to "war economy", in spite of the increased military spending. Since priority of the Croatian Government was determined by war, its activities gravitated towards repair of the enormous war damage in transport, utility and residential infrastructure. In the end of 1991 the Government established the Ministry of Reconstruction, while in the first half of 1992 the Government composed the Reconstruction Program and its Financial Plan that was adopted by the Croatian Parliament in June 1992. Nevertheless, because of the status quo imposed by the UNPROFOR, located on the occupied territories in Croatia, the reconstruction of the country began after the war had ended in 1995. Analyzed activities of the Government in the Defense policy, Foreign Affairs, as well as its Social and Economic policy raise the question of the Government's independence regarding Tuđman and Croatian Parliament. Considering the semi-presidential system, the Government was the executive authority of the president of the Republic and Croatian Parliament. Government also had legislative powers authorized by the Parliament, because in the wartime a great number of important decisions had to be made in a very short amount of time. The Government was not only the executive body of the President, but it also functioned as his close associate. That manifests mostly through the measures for emergency readiness in August and September 1991. Sometimes, the Government had to step out of its Constitutional powers if developments on the battlefield required it to, for example regarding the decisions about Vukovar, November 17 1991. Regarding activities of the Government in the researched areas, it can be concluded that Democratic Unity Government had a high level of autonomy, taking into account the existing semi-presidential system. Nevertheless, the powers of the Government were limited in the Defense policy and Forregin Affairs, while on the other hand, it had complete autonomy in Internal Affairs, in this case, in its Social and Economic politics. An issue that requires special consideration in this research regards the opposition in Croatia during the mandate of the Democratic Unity Government. Some claim that with forming of the multiparty Government, the opposition in Croatia "disappeared". The remark is understandable considering that all the parliament parties signed the Agreement of Democratic Unity Government, which marked their transition from the opposition to coalition partners. But, did the opposition really "disappeared" form Croatian political life? Numerous public appearances of various representatives of opposition parties and parties in general, indicate otherwise. Activity of the opposition at the Parliament sessions from October 1991 to May and June 1992 shows agility of the opposition life in Croatia. From the beginning of the Democratic Unity Government in August till October, the opposition parties didn't raise any questions in public about some decisions of the Croatian leadership, but from October began severe criticism towards Tuđman and the Government. Discontent was expressed primarily to the acceptance of the Carrington's arrangement in Hague. Criticism of Foreign Affairs arose also after the acceptance of the Vance plan. In the last six months of its mandate, the Government was exposed to various pressures from the opposition and from one part of the HDZ, which reinforced especially after the international recognition at the beginning of 1992. Some opposition and nonpartisan ministers left the Government, whereas in April 1992 there was the reconstruction of the Government which changed significantly the personnel composition of the Government, resulting in the increase of the HDZ members. It was obvious that it was not the exact same Government from the beginning of August 1991 and that its end was near. In the new elections held August 2 1992, the HDZ defeated its opponents and ten days later, new, One-party Government was formed. Establishment and presented activities of the Democratic Unity Government is the proof of the democratic system in Republic of Croatia at the beginning of 1990s and counter-argument for theses about Tuđman's authoritarian style of rule. A multiparty Government, whose prominent members were opposition representatives, couldn't have been formed in an undemocratic or authoritarian system. Forming of the Grand Coalition merely one year after HDZ had won the elections, provides a valuable contribution to the study of Tuđman's policy, shows larger picture of the Croatian leadership and opens the door for further research of Croatian political life in the early 1990s.

O stanju privatnih šuma u RH u nekoliko smo navrata pisali u Uvodnicima Šumarskog lista, a 2017. godine "Stanje privatnih šuma u Republici Hrvatskoj" bila je stručna tema povodom obilježavanja Dana hrvatskoga šumarstva. Prema podacima Šumskogospodarske osnove područja Republike Hrvatske iz 2016. godine, površina šuma i šumskih zemljišta u RH iznosi 2 759 039,05 ha. Od ukupne površine u državnom je vlasništvu 2 097 318 ha (76 %), a 24 %, tj. 661 721 ha u vlasništvu je privatnih šumovlasnika. Članak 14. Zakona o šumama definira prema površini šuma i šumskog zemljišta privatne šumoposjednike na male s površinom šuma i/ili šumskog zemljišta do 20 ha, srednje s površinom šuma i/ili šumskog zemljišta većom od 20, a manjom od 300 ha i velike šumoposjednike s površinom šuma i/ili šumskog zemljišta većom od 300 ha. Prema toj klasifikaciji preko 99 % površina šuma i šumskog zemljišta pripada malim šumoposjednicima, njih 418 654, što daje prosječnu veličinu posjeda od 0,5 ha. Kao što ste već u uvodnom dijelu mogli zamijetiti, miješaju se pojmovi šumovlasnik i šumoposjednik, što je rezultat dvojnog vođenja zemljišnih knjiga kroz gruntovnicu i katastar, a njihova nesređenost otežava definiranja stvarnih odnosa. Rješavanje problema uređenja imovinsko-pravnih odnosa uvijek naglašavamo kao prioritet i prvi preduvjet stvaranja organiziranog društva. Isto tako vrijeme je da jasno razlučimo namjenu i korištenje šumskog i poljoprivrednog zemljišta. Od vremena Austro-ugarske monarhije, kada je napravljena prva razdioba, usprkos brojnim zakonskim odredbama, to još nismo učinili. Tako je primjerice velik dio šuma u privatnom vlasništvu nastao obraštanjem poljoprivrednog zemljišta, koje se još uvijek u zemljišnim knjigama vodi kao livada, pašnjak ili oranica. Istovremeno na apsolutnom šumskom zemljištu u državnim šumama podižemo maslinike i vinograde ili izdajemo dozvole za pašarenje??? Povijesne okolnosti definirale su danas izuzetno male posjede šumskog zemljišta u privatnom vlasništvu koji ne omogućuju kontinuirani prihod vlasnicima, već se jednokratnim zahvatom pokušava izvući što veća financijska korist bez pridržavanja potrajnosti, osnovnog načela u šumarstvu. Svijest o potrebi funkcionalnog udruživanja i planiranja šumskouzgojnih zahvata na razini odjela i odsjeka kod naših šumovlasnika nažalost još nije zaživjela, pa se usprkos tomu što za većinu privatnih šuma imamo izrađene programe gospodarenja, ono se u praksi svodi na nepovezane zahvate na pojedinim česticama. U privatnim šumama malih posjednika sve se češće događaju kriminalne radnje vezane za sječu bez doznake, krađu, izvođenje radova pridobivanja drveta od neregistriranih ili nelicenciranih izvođača, nekontrolirano stavljanje drveta u promet, nelegalna trgovina drvetom itd. Nepostojeća jasna i transparentna (tržišna) politika formiranja cijena drveta u Hrvatskoj pogoduje raznim preprodavačima, a vrijedna sirovina bez ikakve kontrole obično završava na stranom tržištu. Sve to navodi nas na razmišljanje o odgovornosti, države kao zakonodavca i njenog odnosa prema toj kategoriji privatnog vlasništva, ali i općeg dobra zaštićenog Ustavom RH. Postavimo ovdje pitanje odgovornosti cijele šumarske struke i njenih institucija, kao i naših kolega ovlaštenih inženjera koji često na terenu provode doznaku, ili otpremu, po načelu "od nečega se mora živjeti". Ako svi, kao što to čini struka, zažmirimo pred ovim problemom, teško da ćemo se u budućnosti moći hvaliti tradicijom potrajnog i prirodnog gospodarenja našim šumama. Prvi preduvjet uvođenja reda u privatnim šumama malih posjednika je organiziranje čuvarske službe. Prema aktualnom ZOŠ-u čuvanje šuma prepušteno je vlasnicima, što je s obzirom na njihovo stanje i dobnu strukturu praktički neprovedivo, ili je dana mogućnost da to obavljaju Udruge šumoposjednika, što se opet u praksi rijetko događa. Kroz povijest uvijek su postojali čuvari šume, bili to općinski (sreski) lugari do sredine 20. stoljeća ili su to donedavno kod nas obavljali djelatnici Hrvatskih šuma. Kako bi riješili ovu situaciju postoji nekoliko opcija: Þ Vratiti nadležnost Hrvatskih šuma d.o.o. preregistracijom ove tvrtke. Þ Osigurati provođenje čuvarske službe kroz lokalnu samoupravu, kao što je to bilo propisano prethodnim ZOŠ-om, no u praksi nije bilo sprovedeno. Þ Osnovati "Šumsku policiju" s jasnim ovlastima koja će osigurati red i spriječiti kriminalne radnje. Þ Osnovati Državnu instituciju (agenciju) za šume, koja bi provodila javne ovlasti i interese neovisno o vlasništvu nad šumama i omogućila bi smisleno i sveobuhvatno planiranje i gospodarenje šumama na svim razinama. Uredništvo ; The status of private forests in the Republic of Croatia has been treated in the Editorial section of the Forestry Journal on several occasions, and in 2017 "The status of private forests in the Republic of Croatia" was a topic discussed at the Day of Croatian Forestry. According to the Forest Management Plan of the Republic of Croatia from 2016, forests and forestland in Croatia cover 2,759,039.05 ha. Of the overall area, state owned forests account for 2,097,318 a (76 %), while privately owned forests account for 661,721 ha (24 %). Article 14 of the Law on Forests classifies private forest owners into three groups: small owners with forests and/or forestland of up to 20 ha, medium owners with forests and/or forestland of more than 20 ha but less than 300 ha, and large forest owners with forest area and/or forestland exceeding 300 ha. According to this classification, over 99 % of the area of forests and forestland are owned by small forest owners (418,654 owners), which means that the average size of the forest property is 0.5 ha. As you may have noticed in the introductory part, there is an ambiguity relating to the terms forest owner and forest holder, which is the result of the dual keeping of land books through the land register and cadastre. Their unsettled status makes it more difficult to define real relationships. We always stress that the regulation of property-legal relations is the priority and the first precondition for creating an organized society. We must also make a clear distinction between the purpose and the use of forest and agricultural land. The first division was made during the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, but despite numerous legal provisions we have not yet done so since. Thus, for example, a large part of privately owned forests came into being by agricultural land being overgrown, but in land registers they are still registered as meadows, pastures, or ploughland. At the same time, we raise olive groves and vineyards or issue permits for grazing over an absolute forest land in state forests??? Due to historical circumstances, there are exceptionally small areas of forestland in private ownership today, and as such they do not ensure continuous income to their owners. Instead, there is an attempt to derive as much financial profit as possible through one operation without adhering to the principle of sustainability, the fundamental principle in forestry. The awareness of the need to functionally merge and plan silvicultural treatments at the level of compartments and sub-compartments has regrettably not yet taken root among Croatian forest owners. Therefore, despite the fact that management plans have been drawn for most private forests, in practice management is reduced to disconnected operations in individual plots. Private forests of small forest holders are witnessing an increase in criminal actions such as felling without marking, theft, timber extraction by unregistered or unlicenced contractors, uncontrolled placing of timber on the market, illegal timber trade, etc. The absence of clear and transparent (market) price forming policy in Croatia favours various resellers, while valuable raw material, usually without any control, ends up on foreign markets. All this makes us think about the responsibility of the state as a legislator and its attitude towards this category of private property, but also towards the common good protected by the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia. Let us also tackle the responsibility of the entire forestry profession and its institutions, as well as our colleagues, certified engineers, who mark trees or dispatch timber in the field guided by the principle "one must have something to live on". If we, as a profession, turn a blind eye to this problem, we will hardly be able to boast in the future of the tradition of sustainable and close-to-nature management of our forests. The first precondition for installing the order in private forests of small holders involves setting up a guard service. According to the valid Law on Forests, the guarding of forests is the responsibility of their owners, which is practically unfeasible given their condition and age structure, or this could be done by forest owners' associations, which again rarely happens in practice. Throughout history there have always been forest guards. Until the mid-20th century they were municipal (regional) forest rangers, and until very recently this job was performed by employees of the company Croatian Forests. There are several options which might solve this situation: Þ Restore the jurisdiction of Croatian Forests Ltd by re-registering the company. Þ Implement guard services through local self-government bodies, similar to the regulations set down in the previous Law on Forests; however, this was not applied in practice. Þ Establish a "Forest Police" service with clearly defined powers to ensure order and prevent criminal activities. Þ Establish a State Forest Institution (Agency), which will exercise public powers and promote interests independently of forest ownership, as well as enable meaningful and comprehensive planning and management at all levels. Editorial Boards

Baski, manjinski narod sa svojim zasebnim jezikom i kulturom, stoljećima je podijeljen između Španjolske i Francuske. U Francuskoj Baski nemaju status manjine ni institucionalnu autonomiju. U Španjolskoj, međutim, nakon teškog razdoblja Francove diktature i preustrojstva Španjolske 1978. na kvazifederalnom načelu, španjolski Baski dobivaju priznanje nacionalne posebnosti te znatnu institucionalnu autonomiju kroz tzv. Autonomnu zajednicu (AZ) Baskiju. Unatoč zadovoljavanju većine aspiracija Baska u Španjolskoj, u španjolskoj Baskiji i dalje je prisutan secesionizam, dok taj fenomen u francuskom dijelu Baskije gotovo da i ne postoji. Cilj disertacije bio je, binarnom studijom i dizajnom najsličnijih slučajeva, koristeći se kvalitativno-kvantitativnom metodom, istražiti je li autonomija, umjesto zadovoljavanja španjolskih Baska statusom u okviru Španjolske, pridonijela jačanju njihova nacionalizma i secesionizma. Ovi fenomeni obrađeni su kroz tri prizme: izgradnju subdržavnih institucija, izgradnju subdržavnih identiteta i izgradnju lokalnih elita. Uočeno je da je autonomija u španjolskoj Baskiji pridonijela izgradnji protodržave, od demokratski izabranog Parlamenta, preko izvršne vlasti, do djelomično izgrađenog sigurnosnog aparata. Iako usporen rascjepima u baskijskom društvu uslijed demografske heterogenosti, na djelu je proces izgradnje subdržavne baskijske nacije. Autonomija je omogućila i izgradnju lokalnih elita, dolazak baskijskih nacionalista na vlast, kao i stranačko nadmetanje u baskijskom nacionalizmu. Sve to omogućilo je i da AZ Baskija krene izrazito "baskijskim" smjerom. Ona je potencijalno samo korak do pune neovisnosti, kojoj nedostaje još "prozor mogućnosti", koji se dogodio npr. raspadom bivših komunističkih federacija. U francuskoj Baskiji ne postoji teritorijalna, odnosno institucionalna autonomija. Ne dajući im "prozor mogućnosti" za razvoj i jačanje, građanska i unitarna država u Francuskoj odigrale su značajnu ulogu u ublažavanju baskijskog nacionalizma i secesionizma. Slučajevi španjolske i francuske Baskije pokazali su kako (ne)postojanje autonomije znatno utječe na periferni nacionalizam i secesionizam, kao i na potencijal za secesiju. ; In the last couple of years, the rise of secessionism in several democratic, Western European countries - from the United Kingdom (Scotland) and Belgium (Flanders) to Spain (Catalonia and the Basque Country) has been noted. All of them have something in common. In addition to having a heterogeneous ethnic structure, that is, the existence of distinct historical ethnic communities, all of these states have also, in the last couple of decades, gone through dramatic administrative and structural changes. From unitary states they had once been, they have transformed in a way which resulted in the introduction of either a certain degree of devolution or even in federalization. Consequently, historical ethnic communities have achieved a certain degree of autonomy, ranging from a partial and asymmetric decentralization ("devolution") as in the case of Scotland, to an extensive autonomy of the so-called autonomous communities of Spain. The intention of the central state and the legislator has been, inter alia, to safeguard the state unity and strengthen the state by accommodating the grievances of ethnic communities and their elites. The final outcome, however, has often been adverse to initial intentions. In the newly formed administrative units, "proto-states" of the ethnic minorities, there has been a rise in nationalism and secessionism. The purpose of this dissertation is to tackle this phenomenon and explore the causal relationship of autonomy and nationalism/secessionism. That is, the idea whether the autonomy itself strengthened nationalism and secessionism in the autonomous territories, thus acting as "subversive institutions" towards the central State, has been examined. In order to test the hypothesis and the arguments of the theory of subversive institutions, a dual comparison of two cases, Spanish and French Basque Country, and the most similar systems design have been used. The most similar systems design holds that the two cases share many common features and differ in only one. For instance, French and Spanish Basque Country are situated in the same region, share common language and ethnic origins; they are both parts of wider nation-states, face situation of diglossia etc. A differing feature, in this case, autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country – Autonomous Community of the Basque Country –Euskadi, is held responsible for the different outcome (stronger peripheral nationalism and secessionism). The choice of these two cases has been prompted by the fact that they may be considered the most similar cases in extremis, given that it is the same people on the two sides of the state border.The Basques, minority group with their own language and culture, for centuries have been divided among Spain and France. In France of today the Basques enjoy neither status of a national minority nor an institutional autonomy. In Spain, however, after a difficult period of Franco's dictatorship and the country's restructuring in 1978 on a quasi-federal principle, the Spanish Basques got acknowledgement of their national uniqueness (through a status of a nationality), and the Basque Country gained a significant institutional autonomy through so-called Autonomous Community of the Basque Country. In spite of the accommodation of most of the Spanish Basques' grievances, both on a tangible level (economic, political and cultural) and on a symbolic level (national and state symbols), the Spanish Basque Country still faces secessionism, while that phenomenon is hardly visible in its French counterpart. The dissertation explores whether the autonomy, instead of accommodating the Spanish Basques in the framework of the Spanish State, has contributed to the growth of their nationalism and secessionism. Conversely, the dissertation explores also whether the French civic state has contributed to attenuation of the peripheral, in this case, Basque nationalism. In France there are no "autonomic" institutions, but as a result of political and societal changes in France and external pressure from the South, i.e. from the Spanish Basque Country (spill over effect or Galton's problem), a "new governance" with specially designed institutions has been developed to partially accommodate the Basque grievances. Deprived of any substantial competences, executive or financial, they are a pale shadow of their Spanish counterparts. However, precisely for that, they serve as a good example to make comparative research in order to show the immense difference the autonomy per se can make. The research relies on the Valerie Bunce' s theory of "subversive institutions", which she tested on the cases of the former communist federations Soviet Union (USSR), Czechoslovakia (CSFR) and Yugoslavia (SFRY). Valerie Bunce (1999), explaining the collapse of former communist federations USSR, CSFR and SFRY, put forward a thesis that their design created preconditions for creating states within state. Consequently, the structure itself brought about the collapse of the communist bloc, and within it, of the federations USSR, CSFR and SFRY. Therefore, Bunce holds that the federalism created nations at the republican level or, if they had already been "defined", the federalism strengthened them. In other words, federal structure where the autonomous/federal units enjoyed relatively wide autonomy, in the long term acted centrifugally and finally led to the collapse of states (federations). With the advent of Gorbatchev and perestroika, consequent abandoning of the Brezhnev doctrine, and array of events that brought upon the collapse of communism and of federations, federal units – new "nations-in-the-making", took advantage of the situation ("window of opportunity") and proclaimed their independence.Bunce's theory and arguments have been applied on the situation in Spain. In the second case of the French Basque Country, and especially in the following comparative analysis, the situation in Spain can be/ is compared with the situation in France. It is thus possible to test the hypothesis on subversive institutions and to note the differences produced by the existence of autonomy in Spain. Bunce's theory has been tested on Spain (Spanish Basque Country) particularly for its quasi-federal structure of so-called autonomous communities (comunidades autónomas), or in Spanish jargon, Autonomías. Spanish autonomías provide a certain framework of a proto-state, nation-state, "state-in-waiting", and strengthen the centrifugal forces and local nationalism in a way, maybe to a lesser extent, but similarly as former republics of the ex-socialist federations. There comes the idea to test the theory of subversive institutions on Spain, i.e. Spanish Basque Country. In the introductory chapters of the dissertation, the phenomena of identity and nationalism have been tackled, followed by the theory of subversive institutions, as well as other supportive theories of the official nationalism (Anderson, 1990), path dependency (Krasner, 1984) and logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen, 2009). Finally, the three main arguments of the theory of subversive institutions have been elaborated, as well as the fourth, "counter argument". The two case studies follow, of the Spanish and the French Basque Country, structured in the same or very similar way. Firstly, the phenomenon of the Basque identity, its formation and its specifics for each of the two cases, has been elaborated. Secondly, the relation of the State towards the Basques and their identity has been examined in more depth. Within that framework, process of state building and other "counter-subversive action" of the state, with the aim of diminishing the peripheral nationalism and secessionism, has been tackled. Separate chapters have been dedicated to the transition to autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country (and to the Spanish Estado de las Autonomías /State of Autonomies) Bunce's theory and arguments have been applied on the situation in Spain. In the second case of the French Basque Country, and especially in the following comparative analysis, the situation in Spain can be/ is compared with the situation in France. It is thus possible to test the hypothesis on subversive institutions and to note the differences produced by the existence of autonomy in Spain. Bunce's theory has been tested on Spain (Spanish Basque Country) particularly for its quasi-federal structure of so-called autonomous communities (comunidades autónomas), or in Spanish jargon, Autonomías. Spanish autonomías provide a certain framework of a proto-state, nation-state, "state-in-waiting", and strengthen the centrifugal forces and local nationalism in a way, maybe to a lesser extent, but similarly as former republics of the ex-socialist federations. There comes the idea to test the theory of subversive institutions on Spain, i.e. Spanish Basque Country. In the introductory chapters of the dissertation, the phenomena of identity and nationalism have been tackled, followed by the theory of subversive institutions, as well as other supportive theories of the official nationalism (Anderson, 1990), path dependency (Krasner, 1984) and logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen, 2009). Finally, the three main arguments of the theory of subversive institutions have been elaborated, as well as the fourth, "counter argument". The two case studies follow, of the Spanish and the French Basque Country, structured in the same or very similar way. Firstly, the phenomenon of the Basque identity, its formation and its specifics for each of the two cases, has been elaborated. Secondly, the relation of the State towards the Basques and their identity has been examined in more depth. Within that framework, process of state building and other "counter-subversive action" of the state, with the aim of diminishing the peripheral nationalism and secessionism, has been tackled. Separate chapters have been dedicated to the transition to autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country (and to the Spanish Estado de las Autonomías /State of Autonomies) after the 1978 Constitution, possess almost the entire state administration. One of the 17 autonomous communities, Autonomous Community of the Basque Country - Euskadi has a clearly defined territory, a democratically elected Parliament (officially called the Basque Parliament), a Government, officially called the Basque Government, ministries (called departamentos, departments, headed by consejeros, counselors), a Prime Minister, Lehendakari, with some prerogatives of a President, including state honours and palace. His office includes a mini Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Acción Exterior – External Action), with its delegations abroad. Thus, the Basque Government can project its image abroad. The autonomous administration has some 60 000 employees, to which one has to add the 30 000 employees of the provincial and communal administration, and disposes of a 10.6 billion € budget. At the same time, the central state administration in the Basque Country counts only 15 000 employees. Euskadi disposes of its own police forces Ertzaintza. As mentioned before, several authors argue that with such a developed administrative apparatus, a "segment-state", in our case the Spanish Autonomous Community of the Basque Country- Euskadi, has been in power for most of the post-1978 Constitution period. Its institutions are consequently able to act as centrifugal ("subversive") institutions, transmitting nationalist messages through media, education system, and regional institutions. But their nationalist message is not of Spanish, but of peripheral, in this case, Basque nationalism. Given the specific, unfavourable linguistic situation of diglossia, and the importance of language for national (and Basque) identity, the Basque Governments took it as a mission to restore to the Basque language a status of a full-fledged official and education language, in a sense of Gellner's "language of high culture" (1998). (Re)Introducing the Basque language, not only in schools and universities, but literary everywhere, rebasquisating Euskadi, a Basque identity has been (re)enforced. Nowadays almost all institutions under the competence of local, autonomous institutions in the Spanish Basque Country are obliged to adopt Action plans or Five-year plans on the language normalization, that is, reinforced use of the Basque language. The Basque Government, in that way projects certain ideology and builds up and strengthens the Basque national identity. A new, Basque nation is being built.The statistics speak for themselves. Before the autonomy, that is, before 1978/1980, education language was 100% Spanish. Nowadays, only a tiny 0.5% of students study exclusively in Spanish (so called Model X), and 15.3% in Model A, with education in Spanish, and Basque language as one of the subjects. 18.9% study in bilingual schools (Model B) and the high 65.3% study in Basque schools (Model D), with Spanish language as one of the subjects. The presence of the Basque language is enforced in other areas as well. For instance, in public administration the targeted percentage of Basque speakers should be 48.46% and it should increase with the rise of knowledge of the Basque language in general population. Moreover, the presence of the Basque language is checked regularly in yearly evaluation reports. In the Parliament, in 2005-2009 legislature, 56% of deputies spoke Basque, while in 2013 the percentage rose to 68,5%. At the University of the Basque Country, in Academic year 1995/1996, 27.2% of the students studied in Basque, while in 2013/2014 the percentage rose to 64.3%. The number of bilingual professors (Basque and Spanish) rose from 35.1% in 2006 to 47.8% in 2013. Similar processes can be followed everywhere.As far as identity is concerned, the 35% of the interviewees in the opinion polls conducted by the University of the Basque Country declare themselves as "only Basques", 21% as "more Basque than Spanish", 35% "equally Basque and Spanish", 3% "more Spanish" and 3% "only Spanish". As it can be noted, Basque identity prevails, with a significant percentage of dual identity. Spanish identity (more or exclusively Spanish) is quite low. Opinion polls also testify of the presence of a strong local (Basque) patriotism, and at the same time, mistrust in Spanish State institutions. For example, 62% of the interviewees show trust in the Basque Government, 61% in the Basque Parliament and Basque police Ertzaintza, while only 39% in the King, 15% in the Spanish Cortes and 11% in the Spanish Government. Trust in the Basque Prime Minister is 56%, while in the Spanish Prime Minister it is only 7%. Regarding the attitude towards secessionism, 35% of interviewees support the present autonomous status, 29% favour federation (which understands a more autonomy), 7% favour more centralization and 25% favour secession. Although the latter percentage alone seems low as to provide proof of secessionism in stricto senso, the sum of the all percentages, except for 7% for centralization, should be taken into consideration if secessionism were to be regarded in a wider sense (as peripheral nationalism; autonomism and secessionism; Horowitz, 1985). From the data above, the conclusion can be drawn that the process of Basque nation-building maybe has not finished yet, but is well under way and that there is a "Basque direction" of the Euskadi. As for the Basque language in the French Basque Country, though it is increasingly present in its schools, public institutions and society, it still does not enjoy an official status. The improvement of linguistic situation is only partially due to the incitement on the part of the authorities. There is an immense difference from Spain. The French state after 1980-s allowed more freedom and space for "regional languages" to be taught, but did not impose it, force it by "dictate", as has been in the case of Euskadi. The main credit for the improvement of status of the Basque language is due to the efforts of the civil society, associations and citizens themselves. The results, comparing the Spanish and the French Basque Country, vary accordingly. Only 36,6% of school children attend some Basque language classes, while in Spanish Basque Country it is 99,5%. There is the Public Office of the Basque Language (OPLB), that helps and promotes teaching Basque language in the French Basque Country, but it has no authority to impose the Basque language in education as the Viceconsejería de Política Lingüística of the Gobierno Vasco and the Gobierno Vasco in the Spanish Basque Country. Only 11% of the interviewees feel "only Basques", 5% "more Basques", 24% "equally Basques and French", 16% "more French and 36% "only French". In the French Basque Country, the French identity and the French language in both education and society prevail. There is no "Basque direction" or Basque nation-building process. The third argument of the theory of subversive institutions is about elites' building. In Euskadi, there is the local (Basque) Parliament, where the Basque nationalists have dominated since the first elections after the establishment of autonomy (1980), with an average of 60% of votes/seats, except for the period 2009-2012 (due to a ban of the Basque radicals before the elections). In the current legislature, 2012-2016, the nationalists (moderate PNV-EAJ and radical EH Bildu) have 48 out of 75 seats. That means that they have been able to impose a "Basque direction", e.g. policies of rebasquization (termed language normalization), or vote the Ibarretxe Plan. There are also numerous examples of party competition in nationalism and local patriotism, e.g. the issue of Basque language use, flag, coat of arms or anthem. In the French Basque Country, due to non-existence of a local Parliament or self-rule, there are no such phenomena. There have been since decades Basque nationalist parties, and they score up to 10% of the votes. Nowadays, there is also a Basque nationalist party, AB (Abertzaleen Batasuna), which is relatively successful at the lower, communal level, having around 100 councillors. However, the non-existence of a Basque administrative unit,département, and centralist French electoral and administrative system, result in a situation where only two Basque nationalist councillors managed to enter the General Council of the Département Pyrénées-Atlantiques, of which French Basque Country is a part. And there they are only two of the 54 councillors. Therefore, even if at the lower, communal level, Basques nationalists can enter the local communes and be part of ruling coalitions, or form associations of local councillors and mayors, they cannot impose a more "Basque direction" of the whole French Basque Country, like their Spanish Basque counterparts. The autonomy, embodied in the Euskadi's Basque parliament, enabled Basque nationalists in the Spanish Basque Country (Autonomous Community of the Basque Country – Euskadi) to come to power at the local level and to direct the (Spanish) Basque Country towards a "Basque direction". In addition, it helped also to build up their own elites – party elites and leaders, Government and Parliament dignitaries, above all the Prime Minister- Lehendakari, local public company managers, University, Academy, institutes' directors etc. If a potential future new country needs the infrastructure (i.e. state administration, the framework), it also needs identity/ideology and leaders (the contents and experts). And here they are! Not only are they in place, but they are in power! Finally, having their own Basque University will help to reproduce new Basque elites. In contrast, the French Basque Country does not possess almost any of the above. Indeed, the difference produced by autonomy is immense. A special attention has been given to the Ibarretxe Plan which represents at the same time a peak of the autonomy, but also shows its limits. Juan Jose Ibarretxe, Euskadi's Prime Minister (Lehendakari) from 1999 to 2009, put forward in 2003 his Proposal for Reform of the Political Statute of Community of Euskadi, popularly known as Ibarretxe Plan. It was actually a proposal for a confederation between the Basque Country and Spain. The relations between them would be based on a "free association"(Art.1). Without going into details of the Proposal, suffice it to say that, had it been enacted, even without a completely independent Basque Country, it would mean the end of Spain as we know it today. The Plan was approved by the Basque Government in 2003, and a year later, by the Basque Parliament, although with a narrow majority of 39 out of 75 votes. However, in order to be enacted, the Proposal should have passed in the Spanish Parliament. It was not surprising that the Spanish Parliament had rejected any discussion about it. Today a Spanish "carte blanche" for an independent Basque Country seems completely unimaginable. Nevertheless, remembering the "velvet divorce" of Czech and Slovak Republics and bearing in mind as well the development of situation in Catalonia, one cannot exclude, under different circumstances and leadership in Madrid and Euskadi, a possibility of a "new Ibarretxe Plan" leading to a "velvet divorce" and eventually to an independent Basque Country. To conclude, the autonomy enabled institutions (Parliament/Argument 1), nurtured Basque identity (Argument 2), enabled Basque nationalists to come to power, created a space for Basque elites and leaders and created space or even incentives for party competition in Basque nationalism (Argument 3). The thing the autonomy has not produced, and that lacks for secessionists, is a "window of opportunity" (Bunce, 1999). But if the "window" opens, as in the case of e.g. Czechoslovak "velvet divorce", an opportunity for a potential sovereign Basque state could be created. The comparative analysis has showed more sharply the differences between the two cases resulting from the existence of the autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country (Autonomous Community of the Basque Country- Euskadi) and its absence in the French Basque Country. While in Euskadi the nationalists have since 1980 scored around 60% of the votes in the Basque Parliament and dominated local politics for most of the time, in the French Pays Basque they never score more than 10% and have always been quite irrelevant at the regional local level (except for the lower local level of municipalities). The Basque identity prevailed in Euskadi and French in the Pays Basque. The Basque nationalists have been able to impose a "Basque direction" and an intensive "basquization" within the language normalization policy in Euskadi, which has not been the case in Pays Basque. Finally, a serious sovereignist/secessionist attemps – Ibarretxe Plan occurred, materialized, and was voted in the Basque Parliament of Euskadi, while in the Pays Basque anything of a kind is beyond imagination. There is no French Basque Government to conceive such a plan, no French Basque Parliament as a forum where such a Plan could be voted and no prevalence of Basque nationalists to vote such a plan…All of these phenomena are direct or indirect results of the autonomy or were allowed and fostered by the autonomic institutions in the Spanish Basque Country. Conversely, they are missing in the French Basque Country due to lack of autonomy. The two cases confirmed the hypothesis that the autonomy in ethno-federal arrangements fosters peripheral nationalism and secessionism and a potential for secession, while civic State attenuates them. Interestingly enough, even the consultative institutions of the French "new governance", initially quite powerless, managed to acquire some of the features of the "subversive institutions". They have become increasingly "Basque" and have taken a "Basque direction". However, the civic, centralised and unitary State prevented these institutions stripped of a real power from taking a lead in the Basque nationalism, to gain any significant power, or to direct the French Basque Country in any "Basque direction". The civic State in France indeed acted in attenuating peripheral, Basque nationalism by not providing it a "window of opportunity" to grow.