Suchergebnisse

"Die neuesten Daten haben es offiziell besiegelt: Latinos sind zur größten Minderheit in den USA geworden, noch vor den Schwarzen. Und ihre Zuwachsraten sind weiter rasant. Diese Latinoisierung der USA verändert nicht nur Bild und Selbstverständnis der US-Gesellschaft, sie bringt auch grundlegende Veränderungen für die Politik der USA und für die Beziehungen zwischen den USA und den Staaten Lateinamerikas. Das "voto latino" wird von den Parteien umworben wie nie zuvor. In Lateinamerika sind die Überweisungen der Emigranten in den USA für viele Länder die wichtigste Devisenquelle geworden, noch vor allen Exporten. Einblicke in die Neue Welt "Latino-Amerikas"."(Brennpunkt Lat.am./DÜI)

"Dieser Beitrag behandelt die Implementation von Mikrokrediten sowie deren Folgen für die sozioökonomische Entwicklung der indischen Ureinwohner Adivasi in der Region Gudalur im indischen Bundesstaat Tamil Nadu. Die Fallstudie handelt von den individuellen Erfahrungen von 10 'self-help-groups'. Nach einer allgemeinen Einführung zum Thema Mikrokredite im 'International Year of Microcredit 2005' der UN werden die Probleme, Herausforderungen und Vorteile der Feldforschung reflektiert. Das Outcome des Mikrokreditprogramms für die Adivasi wird mit Bezug auf die Begriffe community-building, Emanzipation/ Geschlechterverhältnis und Einkommen beschrieben." (Autorenreferat)

Francophone Africa has been dominated to date by the political, economic and cultural repercussions of France's colonial rule. A major instrument to assert France's interests was the upkeep of a common monetary policy and currency, the CFA Franc. Although this has been increasingly resented by African politicians and economists, who wanted to replace it by a West African currency (the 'Eco') the CFA still prevails, due to the social network of French and African political leaders, the 'messieurs Afrique' who benefit from the system. Controversial international discussion concentrates on questions of sovereignty and formal political and economic questions. However, the rules of the informal sector proved to be at least as crucial in structuring the CFA-zone as the institutions and policies of the formal economic sector, including its monetary institutions. For decades, for example, prices of French imports were overpriced, due to protection by tied aid and other political and cultural non-tariff barriers to trade. The cost of this rent-seeking was carried not only by the French Treasury, who guarantees the peg, but by the French and EU taxpayers, who financed budgetary bail-outs and development aid, and last, but not least, by the poorer African member countries and social strata. Although this applies strictly speaking only to the CFA zone, there are strong indicators that things haven't changed much since then for Francophone Africa in general. The repercussions of rent-seeking in Francophone Africat impact up to date negatively on economic performance. For example, growth levels have been significantly lower since two decades compared with Anglophone competitors.

Die CFA-Zone galt vierzig Jahre lang als Selbstbedienungsladen der afrikanischen und französischen Elite im frankophonen Afrika. Mit der Abwertung des Franc CFA am 11.1.1994 brach der Mythos der Stabilität dieser von Frankreich garantierten Währung zusammen, und mit ihm auch das Weltbild der alten Garde frankophoner Politiker und Wirtschaftler. Letztere waren maßgeblich verantwortlich für die Krise der CFA-Zone, die - neben externen Ursachen - wesentlich auf interne sozioökonomische Faktoren zurückzuführen ist. Die Entscheidung über die Abwertung bedeutet einen Sieg der Technokraten über die alte Garde. Dieser Sieg ist aber ein Pyrrhussieg. Er bringt zwar eine Versachlichung der wirtschaftspolitischen Diskussionen und Entscheidungen mit sich; er zerstörte aber traditionelle gesellschaftliche Bande, ohne neue aufzubauen, und bringt die Gefahr gesellschaftlicher und politischer Desintegration mit sich. Auch nach Ansicht unabhängiger Ökonomen wurde mit der Entscheidung über die weiter aufrecht erhaltene feste Bindung des FCFA an den FF eine Chance zur eigenständigen Entwicklung Afrikas vertan.

"This article is organized as follows: in section 1, the authors discuss the Bordo et al. (2002) monetarist counterfactual analysis. Section 2 presents data. In section 3, the authors address the following question: referring to Keynes' definition of liquidity trap, they ask themselves whether there were episodes of liquidity trap over the pre and post 1929 crisis period and whether the Fed modified its reaction function in consequence? Following this, in section 4 and using a SVAR approach, the authors simulate how US economic activity would have reacted following an expansionary monetary policy after the 1929 crisis. In conclusion, the authors suggest a renewed monetary lesson from the past." (author's abstract)

"Die mexikanischstämmige Bevölkerung in den USA ist mit 27 Millionen Einwohnern zur größten nationalen Minderheitengruppe in den USA avanciert. Dies hat für beide Länder zunehmend auch politische Folgen. Mexican-Americans stehen wie nie zuvor in prominenten öffentlichen Ämtern im politischen Rampenlicht, sei es US-Justizminister Alberto González oder der im Mai zum Bürgermeister von Los Angeles gewählte Antonio Villaraigosa. Gleichzeitig sehen sich die USA vor der Herausforderung, angesichts des nicht abreißenden Stroms an mexikanischen Migranten ihre Immigrationspolitik zu reformieren. Doch auch in Mexiko sind es nicht mehr nur die Rücküberweisungen -für dieses Jahr auf 20 Mrd. US$ geschätzt und damit möglicherweise erstmals höher als die Einnahmen aus dem Erdölexport-, die immer bedeutender werden, auch als Akteure in der nationalen Politik gewinnen die Emigranten zunehmend an Gewicht. Ausdruck dessen ist die historische Entscheidung des mexikanischen Parlaments im Juni 2005, den im Ausland lebenden mexikanischen Bürgern das Wahlrecht einzuräumen." (Brennpkt. Lat.am/DÜI)

"Central and East European Countries (CEECs) have liberalised foreign trade almost completely and capital flows quite extensively. All have balance of trade deficits. Experts are worried because in some the current account deficit is high and still rising. Current account deficits could be an indicator of domestic companies' low competitiveness. However, also the contrary could be the case: The country's more dynamic industries may try to increase their position vis-a-vis foreign competitors through massive import of advanced technology, in this way enlarging the trade deficit. Not surprisingly, there are no clear indicators to warn of imminent crisis. Nor is there a generally accepted strategy for reducing proneness to crisis. During the financial crisis in East Asia, analysts identified current account deficits and the banking systems' fragility as the main financial problems. These can also be observed in CEECs. It is not just these current account deficits which continue to plague CEECs, but also relatively high inflation, weak financial systems and structural deficiencies. In fact, the preconditions for far-reaching financial market liberalisation were hardly met in the CEECs. Reversing this step now would be difficult, however, so governments and central banks are targeting ex post improvement of the preconditions. It was not possible within just a few years to create ownership structures in the CEECs enabling companies to modernise rapidly. The decisive exception was privatisation relying an FDI. For this reason, the Hungarian economy now seems quite sound. Capital flows have become an important factor in CEECs, both at company level and macroeconomically. Massive inflow can even more than offset the current account deficit, so increasing currency reserves and lessening vulnerability to currency crisis. It also means availability of additional funds, better capital allocation and capital transfers. On the other hand, if the net inflow continues for a longer period, then it also tends to expand the monetary basis and may feed inflation. It might be primarily attracted by expectation of quick gains thanks to high interest rates. This can push up the exchange rate and may ultimately elevate the real exchange rate to a level causing an unsustainable deficit in the current account. As experience from the Czech Republic illustrates, high interest rates may fail to protect the economy against a currency crisis. Another example is Russia, where in Summer 1998 a dramatic increase in interest rates did not prevent a currency crisis." (author's abstract)

Francophone Africa has been dominated to date by the political, economic and cultural repercussions of France's colonial rule. A major instrument to assert France's interests was the upkeep of a common monetary policy and currency, the CFA Franc. Although this has been increasingly resented by African politicians and economists, who wanted to replace it by a West African currency (the 'Eco') the CFA still prevails, due to the social network of French and African political leaders, the 'messieurs Afrique' who benefit from the system. Controversial international discussion concentrates on questions of sovereignty and formal political and economic questions. However, the rules of the informal sector proved to be at least as crucial in structuring the CFA-zone as the institutions and policies of the formal economic sector, including its monetary institutions. For decades, for example, prices of French imports were overpriced, due to protection by tied aid and other political and cultural non-tariff barriers to trade. The cost of this rent-seeking was carried not only by the French Treasury, who guarantees the peg, but by the French and EU taxpayers, who financed budgetary bail-outs and development aid, and last, but not least, by the poorer African member countries and social strata. Although this applies strictly speaking only to the CFA zone, there are strong indicators that things haven't changed much since then for Francophone Africa in general. The repercussions of rent-seeking in Francophone Africa impact up to date negatively on economic performance. For example, growth levels have been significantly lower since two decades compared with Anglophone competitors.

Given recent history it may be necessary to recall that the so-called Great Recession we have been
witnessing for more than five years now was, first and foremost, a crisis of financial markets. One reason
for rising debt levels at the outset of the crisis have been massive government expenditures to bail out
struggling and even failing banks. Yet, I argue that it falls short of a satisfactory explanation to simply view
political action as a rational response to "objective" political and economic problems.
Therefore, the fundamental question that underlays this study is: How did different institutional settings
influence diverging policy reactions to the financial crisis? To answer this question, this study compares
bank bailouts in France, Germany and the United Kingdom. Drawing upon the Varieties of Capitalism
literature, I identify four central, national institutions that have influenced political decision-making during
the financial crisis: the political system, traditions of market intervention, economic discourse and banking
and financial systems.
The French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, reverting to France's dirigiste tradition and resorting to a dense
elitist network, used bank bailouts to support the French financial industry and to create "national
champions". This sort of policy was accompanied by a non-liberal discourse criticising "excessive"
financial markets. In Germany, on the other hand, the government deliberated with a broad coalition of
political and market actors to create a bailout programme aiming at sustaining bank lending to the
industry. However, market actors were criticised on a moral and ethical basis and the ordo-liberal state
was considered as a necessary corrective safeguarding true economic freedom. Finally, the UK's "elected
dictator", Prime Minister Gordon Brown, used his political power and involved his close political allies to
carry out a bailout programme that was predominantly designed to defend the international
competitiveness of the British financial industry. Albeit market intervention was inevitable it was
announced as being temporarily and leaving as much problem solving as possible to the markets.

"Aus Anlass der Evaluierung des Max-Planck-Instituts für Gesellschaftsforschung entwickelt dieses
Working Paper einen Bezugsrahmen, in dem die Ergebnisse der am Institut betriebenen Forschung zur
europäischen Mehrebenenpolitik im Kontext der internationalen Literatur eingeordnet und diskutiert
werden können. Der Bezugsrahmen verbindet eine institutionelle Dimension (in der zwischen
supranationalen, verflochtenen und intergouvernementalen Interaktionsformen unterschieden wird) mit
einer Policy-Dimension (in der zwischen marktschaffenden, marktfördernden, markt-korrigierenden und
redistributiven Policy-Typen unterschieden wird). Da Interaktionsformen sich in ihrer
Konfliktregelungskapazität, und da Policy-Typen sich in ihrer Konfliktwahrscheinlichkeit unterscheiden,
kann die größere oder geringere Problemlösungsfähigkeit in einem bestimmten Politikfeld durch dessen
Lage in beiden Dimensionen erklärt werden." [Autorenreferat]

This article systematically reviews trends in numerous economic policy indicators in eighteen OECD countries since the early 1980s, synthesizing findings about the fate of states' economic interventionism from several customarily separate literatures. Rather than observing any paradigmatic policy shift, the review finds that policies with markedly different ideational foundations currently cohabitate. In line with non-interventionist prescriptions, policymakers have largely abandoned the intrusive heterodox 'power tools' of previous eras, while establishing new norms for monetary policy based on monetarist theory. However, this has not led to a full retreat of economic interventionism. Instead, policymakers are gradually developing a new, albeit more constrained, approach to promoting economic activity in line with selected distributional goals - here labelled the micro-interventionist state, or the 'Swiss Army Knife State', as it were. The cross-partisan appeal of the 'multi-tools' associated with this approach - such as horizontal industrial policy, active social policy, and strategic tax expenditures and procurement - partly stems from their versatility, as policymakers can use them to very different distributional ends. To better understand the politics and distributional consequences of contemporary economic policies, scholars need to take their versatility more seriously, shifting focus theoretically and empirically from how much to how policymakers intervene in the economy.

"Chiles sozialistischer Staatspräsident Ricardo Lagos, seit dem 11. März 2000 im Amt, kann mit seinem ersten Regierungsjahr zufrieden sein: Die Wirtschaft ist wieder kräftig gewachsen, das regierende Mitte-Links-Bündnis wurde bei den Kommunalwahlen im letzten Oktober mit 52,1% der Stimmen bestätigt. Allerdings treten die vergleichsweise hohen Arbeitslosenzahlen ebenso auf der Stelle wie die seit langem geplanten Reformen zur Arbeits- und Steuergesetzgebung. Dazu kommt der militanter werdende Konflikt mit den Mapuche, den Ureinwohnern im Süden des Landes. Zu alledem hängt mit der Anklageerhebung gegen Ex-Diktator Pinochet ein weiteres Damoklesschwert über den zivil-militärischen Beziehungen." (Brennpkt. Lat.am/DÜI)

Unter der Regierung von Jamil Mahuad wiederholte sich in Ekuador 1998/99 der Ablauf des Krisenszenariums von 1997/98, wenn auch mit zum Teil anderen Vorzeichen und unter erschwerten externen und kaum beeinflussbaren Bedingungen wie dem Verfall der Erdölpreise, der Exporte, der Kapital- und Investitionszufuhr sowie der El Nino-Flutkatastrophe. Die Bereitschaft von Seiten des Parlaments, der Parteien und Organisationen zur Unterstützung eines - verglichen mit Abdala Bucaram -integren Präsidenten, um das im lateinamerikanischen Vergleich immer weiter zurückfallende Land auf Sanierungs- und Entwicklungskurs zu bringen, war bisher äußerst gering. (Brennpkt. Lat.am/DÜI)