Suchergebnisse

Vlada demokratskog jedinstva nastala je u početcima otvorene velikosrpske agresije na Hrvatsku, ali i usred krize strateško-obrambene koncepcije. Tuđmanova politika čekanja i kupovanja vremena te izbjegavanja frontalnog i općeg sukoba s JNA, doveli su do javnog kritiziranja njegove obrambene politike od strane oporbe i dijela HDZ-a. U okolnostima sveobuhvatne agresije i, prema nekim navodima, očekivanja raskola u hrvatskoj politici, sredinom srpnja počela je rekonstrukcija postojeće Vlade. Novi mandatar Franjo Gregurić okupljao je kadrove za sastavljanje Vlade, a u tom razdoblju javila se ideja o potrebi proširenja Vlade i nekim nestranačkim kandidatima pa i predstavnicima oporbe. U samo dva-tri dana pregovora postignut je nacionalni konsenzus i potpisan Sporazum saborskih stranaka, čime je stvorena Vlada demokratskog jedinstva. Vlada se sastojala od devet parlamentarnih stranaka, od kojih je osam imalo svoje predstavnike u Vladi. Unatoč činjenici da je 1990-ih godina u Hrvatskoj na snazi bio polupredsjednički sustav koji je predsjedniku Republike davao prilično široke ovlasti, Vlada je na području obrambene i vanjske politike pokazivala određeni stupanj samostalnosti. Prema nekim tvrdnjama Vrhovno državno vijeće je ograničavalo slobodu djelovanja Vlade tako da se za svog jednogodišnjeg mandata Vlada trebala često boriti za veću samostalnost i slobodu djelovanja. S druge strane, Vlada je imala potpunu slobodu u unutarnjim poslovima, primjerice u njezinoj politici prema prognanicima i izbjeglicama, kao i u gospodarskoj politici. Unatoč tvrdnjama o "nestanku" oporbe u vrijeme te višestranačke vlade, s obzirom na to da su potpisivanjem Sporazuma o Vladi demokratskog jedinstva saborske stranke od oporbenih formalno postale koalicijske, dostupni izvori navode na drukčiji zaključak. Naime, predstavnici pojedinih oporbenih i ujedno koalicijskih stranaka od listopada 1991. godine često su kritizirali neke odluke vlasti, koje su se posebno odnosile na vanjsku politiku. Predmet njihovih kritika bile su ujedno Vladine i Tuđmanove uredbe sa zakonskom snagom. Vlada je posljednjih šest mjeseci svog mandata bila izložena pritiscima oporbe i dijela HDZ-a. Međunarodno priznanje Hrvatske i priprema za nove parlamentarne i predsjedničke izbore uzrokovali su pritiske na Vladu demokratskog jedinstva, što se prije svega očitovalo u odlascima određenih nestranačkih i oporbenih ministara, a kasnije dovelo i do velike travanjske rekonstrukcije Vlade u kojoj je u znatnoj mjeri promijenjen njezin sastav u korist HDZ-a. Vlada demokratskog jedinstva nastavila je djelovati do kolovoza, kad je nakon novih parlamentarnih izbora formirana nova, jednostranačka HDZ-ova vlada. ; After the democratic elections in Croatia in the spring of 1990 and the victory of Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), the new Croatian Government faced the Serbian insurgency which expressed approval for the Milošević's Greater-Serbian policy. The insurgency was supported by the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) that had disarmed Croatia just after the elections in May 1990. In the summer of 1991, the Yugoslav crisis aggravated. Previous occasional and sporadic conflicts between Croatian police forces and the Serbian insurgents escalated into the open aggression of Serbia, Montenegro and JNA against Croatia. In such conditions, Croatian leadership was conflicted about the defense policy. The disagreement caused the appearance of some fractions in the parliament parties, especially in HDZ. Some participants of Croatian politics in the early 1990s today assert that there were at least two main fractions in HDZ – the "moderate" one that supported Tuđman's policy based on avoiding head-on conflict with JNA, and the "radical" one that wanted to declare JNA and Serbia the aggressors on Croatia and to fight back. Some claim that the "radical" fraction even wanted to bring down Tuđman and replace him with someone else. There isn't enough evidence to verify such statements. It probably was the case of dissatisfaction with the situation on the battlefield. Some write about wide discontent and criticism of Tuđman regarding his defense policy, which was evident at the meetings of the main Board of HDZ in the middle of July, Supreme State Council in the end of July and parliamentary session in the beginning of August 1991. Regarding the attitude towards Tuđman, there is a widespread and simplified opinion that his party turned its back on him and that the opposition expressed him support. Exactly the opposite, the opposition, especially heads of the parties Croatian Social-Liberal Party (HSLS), Croatian democratic party (HDS), and Croatian People's party (HNS) expressed equal, or even more severe, criticism of Tuđman's defense policy. In that kind of atmosphere, the reconstruction of the Government resulted in the national consensus – Democratic Unity Government was formed. It was the third democratic Government and the first multiparty Government after the democratic elections. It is an example of a Grand coalition formed during the war in many countries. The main goal of the new Government was to create more effective defense policy that would gather all the necessary political and military structures and establish the unified command structure. That resulted in entering of the Crisis Staff into the Government and forming of the General Staff of the Croatian Army. In the first two months of its mandate, the Government proposed and adopted measures for emergency readiness in order to organize life in the crisis areas. One of those measures included the blockade of the JNA barracks which Tuđman approved September 13 1991. With the blockade, the previous measured and careful attitude of the Croatian leadership towards JNA shifted from passive to active. One part of the research discussed the role of the Government in defense of the cities of Vukovar and Dubrovnik. Regarding Vukovar, there are some controversies embodied in widespread claims that Croatian leadership "betrayed" and "sacrificed" Vukovar by not sending enough weaponry and ammunition. However, available sources, primarily transcripts and records of the Government sessions, suggest that Vukovar was the priority in the supply of weaponry and ammunition. Furthermore, some members of the Government and other representatives of the Croatian leadership visited Vukovar and Eastern-Slavonian battlefield. In the context of all the crisis areas on the Croatian battlefield, Vukovar was the most dominant topic at the Government sessions. At the session held November 17, the Government adopted a series of decisions pertaining to the protection of Vukovar civilians. In the appeals to the international organizations, Vukovar and Dubrovnik were the two most mentioned cities. As was the case with Vukovar, the Government sent weaponry and other military equipment, transported humanitarian aid to Dubrovnik and appealed for help. It is worth mentioning convoy "Libertas" which supplied humanitarian aid to the surrounded Dubrovnik and broke the naval blockade. Also, some Government members came by the convoy to Dubrovnik to show their support. At the end of November 1991, Government sent three of its ministers to Dubrovnik where they had to represent the Government and facilitate its operation in Southern Dalmatia, maintain contacts with the international organizations, negotiate with the JNA representatives and maintain communication with the Croatian Army. The three ministers Davorin Rudolf, Petar Kriste and Ivan Cifrić were situated in Dubrovnik during its heaviest attack and the day after they agreed to a truce with the JNA representatives. The Government supported the negotiations between the city military and civil representatives and JNA because it wanted to procrastinate with the attacks and buy some time to strengthen the military and international position of Croatia. On the other hand, the Government and Tuđman strongly opposed to intentions of "demilitarization" of Dubrovnik which would surrender its arms to the JNA under the supervision of representatives of the international community, i.e. surrender of the city to the aggressor. Second most important task of the Government was the struggle for international recognition. The establishment of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs showed all the problems of the political structures that young democratic state had to face. Such problems refer to lack of experience as well as technical and financial resources. The Government cooperated with the European Community and the United Nations. Although, Tuđman was the designer of the Forreign Affairs and the Government often had to put into action his decisions, during the Conference of peace in Hague it showed some differentiation, such as declaring it would abort the attending of the Conference unless JNA left Croatia. After the arms embargo in September 1991, the Croatian Government deprived of the right of representation of Croatia in the UN Budimir Lončar and Darko Šilović, due to their role in instigating the decision of the UN regarding embargo. The Government Memorandum, addressed to ministerial Council of the EC in November 22, stated that economic sanctions of the Roman declaration of November 8 would affect mostly Croatia. Such view showed a certain degree of independence of the Democratic Unity Government. The Government accepted the Vance plan but argued the methods of its implementation. The activity of the Government in Forreign Affairs reflects in numerous official and unofficial meetings and encounters with various politicians and statesmen. The main task of the Government members was to appeal to stop the war and recognize Croatia, but they also had to struggle against Serbian propaganda which spread lies about rehabilitation of Ustasha and Independent State of Croatia (NDH) and portrayed president Tuđman and the Croatian Government as anti-Semitic. In that context, some think that the Croatian Government and leadership in general, provided insufficient to the international public. In this research, I also analyzed social politics of the Democratic Unity Government, that is, politics towards Croatian displaced persons and refugees as well as Bosnian-Herzegovinian refugees during 1991 and 1992. At the very beginning of the aggression against Croatia, new Croatian Government had to face refugee crisis. Forcible relocations of the Croatian civilians, among which some moved into safe areas in Croatia, while others left the country, induced Government to, with the term "refugee", which refers to those persons who had to emigrate their own country, introduce another one – "displaced persons", which referred to those civilians who hadn't left Croatia, only were displaced to some other territory within the country. Government also adopted some measures to secure accommodation for the displaced persons and refugees by emptying hotels and resorts and founding of the Office for the displaced persons and refugees in November 1991. Funds for the displaced persons and refugees Government secured mostly from the state budget, while all requests for financial help from the international community were unsuccessful. Consequently, in that period Croatia funded also Bosnian-Herzegovinian refugees from its budget, while the international community helped only with humanitarian help. In this chapter the Government activity in prevention of persecution of the civilian population was discussed through several examples. In that aspect, its activities were mostly limited to addressing the international community. In the case of Ilok, from where in October 1991 approximately 10.000 people were banished, Government founded the Commission of the Parliament and Government to try to stop the persecution, but it failed to achieve its goal, since the persecution had already begun. After the fall and occupation of Vukovar in November 1991, the Government organized evacuation of approximately 15.000 people, but it was carried out only partially. The Government didn't have control over the war zone, which means that its opportunities for safe and efficient evacuation were highly limited. One of the main plans for the displaced persons and refugees was Government's Return Program, which began its realization only after the end of the war and peaceful reintegration of Podunavlje in 1998. Economic politics of the Democratic Unity Government was reflected in its independence from Serbia. Following measures and decisions of the previous Croatian Government, on the day of its establishment, Democratic Unity Government broke off economic relations with Serbia, however only partially. Those companies with strong business ties with some companies in Serbia, had liberty to continue their cooperation. The export to Serbia and Montenegro was limited only to some "strategic" raw materials and products, such as petroleum. The Government also introduced its own currency, hrvatski dinar (HRD). One of the main achievements of the Government was that it avoided the transit to "war economy", in spite of the increased military spending. Since priority of the Croatian Government was determined by war, its activities gravitated towards repair of the enormous war damage in transport, utility and residential infrastructure. In the end of 1991 the Government established the Ministry of Reconstruction, while in the first half of 1992 the Government composed the Reconstruction Program and its Financial Plan that was adopted by the Croatian Parliament in June 1992. Nevertheless, because of the status quo imposed by the UNPROFOR, located on the occupied territories in Croatia, the reconstruction of the country began after the war had ended in 1995. Analyzed activities of the Government in the Defense policy, Foreign Affairs, as well as its Social and Economic policy raise the question of the Government's independence regarding Tuđman and Croatian Parliament. Considering the semi-presidential system, the Government was the executive authority of the president of the Republic and Croatian Parliament. Government also had legislative powers authorized by the Parliament, because in the wartime a great number of important decisions had to be made in a very short amount of time. The Government was not only the executive body of the President, but it also functioned as his close associate. That manifests mostly through the measures for emergency readiness in August and September 1991. Sometimes, the Government had to step out of its Constitutional powers if developments on the battlefield required it to, for example regarding the decisions about Vukovar, November 17 1991. Regarding activities of the Government in the researched areas, it can be concluded that Democratic Unity Government had a high level of autonomy, taking into account the existing semi-presidential system. Nevertheless, the powers of the Government were limited in the Defense policy and Forregin Affairs, while on the other hand, it had complete autonomy in Internal Affairs, in this case, in its Social and Economic politics. An issue that requires special consideration in this research regards the opposition in Croatia during the mandate of the Democratic Unity Government. Some claim that with forming of the multiparty Government, the opposition in Croatia "disappeared". The remark is understandable considering that all the parliament parties signed the Agreement of Democratic Unity Government, which marked their transition from the opposition to coalition partners. But, did the opposition really "disappeared" form Croatian political life? Numerous public appearances of various representatives of opposition parties and parties in general, indicate otherwise. Activity of the opposition at the Parliament sessions from October 1991 to May and June 1992 shows agility of the opposition life in Croatia. From the beginning of the Democratic Unity Government in August till October, the opposition parties didn't raise any questions in public about some decisions of the Croatian leadership, but from October began severe criticism towards Tuđman and the Government. Discontent was expressed primarily to the acceptance of the Carrington's arrangement in Hague. Criticism of Foreign Affairs arose also after the acceptance of the Vance plan. In the last six months of its mandate, the Government was exposed to various pressures from the opposition and from one part of the HDZ, which reinforced especially after the international recognition at the beginning of 1992. Some opposition and nonpartisan ministers left the Government, whereas in April 1992 there was the reconstruction of the Government which changed significantly the personnel composition of the Government, resulting in the increase of the HDZ members. It was obvious that it was not the exact same Government from the beginning of August 1991 and that its end was near. In the new elections held August 2 1992, the HDZ defeated its opponents and ten days later, new, One-party Government was formed. Establishment and presented activities of the Democratic Unity Government is the proof of the democratic system in Republic of Croatia at the beginning of 1990s and counter-argument for theses about Tuđman's authoritarian style of rule. A multiparty Government, whose prominent members were opposition representatives, couldn't have been formed in an undemocratic or authoritarian system. Forming of the Grand Coalition merely one year after HDZ had won the elections, provides a valuable contribution to the study of Tuđman's policy, shows larger picture of the Croatian leadership and opens the door for further research of Croatian political life in the early 1990s.

Sve veća nepovezanost građana i donositelja odluka gura politiku u smjeru koji će dovesti do preoblikovanja institucionalnog aranžmana. Komunikacijski alati mogu imati važnu ulogu u razvijanju novih prostora za participaciju građana. Postoje različiti modeli kojima vlada i javna administracija mogu poduprijeti građansku participaciju: e-vlada, otvorena vlada i specifičan dizajn digitalne demokracije. Otvorena vlada može biti jedan od načina za ponovno povezivanje građana i političkih institucija, ali u isto vrijeme može biti i "privlačan" alat za institucionalizaciju participacije odozdo prema gore i njezino umrtvljivanje. Cilj je ovog rada predstaviti prva saznanja međunarodnog istraživačkog projekta na temu otvorene vlade i participacijskih platformi u četiri europske države (Francuskoj, Italiji, Španjolskoj i Ujedinjenom Kraljevstvu). Istraživanje nastoji otkriti mogu li platforme za participaciju poboljšati kvalitetu demokracije i može li otvorena vlada doprinijeti demokratizaciji demokracije. ; The growing disconnection between citizens and decision-makers is pushing politics towards a re-shaping of institutional design. New spaces of political participation are sustained and even reinforced by communication, especially by digital communication. Governments and public administrations can find and use different models to facilitate citizens' participation; e-government, open government and a specific design of digital democracy. In this respect, open government can constitute a way to re-connect citizens and political institutions, but at the same time, it can also be an "appealing" tool to institutionalize bottom-up participation and so anesthetizing it. The aim of this article is to present the first findings of an international research project about open government and participatory platforms in four European countries (France, Italy, Spain, the UK). The study tries to understand if participatory platforms can improve the quality of democracy, and if open government can contribute to democratizing democracy.

Kao rezultat izbora 2005. Pravo i pravda (PIS) postaje dominantna stranka u poljskom parlamentu s dominantnom braćom Kaczyński na čelu. Od 2007. do 2015. je oporbena politička sila, a onda 2015. uvjerljivom većinom i u donjem i u gornjem domu parlamenta opet dolazi na vlast. PiS je radikalna stranka desne orijentacije ili desnog centra. Zbog svojih je radikalnih stavova često spominjan kao uzrok slabijeg razvoja Poljske i njenog slabog međunarodnog položaja. U radu se konzervativna vlast te stranke prikazuje s obzirom na neovisnost rada sudova, slobodu medija i zaštitu ljudskih prava i sloboda. Status zaštite ljudskih prava i stupanj demokracije utjecao je na odnos EU prema Poljskoj, a nacionalizam PiS-a na odnos Poljske prema EU, Rusiji, Njemačkoj i ukupnoj međunarodnoj zajednici. ; As a result of the 2005 election, the Law and Justice party (abbreviated as PiS in Polish for Prawo i Sprawiedliwość) became the dominant party in the Polish parliament under the leadership of the Kaczyński brothers, Lech and Jaroslaw. From 2007 to 2015, PiS was a force in its role as the political opposition. It came to power again in 2015 after winning persuasive majorities in the Lower and Upper Houses. PiS is a radical party of right or center-right orientation. Because of its radical positions, it often is mentioned as a cause of Poland's weaker national development and international status. This work discusses the party's conservative government with regard to the relationship between legislative and judicial authorities, freedom of the media, and the protection of human rights. Poland's state of human rights protection and its degree of democracy has influenced its relationship with the EU. PiS's nationalism also has had an impact on Poland's relations with the EU, Russia, Germany, and the larger international community.

U radu su analizirani zakonski i normativno-pravni akti o sudjelovanju građana u procesu donošenja odluka u jedinicama lokalne samouprave. Sudjelovanje građana u procesu odlučivanja jeste građansko pravo koje građani konzumiraju na svim razinama vlasti, kako na lokalnim tako i na višim razinama vlasti, što čini temelj razvoja demokratskog društva. S obzirom na složenost ustroja i funkcioniranja Bosne i Hercegovine, postoji velik broj normativno-pravnih akata koji reguliraju navedeno područje. Može se očekivati da će ova tema biti zanimljiva ne samo znanstvenicima čije je polje zanimanja javna uprava nego i široj javnosti iz razloga što građani većinu svojih interesa, potreba i očekivanja (prema provedenim istraživanjima preko 70%) upravo ostvaruju na lokalnoj razini. ; Citizens' participation in decision-making process is a civil right that citizens consume at all government levels, either directly or indirectly. Citizens' participation is regulated by the Constitutions (at the state, entity, and cantonal levels), as well as by the laws on local self-government and by the statute, which is the basic normative legal act of local self-government units. Although legal regulation of citizens' participation has been harmonised with the European Charter of Local Self-Government, an analysis of legislation concerning citizens' participation has shown numerous differences, deficiencies, and unfinished solutions in the regulations at the municipal and sub-municipal levels, as well as at the entity and cantonal levels of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, primarily due to the complex organisation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. What is necessary is to adopt the Law of Referendum at the entity (and state) level, and to amend and harmonise other regulations related to citizens' participation – entity and cantonal Constitutions, the Law on Local Self-Government at the entity and cantonal levels, and municipal and sub-municipal statutes. It is also necessary to adopt the Regulation of the Rules of Citizens' participation at the Local Level. Local self-government units must develop and adopt their partnership strategies for cooperation with local citizens.

Od financiranja lokalne samouprave zavisi provođenje njenih nadležnosti. Bez adekvatnog financiranja ne možemo očekivati kvalitetnu lokalnu samoupravu za građane kao krajnje korisnike usluga. Financiranje lokalne samouprave predstavlja važan princip koji je zajamčen i Europskom poveljom o lokalnoj samoupravi. Bez značajnije financijske i materijalne autonomije, cjelokupan koncept i funkcioniranje lokalne samouprave gube na značaju. Cilj ovog članka jest predstavljanje osnovnih pitanja o financiranju lokalne samouprave u Bosni i Hercegovini, odnosno njenim entitetima Federaciji Bosne i Hercegovine i Republici Srpskoj. Analiza predstavlja međunarodnopravne odredbe o financiranju lokalne samouprave sadržane u Europskoj povelji o lokalnoj samoupravi i pravne odredbe iz nacionalnog zakonodavstva Bosne i Hercegovine i njezinih entiteta. ; The financing of local self-government influences the capacities of local units to perform their tasks. One cannot expect to receive high quality local services unless local units have sufficient financial means and are able to provide a wide range of services. The principle of local self-government financing is a basic principle guaranteed by the European Charter of Local Self-Government. The whole concept of local self-government and its functioning lose on their importance if there is not sufficient financial autonomy. The paper aims at presenting the basic issues of local self-government financing in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republic of Srpska. Some of the main international legal norms related to the financing of local self-government from the European Charter and national legal regulation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its entities are analysed in the paper. The analysis has shown that the funds allocated to Bosnian local self-government are far from sufficient. Furthermore, there is a significant difference in local self-government funding between the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which spends 8.42 per cent of its budget on local finances, and the Republic of Srpska, which spends 24 per cent.

RIJEČ UREDNIŠTVAZa tematiku i aktualnost ove rubrike Šumarskoga lista očito nije potrebno brinuti. Naime, svako malo mediji nam prenose vijesti o novim nesporazumima pa i sukobima šumarske struke i amaterskih udruga, koje si umišljaju da sve znaju o šumarstvu. Interesantno, primjerice u kirurgiju se ne petljaju! Tako ovih dana u Glasu Istre čitamo: Nastavlja se fajt oko Motovunske šume – Tartufari uzvraćaju udarac: Hrvatske šume ponašaju se kao feudalac! Šire o tome pisat ćemo na temelju egzaktnih podataka u jednoj od rubrika sljedećeg dvobroja Šumarskoga lista. Ovdje ćemo komentirati Zakon i ulogu Hrvatskih šuma d.o.o.Feudalizam je oblik društvenog odnosa koji je prevladavao u srednjem i dijelu novoga vijeka, ukinut 1848. godine, a feudalac je vlasnik zemljišta za kojega drugi rade. Da li su Hrvatske šume d.o.o. vlasnik zemljišta-šume i da li odgovaraju tome kriteriju? Za odgovor na ovo pitanje pozivamo se ponajprije na zakon, u ovome slučaju Zakon o šumama, koji u članku 2. (1) kaže: Šume i šumska zemljišta dobra su od interesa za Republiku Hrvatsku te imaju njezinu osobnu zaštitu, a u istom članku (3) Vlada Republike Hrvatske upravlja šumama i šumskim zemljištem u interesu Republike Hrvatske, prema u daljnjem tekstu navedenim načelima. Članak 3. (1) navodi: Šume i šumska zemljišta specifično su šumsko bogatstvo te s općekorisnim i gospodarskim funkcijama šuma uvjetuju poseban način planiranja, gospodarenja i korištenja na načelu održivog gospodarenja šumama. (2) Održivo gospodarenje šumama znači korištenje šuma i šumskog zemljišta na način, i u mjeri, koja održava njihovu bioraznolikost, produktivnost, kapacitet za regeneraciju, vitalnost i potencijal da trenutačno i ubuduće ispune odgovarajuće ekološke, gospodarske i društvene funkcije na lokalnoj, nacionalnoj i globalnoj razini te koja ne uzrokuje štetu drugim ekosustavima. Po tome načelu potrajnosti, hrvatskim šumama šumarska struka gospodari već više od 250 godina. Uz ­gospodarske funkcije šuma (proizvodnju drvnih sortimenata, proizvodnju šumskog reprodukcijskog materijala i proizvodnju nedrvnih šumskih proizvoda), treba imati na umu da ona osigurava i njene općekorisne funkcije navedene u članku 4. (1) do (9). Dakle, u gospodarenju s tim najsloženijim ekosustavom nema mjesta amaterizmu i interesnim skupinama! Žalosno je i nelogično, ali istinito, da je politika koja treba strogo zagovarati Zakon, češćesklonija njima nego struci. Imajući u vidu prethodno rečeno o šumi kao specifičnom šumskom bogatstvu, logično je da operativno njima može upravljati i gospodariti specifična pravna osoba koja posjeduje potrebnu infrastrukturu, opremu i posebice visoko stručne kadrove. Kada je riječ o visokostručnim kadrovima opetovano ističemo, kako se još u 19. stoljeću odlučilo da šumama trebaju upravljati i gospodariti fakultetski obrazovani stručnjaci, pa ističemo da je i šumarska fakultetska nastava u Hrvatskoj uspostavljena već 20. listopada 1898. godine. Stoga je logično da upravljanje i gospodarenje šumama Vlada Republike Hrvatske povjerava javnom šumoposjedniku Hrvatske šume d.o.o. čiji je osnivač. Članak 44. (1) propisuje: Javni šumoposjednik i Ustanova (kada se radi o zaštićenim šumama) dužni su osigurati zaštitu šuma i šumskih zemljišta u vlasništvu Republike Hrvatske od protupravnog prisvajanja, korištenja i drugih protupravnih radnji te provoditi šumski red. Iz svega je razvidno da je sve zakonom propisano i da su Hrvatske šume d. o. o. provoditelj Zakona o šumama, a nikako feudalac. No, kada raspravljamo o stanju u našoj Državi, počevši od društvenih odnosa, gospodarstva, pa sve do prevelikog uvoza "svega i svačega", svima su "puna usta" Pravne države, naravno samo kada to njima ide u prilog, a briga ih za opći interes.Uredništvo ; EDITORIALWe should never be concerned about the themes and topicality of this column of Forestry Journal. Every now and then the media reports on the latest misunderstandings and even conflicts between the forestry profession and amateur associations which imagine that they know everything about forestry. Interestingly, they never meddle in surgery, for example. The Voice of Istria recently wrote: The battle of the Motovun Forest continues - Truffle hunting people strike back: The company Croatian Forests Ltd behaves like a feudal lord! This topic will be dealt with more extensively on the basis of exact data in one of the columns of the next double issue of Forestry Journal.Feudalism is a form of social system that prevailed in the Middle and part of the New Age and was abolished in 1848. A feudal lord was a land owner who had other people working for him. Is the company Croatian Forests Ltd the owner of the land - forest and does it match these criteria? To answer these questions we should first consult the law, in this case the Forest Law. Article 2 (1) of the said Law states: Forests and forest land are natural goods of interest to the Republic of Croatia and enjoy its particular protection. In the same article (3) it is stated that the Government of the Republic of Croatia manages forests and forest land in the interest of the Republic of Croatia according to the principles listed further on. Article 3 (1) states: Forests and forest land constitute specific forest wealth and together with non-market and market forest functions dictate a particular manner of planning, management and usage according to the principles of sustainable forest management. (2) Sustainable management of forests means using forests and forest land in the manner and to the extent to which it maintains its biodiversity, productivity, regeneration capacity, vitality and potential to, now and in the future, fulfil the relevant ecological, economic and social functions locally, nationally and globally without inflicting harm to other ecosystems. The Croatian forestry profession has applied the principle of sustainability to Croatian forests for over 250 years. In addition to commercial forest functions (production of wood assortments, production of forest reproductive material and production of non-wood forest products), we should bear in mind that it also ensures its non-market functions listed in article 4 (1) to (9). Therefore, management of this most complex ecosystem excludes amateurism and interest groups! Sadly and illogically, but true, politics which should strictly enforce the Law, is more often inclined to them than to the profession. In view of what was said above about the forest as specific forest wealth, it is logical that it should operatively be managed by a specific legal entity which has the necessary infrastructure, equipment and highly skilled personnel in particular. As for highly skilled personnel, we repeatedly point out that it was decided no later than 19th century that forests should be managed by academically educated experts. Furthermore, the university forestry education in Croatia was established as early as 20th October 1898. It is logical, therefore, that the Government of the Republic of Croatia entrusted the company Croatian Forests Ltd, a public forest owner which it founded, with forest planning and management. Article 44 (1) states: The public forest owner and Institution (in case of protected forests) are obliged by law to ensure the protection of forests and forest land owned by the Republic of Croatia from unlawful appropriation, use and other illegal activities, as well as enforce the forest order. Clearly, everything is regulated by law: hence, the company Croatian Forests Ltd is the law enforcer and by no means a feudal lord. Yet, when we discuss the situation in our State, starting from social relations, economy and excessive import of "anything and everything", we all swear by the legal State, but only when it is in our favour, while public interest is of no concern whatsoever.Editorial Board

Specifičnost nadzora nad radom izvršnih i upravnih tijela lokalne samouprave leži u opreci između upravnih obilježja jedinice lokalne samouprave i njezinih samoupravnih obilježja. Stoga on treba biti ustrojen na način kojim se respektiraju samoupravne ovlasti lokalne samouprave, ali pritom istodobno štiti zakonitost u cjelokupnom pravnom sustavu. U radu se istražuju oblici nadzora nad izvršnim i upravnim tijelima jedinica lokalne samouprave u Hrvatskoj, pri čemu se, nakon razmatranja prirode nadzora, subjekata nadzora i nadzornih ovlasti, posebice analizira nadzor unutar samih tijela lokalne samouprave, hijerarhijski upravni nadzor od strane tijela područne (regionalne) samouprave te upravni i inspekcijski nadzor od strane Ministarstva uprave, upravnosudski nadzor kao i nadzor od strane pučkoga pravobranitelja. Poseban naglasak stavljen je na instrumente provođenja svakoga pojedinoga nadzora te na nadzorne ovlasti kojima raspolažu nadzorna tijela. Pritom se skreće pozornost na utjecaj koji na učinkovitost i djelotvornost nadzora imaju broj i veličina lokalnih jedinica i posljedično njihova objektivna sposobnost obavljanja poslova iz samoupravnog djelokruga. ; The specificity of supervision over the work of executive and administrative bodies of local self-government lies in the contradiction between administrative characteristics of units of local self-government and its self-administrative characteristics. Therefore, it should be organised in a way that respects the self-administration powers of local self-government, but at the same time, protects legality in the entire legal system. This paper investigates the supervision of executive and administrative bodies of units of local self-government in Croatia. Here, after considering the nature of the supervision, subjects of supervision and supervisory powers, in particular the forms of supervision are analysed over executive and administrative bodies of units of local self-government, hierarchical administrative supervision by bodies of regional self-government ...

Šteta nastala upotrebom vozila jedna je od pretpostavki nastanka obveze za osiguratelja od automobilske odgovornosti. Sadržaj pojma "upotreba vozila" nije posebno određen (definiran) u Zakonu o obveznim osiguranjima u prometu niti u direktivama Europske unije koje se odnose na obvezna osiguranja u prometu. To je razlog nastanka mnogobrojnih sporova iz pokrića osiguranja od automobilske odgovornosti. U radu se nastoji prikazati sadržaj pojma "upotreba vozila" koji je proizišao iz domaće i europske sudske prakse uz istodobno upozoravanje na neke razlike u njegovu shvaćanju koje se vezuju uz tendenciju proširenja obveze osiguratelja od automobilske odgovornosti. ; Damage caused by or arising from the use of a vehicle is a prerequisite for the emergence of obligations on the part of car insurers. The scope of the term "vehicle use" is not precisely defined either by the Compulsory Car Insurance Act, or by the EU directives on compulsory traffic-related insurance, which explains numerous car insurance disputes. The paper aims to shed light on the scope of the term "vehicle use" in Croatian and EU case law, as well as shift attention to the term's varying interpretations, because of which car insurers tend to meet more obligations.

U radu se prikazuju neke od temeljnih koncepcija lokalne samouprave koje su se iskristalizirale u literaturi. Prikazuju se koncepcija političke i upravne decentralizacije, marksistička koncepcija komune te pristupi razvijeni u okviru nekih meðunarodnih asocijacija, prvenstveno koncept razvoja zajednice i načelo supsidijarnosti. U nastavku se analizira sadržaj prava na lokalnu samoupravu i njegova zaštita u pravnom sustavu Republike Hrvatske. Poseban naglasak stavljen je na uređenje raspuštanja lokalnih predstavničkih tijela. Nadalje, u radu se kritički analizira uređenje sustava lokalne samouprave u Republici Hrvatskoj. Pri tome se razlikuju dvije faze. Prva, koja je velikom dijelom počivala na koncepciji upravne decentralizacije, dominirala je uređenjem lokalne samouprave u prvih deset godina samostalnosti. Političkim, ustavnim i zakonskim promjenama u razdoblju 2000.–2001., formalno je započela druga faza uređenja lokalne samouprave u Republici Hrvatskoj utemeljena na koncepciji političke decentralizacije. ; The article presents some of the fundamental concepts of local self-government which have crystallized in literature. The concepts of political and administrative decentralisation, the Marxist concept of the commune and the approaches developed within the framework of some international associations, primarily the concept of the development of the community and the principle of subsidiarity are presented. The content of the right to local self-government and its protection in the legal system of the Republic of Croatia, regulation of local self-government and particularly regulation of the dissolution of local representative bodies are analysed. There are two phases of the regulation of local self-government. The first one, mostly based on the concept of administrative decentralisation, dominated the local self-government regulation for the first ten years of its independence. In that phase, the local government did not sufficiently develop its democratic potential, which was the consequence of a number of factors. Among others, the legal framework which regarded local units as instruments of central government, high level of centralisation, undeveloped democratic environment, inadequate territorial division, etc. By political, constitutional and legal changes in the period of 2000/1, the second phase of the local self-government regulation in Croatia formally started. The basic approach to local self-government is dominated by the concept of political decentralisation. Although legal solutions provide for the development of local potentials, there remains the question of the direction of further development of local self-government in the Republic of Croatia. The experience so far has shown that there is still not enough attention paid to the development of local institutions. There are still numerous problems, while there is not enough political will to lead systematically an active decentralisation policy. The policy of enlarging and strengthening of local units is not clear enough. In the end, it is pointed out that along with the basic provisions which regulate local self-government, it is also necessary to use other mechanisms in order to build a modern system of local self-government prepared for European integration.

U svibnju 2013. godine ponovno je izmijenjen i dopunjen Pomorski zakonik Republike Hrvatske. Promjene su, među ostalima, i u dijelu o prijevozu putnika i njihove prtljage. Ovim izmjenama i dopunama vodilo se računa o usklađivanju s normama Europske unije. Posebno izdvajam zakonski tekst o obvezi primjene Uredbe 392/2009 Europskog parlamenta i Vijeća o odgovornosti prijevoznika u prijevozu putnika morem u slučaju nesreća. Time se Republika Hrvatska (a prije toga i ratifikacijom u veljači 2013.) obvezala primjenjivati Protokol, odnosno Atensku konvenciju iz 2002. o prijevozu putnika i njihove prtljage morem, uz intervenciju Međunarodne pomorske organizacije (IMO) u tekst Konvencije zbog visine odgovornosti, kako to vrijedi za cijelo područje EU-a. Prihvaćanjem spomenute Uredbe pruža se veća zaštita putniku jer se u međunarodnoj plovidbi i u nacionalnoj plovidbi brodovima klase A i B uvodi objektivna odgovornost za njegovu smrt ili tjelesnu ozljedu u slučaju pomorske nesreće. Na prijevoz putnika i prtljage u nacionalnoj plovidbi brodovima koji ne spadaju u klasu A i B primjenjuju se postojeće odredbe Pomorskog zakonika koje su se prije njegove izmjene zasnivale na Atenskoj konvenciji iz 1974. ( s protokolima), a to znači i daljnja primjena pretpostavljene krivnje. ; Maritime Law of the Republic of Croatia was changed and amended in May, 2013. Changes are, among other things, related to carriage of passengers and their luggage. These changes and amendments served for harmonization with European Union norms. I specially point out the legal text about the obligation of applying Regulation No 392/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the liability of carriers of passengers by sea in the event of accidents. With that the Republic of Croatia (and before that with ratification in February 2013) committed itself to applying Protocol or Athens Convention from 2002 relating to the carriage of passengers and their luggage by sea, with intervening of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) in the text of the Convention due to the level of responsibility, as it is valid for the entire EU area. Adopting the mentioned Convention offers better protection to passengers because during the international and national carriage by A and B class ships objective responsibility for his death or bodily harm in the event of accident is introduced. The existing regulations of the Maritime Law, which were based on the Athens Convention from 1974 (with protocols) before its change, are used for the national carriage of passengers and luggage by ships which are not class A or B and that means further applying of presumed guilt.

Switzerland's major contribution to the shaping of neutrality as an institution of international law lies in its centuries-old practice & its international recognition. However, Swiss neutrality still conforms to the classical military/political conflict, since in the past, it proved to be a successful security/political instrument in the protection of independence & territorial integrity. In the contemporary international/global constellation, there is almost no room for a neutral stance due to the global interdependence within the international community & the collective security, on the one hand, & the new threats & dangers lacking a classical military dimension, on the other. All this is conducive to the solidarity & cooperation whose purpose is protection, which requires international security/political efforts in securing peace. The Swiss government is of the opinion that participation in a collective security system such as the UN does not run counter to its permanent neutrality, since the UN Charter forbids war & does not recognize it as a means of the international regulation of conflicts. Also, the UN Charter does not oblige member countries to participate in any coercive military measure. Finally, by the admittance of the permanently neutral Austria into the UN, the practice has proved that neutrality & the collective security are compatible. On several occasions, the Swiss have raised the issue of UN membership; in the 1986 referendum, the Swiss citizens voted against this proposal, while on 3 Mar 2000, they voted in favor of it; the only other country besides Switzerland not in the UN is the Vatican. 32 References. Adapted from the source document.

Globalizacija i povećana međunarodna međuovisnost pridonose tomu da se ponovno povećava interes utjecaja strukture međunarodnog sustava na međunarodne odnose. Međunarodni sustav od kraja Hladnog rata neprestano proživljava promjene. One se najviše odlikuju u političkim i sigurnosnim novitetima. U takvim je uvjetima struktura sustava postala glavnom odrednicom ponašanja država koje se, promatrajući ih kroz perspektivu strukturalnog realizma ili neorealizma, ponašaju isključivo u skladu s vlastitim interesima, u uvjetima anarhičnog sustava. S obzirom na geopolitički položaj te veličinu Hrvatskoj je izrazito bitno čvrsto članstvo unutar NATO-saveza i Europske Unije. Kontekst razvoja sigurnosti i obrane time postaje više usmjeren na činjenicu da se zemlje članice saveza obvezuju pomagati jedna drugoj u slučaju pojave ugroze, te se time jača stabilnost nacionalne sigurnosti potrebne da se omoguće dugoročni mir i stabilnost u zemlji, ali i u susjedstvu. Kao središnji i konstantan fenomen u proučavanju međunarodnih odnosa, savezi nastaju jer su vlade svih razvijenih država svjesne da su dio jednog većeg entiteta u međunarodnoj politici u kojoj, prema postavkama neorealističke škole među-narodnih odnosa, postoje prijetnje koje su uzroci stvaranja saveza. ; Globalisation and increased international interdependence have contributed to the fact that once again the interest of the impact on the structure of the international system to international relations is increased. The international system, since the end of the Cold War, is constantly going through changes. They are the most distinguished in political and security innovations. In such circumstances, the structure of the system has become the main determinant of behaviour of states that, looking through the perspective of structural realism or neorealism, act solely pursuing their own interest, in terms of an anarchic system. Given the geopolitical position and size of the country, it is extremely important for Croatia to have a firm membership within the NATO and the European Union. The context of development of security and defence thus becomes more focused on the fact that the member states of the alliance commit to assist each other in case of threats, so the stability of national security needed to enable long-term peace and stability in the country, but also the neighbourhood, is strengthened. As a central and constant phenomenon in the study of international relations, alliances are formed because the governments of all developed countries are aware that they are part of a larger entity in international politics, in which, according to the neorealist school of international relations, there are threats that cause creating alliances.

U radu se daje kratak pregled ustavnog uređenja Bosne i Hercegovine i Federacije Bosne i Hercegovine te položaja lokalne samouprave u vertikalnom ustroju vlasti. Pored toga, tretira se pitanje organizacije i nadležnosti jedinica lokalne samouprave. U radu se obrađuje pitanje prava na lokalnu samoupravu koju garantira Ustav Federacije Bosne i Hercegovine. Fokus istraživanja je usmjeren na službeničko pravo u Federaciji Bosne i Hercegovine, odnos političkih struktura prema službeničkoj profesionalnoj neovisnosti i ulogu i značaj koji državni službenici treba da imaju u postupcima ostvarivanja građanskih prava, odnosno prava na lokalnu samoupravu. Autor ukazuje na nužnost harmonizacije kantonalnog zakonodavstva iz oblasti službeničkog prava sa federalnim zakonodavstvom, te potrebu utemeljenosti službeničkog prava na načelima i dostignutim standardima u Europskoj uniji. ; A brief overview of the constitutional order of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the position of local self-government in the vertical structure of government is provided in the paper. In addition, the issue of the organization and jurisdiction of local self-government is treated. The issue of the right to local self-government guaranteed by the Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina is addressed in this paper. The right of civil servants in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the attitude of political structures to professional independence of civil servants and the role and importance that civil servants should have in the processes of exercising civil rights, and the right to local self-government is what the research is focused on. The necessity of harmonization of cantonal legislation on civil service law with federal legislation, and the need to base the civil service law on the principles and standards achieved in the EU is what the paper points out.

Rad se bavi analizom reakcija Ujedinjenih naroda na zločin terorizma u obliku inkriminacije terorizma u nizu konvencija prihvaćenih u krilu te organizacije, no još više u obliku moralnih, ali i pravnih sankcija sadržanih u političkim osudama neobvezujućih rezolucija Opće skupštine, posebice tijekom hladnog rata, kao i u obvezujućim sankcijskim rezolucijama Vijeća sigurnosti počevši od 90-ih godina prošlog stoljeća. Pritom rad upućuje na specifičan razvojni proces koji počinje sankcijama prema državama odgovornima za tzv. "državni terorizam", a u posljednjih 15-ak godina sankcije su se gotovo potpuno usmjerile prema terorističkim organizacijama kao nedržavnim akterima te su razvojem međunarodnoga kaznenog pravosuđa otvorile prostor i individualnoj međunarodnoj kaznenoj odgovornosti za taj zločin. ; This paper analyzes the United Nations' reactions to the international crime of terrorism. It focuses on counter-terrorism international conventions adopted within the UN, as well as on moral and political sanctions contained in non-binding resolutions of the General Assembly during the period of the so-called ˝Cold war˝. However, the main focus of this research is on the analysis of legally binding resolutions adopted by the Security Council starting from the 1990s. The analysis of the development of the Security Council's resolutions adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter indicates that these resolutions, initially addressed to states responsible for the so- called ˝state terrorism˝, gradually became directed exclusively towards terrorist organizations as non-state actors. In this context, the ˝ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List˝ of the Security Council is being continuously expanded with names of individuals as well as of other non-state ˝entities and other groups˝ affected by these sanctions. Unfortunately, compared to the beginnig of 2015, when only 70 ˝entities and other groups˝ were listed, in March 2017 their number increased to over 360. These ˝entities and other groups˝, which originate from Tunisia, Mali, Albania, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Bangladesh, the Comoros, Pakistan, Indonesia, Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania, Arabian Peninsula, Libya, Sudan, Egypt, the Caucasus region, Uzbekistan, and even Bosnia and Herzegovina, differ in various ways. Some of the above mentioned ˝entities˝ aim at overthrowing the government of their country, just like ˝classical˝ insurgents as temporary subjects of international law. Other non-state actors' activities are directed towards establishing a new state (for example, Ansar Eddine, Mouvement national de libération de l'Azawad – MNLA in Mali, Sudan People's Liberation Movement – SPLM in South Sudan). International crimes committed by these organizations are not only the object of the resolutions of the Security Council, but they are also in the focus of interest of the International Criminal Court (the ICC). Although the international crime of terrorism is not covered by the jurisdiction of the ICC under the Rome Statute, certain international crimes committed by terrorists or under the auspices of terrorist organizations share some common features with crimes against humanity, which fall under the jurisdiction of the ICC. Thus, the ICC indirectly contributes to the sanctioning for the crime of terrorism. Further evolution of the international criminal justice, both through the jurisprudence of the ICC and other ad hoc international and ˝hybrid˝ courts, will most certainly contribute to the development of international criminal liability of individuals for the crime of terrorism.