NATO's political and - above all - military participation in secession-motivated conflicts in former Yugoslavia (1990-1995), will be remembered as a clear example of demonstration of power, intentions and (in)capability of the Victor in a decades-long global "cold war" between the "freedom-loving" West and "totalitarian East". Regardless of the expectations of liberal theoreticians and the majority of public opinion, it was soon revealed that the victory was no "triumph of freedom" and even less "the end of history". On the contrary, as historically typical, it was only an unstable resultant of relations between major actors in the modern global theater, who strive to legitimize their need for domination with varying success and vocabulary. Hence the lessons to be learned from the final act of destruction of Yugoslavia (several months of NATO bombing of Serbia in 1999) have the expected tone of banality: absolute might strives for absolute power (which remains unattainable in principle); "the mighty oppress" is true always and in any place (but with a time limit); and, finally, what everyone knows but does not (or is unable or refuses) to say aloud: the only true alternative to military threat and/or aggression of a single political actor is an equally valid (military) threat/aggression by another one. We are tempted to conclude that, despite the ideological ardor of NGO activists, the political correctness of theoreticians and the rhetorical figures of speech of politicians, the "banalities" remain valid as the only certainties, i.e., regularities in the unpredictable currents of relations between states.
У овој студији пажња је фокусирана на реконструкцију пијанистичког репертоара Корнелија Станковића, како би се испитао однос његових и дела иностраних композитора, као и колико је концепција програма била условљена срединама у којима je наступао. Након увида у написе у оновременој штампи, као и у сачуване плакате са концерата, издвојене су композиције које су се налазиле на његовом пијанистичком репертоару. Циљ овога рада био је и да се укаже на актуелност извођених композиција, што је, између осталог, омогућио и увид у немачку штампу разматраног периода. ; Of particular importance for the artistic commitment and maturation of Kornelije Stanković, was his training in Vienna, which at that time represented the center of the Slavic elite. The whole cultural and social atmosphere of Vienna left a strong imprint on the young artist: a rich cultural and political life of the city, contacts with Serbian and Slavic circles and their ideas, especially studies under distinguished professor at the Conservatory – a composer, pianist and theorist Simon Sechter. By studying the inscriptions in the Serbian press from the 19th century (Srbski list, Vidovdan, Južna pčela, Danica, Trgovačke novine, Šumadinka) and preserved posters of Stankovic's concerts, we have selected the compositions that were part of the Kornelije Stanković piano repertoire. Besides his own compositions, his repertoire included some works of Franz Liszt and Sigismund Thalberg, and even, then popular and now forgotten salon composers-pianists: Jacob Blumenthal, Louis Lacombe, Rudolf Willmers, Eduard M. Pirkhert, and a certain man named Wald. It is possible that this selection of works was influenced by Sechter himself. Blumental and Lacombe were his students. However, the fact remains that the compositions of those authors, which Stanković performed, also represented the most famous works of those composers, as well as the standards of the salon repertoire at the time. The aim of this paper is to highlight the equal importance and representation of the foreign composers within Stankovic's piano repertoire, as well as the actuality of performed compositions, which has allowed us to gain an insight into the German press of the considered period.
In this paper, we analyse two recent contributions to the Marxist critique of the political economy of art: the article "Artistic Labor and the Production of Value: An Attempt at a Marxist Interpretation" by José María Durán and the book Art and Value: Art's Economic Exceptionalism in Classical, Neoclassical and Marxist Economics by Dave Beech. While Durán emphasizes the emergence of the legal category of intellectual property rights as crucial for value production in art, Beech has reached the contrary conclusion that artistic labour does not produce value and that artistic production is therefore excepted from capitalist commodity production. In our paper, we criticize both conclusions. While agreeing with Beech that artistic labour does not produce value and is thus excepted from the ideology of commodity fetishism, we believe that through the ideology of converted forms it nevertheless becomes part of capitalist commodity production. We would argue that the sector of artistic production, through the converted form of monopoly rent, establishes a production relation with other, competitive, sectors of capitalist economy. This production relation is enabled by the ideology of aesthetic fetishism, supported by the ideology of legal fetishism through the category of intellectual property rights. Contrary to Durán, we thus conclude that intellectual property rights allow for a hidden transfer of surplus value produced by the workers in the competitive sectors of the capitalist economy. ; U tekstu analiziramo dva novija priloga marksističkoj kritici političke ekonomije umetnosti: članak "Umetnički rad i proizvodnja vrednosti: pokušaj marksističke interpretacije" Hozea Marije Durana [José María Durán] i knjigu Umetnost i vrednost: ekonomska izuzetnost umetnosti u klasičnoj, neoklasičnoj i marksističkoj ekonomici Dejva Biča [Dave Beech]. Dok Duran u svojoj analizi daje naglasak zasnivanju pravne kategorije prava na intelektualno vlasništvo kao determinanti proizvodnje vrednosti u umetničkoj proizvodnji, Bič dolazi u svojoj knjizi do suprotnog zaključka da umetnički rad ne proizvodi vrednost i da je time umetnička proizvodnja izuzeta iz kapitalističke robne proizvodnje. U našem tekstu kritikujemo oba zaključka. Sa Bičom se slažemo da umetnički rad ne proizvodi vrednost i da je time izuzet iz ideologije robnog fetišizma, ali smatramo da on putem ideologije preobraženih oblika postaje deo kapitalističke robne proizvodnje. Tvrdimo da sektor umetničke proizvodnje putem preobraženog oblika monopolske rente zasniva proizvodni odnos sa drugim, konkurentskim, sektorima kapitalističke privrede. Ovaj proizvodni odnos je omogućen ideologijom estetskog fetišizma koju podržava ideologija pravnog fetišizma putem kategorije prava na vlasništvo intelektualne svojine. Contra Duranu zaključujemo da pravo na vlasništvo intelektualne svojine omogućava skriveni prenos viška vrednosti koji su proizveli radnici konkurentskog sektora kapitalističke privrede.
В работе анализируются процессы преобразования идентичности в межвоенное время в Советской России на примере мифологизации образа Василия Ивановича Чапаева, командира дивизии в Граждан- ской войне 1917–1923 гг. В начале рассматриваются основные этапы биографии Чапаева как реальной исторической личности, а также различные оценки его деятельности в трудах ведущих историков Граж- данской войны в России. Основная часть работы посвящена проблеме мифотворчества и мифологизации личности Чапаева, с помощью чего сторонники новой власти в Советской России пытались создать своеобразный противовес образу офицера как символу имперской власти. В статье прослеживается процесс отрыва образа Чапаева от контекста политической идеологии и его трансформации в практи- чески фольклорный анекдотич- ный персонаж как свидетельство профанации коммунистической идеологии. В конце анализирует- ся литературно-художественный образ Чапаева, связанный со всеми перечисленными мифологически- ми образами, но одновременно отличающийся от них. ; This paper analyzes the process of identity transformation of the interwar period in Soviet Russia on the example of mythologization of Vasily Ivanovich Chapaev, division commander in the Russian Civil War of 1917–1923. In the beginning of the work main stages of Chapaev's biography as a real historical figure are considered, as well as various assessments of his activity in the works of leading historians of Civil War in Russia. The main segment of this paper is devoted to the problem of myth creation and mythologization of Chapaev's personality, with the help of which supporters of the new government in Soviet Russia tried to create a kind of counterbalance to the figure of officer as a symbol of earlier imperial power. The article also traces the process of separation of Chapaev's figure from the context of political ideology, and its transformation into a practically folklore anecdotical hero as evidence of the profanation of communist ideology. In the conclusion of the article an artistic and literary figure of Chapaev, related to all above mentioned mythological figures, but simultaneously different from them, is analyzed.
The authors of this paper offer an overview and analysis of the rise and fall of the liberal international order that emerged after the end of the Cold War and along with the rising power of the United States. The foreign policy agenda of the post-Cold War sole superpower was guided by the idea of creating a global order based on the ideology of liberalism, which incorporates theories of liberal peace, democratic peace and neoliberal institutionalism. The establishment of a liberal order has been accompanied by numerous political, social, economic and security crises. The current era is characterized by the rise of the relative power of global actors, primarily China and Russia, as the main challengers to the world domination of the United States, geopolitical revisionism and ideological struggle around the world. The authors of this paper use the dialectic of political mechanics as a method that relies on the teachings of Friedrich Hegel on the dialectic of history and Carl Schmitt on the phenomenon of the political. The authors advocate the view that the political field "permanently pulsates", which, in everything that is social and political, necessarily creates action and reaction.
In this paper, populism is regarded as a kind of ideological map that facilitates to the citizens their coping in the political space, as well as a "thin-centered ideology" which has at his center the idea that politics should be a reflection of the will of the people, the idea that a clean and moral nation confronts a corrupt elite and "out groups", "out groups" which actions endanger or impair the rights and values of the nation. The paper focuses on some fundamental theoretical considerations on populism and empirical determination of the elements of populism in the public opinion in Serbia. Based on opinion polls in Serbia it has been shown what is the relationship of citizens to the people, political elites, democracy and its institutions, as well as the attitude towards "out groups". Empirical research conducted in Serbia in 2017 confirms the hypothesis that the gap between citizens and their elected representatives is deep, and it marks also that conventional politics increasingly faces the difficulties to reach citizens, and that lack of trust in political parties is generated in all spheres of representative democracy. In the political life, "out groups" are instrumentally ranked by political actors according to the necessities of the moment, and the empirical research of attitudes shows that they are in the same way as "out groups experienced by the citizens.
U tekstu se naglašava središnja uloga staha u razmatranju problema političkog poretka i dokazuje da svaka teorija države i razvijena politička ideologija teži da izbegne kolektivne posledice straha. Uprkos njegovoj važnosti, problem straha je bio zanemarivan u glavnim tokovima političke teorije. Autor je ponudio kratku geneaologiju načina na koji se problem straha razmatrao u tradicionalnoj političkoj teoriji, počev od Tukidida. U središtu analize je složeni odnos između poretka, straha i legitimnosti u radovima Giljerma Ferera i njegovog učenika Ištvana Biba. U poslednjem delu teksta autor je pokušao da pokaže kako se o političkoj dinamici Balkana može razmišljati u širim okvirima Fererove političke teorije. On smatra da Fererov pojam kvazilegitimnosti može biti plodan za takvu analizu. ; The article stressed the centrality of fear for political order, arguing that every theory of state, every developed political ideology tend to evade collective consequences of fear. Despite its importance, the problem of fear was neglected in mainstream political theory. The author offers a short genealogy of the way the problem of fear was addressed in traditional political theory since Thucydides. The focus of analysis is the complex relations between order (government), fear and legitimacy in the works of Guglielmo Ferrero and his disciple Bibó István. In the last part of article, the author makes an attempt to demonstrate how political dynamic on the Balkans could be refl ected within broader framework of Ferrero's political theory. He found that Ferrero's concept of quasi-legitimacy might be very useful in that analysis.
Hladni rat je predstavljao rat ideologija bez presedana u istoriji. Nijedan drugi rat, ni pre ni posle ovog višedecenijskog hladnog sukoba između Sjedinjenih Američkih Država i Saveza Sovjetskih Socijalističkih Republika, nije bio rat koji se vodio u tolikoj meri u sferi meke moći kao Hladni rat. Odsustvo neposrednog oružanog sukoba između Sjedinjenih Američkih Država i Sovjetskog Saveza učinilo je da se Hladni rat odvija kao takmičenje u sferi ekonomije, tehnologije i nauke, kao trka u nuklearnom i konvencionalnom naoružanju i kao svemirsko nadmetanje. Pored takmičenja u sferi tvrde moći, Sjedinjene Američke Države i Sovjetski Savez vodili su intenzivnu bitku u oblasti meke moći. Ovo je bio sukob između američke liberalno-demokratske ideologije i sovjetske marksističke ideologije. Svaka od ove dve zemlje težila je tome da ubedi građane one druge zemlje da je njen društveni i ekonomski sistem idealan i da je bolji i pravedniji od sistema njenog glavnog suparnika. Uzrok propasti Sovjetskog Saveza i komunizma u istočnoj Evropi nikada sa sgurnošću neće moći da bude određen. Okolnosti koje su dovele do raspada Sovjetskog Saveza, pada Berlinskog zida 1989. godine i urušavanja komunizma u Evropi ne mogu se svesti na skup vojnih, političkih, ekonomskih i društvenih činilaca koji su, nezavisno jedni od drugih, doveli do tektonskih promena u međunarodnim odnosima. Svi ovi činioci zajedno, isprepletani u kompleksnu mrežu poluga, učinili su da se Sovjetski Savez uruši i da Sjedinjenim Američkim Državama prepusti ulogu pobednika u Hladnom ratu. Pritom, Amerika nije bila samo vojni i ekonomski pobednik. Amerika je iz Hladnog rata izašla kao moralni i ideološki pobednik. Hladni rat predstavlja temu izuzetno velikog broja radova, ali mali broj tih radova se bavi analizom američko-sovjetskog sukoba u sferi meke moći. Stoga je cilj ovog istraživanja i rada rasvetljavanje, objašnjene i tumačenje poluga meke moći koje su Sjedinjene Američke Države institucionalizovale, pokrenule i upotrebile u ideološkoj borbi protiv Sovjetskog Saveza u vreme Hladnog rata. Međutim, Sjedinjene Američke Države nisu od svog nastanka u drugoj polovini 18. veka do Hladnog rata osmišljeno primenjivale svoju meku moć. Do Hladnog rata upotreba poluga meke moći bila praksa kojom su se Sjedinjene Američke Države bavile isključivo u vreme učešća u oružanim sukobima. Tek sa Hladnim ratom u Americi se javlja potreba za namenskom i osmišljenom upotrebom poluga meke moći. Odmah nakon Drugog svetskog rata Sovjetski Savez je počeo da vrši uticaj na druge zemlje šireći marksističku ideologiju i komunističke ideje. Osim širenja marksističke ideologije Sovjetski Savez je vodio i dobro osmišljenu kampanju protiv Sjedinjenih Američkih Država i američkog načina života. Američka administracija je kao odgovor na sovjetsku spoljnu politiku u periodu od 1946. do 1950. godine stvorila politiku obuzdavanja Sovjetskog Saveza i sovjetskog uticaja u svetu svim sredstvima. Ovo je podrazumevalo kako upotrebu poluga tvrde moći tako i primenu poluga meke moći. U to vreme u američkom društvu postojao je konsenzus o upotrebi političkih, vojnih i ekonomskih oruđa u borbi protiv Sovjetskog Saveza, ali je upotreba poluga meke moći bila predmet duge javne rasprave. Jedna od izuzetno važnih poluga meke moći su državni programi informisanja, odnosno ono što se u Sjedinjenim Američkim Državama smatra propagandom, a propaganda se od nastanka Sjedinjenih Američkih Država do danas smatra nečasnom delatnošću autokratskih režima. Sjedinjene Američke Države su u periodu neposredno nakon Drugog svetskog rata sprovele zakonske, institucionalne i strukturalne promene koje su omogućile trajno ustanovljavanje poluga meke moći zarad širenja američkih vrednosti, ideja i kulture i zarad ideološke borbe protiv Sovjetskog Saveza i sovjetske marksističke ideologije. Zakoni doneti u to vreme su na snazi i danas i pružaju okvir za mnogobrojne programe i aktivnosti na polju primene poluga meke moći po celom svetu. ; The Cold War was a war without precedent in the history. No war before this prolonged cold conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union was waged that much in the realm of soft power as the Cold War. In the absence of an immediate armed conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union, the Cold War was conducted as a competition in the areas of economy, technology and science, nuclear and conventional weapons, as well as the space race. Besides the competition in the realm of hard power, the United States and the Soviet Union pursued an intensive battle in the realm of soft power. This was a conflict between the American ideology of a liberal democracy and the Soviet Marxist ideology. Each of the two attempted to persuade the citizens of the other country that its social and economic practice was an ideal one, better and more just than the other one. The source of the collapse of the Soviet Union and communism in Eastern Europe will never be fully determined. The circumstances that brought about the break-up of the Soviet Union, the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, and the fall down of communism in Europe cannot be summarized as an aggregation of military, political, economic and social factors that independently from each other led to the colossal changes in the world order. All of these factors, entangled together in a complex net, caused the implosion of the Soviet Union which left the United States as the winner in the Cold War. Yet, the United States was not only a military and economic victor, it resurfaced as a moral and ideological champion, as well. The Cold Was has been a theme of numerous papers but only a handful of these papers tackled the American-Soviet conflict in the realm of soft power. Thus, the objective of this research and dissertation is to shed the light, explain and construe the instruments of soft power that the United States institutionalized, put into motion and deployed in the ideological battle against Soviet Union in the Cold War. However, since its birth in the 18th century until the Cold War, the United States had not wielded its soft power strategically. Up to the Cold War, the soft power instruments were used exclusively during the times when the United States was involved in an armed conflict. Only in the Cold War, the need for intentional and thoughtful use of soft power instruments emerged. Soon after the end of the Second World War, the Soviet Union got set off to exert its influence by diffusing its Marxist ideology and communist values. In addition to spreading its ideology, the Soviet Union led a well-planned campaign against the United States and the American way of life. From 1946 to 1950, in response to the Soviet policy towards the United States, the American administration coined the policy of containment of the Soviet Union and the Soviet influence in the world. The policy of containment included both the use of the instruments of hard power and of soft power. At that time, there was a consensus in the American society on the use of political, military and economic means in fighting the Soviet Union, while the use of soft power instruments was a subject of a prolonged public discourse. Government information programs, perceived as propaganda in the United States, have always been a very important soft power instrument, and propaganda has been considered by Americans to be a dishonest activity of autocratic governments. In the period right after the Second World War, the United States implemented legislative, institutional and structural changes that allowed for permanent establishment of the soft power instruments. These foreign policy instruments made it possible for the United States government to diffuse American values, ideas and culture and to wage an ideological war against the Soviet Union and its Marxist principles. The acts adopted at that time are in place nowadays, and provide a legal framework for numerous programs and activities in the realm of soft power.
Autori ovog rada nude pregled i analizu uspona i pada međunarodnog liberalnog poretka koji je nastao nakon okončanja Hladnog rata i uspona moći Sjedinjenih Američkih Država. Spoljnopolitička agenda jedine posthladnoratovske supersile vođena je idejom stvaranja globalnog poretka utemeljenog na ideologiji (globalnog) liberalizma koja u sebi inkorporira teorije liberalnog mira, demokratskog mira i neoliberalnog institucionalizma. Uspostavljanje tzv. globalnog liberalnog poretka dosada je bilo praćeno brojnim političkim, socijalnim, ekonomskim i bezbednosnim krizama, a trenutnu eru međunarodnih odnosa odlikuju uspon relativne moći "neliberalnih" globalnih aktera, pre svega Kine i Rusije, kao glavnih izazivača svetske dominacije Sjedinjenih Američkih Država, te geopolitički revizionizam i ideološka konfrontacija liberalnih i antiliberalnih snaga širom sveta. Autori ovog rada koriste specifičan analitički metod tzv. dijalektike političke mehanike, koji se oslanja na učenja Friedricha Hegela o dijalektici istorije i Carla Schmitta o fenomenu političkog, kako bi objasnili trenutnu dinamiku međunarodnih odnosa, pokazujući da političko polje "permanentno pulsira" što, u svemu što je društveno i političko, nužno kreira akciju i reakciju, čijom dinamikom se mogu tumačiti i globalna zbivanja kojima upravo prisustvujemo. ; The authors of this paper offer an overview and analysis of the rise and fall of the liberal international order that emerged after the end of the Cold War and along with the rising power of the United States. The foreign policy agenda of the post-Cold War sole superpower was guided by the idea of creating a global order based on the ideology of liberalism, which incorporates theories of liberal peace, democratic peace and neoliberal institutionalism. The establishment of a liberal order has been accompanied by numerous political, social, economic and security crises. The current era is characterized by the rise of the relative power of global actors, primarily China and Russia, as the main challengers to the world domination of the United States, geopolitical revisionism and ideological struggle around the world. The authors of this paper use the dialectic of political mechanics as a method that relies on the teachings of Friedrich Hegel on the dialectic of history and Carl Schmitt on the phenomenon of the political. The authors advocate the view that the political field "permanently pulsates", which, in everything that is social and political, necessarily creates action and reaction.
The basic problem that the process of Euro integrations faces today is the absence of the European identity. There are ideas how it could be built, on what it should be based, but the basic problem is the EU has give up in a great extent from the real European values - the ideals like freedom, equality, solidarity, social justice, etc. Human rights are the European achievement, but a distinctive, therefore identity difference between the European and the Anglo-American interpretation is that the European variant guaranteed social-economic rights, which was actually a concretization of the great ideal of solidarity. Today, with prevailing ideology of globalism, just this element of human rights has been brutally waded, a part of the European identity with it. A similar situation is with what the Europeans consider the greatest achievement of the EU - free movement of people, goods and capital. Free movement of people is questioned by building barbed wires and creation of a new ante murale christianitatis, even in Islamic states, far away from the Schengen Area that is proclaimed untouchable. Moreover, all those people swarming to the Europe actually have close connections with it - they originate from former European colonies, brutally exploited by their metropolises for decades and centuries. Not only that, but recently their new 'Europeanization' has been attempted through the initialization of the 'Arab Spring' , which resulted with increase of the Islamic fundamentalism, disintegration of certain Arab states and tribal war in them, increase of terrorism and, of course, migrants from those areas. Although it would be justified to try to return the evil gotten to them at least partly, by refusing to accept the miserable the Europe gives the mortal strike to some of the main values that are considered its identity characteristics - free movement of people and solidarity. All this, actually, indicates on the absence of the European identity consciousness. There is no clearly defined content of the idea of the Euroidentity, nor there is consciousness of it with the citizens of the EU. The citizens of the EU are still more French, Englishmen, Germans, Italians, Spaniards, Poles, Czechs rather than the Europeans. Their Europeanism exists only on the level of usefulness and efficacy, therefore, the prediction is that the model of the EU as an international organizations generis will be kept for a long time, while identities in future will be tied for (European) nations.
There are some time and geographical points, determinants before which decency calls solely for silence and bowed head, before which words and our ability to understand grow weary or actually, they lose any meaning. Jasenovac is undoubtedly such a place. Our language has one horrifying word – stratište (a place of execution). Simply, it is a place where anthropological, diluvial evil destroys the most valuable – life. The place whose impeccably unmasked and inevitable horror has not been anywhere else so tersely defined, it seems, as in the words of a Serbian old man addressing his executioner: "My child, do what you must". Why are we speaking today then, instead of being appropriately silent? Because the victims, the Serbs together with their fellow-citizens – the Jews and the Roma, those eternal culprits behind all evil, the disliked citizens of the Independent State of Croatia (NDH), ask for a moment of remembrance. A moment of reverence. A bowed head before this place of execution called Jasenovac. It is because today we, not only as a nation, as a state, but as Homo sapiens, and finally as this scrap of civilization that remained for the mankind, do not have the right to be naive. We are obliged to recognize evil in its inception before it is too late, everywhere, far and wide. It is not the number of the murdered people (and the number is large) that determines the horror of Jasenovac, but the intention behind it. The executors of these crimes, with all the contempt that they deserve everywhere and in every place, were not the most horrible ones even in Jasenovac. The most horrifying is the political thought that sustains the deviance of perpetrators, the intention behind the idea of such places of execution, the pseudo-ideology of obliteration that justifies and redeems the sins of those intoxicated with blood. Nowadays, we do not point the finger at any nation or any religion. It would be an unpardonable simplification and primitivism beneath the dignityof this institution. We merely define ourselves in relation to the crime that happened, since it did happen. We do recognize it and remember it. With the ever present and often betrayed and unsuccessful idea not to let it happen again. To us, it remains to pursue the trace of Marko Miljanov's mythical sentence, as we cannot offer anything better even nowadays, which reads that heroism means defending oneself from the evil in others, but also defending others from the evil residing in oneself. Vladimir S. Kostić ; Посебна издања / Српска академија наука и уметности ; књ. 686. Председништво ; књ. 7
Тhis paper considers the phenomenon of global growth, emphasizing the slowdown and (limits) of the Western GDP growth. By comparing the United States as the most mature economy in the world, China as the new hegemon, the OECD countries, the BRICS countries, and the rest of the world, we show the growth and unequal development of the five "regional futures" of the global world. In addition to the imminent economic reasons for the backwardness of Western economies and societies, the crisis of the structure and functioning of the democratic capitalist system, and the ecological limits of sustainability, we emphasize two non-economic moments: the end of liberalism as a fundamental ideology of the Western world, and the loss of trust, which is a fundamental moral category. According to futurist forecasts, the West has slowed down, the financial system has been damaged, and the recovery is slow and uncertain. The following subjects are being considered: the growth paradigm, the belief in lasting progress, the end of liberalism and the loss of confidence, the recovery of Western economies, some monetary policy measures, and European fiduciary money and the slowdown of the growth in the Eurozone. The monetary economy of the euro as an agreed single currency has caused strong changes in the Eurozone and has "trapped" the European Union. The euro economy, among other things, is responsible for the sharp division of the Eurozone member states into surplus and deficit countries, and the Eurozone crisis, stagnation, and slowdown in economic (non-economic) growth. ; U ovom radu razmatramo fenomen rasta na globalnom nivou, apostrofirajući usporavanje i (granice) rasta BDP Zapada. Komparacijom SAD kao najzrelije ekonomije na svijetu, Kine kao novog hegemona, zemalja OECD-a, zatim zemalja BRICS-a, te ostatka svijeta, predočava se rast i nejednaki razvoj pet ,,regionalnih budućnosti," globalnog svijeta. Pored imanentnih ekonomskih razloga zaostajanja zapadnih ekonomija i društava, krize strukture i funkcionisanja demokratskog kapitalističkog sistema, i ekološke granice održivosti, ističemo i dva neekonomska momenta, kraj liberalizma kao fundamentalne ideologije zapadnog svijeta i gubitak povjerenja kao temeljne moralne kategorije. Prema prognozama futurista, Zapad je posustao, finansijski sistem je oštećen, oporavak je spor i neizvjestan. Predmet razmatranja su: paradigma rasta, vjera u trajni napredak, kraj liberalizma i gubitak povjerenja, oporavak zapadnih ekonomija, neke mjere monetarne politike, te Evropski prekarni novac i usporavanje rasta evrozone. Monetarna ekonomija evra kao dogovorene jedinstvene valute izazvala je snažne promjene u evrozoni i Evropskoj uniji uhvaćenoj u ,,zamku." Ekonomija evra, između ostalog, odgovorna je za oštru podjelu zemalja članica evrozone na zemlje suficita i zemlje deficita, te krizu evrozone, stagnaciju i usporavanja ekonomskog (neekonomskog) rasta.
U savremenim društvima se smatra da visoko obrazovanje ima značajnu ulogu za ekonomski razvoj tako što obezbeđuje kvalifikovanu radnu snagu, ekonomsku konkurentnost, produktivnost, političku stabilnost i stvaranje demokratskog društva. Predmet rada je da se predstave i kritički ispitaju sociološka stanovišta koja pripadaju funkcionalističkoj i institucionalističkoj paradigmi koje na različite načine tumače značaj obrazovanja za razvoj društva. Prvi cilj je da se predstavi na koji način autori koji pripadaju ovim teorijskim pravcima opisuju ulogu obrazovanja u ekonomskom i političkom razvoju. Drugi cilj je da se ispita na koji način isti autori tumače značaj visokog obrazovanja za pojedince: za zaposlenje, napredovanje i životne šanse. Funkcionalistička paradigma smatra da je visoko obrazovanje neophodno za tehnološki, ekonomski i društveni napredak, jer priprema pojedince za rad u odgovarajućem segmentu kapitalističke ekonomije i povezana je sa shvatanjem progresa i pojmova: modernist, profesionalizacija i racionalizacija. Institucionalistička perspektiva takođe pokazuje da je obrazovni sistem strukturalno povezan sa nastankom moderne privrede i nacionalne države, da ima alokativnu funkciju i da na taj način utiče na životne šanse pojedinaca. Za razliku od funkcionalističke, institicionalistička perspektiva naglašava ideološku i legitimacijsku stranu ovih procesa i značaj pridaje političkim faktorima u odnosu na ekonomske faktore. Preispitivanjem i suočavanjem različitih teorijskih polazišta ukazuje se na kompleksan odnos obrazovanja i šireg društva. Stoga je potrebno kontinuirano ispitivati suprotstavljena stanovišta koja ovoj temi prilaze na različite načine. Jedino celovito i kritičko teorijsko promatranje ovih procesa može imati značajne implikacije za kreiranje obrazovnih politika, kao i sveobuhvatnijih reformi društva. ; In modern societies, higher education is considered to be playing a significant role in economic development by providing skilled labor, economic competitiveness, productivity, political stability and building a democratic society. The subject of this paper is to present and critically review sociological standpoints belonging to functionalist and institutionalist paradigm which interpret the importance of education for development of a society in a different way. The first objective is to present how authors belonging to these theoretical concepts describe the role of education in economic and political development. The second objective is to examine how these authors interpret the importance of higher education for individuals: for their employment, promotion and life chances. The functionalist paradigm holds that higher education is necessary for technological, economic and social progress, as it prepares individuals for work in the relevant segment of capitalist economy and is linked to understanding of progress and concepts of modernity, professionalization and rationalization. The institutionalist perspective also shows that education system is structurally linked to emergence of modern economy and the nation-state, that it has an allocative function and thus affects the life chances of individuals. Unlike the functionalist, the institutionalist perspective emphasizes the ideology and legitimacy of these processes and attaches importance to political rather than economic factors. By reviewing and confronting different theoretical starting points, a complex relationship between education and wider society is revealed. It is therefore necessary to continually examine the opposing viewpoints that approach this topic in a different way. Only a comprehensive and critical theoretical observation of these processes can have significant implications for creating educational policies and far-reaching societal reforms. ; Zbornik rezimea / 24. Međunarodna naučna konferencija "Pedagoška istraživanja i školska praksa ; Book of abstracts / 24th International Scientific Conference "Educational Research and School Practice"
The relations with Russia rank among the most important and most complex issues in the US and UK foreign policy. The years after the Second World War have been marked by an exhausting arms race between the Western and Eastern bloc that ended with the fall of the Berlin Wall, the break-up of the Soviet Union and the victory of the United States and its Western allies. The purpose of this paper is to analyse the relations between the US and the United Kingdom on the one hand, and Russia, on the other, during the mandate of President Trump and after Brexit and point to possible directions that these relations may take in the aftermath of Biden's victory in the 2020 US Presidential elections. The author proceeds from a hypothesis that the efforts of President Trump, who, contrary to his predecessors, felt that the relations with Russia should be based on interests rather than ideology, have failed. He has not been successful primarily due to the huge resistance mounted by the state structures, mainstream media and anti-Russian coalition forged by the Republican and Democratic parties. The relations between the UK and Russia remain cold after Brexit as well due to the severe problems between the two countries. The first part will deal with the strained relations between the United States and Russia following the West's victory in the Cold War, the efforts of President Trump to improve these relations and his failure to do so. The second part of the paper will address the relationship between the United Kingdom and Russia, which is in many respects even more complicated than that between Russia and the US. After Brexit, the relations between the two countries continue to be plagued by the activities of the Russian agents in Great Britain, the crisis in Ukraine and different views on the war in Syria. In the third part, the concluding part of the paper, the author tried to answer the question of how the relations between the US and Russia will develop after Joseph Biden won the 2020 US Presidential elections. According to him, the new President will continue to pursue the traditional policy towards Russia agreed upon by both US parties. It can be expected that Biden will, despite the policy of sanctions pursued by his predecessors, Obama and Trump, engage more in supporting the opposition and civilian sector in Russia. Given the cold and strained relations between these two states, it may be assumed that Great Britain will readily follow a new, tougher course of action pursued by President Biden towards Russia and Putin. It is especially important for UK politics that Biden returns to the ideas of liberalism because, as we have seen on previous pages, in London, in addition to the actions of Russian agents on the UK territory, Putin is most resented precisely for his activities to overthrow the ruling liberal order. Despite the good ties between Prime Minister Johnson and the former US President who supported Brexit, Biden's victory will bring relief to the UK because of his commitment, as opposed to Trump, to bring back America to the world political stage, where London is likely to expect to find space for its new global role after leaving the EU. On the other hand, Moscow will probably continue with its past foreign policy strategy in anticipation of the moves to be taken by the new US President without high expectations regarding the future relations between the two countries. Russia has even fewer expectations when it comes to relations with the UK, given the gravity of the problems that burden the relations between the two countries.
Doktorska disertacija Jugoslovenska politika prema zemljama narodne demokratije u susedstvu 1953 – 1958. godine zasnovana je na jugoslovenskim arhivskim izvorima iz Arhiva Srbije i Crne Gore, Diplomatskog arhiva Ministarstva spoljnih poslova Republike Srbije i Vojnog arhiva kao i na relevantnoj domaćoj i stranoj literaturi. Disertacija se bavi jugoslovenskom politikom prema Albaniji, Bugarskoj, Rumuniji i Mađarskoj u periodu normalizacije odnosa Jugoslavije sa ovim zemljama posle Staljinove smrti tj. posle petogodišnjeg perioda tokom koga su njihovi odnosi bili u gotovo potpunom prekidu. Ona predstavlja pokušaj da se sagleda odnos Jugoslavije prema neposrednom susedstvu u uslovima hladnog rata i sadejstva jugoslovenskih interesa sa jedne i spoljnih faktora poput uloge Sovjetskog Saveza u procesu normalizacije odnosa Jugoslavije sa pomenutim zemljama ili uloge vodećih zapadnih zemalja i njihovih interesa u Jugoslaviji i susednim zemljama "narodne demokratije" sa druge strane. U nekoliko faza kroz koje su od marta 1953. do aprila 1958. godine prošli odnosi Jugoslavije sa Albanijom, Bugarskom, Rumunijom i Mađarskom (od Staljinove smrti do potpisivanja Beogradske deklaracije, od potpisivanja Beogradske deklaracije do XX kongresa KPSS-a, od XX kongresa KPSS-a do izbijanja događaja u Mađarskoj 1956. godine i od događaja u Mađarskoj do kritike novog Programa SKJ) jugoslovenska politika se menjala u skladu sa okolnostima zadržavajući kao konstante izražen interes za normalizaciju odnosa i insistiranje na tome da sve susedne zemlje "narodne demokratije" javno osude svoju raniju politiku prema Jugoslaviji i rehabilituju sve koji su na montiranim sudskim procesima osuđeni zbog špijunske delatnost u korist Jugoslavije. Osnovni cilj rada na ovoj dioktorskoj disertaciji je bio da pruži nova znanja o ovoj temi, nove poglede na jugoslovensku spoljnu politiku i ponudi novi ugao gledanja na odnose Jugoslavije sa SSSR-om i Varšavskim paktom u celini. U vezi sa tim definisan je i drugi cilj ovog rada koji se odnosi na rekonstrukciju jugoslovenske politike prema ovim zemljama i na pokušaj da se uoče specifičnosti, metode i ciljevi te politike koji su se razlikovali u odnosu na jugoslovensku politiku prema ostalim istočnoevropskim zemljama. Treći cilj na temu jugoslovenske politike prema susednim zemljama "narodne demokratije" od 1953. do 1958. godine bio je i sistematizacija postojećih znanja o ovoj temi i njihova evaluacija s obzirom na veći stepen dostupnosti izvora nego što je to bio slučaj pre više decenija kada su nastali najznačajniji radovi koji su se delimično bavili pojedinim segmentima ove teme. Četvrti cilj istraživanja bio je utvrđivanje hronološki jasno određenih faza kroz koje su prolazili odnosi Jugoslavije sa Mađarskom, Rumunijom, Bugarskom i Albanijom u posmatranom periodu i identifikacija faktora koji su na to uticali. U trenutku Staljinove smrti, susedne zemlje "narodne demokratije" bile su daleko od centra pažnje jugoslovenske spoljne politike jer je , između ostalog, i njihov značaj za nju u uslovima prekida međudržavnih odnosa bio mali. Međutim, promene koje su ubrzo posle Staljinove smrti usledile u Sovjetskom Savezu omogućile su početak normalizacije odnosa Jugoslavije i "prve zemlje socijalizma" što je za sobom povuklo i mogućnost da Jugoslavija normalizuje svoje odnose i sa susednim zemljama "narodne demokratije". Kada su u pitanju bile te zemlje, primarni jugoslovenski interes nije se nalazio u sferi politike i ekonomije kao u slučaju Sovjetskog Saveza već u sferi praktičnih međudržavnih pitanja koja su teško opterećivala Jugoslaviju. Na prvom mestu to je bio interes da se što pre otkloni vojna pretnja na granicama i stanje na zajedničkoj "liniji razgraničenja" koje je u godinama posle 1948. iziskivalo velika materijalna i kadrovska ulaganja. Osim toga, Jugoslavija je jasan interes imala i po pitanju poboljšanja položaja pripadnika jugoslovenskih manjina u susednim zemljama "narodne demokratije" kao i po pitanju normalizacije saobraćaja. Razlog što Jugoslavija nije pokazivala izražen interes za političku i ekonomsku saradnju sa ovim zemljama ležao je u činjenici da je ona u međuvremenu, u vreme godina sukoba, uspela da pronađe alternativu kako u sferi spoljne politike tako i u sferi ekonomije i na taj način obesmisli blokadu kojoj je bila izložena sa Istoka. Međutim, cena iznalaženja te alternative bila je visoka i pretila je da ugrozi monopol vlasti Saveza komunista Jugoslavije što je za Tita i njegovo najbliže okruženje bilo neprihvatljivo. Iz tog razloga, mogućnost da se nađe zajednički jezik sa Moskvom predstavljao je za Tita priliku da uspostavi ravnotežu kada je u pitanju bio jugoslovenski položaj prema suprotstavljenim blokovima u zaoštrenoj hladnoratovskoj atmosferi. Odnos Jugoslavije prema SSSR-u, i obrnuto, može se smatrati jednim od najznačajnijih faktora koji su uticali na oblikovanje jugoslovenske politike prema susednim zemljama "narodne demokratije" sa jedne i na kreiranje politike koje su sve istočnoevropske zemlje vodile prema Jugoslaviji sa druge strane. Drugi značajan faktor koji je uticao na jugoslovensku politiku prema zemljama "narodne demokratije" u susedstvu od 1953. do 1958. godine bio je u tesnoj vezi sa jugoslovensko-sovjetskim odnosima a ticao se prevashodno ideologije i s tim u vezi destaljinizacije. Kreirajući u godinama sukoba sa Informbiroom sopstveni model "samoupravnog" socijalizma, Jugoslavija tokom procesa normalizacije odnosa nije pristajala na "jedinstvo lagera" i povratak u njega što je bio glavni kamen spoticanja u njenim odnosima kakao sa SSSR-om tako i sa drugim istočnoevropskim zemljama pa i susednim kao što su bile Albanija, Bugarska, Mađarska i Rumunija. S tim u vezi je i destaljinizacija, odnosno njen napredak i dubina u susednim "zemljama" narodne demokratije kao i njihova spremnost da se distanciraju od staljinističke ideologije, predstavljala jedan od glavnih faktora koji su uticali na oblikovanje jugoslovenske politike prema tim zemljama. Najzad, važan činilac koji je uticao na jugoslovensku spoljnu politiku uopšte pa i na njenu politiku prema delu ili celini Istočnog bloka bili su i njeni odnosi sa Zapadom, koji su iz pragmatičnih razloga tokom godina sukoba sa Informbiroom bili poboljšani do te mere da su Jugoslaviju, iako nevoljno, doveli na rub uključenja u zapadni vojni savez. Zapad je bio taj kome se nije dopadalo jugoslovensko približavanje SSSR-u i istočnoevropskim zemljama i u periodu normalizacije njihovih odnosa svaki korak koji je vodio približavanju dveju do tada suprotstavljenih strana izazivao je na Zapadu sumnje u iskrenost Jugoslavije i zebnju kada je u pitanju bila budućnost odnosa Zapada i Jugoslavije. Kao rezultat sadejstva nekoliko najvažnijih spoljnih faktora i jugoslovenskih interesa u neposrednom susedstvu iz okvira socijalističkog "lagera" nastajala je jugoslovenska politika prema Istoku uopšte pa i prema Albaniji, Bugarskoj, Rumuniji i Mađarskoj ponaosob, onakva kakva je bila. U periodu od 1953. do 1958. godine ta politika je bila aktivna i pozitivna ali ne i bez ograda. Tih godina, Jugoslavija je bez sumnje pokazivala interes da normalizuje svoje odnose sa susedima sa kojima je osim granice delila i ideologiju ali najčešće nije želela da ona bude ta koja će dati inicijativu za konkretne korake u tom procesu. Smatrajući da su međusobni odnosi narušeni ne njenom već krivicom suseda, ona je strogo poštovala načelo (koje je inače zastupala i kada je u pitanju bila njena politika prema SSSR-u) da prvi korak treba da učini onaj koji je odgovoran za prekid normalnih dobrosusedskih odnosa. Imajući u vidu sve interese, želje i aspiracije koje je Jugoslavija imala kada je u pitanju bio prostor neposredno uz njene granice kao i faktore koji su neminovno uticali na njenu politiku, može se reći da je Jugoslavija prema zemljama "narodne demokratije" u susedstvu u periodu normalizacije međusobnih odnosa od 1953. do 1958. godine vodila politiku mogućeg. Ta politika, međutim, iako osmišljena na isti način, nije uvek bila ista prema svakoj pojedinačnoj zemlji u susedstvu iz prostog razloga što u njima nije nailazila na istovetne uslove i mogućnosti. Tamo gde su mogućnosti bile veće, Jugoslavija je postizala više. Međutim, kako je vreme odmicalo i kako je Jugoslavija bivala sve uspešnija u pronalaženju svog sopstvenog "trećeg puta", čini se da joj je sve manje i manje bilo stalo do sadržajnije saradnje sa većinom suseda od kojih je (budući da su sve bile deo Istočnog bloka), u skladu sa svojom novom spoljnopolitičkom strategijom koja je ekvidistancu prema blokovima predviđala kao imperativ, trebalo da napravi određeni otklon. ; The Ph.D. thesis Yugoslav Policy Towards the Neighboring Countries of People's Democracy 1953-1958 is based on Yugoslav archival sources from the Archives of Yugoslavia, the Diplomatic Archives of the Foreign Ministry of the Republic of Serbia and the Military Archives, as well as on the relevant domestic and foreign literature. The thesis deals with Yugoslav policy towards Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary during the period of normalization of relations between these countries and Yugoslavia after Stalin's death, i.e. after a five years' period of almost complete interruption in bilateral relations. It is an attempt at a study of the interplay of Yugoslavia's relations with immediate neighborhood during the Cold War and Yugoslav interests on the one hand, and interests of foreign factors, such as the Soviet Union and the leading Western nations in Yugoslavia and in the neighboring countries within the framework of the normalization of Yugoslavia's relations with the above mentioned countries. During the several phases the Yugoslav relations with Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary went through between March 1953 and April 1958 (from Stalin's death until the signing of the Belgrade Declaration, from then to the 20th congress of the CP of the USSSR, from then until the beginning of the events in Hungary in 1956 and from then until the critique of the new Program of the CP of Yugoslavia), the Yugoslav policy changed in accordance with the situation, preserving the interest in normalizing relations and insisting that all neighboring countries of "people's democracy" should condemn their former policy towards Yugoslavia and rehabilitate all those who had been sentenced as Yugoslav spies at show trials. The main goal of this Ph.D. thesis was to provide new knowledge of the topic, new views on Yugoslav foreign policy and to propose a new vantage point on the Yugoslav relations with the Soviet Union, and on relations with the Warsaw Pact as a whole. Connected with this was another goal of the thesis that concrens the reconstruction of Yugoslav policy toward these countries and the attempt to pinpoint the characteristics, methods and goals of that policy that were different from those of Yugoslav policy toward other east European countries. The third goal of the topic of Yugoslav policy toward the neighboring countries of "people's democracy" between 1953 and 1958 was also to systematize the existing knowledge on the subject in view of better accessability of sources as compared with the situation of several decades ago when the most important works touching upon some aspects of this topic were written. The fourth goal of the research was to determin chronologically clearly defined phases that the Yugoslav relations with Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Albania had gone through during the researched period and to identify the factors that influenced the process. At the time of Stalin's death the countries of "people's democracy" were far from the focus of the Yugoslav foreign policy, because, among other things, their importance was small due to the severed inter-state relations. However, the changes that set in the Soviet Union soon after Stalin's death made the beginning of normalization of relations with the "first country of socialism" possible. This entailed the possibility that Yugoslavia also normalizes its relations with neighboring countries of "people's democracy". When these countries were in question, Yugoslavia's primary interest didn't lie in political or economic spheres as in the case of the Soviet Union, but rather in the sphere of practical inter-state matters weighting heavily on Yugoslavia. Supreme was the interest to do away as soon as possible with the military threat on the borders and to change the situation on the "line of demarcation" that had required much material and human resources in the years after 1948. Furthermore, Yugoslavia had a clear interest in improving the situation of members of Yugoslav minorities in the neighboring countries of "people's democracy", as well as in normalization of trafic. The reason why Yugoslavia showed no great interest in political or economic cooperation with these countries lay in the fact that she had in the meantime, during the years of conflict, found alternative solutions in the spheres of foreign policy and economy, reducing thus to insignifficance the blocade imposed on her from the East. However, the price of that alternative solution was high and it threatened to endanger the power monopoly of the Union of the Communists of Yugoslavia, which was unacceptable for Tito and his innermost circle of collaborators. For that reason, the possibility of finding common grounds with Moscow was for Tito an oportunity to balance Yugoslavia's position between the two competing blocs in a worsened Cold War atmosphere. Yugoslavia's relation to the USSSR and vice versa, can be seen as one of the most important factors influencing Yugoslav policy toward the neighboring countries of "people's democracy" on the one hand, and on the other, one that was decisively shaping their policy towards Yugoslavia. Another important factor influencing Yugoslav policy toward the countries of "people's democracy" in the vicinity between 1953 and 1958 was closely connected with the Yugoslav-Soviet relations and it concerned primarily ideology and, in that context, destalinization. Having created her own model of "self-managing" socialism during the years of conflict with the Cominform, during the process of normalization Yugoslavia didn't accept the unity of the Eastern Bloc and the matter of her return to it was one of the main stumbling blocks both in her relations with the USSR and with the neighbors such as Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania. In that context, destalinisation, i.e. its progress and depth in the neighboring countries of "people's democracy" and their willingnes to distance themselves from the Stalinist ideology was one of the major factors influencing Yugoslavia's policy toward those countries. Finally, the important factor influencing Yugoslav foreign policy in general, including part of the Eastern Block or it as a whole, were Yugoslavia's relations with the West that had been so improved during the years of conflict with the Cominform, that they led Yugoslavia, although unwillingly, to the brink of joining the western military alliance. The West was unhappy with Yugoslav rapprochement with the USSR and eastern European countries and every step that brought closer the two once confonted parties during the process of normalization of their relations, caused the West to doubt Yugoslavia's sincerety and cause fears for the future relations between the West and Yugoslavia. As a result of interplay of several major foreign political factors and Yugoslav interests in the imediate socialist block neighborhood, the Yugoslav policy toward the East in general and toward Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary individually, emerged in the given form. Between 1953 and 1958 that policy was active and positive, but not without restrains. During those years Yugoslavia clearly showed interest in normalizing her relations with the neighboring countries with whom she shared not only borders, but ideology too, but in most cases she was not willing to be the one to initiate concrete steps in that process. Deeming that it had not been her fault but that of her neighbors that the bilateral relations had been spoiled, she observed strictly the principle (that she also championed in her relations with the USSR) that the side that had been responsible for the interruption of normal good neighborly relations should also make the first move. Having in mind all the interests, wishes and aspirations that Yugoslavia had concerning the space imediatly bordering on her territory as well as the factors necessarily infuencing her policy, it can be said that Yugoslavia led the policy of what was possible toward the neighboring countries of "people's democracy" during tthe period of normalization of bilateral relations 1953-1958. However, that policy wasn't always the same toward all these neighboring countries, for simple reason that it didn't meet with the same conditions and possibilities in them. Where possibilities were greater, Yugoslavia acheived more. However, as the time went by and as Yugoslavia became increasingly more successful in finding her own "third way", it seems she was increasingly less interested in substantial cooperation with most of the neighbors from whom (since they were all members of the Eastern Block) certain distance should be kept – in keeping with the new foreign political strategy that foresaw equidistance towards both blocs as a must.
