Peace-Institution and Nation-Building in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. Task for Transatlantic Cooperation
In: Rivista di studi politici internazionali: RSPI, Band 71, Heft 2, S. 345
ISSN: 0035-6611
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In: Rivista di studi politici internazionali: RSPI, Band 71, Heft 2, S. 345
ISSN: 0035-6611
In: Affari esteri: rivista trimestrale, Band 21, S. 41-50
ISSN: 0001-964X
In: Affari esteri: rivista trimestrale, Band 41, Heft 164, S. 803-816
ISSN: 0001-964X
In: Affari esteri: rivista trimestrale, Band 13, S. 473-495
ISSN: 0001-964X
In: Politica internazionale: rivista bimestrale dell'IPALMO, Band 14, Heft 3-4, S. 105-114
ISSN: 0032-3101
Analyse der arabischen Gesellschaft und Wirtschaft seit 1800 - ausgehend von den Werken "The Middle East in the World Economy, 1800-1914" (Roger Owen) und "An Economic History of the Middle East and North Africa" (Charles Issawi) - unter osmanischer Herrschaft, ihrem Zusammenstoß mit der westlichen Zivilisation und Ökonomie, der Kolonialzeit und deren Ende. (DÜI-Hlr)
World Affairs Online
In: Il politico: rivista italiana di scienze politiche ; rivista quardrimestrale, Band 74, Heft 2, S. 63-91
ISSN: 0032-325X
The aim of the article is to apply an economic model -- the theory of contests -- to al-Qaeda's operating procedures, in order to account for two of its distinct features: the rise of self-starters and their inclination to mass killing. According to the model, al-Qaeda can be considered as a firm rewarding a prize -- namely, official membership. Since al-Qaeda's goal is to spread terror, the efforts of a candidate member can be assessed by proxy observing the number of casualties. As a result, the argument is that groups that wish to join the network compete to get the price, and their performance is measured in terms of mass murdering. This model is also tested on an empirical case: the July 2005 London bombings, which displays many features of a contest. Policy implications for counter-terrorism are then discussed: following the insights of the model, action should be undertaken in order to falsify or at least confuse al-Qaeda's internal communication. Second, since al-Qaeda's reward is as ideological as economics, efforts should be dedicated to tracking down, and possibly halt, financial flows. Finally, the article suggests further lines of research. Adapted from the source document.
In: La comunità internazionale: rivista trimestrale della Società Italiana per l'Organizzazione Internazionale, Band 37, Heft 1/2, S. 9-33
ISSN: 0010-5066
In: Affari esteri: rivista trimestrale, Band 10, S. 316-324
ISSN: 0001-964X
In: Affari esteri: rivista trimestrale, Band 41, Heft 163, S. 485-503
ISSN: 0001-964X
In: Rivista di studi politici internazionali: RSPI, Band 71, Heft 1, S. 96-100
ISSN: 0035-6611
In: Affari esteri: rivista trimestrale, Band 6, S. 120-136
ISSN: 0001-964X
In: Affari esteri: rivista trimestrale, Band 41, Heft 163, S. 550-563
ISSN: 0001-964X
In: Il politico: rivista italiana di scienze politiche ; rivista quardrimestrale, Band 66, Heft 1, S. 135-156
ISSN: 0032-325X
Based on the original unpublished documents of the Italian ambassador in Ankara, the article refers to the difficult situation in which Turkey found itself as a consequence of the 1956 Suez Canal crisis. Since its entry into NATO in 1952, the Turkish government had been active in completing the Western defensive system in the Middle East. After the disappointing Middle East Command & the Medo, which had to see Egypt as a main pillar, the US Secretary of State saw in the Northern Tier line as the real base for building the Baghdad Pact. GB, of course, had to be the "glue" of the structure. Pakistan would be a new element; an Arab country; Iraq, was most welcome; & Iran joined too. Turkey tried from the beginning to get Washington into the Pact. It had to measure itself against the irresistible rise of Nasserism & the strong dissuasive action it exerted on Hussein of Jordan & Nuri Said of Iraq. When Nasser's ascendancy gained ground in Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, & Iraq, Turkey tried in vain to connect the Baghdad Pact to NATO; Cairo & Damascus, the two main centers of Arab nationalism, succeeding in isolating Iraq, would strengthen those links with the USSR that would suddenly threaten Turkey both from communism in the North & Arabism from South. The bilateral treaty of 11 March 1959 with Washington, together with strong economic aid, would in the end guarantee Turkey would open its territory to the intermediate range ballistic missile base. Adapted from the source document.
In: Rivista di studi politici internazionali: RSPI, Band 68, Heft 1, S. 65-78
ISSN: 0035-6611
The article opens with the position that Jerusalem had not yet been able to fully take up its position as nexus of the three major world religions due to armed conflict. The article continues with a discussion on the pivotal role Jerusalem plays in Middle Eastern politics & with the state of Israel itself. The article gives a brief historical account of the laws that govern political ownership of Jerusalem & the international diplomatic interventions that have attempted to create peace in the Middle East through political play with Jerusalem. The author gives an account of the recent events at Camp David & the more open negotiations that occurred there. E. Miller
In: Rivista di studi politici internazionali: RSPI, Band 68, Heft 3, S. 422-430
ISSN: 0035-6611
In this diplomatic letter, the Italian ambassador to Israel indicates reasons for admiring the Israelis: a people unique in maintaining religious, national, & ethnic identity despite persecution & discrimination; the return to their homeland; & their shrewd tenacity in developing & safeguarding the nation. After discussing theories about how to reconcile the Israeli state with Palestinians claiming homeland, the failures of the Middle Eastern peace accords are reviewed. It is suggested that Israelis lay the Holocaust to rest & that the state of Israel is a significant aspect of the eternal Jewish medallion. The text of the Middle East Conflict. Resolution 1245 (2001), adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, is appended. 1 Appendix. J. Sadler