Suchergebnisse

Includes bibliographical references. ; Number of sources in the bibliography: 72 ; Thesis (Ph. D.) -- University of Cyprus, Faculty of Economics and Management, Department of Economics, 2016. ; The University of Cyprus Library holds the printed form of the thesis. ; Η παρούσα διατριβή διερευνά τις διαφορές τιμών στην ΕΕ και την ύπαρξη ομάδων σύγκλισης τιμών σε όλη την υδρόγειο. Πρώτα, εξετάζουμε τους καθοριστικούς παράγοντες και την εξέλιξη της διασποράς τιμών των εμπορευμάτων σε όλη την Ευρώπη με την πάροδο του χρόνου. Βρίσκουμε ότι η εμπορευσιμότητα και οι μη – εμπορεύσιμες εισροές παίζουν σημαντικά μικρότερο ρόλο στην διασπορά τιμών μεταξύ των χωρών μετά την υιοθέτηση του ευρώ, και για τις οικονομίες στην Ευρωζώνη (ΕΖ) σε σύγκρισή με αυτά της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης (ΕΕ). Στην συνέχεια, συγκρίνουμε τις κατανομές των αποκλίσεων του νόμου της μιας τιμής (LOP) με την πάροδο του χρόνου και ανακαλύπτουμε ότι οι κατανομές μετά την υιοθέτηση του ευρώ είναι συνήθως στατιστικά διαφορετικές σε σύγκριση με αυτά πριν την υιοθέτηση, συνεπής με την ολοκλήρωση σε μεγάλο βαθμό. Επιπλέον, διαπιστώνουμε ότι οι αποκλίσεις του νόμου μιας τιμής (LOP) συσχετίζονται σημαντικά για τους ορίζοντες των πέντε ή δέκα ετών, και οι συσχετίσεις παραμένουν σημαντικά υψηλές για μεγάλους χρονικούς ορίζοντες. Αυτές οι συσχετίσεις είναι μεγάλες για ομοιογενείς σε σχέση με τα διαφοροποιημένα αγαθά, και ποικίλουν από χώρα σε χώρα. Για τις περισσότερες αυτές ευρωπαϊκές οικονομίες και αγαθά, πλεονέκτημα τιμής συνήθως φαίνεται να είναι πιο επίμονο από ότι μειονέκτημα τιμής. Κατόπιν, εξετάζουμε τις αποκλίσεις από τον νόμο μίας τιμής για την περίπτωση της Κύπρου σε σχέση με την Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση (Ε.Ε.) μεταξύ 2005 και 2010 για να κατανοήσουμε το ρόλο που διαδραματίζει η διαδικασία υιοθέτησης του ευρώ για αυτή τη συγκεκριμένη χώρα. Συμπεραίνουμε ότι πρώτον, η Κυπριακή οικονομία παρουσίασε σημαντικά αυξημένο βαθμό ολοκλήρωσης εν σχέση με χώρες της Ε.Ε. μεταξύ 2005 και 2010, και δεύτερον, η Κύπρος έγινε σχετικά φθηνότερη κατά αυτήν την περίοδο. Από το 2010 η εμπειρική κατανομή αποκλίσεων από τον νόμο μίας τιμής για την Κύπρο γίνεται στατιστικά ίδια με αυτή χωρών του πυρήνα της ΕΖ όπως η Γερμανία. Αυτό συνάδει με ένα γρήγορο ρυθμό προσαρμογής των σχετικών τιμών κατά την διαδικασία υιοθέτησης του ευρώ, καταδεικνύοντας και τον ψηλό βαθμό προσαρμοστικότητας της Κυπριακής οικονομίας. Τέλος, εξετάζουμε την ύπαρξη ομάδων σύγκλισης στον μηχανισμό τιμών της κάθε χώρας για 96 αγαθά σε επίπεδο τιμών λιανικής πώλησης για 40 χώρες όπου τα δεδομένα είναι διαθέσιμα σε εξαμηνιαία βάση από 1990 – 2010, χρησιμοποιώντας μη γραμμικό μοντέλο παράγοντα και εργαλεία παλινδρόμησης ορίων (threshold regression). Αυτό το άρθρο είναι το πρώτο, το οποίο βρίσκει ισχυρή ένδειξη για την ύπαρξη ομάδων σύγκλισης για τιμές λιανικής πώλησης . Βρίσκουμε ότι οι χώρες οι οποίες είναι πιο κοντά στους πιθανούς εμπορικούς εταίρους συγκλίνουν ταχύτερα από ότι οι χώρες στον τομέα της υψηλής απόστασης αν η αρχική παραγωγικότητα εργασίας είναι χαμηλή ή αν έχουν χαμηλό αρχικό εισόδημα, και οι χώρες με χαμηλή αρχική παραγωγικότητα εργασίας συγκλίνουν ταχύτερα από ότι οι χώρες που βρίσκονται στο τομέα υψηλής παραγωγικότητας αν χαρακτηρίζονται από χαμηλή μέση απόσταση από τους εμπορικούς εταίρους. Ερμηνεύουμε τα αποτελέσματα μας ως ένδειξη για την ύπαρξη τοπικού νόμου της μιας τιμής λόγω της ύπαρξης εμπόδιων για την σύγκλιση τιμών ; The present dissertation investigates price differences in the EU and the existence of price convergence clubs across the globe. First, we study the determinants and the evolution of goods price dispersion across Europe over time. We find that tradeability and non-traded inputs play a significantly smaller role for cross-country price dispersion after the adoption of the euro, and for Eurozone (EZ) economies as compared to European Union (EU) ones. We then compare the distributions of law-of-one-price (LOP) deviations over time and reveal that the distributions after the euro are typically significantly different than those before, consistent with a greater degree of integration. Moreover, we find that LOP deviations are highly correlated over five or ten year horizons, and correlations remain significantly high over longer horizons. These correlations are greater for homogeneous as compared to differentiated goods, and vary across countries. For most of these European economies and goods, price advantage is typically revealed to be more persistent than price disadvantage. Then, we analyse cross-sectional LOP deviations for the case of Cyprus relative to the EU in 2005 and 2010 in order to understand the role played by the process of monetary unification for this particular economy. We infer that Cyprus became significantly more integrated with EU economies between 2005 and 2010, and relatively cheaper during this period. By 2010, the empirical distribution for Cyprus becomes statistically indistinguishable from that of core EZ economies like Germany, implying a fast pace of relative price adjustment for Cyprus during the process of euro adoption and indicative of the high degree of flexibility characterizing the Cypriot economy. Finally, we investigate the existence of convergence clubs in the cross-country price mechanism for 96 individual goods retail price levels across 40 countries available semi-annually for 1990-2010, using a nonlinear factor model and threshold regression tools. This is the first paper to find strong evidence for club convergence of retail prices. We find that countries that are physically closer to potential trade partners converge faster than countries in the high distance regime if they have low initial labor productivity or low initial income, and countries with low initial productivity converge faster than those in the high productivity regime if characterized by low average distance from trade partners. We interpret our findings as evidence of a local law of one price due to barriers to price convergence that influence the duration of the effect of price shocks.

This book explores how the EU, as an international actor, is adapting to recent transformations in the multilateral system. The international identity of the European Union is built upon its support for effective multilateralism and its commitment to core norms and values. Until recently, there was no need to choose between these goals. Emerging powers in the international system are not only demanding more power in multilateral institutions, but also sometimes seeking to influence their purpose and function, away from those championed by the EU. This presents a dilemma for EU foreign policy - framed in this edited volume as either accommodating changes in order to support multilateral institutions or entrenching the EU position in order to uphold values. Using a common analytical framework, the chapters include case studies on important multilateral institutions such as the United Nations Security Council, the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization and the International Criminal Court, as well as key policy areas such as energy, climate change, nuclear non-proliferation, and human rights.

Published online 3 Jul 2018 ; This article shows that the troika institutions — the European Commission, the European Central Bank (ECB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) — formed a technocratic consensus about the desirability of establishing national fiscal councils in the European Union (EU). Considerable disagreement existed, however, with regards to their design features. Each institution promoted a distinct mode of indirect governance by ranking national fiscal councils depending on their adopted governance model (agent, trustee or orchestrator). This persuasion through entrepreneurial bench- marking constitutes an important mechanism by which member states were nudged to adopt a distinct fiscal council model. Preference heterogeneity among the troika members ultimately prevented the spread of a one-size-fits-all fiscal council in the EU.

There is a consensus that within the European Union, Germany is presently the country lagging farthest behind in terms of economic dynamics. Most researchers blame rising wages, welfare costs, and overregulated labour markets for this poor position. Some add that as a result of membership in the European Monetary Union, Germany lost the advantage of having low interest rates. To a certain extent, all view German unification as a prime culprit. This article acknowledges that although these factors have contributed to the recent underperformance of Germany, another major reason has been overlooked. A problem was brewing in Germany long before unification, namely the danger of being a high wage country specialised in medium technologies. We show that Germany neither increased its investment into research and education, nor did it embrace ICT technology. Germany lost its position as the European leader in research expenditures relative to GDP. For a set of 16 growth drivers, the dynamics of investment into research, education and information technology during the nineties were the slowest of all EU countries, and according to a quantitative indicator of total investment into the future Germany ranked second to last. Investment into future growth is specifically crucial when costs are high and markets are strictly regulated. Comparing the three potential reasons for low growth, namely underinvestment into growth drivers, rising costs and strict regulation, we find the first one to be the most important growth blocker and the least acknowledged in the German debate.

Acronyms -- About the author -- Executive summary -- Introduction -- Diagnosing the climate change problem -- The GSF illustrative expenditure package -- Thinking outside the box -- Financing the GSF: how to get the money -- Conclusion -- Annex 1 -- Works cited.

This study investigates whether and to what extent political factors drive disagreement within the allegedly consensual monetary committee of the European Central Bank. Absent voting data, the article assesses disagreement based on the semantic distance between the policy positions publicly articulated by the European Central Bank President and the central banks of Eurozone member states. The empirical analysis shows that the disagreement articulated by national central bankers is affected by the ideological inclinations of the governments of the countries they represent. Our findings thus suggest that central bankers' position-taking is shaped not only by economic conditions but also by domestic political considerations. This result challenges the European Central Bank's projected image of itself as an institution whose members are impermeable to domestic political pressures as a way to defend the independence of the institution to which they belong.

This paper sets out to explain the preferences of the seven northern euro area member states on the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) concerning the threshold set for direct European Central Bank (ECB) control over bank supervision. Building on the concept of the 'financial trilemma', it argues that different bank internationalisation patterns in the seven northern member states explain different preferences on the transfer of supervisory powers over less significant banks to the ECB. In particular, the reach of internationalisation into a national banking system – notably the extent to which even smaller banks were exposed to foreign banking operations – is shown to be the core factor explaining different national preferences on threshold. In the five countries with a large number of small and parochial alternative (cooperative and savings) banks, it is necessary to examine the system-specific structures of these banks to explain better the reach of internationalisation and national preferences on the threshold. Determined German opposition to ECB supervision of smaller alternative banks is juxtaposed with either less hostile or more positive support of at least four other countries despite the important presence of small alternative banks.

In this paper, we analyze the role of the current institutional setup of the eurozone in fostering the ongoing peripheral euro countries' sovereign debt crisis. In line with Modern Money Theory, we stress that the lack of a federal European government running anticyclical fiscal policy, the loss of euro member-states' monetary sovereignty, and the lack of a lender-of-last-resort central bank have significantly contributed to the generation, amplification, and protraction of the present crisis. In particular, we present a Post-Keynesian eurozone center-periphery model through which we show how, due to the incomplete nature of eurozone institutions with respect to a full-fledged federal union, diverging trends and conflicting claims have emerged between central and peripheral euro countries in the aftermath of the 2007-08 financial meltdown. We emphasize two points. (1) Diverging trends and conflicting claims among euro countries may represent decisive obstacles to the reform of the eurozone toward a complete federal entity. However, they may prove to be self-defeating in the long run should financial turbulences seriously deepen in large peripheral countries. (2) Austerity packages alone do not address the core problems of the eurozone. These packages would make sense only if they were included in a much wider reform agenda whose final purpose was the creation of a government banker and a federal European government that could run expansionary fiscal stances. In this sense, the unlimited bond-buying program recently launched by the European Central Bank is interpreted as a positive, albeit mild step in the right direction out of the extreme monetarism that has thus far shaped eurozone institutions.

Given the need to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to decrease the risk of dangerous climate change, economists have often argued in favour of carbon pricing. Carbon pricing can essentially take two forms: an emissions trading system or a carbon tax. The European Union chose the former option and implemented the EU ETS in 2005, the first large scale carbon market. As a first mover in experimenting with such regulatory instruments, the EU ETS case offers qualitative and quantitative insights of foremost importance for emerging carbon markets worldwide. This thesis is divided into two parts. Part I provides ex-post learnings on the EU ETS price formation and policy design. Part II offers an ex-ante perspective by exploring the expansion of the European carbon market. Both parts pay particular attention to a central feature of the EU ETS: its political nature as a government created market. This institutional perspective on the EU ETS, which seeks to take into consideration the impact of politics and institutions on market functioning, is at the heart of this thesis. It brings a new lens to examine emissions trading as well as draws on the experience of other policy fields, notably monetary policy. Following the drop of permit prices in the EU ETS, intense discussions emerged on the need to and modality for reforming the market, which is the focus of Part I of this thesis. Yet, evaluating the need to reform first implies understanding the goals of the EU ETS and whether market outcomes are likely to deliver on their promises. Chapter 2 lays the groundwork for the remaining discussions of the thesis by clarifying the different implicit and explicit objectives expected from the EU ETS. Although cost-effectiveness is often proclaimed to be the main goal of the EU ETS, stakeholder opinions diverge regarding the appropriate time frame for this objective, some focusing on short-term while other having a long-term perspective. In addition, certain stakeholders have multiple objectives, for instance, addressing the social cost of carbon. Based on economic theory, Chapter 2 then provides a comprehensive review of the drivers of the price collapse in the EU ETS, classifying them into three categories: (i) exogenous demand shock, (ii) lack of policy credibility and (iii) market imperfections. From this classification, a new framework to map the reform option space is developed. It carefully examines which policy options represent potential solutions depending both on what drives the price as well as on the objective intended for the EU ETS. Drawing on the analogy to monetary policy, this mapping of the reform option space introduces the concept of delegation in the context of emissions trading. Delegation reflects the extent to which the governance of the market is relinquished to a rule-based adjustment mechanism or an independent body with varying levels of discretionary power. Complementing the qualitative analysis of Chapter 2, Chapter 3 offers an empirical analysis of price formation. It shows that, contrary to conventional wisdom, demand-related fundamentals such as fuel prices or the economic downturn only explain a fraction of the carbon price drop. Importantly, chapter 3 provides preliminary evidence that regulatory uncertainty and the lack of policy credibility played a much larger role than previously assumed in driving down the price. Chapter 4 is a direct follow-up, closing the gap on the influence of regulatory events in price formation. Using an empirical event study methodology, the chapter carefully investigates how the political process of the cap adjustment has shaped market outcomes in the European carbon market. The findings show that the tedious process of achieving reform unveiled the lack of political consensus on the EU ETS goals; thereby increasing political uncertainty and contributing to the price decline. These empirical findings have critical implications for the reform of the EU ETS – instruments that do not attempt to anchor long-term regulatory credibility are unlikely to be successful in bringing the price closer to its long-term, socially-optimal path. In this context, though delegation is unlikely to be a silver bullet, it could strengthen the credibility of political commitment by locating the governance of the market outside the political sphere. It could likewise reinforce the flexibility of responding to "unknown unknowns". Supplementing the previous chapters, Chapter 5 provides a comprehensive policy analysis of the specific reform option for the EU ETS proposed by the European Commission in 2014 following the price collapse: the Market Stability Reserve (MSR). It is argued that the MSR is unlikely to enhance long-term commitment credibility, raising doubt on its ability to trigger low carbon investments. This policy evaluation is embodied in a broader reform context taking both an ex-post and ex-ante perspectives. It thereby bridges Part I and II. The second half of this thesis, Part II, offers a forward-looking perspective on the expansion of carbon markets. Chapter 6 investigates the sectoral expansion of the EU ETS towards agriculture, which has often been perceived as challenging. Implementation barriers are regularly cited as impeding carbon pricing in the sector, in particular transaction costs stemming from sector specificities, risks of leakage and distributional impacts on farmers, often perceived as major veto-players. However, the importance of the barriers hinges critically on the precise policy design. Chapter 6 therefore offers the first synthesis of literature on the pricing of agricultural emissions with the rich body of literature on the design of carbon markets. The chapter provides a new perspective on carbon pricing in European agriculture by disentangling the key dimensions of policy design in the light of implementation barriers. In particular, it investigates the role of policy coverage, instrument choice and transfers to farmers in overcoming policy obstacles. First, it is shown that a policy coverage targeting large farms and few emission sources could include a significant share of agricultural emissions, while reducing transaction costs. Second, it is argued that the distributional impacts and leakage risks are contingent upon the policy being voluntary or mandatory. From this perspective, a voluntary instrument can be attractive, but comes at the cost of possible subsidy lock-ins and carbon price distortion. Third, the role of the Common Agricultural Policy and its potential interaction with carbon pricing is highlighted as being pivotal in determining political feasibility. Chapter 7 focuses on the other critical side of carbon pricing, going beyond jurisdictional borders. In principle, linking could lead to efficiency gains and reduce the cost of compliance for entities covered under a trading system. Taking the example of REDD+ offsets (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation), Chapter 7 investigates the trade-offs between the opportunities of allowing an import of cheaper offsets in carbon markets and the risks it entails in terms of investments. It is shown that a well-designed policy could provide a risk-hedging opportunity for compliance entities while having limited impact on low carbon investment. In sum, this thesis concentrates on investigating the conditions under which the EU ETS requires policy intervention. It offers an institutional view on the EU ETS reform. Drawing on empirical results, it demonstrates the role of political commitment in price formation. It then analyses the pros and cons of delegation in carbon markets to overcome time-inconsistency and lack of policy credibility (Part I). Part II delivers insights to broaden carbon pricing in the European Union and beyond in the future. Focusing on pricing agricultural emissions, it provides a framework to disentangle the different dimensions of policy design and conceptualize policies that reduce implementation barriers. Finally, Part II examines the trade-offs associated with various policy options to link carbon markets to a forestry offset scheme. ; In Anbetracht der Dringlichkeit, Treibhausgasemissionen zu reduzieren, um das Risiko eines gefährlichen Klimawandels zu senken, sprechen sich Ökonomen oft für eine Bepreisung von Kohlenstoff aus. Die Bepreisung von Kohlenstoff kann grundsätzlich zwei Formen annehmen: ein Emissionshandelssystem oder eine CO2-Steuer. Die Europäische Union hat die erste Option gewählt und 2005 das EU ETS (EU Emissions Trading System, Europäisches Emissionshandelssystem) eingeführt, den ersten großangelegten Kohlenstoffmarkt. Als Vorreiter in diesem regulatorischen Instrument bietet das EU ETS qualitative und quantitative Erkenntnisse von höchster Bedeutung für entstehende Kohlenstoffmärkte weltweit. Diese Doktorarbeit unterteilt sich in zwei Teile. Teil 1 stellt ex-post Lernerfahrungen hinsichtlich der Preisbildung und Politikgestaltung des EU ETS dar. Teil 2 bietet eine ex-ante Perspektive, indem es die Ausweitung des Europäischen Kohlenstoffmarktes erforscht. Beide Teile legen ein besonderes Augenmerk auf ein zentrales Merkmal des EU ETS: seine politische Natur als ein von Regierungen geschaffener Markt. Diese institutionelle Perspektive auf das EU ETS, die den Einfluss von Politik und Institutionen auf das Funktionieren des Marktes berücksichtigt, steht im Zentrum dieser Doktorarbeit. Sie bietet eine neue Perspektive, was die Untersuchung von Emissionshandel betrifft, und zieht Erfahrungen anderer Politikfelder, insbesondere der Geldpolitik, heran. Der Preisrückgang für Zertifikate im EU ETS führte zu intensiven Diskussionen über Bedarf und Modalitäten einer Reform des Marktes, was der Fokus von Teil 1 dieser Doktorarbeit ist. Doch eine Bewertung des Reformbedarfs verlangt zuerst ein Verständnis der Ziele des EU ETS und der Wahrscheinlichkeit, mit der der Markt seine Versprechen hält. Kapitel 2 leistet Vorarbeit für die weitere Diskussion der Doktorarbeit, indem es die verschiedenen expliziten und impliziten Ziele des EU ETS beleuchtet. Während Kosteneffizienz oft als Hauptziel des EU ETS angeführt wird, gehen die Meinungen der Stakeholder auseinander, was den angemessenen Zeitrahmen für dieses Ziel betrifft: Manche nehmen eine Kurzzeit-, andere eine Langzeitperspektive ein. Zusätzlich verfolgen einige Stakeholder mehrere Ziele, wie zum Beispiel die sozialen Kosten von Kohlenstoffemissionen zu minimieren. Basierend auf ökonomischer Theorie gibt Kapitel 2 eine umfassende Übersicht über die treibenden Kräfte des Preisverfalls im EU ETS, welche in drei Kategorien eingeteilt werden: (i) exogener Nachfrageschock, (ii) mangelnde Glaubwürdigkeit der Politiken und (iii) Marktverzerrungen. Auf Basis dieser Klassifikation wird ein neuer Rahmen entwickelt, um den Spielraum für Reformen aufzuzeigen. Es wird untersucht, welche Politikoptionen als Lösungen in Frage kommen, in Abhängigkeit verschiedener Preistreiber und Ziele des EU ETS. Analog zur Geldpolitik führt diese Darstellung des Spielraumes für Reformen das Konzept der Delegation im Kontext vom Emissionshandel ein. Delegation beschreibt das Maß, in demdie Governance des Marktes einem regelbasierten Anpassungsmechanismus oder einer unabhängigen Institution mit unterschiedlichen Graden an Weisungsbefugnis überlassen wird. Komplementär zur qualitativen Analyse in Kapitel 2 bietet Kapitel 3 eine empirische Analyse der Preisbildung. Sie zeigt, dass nachfragebezogene Faktoren wie die Rezession, im Gegensatz zur gängigen Meinung, nur einen (kleinen) Teil des CO2-Preisverfalls erklären. Kapitel 3 erbringt den vorläufigen Nachweis dafür, dass regulatorische Unsicherheit und mangelnde Glaubwürdigkeit der Politiken eine viel größere Rolle für den Preisverfall spielten als vorher angenommen. Kapitel 4 schließt direkt daran an, indem es die Wissenslücke bezüglich des Einflusses von regulatorischen Ereignissen auf die Preisbildung schließt. Unter Verwendung einer empirischen Event-Studie analysiert das Kapitel wie der politische Prozess der Cap-Anpassung den Europäischen Kohlenstoffmarkt beeinflusst hat. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass der langwierige Prozess der Reformierung den Mangel an politischem Konsens bezüglich der Ziele des EU ETS offenbart und somit die politische Unsicherheit erhöht hat, was zum Preisverfall beitrug. Diese empirischen Ergebnisse bringen entscheidende Implikationen für die Reform des EU ETS mit sich: Instrumente, die keine langfristige regulatorische Glaubwürdigkeit erzeugen, warden voraussichtlich keinen Erfolg darin haben, den Preis näher an sein langfristiges soziales Optimum zu bringen. Wenngleich Delegierung keine Wunderwaffe ist, könnte sie in diesem Kontext doch die Glaubwürdigkeit des politischen Engagements stärken, indem sie die Governance des Marktes außerhalb der Politik ansiedeln würde. Auch könnte sie die Flexibilität stärken, auf "unbekannte Unbekanntheiten" zu reagieren. In Ergänzung zu den vorhergehenden Kapiteln bietet Kapitel 5 eine umfassende politische Analyse jener spezifischen Reformoption für das EU ETS, die 2014 nach dem Preissturz von der Europäischen Kommission vorgeschlagen wurden: die Marktstabilitätsreserve (MSR). Es wird argumentiert, dass es unwahrscheinlich ist, dass die MSR die langfristige Glaubwürdigkeit des verbindlichen politischen Engagements erhöhen wird, was Zweifel an ihrer Fähigkeit aufkommen lässt, die entsprechenden Investitionen in Gang zu setzen. Diese Politikbewertung bettet sich in den weiteren Reformkontext ein und nutzt sowohl eine ex-post als auch eine ex-ante Perspektive. Sie bildet damit die Brücke zwischen Teil 1 und 2. Die zweite Hälfte der Doktorarbeit, Teil 2, bietet eine vorausschauende Perspektive auf die Erweiterung von Kohlenstoffmärkten. Kapitel 6 untersucht die Ausweitung des EU ETS auf den Landwirtschaftssektor, die oft als Herausforderung wahrgenommen wird. Oft wird angeführt, dass zu viele Hürden einer Umsetzung der Kohlenstoffbepreisung in diesem Sektor im Wege stünden, insbesondere sektorspezifische Transaktionskosten, Leakage Risiken und Verteilungseffekte für Landwirte, deren Verbände oft als wichtige Veto-Mächte betrachtet werden. Die tatsächliche Bedeutung dieser Hindernisse hängt jedoch stark von der konkreten Ausgestaltung der Politiken ab. Kapitel 6 bietet daher die erste Synthese der Literatur zur Bepreisung von Landwirtschaftsemissionen und der Literatur zur Ausgestaltung von Kohlenstoffmärkten. Das Kapitel bietet eine neue Perspektive auf Kohlenstoffbepreisung in der europäischen Landwirtschaft in dem es die Schlüsseldimensionen der Politikgestaltung im Hinblick auf Umsetzungsbarrieren analysiert. Insbesondere untersucht es die Rolle des Anwendungsbereiches der Politiken, derWahl der Politikinstrumente und von Transfer an Landwirte für das Überwinden von politischen Hindernissen. Zuerst wird gezeigt, dass eine Anwendung auf große Betriebe und wenige Emissionsquellen einen beträchtlichen Anteil an landwirtschaftlichen Emissionen abdecken und gleichzeitig Transaktionskosten reduzieren könnte. Zweitens wird argumentiert, dass die Verteilungseffekte und Leakage Risiken davon abhängen, ob das Politikinstrument verpflichtend oder freiwillig ist. Aus dieser Perspektive kann ein freiwilliges Instrument attraktiv sein, jedoch auf Kosten eines möglichen Fortbestandes von Subventionen und Kohlenstoffpreisverzerrungen. Drittens wird die Rolle der Gemeinsamen Agrarpolitik der EU und ihrer möglich Wechselbeziehung mit Kohlenstoffbepreisung als entscheidend für die politische Machbarkeit hervorgehoben. Kapitel 7 betrachtet einen anderen entscheidenden Aspekt der Kohlenstoffbepreisung: die Ausweitung über Grenzen hinweg. Im Prinzip kann eine Verbindung von Kohlenstoffmärkten Effizienzgewinne mit sich bringen und die durch die Beachtung der Rechtsvorschriften entstehenden Kosten für die vom Handelssystem abgedeckten Einheiten reduzieren. Anhand des Beispiels der REDD+ Kompensation wägt Kapitel 7 die Chancen, die sich daraus ergeben, dass ein Import von preisgünstigeren Kompensationszertifikaten in Kohlenstoffmärkten erlaubt wird, mit den damit verbundenen Risiken für Investitionen ab. Es wird gezeigt, dass die richtige Politik eine Möglichkeit zur Risikoabsicherung für einbezogene Betreiber darstellen und gleichzeitig einen begrenzten Einfluss auf weniger emissionsintensive Investitionen haben könnte. Insgesamt konzentriert sich diese Doktorarbeit darauf, die Bedingungen, unter denen das EU ETS ein Eingreifen der Politik benötigt, zu untersuchen. Sie bietet eine institutionelle Perspektive auf die EU ETS Reform. Indem sie empirische Ergebnisse heranzieht, demonstriert sie die Rolle eines verbindlichen politischen Engagements für die Preisbildung. Sie analysiert dann die Vor- und Nachteile von Delegierung in Kohlenstoffmärkten, um zeitliche Inkonsistenzen und einen Mangel an politischer Glaubwürdigkeit zu überwinden (Teil 1). Teil 2 stellt Erkenntnisse zur zukünftigen Ausweitung der Kohlenstoffbepreisung in der Europäischen Union und darüber hinaus dar. Mit einem Fokus auf die Bepreisung von Agraremissionen bietet dieser Teil einen Analyserahmen um die verschiedenen Dimensionen der Politikgestaltung zu entflechten und Politiken zu konzeptualisieren, die Umsetzungshürden reduzieren können. Schließlich untersucht Teil 2 die Zielkonflikte verschiedener Politikoptionen, die eine Verbindung von Kohlenstoffmärkten mit waldbezogenen Kompensationssystemen anstreben.

Stage Three of the European Monetary Union (EMU) will start on January 1, 1999. The new currency area, for which the name "Euroland" has been coined, will comprise 11 countries: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. The project of a single currency has enhanced economic convergence among the participating countries to some degree, but differences with respect to the business cycle have remained pronounced. This can also be expected for EMU. A single monetary policy for Euroland will not affect regions uniformly, given the substantial differences between the participating countries with respect to, for example, institutional arrangements in financial markets and in labor markets, the public share in the economy or the structure of production. It is often argued that monetary policy in Europe is currently too tight; consequently, the upswing is at risk or even deflation is around the corner. This view is not supported by the facts. Various indicators suggest that monetary policy is actually quite easy. Given that European short-term interest rates are bound to converge around summer at a historically low level and key interest rates will hardly be raised substantially in the immediate future, monetary policy will remain loose for the time being. This policy increasingly bears some risk of accelerating inflation. In any event, there is no risk of outright deflation in Euroland. It is still an open question whether the European Central Bank (ECB) will use a monetary aggregate as an intermediate target (monetary targeting) or try to directly adjust monetary policy to (forecasted) inflationary developments (inflation targeting). Empirical work suggests that money demand in Euroland is sufficiently stable to pursue monetary targeting. Even if instability were to occur in the transition period and right after the introduction of the euro, this would not necessarily imply the superiority of inflation targeting because under such circumstances the reliability of inflation forecasts is reduced as well. The advantage of implementing the monetary targeting strategy that had proved to be successful in Germany would be that it allows the ECB to gain some of the Bundesbank's reputation. In 1997 public deficits in all countries of Euroland were kept within the limit of 3 percent of GDP set in the Maastricht Treaty. However, further consolidation is necessary in most countries in order to meet the obligations of the Stability and Growth Pact. Ultimately, the fiscal positions have to be sustainable in the long term. A rough calculation suggests that at present only a few of the prospective EMU countries have a sustainable fiscal position. In addition, fiscal policy seems to be less sustainable because in some countries one-off measures contributed significantly to the reduction of the 1997 deficits. After EMU is established, bilateral exchange rates as possible shock absorber cease to exist and other mechanisms of adjusting to a negative (external) shock are necessary in order to prevent unemployment from rising. The most important adjustment mechanism left is flexibility of wages. It would be counterproductive to increasingly negotiate wage settlements at the European level. Against the background of the rising need for differentiation, decisions that affect employment should, to the contrary, be more and more decentralized.

In the light of the current economic debt crisis within the Euro zone, the heterogeneity of EU members has becoming increasingly apparent. This heterogeneity is evident not only in some single macroeconomic variables but also in the level of economic integration with the other EU members. Despite the common use of the term European integration, neither a uniform definition nor a holistic economic approach to this concept exists. Thus, the different steps and processes of European integration are hard to quantify, thereby making it almost impossible to argue objectively whether an individual EU member state has fallen behind the general speed of European integration or whether the distance to a potential core group is undesirably large. In order to fill this gap, we have developed a composite indicator - the EU-Index - measuring the extent of European economic integration of the EU member states. The EU-Index exhibits large heterogeneities between the member states with respect to overall European economic integration and with respect to various sub-indices. By using cluster analysis, however, we find relatively homogeneous country groups within this heterogeneous community. The prevailing economic heterogeneities combined with the strong and even growing clustering of EU members may create fundamental difficulties for further integration of the European Union, and may even put existing integration steps (such as the creation of the European Monetary Union) into question. The EU-Index thus offers a unique statistically solid base for political discussions and empirical investigations, since now the degree of European economic integration is numerically tangible and can be determined individually for each country.

Aus polnischer Sicht