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AbstractIn this paper, we draw attention to several important tensions between Kant's account of moral education and his commitment to transcendental idealism. Our main claim is that, in locating freedom outside of space and time, transcendental idealism makes it difficult for Kant to both provide an explanation of how moral education occurs, but also to confirm that his own account actually works. Having laid out these problems, we then offer a response on Kant's behalf. We argue that, while it might look like Kant has to abandon his commitment to either moral education or transcendental idealism, there is a way in which he can maintain both.

I argue that political liberals should not support the monopoly of a single educational approach in state sponsored schools. Instead, they should allow reasonable citizens latitude to choose the worldview in which their own children are educated. I begin by defending a particular conception of political liberalism, and its associated requirement of public reason, against the received interpretation. I argue that the values of respect and civic friendship that motivate the public reason requirement do not support the common demand that citizens "bracket" their comprehensive commitments in politics. Rather, citizens should seek to enact policies the justification of which is compatible with the truth of their fellow reasonable citizens' worldviews. Next I argue that no single educational approach can meet this standard of justification. Many believe that state sponsored education in a pluralist, liberal society ought to present multiple worldviews in a neutral way. I argue that this aspiration is unrealizable, and no other educational model will plausibly meet the justificatory demand. Finally, I address two objections to my favored alternative: that it may allow for the inculcation of disrespect, and that it violates children's autonomy. Against the first, I claim that political liberals have no grounds for thinking that reasonable citizens will seek to inculcate disrespect. Finally, I argue that there is no conception of autonomy that can sustain the second.

Many well-meaning parents and teachers are hamstrung in their attempts at moral education of their children and wards. Hence they are caught in some dilemma. On the one hand, if they incline toward the code of conception, they tend to be authoritarian in their approach; if, on the other hand, they favour some variant of the romantic reaction, they may expect that children will go it alone and decide it all for themselves. To overcome this dilemma, there is need for a synthesis of both alternatives. It is precisely the synthesis of these two positions (principles and creativity) that we propose to explore in this paper as a preliminary to any discussion on moral education. With analytic method as a tool, the paper concludes that until a more adequate view of morality which embroils the proper place for both authority and self-directed learning is synthesized, a discourse on moral education will be of no good.

The article presents a review focusing on key issues discussed within the disciple of moral education. It is regarded as a subsystem of education policy, and in a wider sense, public policy. It shows the main phenomenon, trends, ongoing discussions as well as conceptual disputes in two Anglo-Saxon countries as well as in Poland. The type and content of the article results from the fact that the Polish scientific literature almost lacks the texts dedicated to moral education. This kind of issues is partially analysed with pedagogy but its conceptual frame is different from that of public policy. The latter is focused on the school perspective and its potential to influence students' attitudes and values.

The article is a review of ways of thinking and concepts available in the literature that are the basis for creating school syllabi of moral education. It describes what axiological and anthropological assumptions and psychological theories those syllabi are based on and analyses selected studies that evaluate their effectiveness and impact on the moral formation of young people.

In A Theory of Moral Education, Michael Hand claims that a directive moral education that seeks to persuade children that a particular conception of contractarian morality is justified can be undertaken without falling foul of the requirement not to indoctrinate. In this article, we set out a series of challenges to Hand's argument. First, we argue that Hand's focus on 'reasonable disagreement' regarding the status of a moral conception is a red-herring in this conception. Second, we argue that the endorsement of moral contractarianism and the prohibition on indoctrination pull in different directions: if contractarianism is sound, then teachers or governments should be less worried about indoctrination than Hand suggests. Third, we argue that moral contractarianism is mistaken; teachers should look elsewhere for guidance on the moral norms and principles towards which they should direct their pupils.