Suchergebnisse

The hypothesis presented is that the ideological radicalization of the Cuban Revolution (which gained momentum in 1966 & reached a climax in 1968 with the so-called Revolutionary Offensive) has negatively affected economic performance, growth, & popular support. These phenomena may in turn halt or reverse the process of radicalization. Data come from Cuban statistics, legislation, speeches of the political leaders, radio broadcasts, newspapers, & articles in technical journals. Quantification is prevalent in measuring the economic performance while qualitative interpretation is mainly used when evaluating the radicalization process. In trying to predict the feasibility of the Cuban model, comparisons are made with some antecedents such as "War Communism" in the USSR, the "Great Leap Forward" & the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" in China. The hypothesis is tentatively accepted, although additional data & time are necessary to draw more solid conclusions. The radicalization process seems to have induced a decline in sugar production, nonsugar agriculture, & mining (except nickel) output, & GNP in both absolute figures & per capita. Domestically, this has forced an expansion of rationing & mass mobilization for productive activities. Externally it has resulted in a widening deficit in the balance of trade. There are also signs of deterioration in the political consensus. Although the Cuban blueprint for the future society & "New Man" is very appealing to the sociologist, there are serious doubts whether the economic performance of the nation will permit the continuation of the process. Modified AA.

Drawing largely on data obtained from a sample survey of Mc adolescents (N=389), the structural position of youth in modern industr society is discussed & inferences are drawn concerning the potential for alienation, radicalization, & subsequent soc action of this group. The relationship of youth to the adult-dominated instit's of society is virtually a feudal one, with young people constituting a subject "caste" that eventually must transcend its position. Young people are constrained to accept the dominant values of their culture, esp those relating to the benefits of educ as a key to upward mobility. As a result, nearly 50% of the R's studied plan to go to U (which plan varies directly by SC), & more than 50% in all SC's anticipate future professional & technical careers. However, because of econ changes taking place in advanced capitalist societies, young people are increasingly being exposed to unemployment & underemployment, frustration of career aspirations, & alienation. Some of these changes include the preferred status of blue-collar guilds, econ decline, inflation, the role of gov as a consumer, & the growth of multi-nat'l Corp's. The course which this radical potential may take is suggested by an analysis of the social forces operating within adolescent society itself. The young people studied are primarily left-liberal in their SP position, & are issue-oriented rather than concerned with abstract ideologies & philosophies. Their approach to issues is negativistic (ie, young people are clearer on what they are against than what they are for), & they display a strong nihilism in their att towards soc org's. Another element in the life-style of young people is hedonism, a value which is transmitted back to mainstream adolescents by those who have dropped out of the system. The soc action of youth is likely to be reformist & oriented to the redress of specific issues. "Dropping out," either to subsist in youth ghettoes or to become involved in alternative structures, is likely to increase. If young people develop a pol'al consciousness, it is likely to be anarchistic, although the elements of nihilism & soc consciousness may lead to involvement in "vanguard" activities directed towards the liberation of minority groups. AA.

Based on data taken from 412 adult education students in Montreal, Quebec, Canada, this research attempts to show that attitudes toward French Canadian Separatism by the sample members can be accounted for by differentiaf communication processes. Results show that attitudes held by sample members are well explained (R2 = .64) by a weighted average of the information they received from interpersonal and media sources. The resultant attitude shows substantial effects on behaviors related to separatism for the same respondents.

Aus westeuropäischer Sicht + Aus politischer Sicht