Suchergebnisse

The hypothesis presented is that the ideological radicalization of the Cuban Revolution (which gained momentum in 1966 & reached a climax in 1968 with the so-called Revolutionary Offensive) has negatively affected economic performance, growth, & popular support. These phenomena may in turn halt or reverse the process of radicalization. Data come from Cuban statistics, legislation, speeches of the political leaders, radio broadcasts, newspapers, & articles in technical journals. Quantification is prevalent in measuring the economic performance while qualitative interpretation is mainly used when evaluating the radicalization process. In trying to predict the feasibility of the Cuban model, comparisons are made with some antecedents such as "War Communism" in the USSR, the "Great Leap Forward" & the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" in China. The hypothesis is tentatively accepted, although additional data & time are necessary to draw more solid conclusions. The radicalization process seems to have induced a decline in sugar production, nonsugar agriculture, & mining (except nickel) output, & GNP in both absolute figures & per capita. Domestically, this has forced an expansion of rationing & mass mobilization for productive activities. Externally it has resulted in a widening deficit in the balance of trade. There are also signs of deterioration in the political consensus. Although the Cuban blueprint for the future society & "New Man" is very appealing to the sociologist, there are serious doubts whether the economic performance of the nation will permit the continuation of the process. Modified AA.

The Caucus for a New Pol'al Sci emerged from a meeting of graduate students at the 1967 convention of the Amer Pol'al Sci Assoc. It Is based on a demand for a new relevance in pol'al sci. Pol'al set is considered irrelevant if it is uncritical of society & assumes the values & soc priorities of corrupt bur'cies, powerful elites or unjust soc practices. The 'established' pol'al set profession is accused of justifying everything in the Amer pol'al system as unique & workable & of condemning attempts to change it. Stability, rather than change, is the highest value, & conflict may be resolved peacefully & fairly within the existing system. Behavioralism, emphasizing the fact/value dichotomy & preoccupied with questions of method & model-building, supports these conservative tendencies. Pol'al sci'ts have become ideologues of the gov. Professionalism & its rewards are determined less by the values & ethics of the discipline than by the values & ethics of the soc & pol'al status quo. There are 3 prospective lines of development for radical pol'al sci: (1) a primarily theoretical one-the development of new paradigms for res & pol'al analysis or new modes of inquiry; (2) the politization & democratization of the APSA & the reform of the discipline, teaching, curricula-with the CNPS as the pinwheel for reform; (3) the creation of a res-action pol'al sci focusing on criticism of Amer instit's & analyses of alternative soc priorities. IPSA.

It is stated that a diverse collection of right-wing org's obsessed by the menace of domestic communism has come to prominence during the late 1950's & early 1960's-the Radical Right. The Radical Right's ideology rests on the premise that a minority of Amer's are conspiring to gain control of the nation's pol'al & soc instit's in order to turn the US into a communist satellite. This ideology permits easy opposition to most gov'al programs. Many commentators on this phenomenon, mesmerized by this fantasy of communist subversion, have suggested that the Radical Right appealed to authoritarian & conservative persons as well as to the alienated. The Fundamentalist movement of the 1920's is generally considered a right-wing manifestation. The most popular interpretation has been based on the 'status-frustration hyp.' According to this, people have joined the Radical Right to protest soc changes & gov'al policies which have deprived them of their status in society, to which they feel entitled by virtue of their educ or the soc standing of their parents. The newer ethnic groups are said to be attracted to the Radical Right because they believe that supporting the avowed purpose of the movement, which is to protect the US from subversives, will prove them good Amer's. While it is true that a sizeable N of Amer's do resent the nation's rapid change, these explanations must be rejected as lacking empirical support. Empirical proof exists that the Radical Right is mainly supported by loyal Republicans. In some areas the Radical Right has had considerable success in controlling or influencing the Republican party, eg, in Calif since 1962. Since 1964, the Radical Right's interest has swung from the focus on a vague & mysterious conspiracy onto specific internal problems: the increase in crime, the use of drugs, the ghetto riots, etc. But the Republican Party cannot move far to the Right without sacrificing the major part of its support. It is doubtful whether it can go far enough in the area of real problems to satisfy the New Right. The alliance between the New Right & the Republican Party will probably continue. With a Republican admin, the Radical Right will be less critical & less visible. M. Maxfield.

Developments in the Cuban revolution between mid-1959 and early 1960 demonstrate both the interaction between the international and domestic systems and the bargaining process involved in Cuban efforts to secure Soviet support. Until the dispatch of First Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan to Havana in early February 1960, the Soviet Union had been hesitant about revolutionary Cuba. The radicalization of the revolution which preceded Mikoyan's visit, therefore, stemmed not only from Fidel Castro's perception of opposition to his regime and from his need to ensure revolutionary momentum, but also from his efforts to increase Cuba's bargaining leverage with Moscow. In turn, the Cuban Communists served as a key linkage with Moscow and, most important, as an aggressive negotiating agent for Castro. In formulating their response to revolutionary Cuba, the Soviets were thus forced to contend with covert and overt pressures from Castro and his Communist allies.