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The opening, in 2004, of John Rawls's personal archive prompted a new wave of Rawls scholarship. This work has deepened our understanding of the development and impact of Rawls's ideas and of the broader contours of twentieth-century analytical political philosophy. This article places these recent archival histories, for the first time, in the context of the longer history of attempts to historicize Rawls, beginning with the publication of A Theory of Justice fifty years ago. Doing so does three things. First, it shows that early readers were more interested in how to think historically about Rawls than is sometimes assumed. Second, it reveals that partisan accounts of Rawls's place in history, popularized by those close to him, have sometimes made their way into the archival studies. Third and finally, it offers an opportunity to rethink how the twentieth-century history of political philosophy and political theory is often told.

Rawls' primary legacy is not that he standardised a particular view of justice, but rather that he standardised a particular method of arguing about it: justification via reflective equilibrium. Yet this method, despite such standardisation, is often misunderstood in at least four ways. First, we miss its continuity across his various works. Second, we miss the way in which it unifies other justificatory ideas, such as the 'original position' and an 'overlapping consensus'. Third, we miss its fundamentally empirical character, given that it turns facts about the thoughts in our head into principles for the regulation of our political existence. Fourth, we miss some of the implications of that empiricism, including its tension with moral realism, relativism, and conservatism.

In this article, the author evaluates whether Rawls rightly believed that his theory of justice could be interpreted as Kantian. Rawls' Kantianism is primarily treated as the general ethical foundation of his theory of justice. Providing insight into the debate conducted on Kantian's interpretation in the 1970s and early 1980s, the author explains the first doubts about Rawls' Kantianism, and how Rawls' defenders subsequently responded to them. At the center of the debate was the question of whether Rawls' principles of justice were essentially the fruit of heteronomous rather than autonomous motivation, and whether they could be treated as "categorical imperatives." Noting the significant differences in the conception of moral motivation between Kant and Rawls, the author explains how and why Rawls' Kantianism is essential to the history of moral and political philosophy. Finally, the author suggests that Rawls' Kantianism should be treated more like Kantian inspiration rather than Kantian interpretation in a literal sense.

First, this article puts forth a political and cultural explanation for the fact that the work of Rawls and other American liberal analytic political philosophers was neglected in Portugal during the 1970s and 1980s. Second, the article describes Portuguese reactions to Rawls's ideas in the 1990s, focusing on commentaries by scholars and `public intellectuals'. Throughout this period, there was a gradual shift from glib partisan judgements to more careful responses. Third, the reception of Rawls in Portugal is compared with the reception in Spain. This comparison shows that both broad social context and the nature of academia tended to be more hospitable to Rawls in Spain than in Portugal. However, the situation is changing. ; (undefined) ...

Many mainline Protestant communities want to be welcoming while preserving their identities; they want to be shaped by the central claims of the faith while making room for those who doubt. And crucially, they want to do this in a way that leads to vibrant, growing communities, where more and more people gather to worship, encourage one another, and live out the Gospel. How should the Episcopal Church—and other mainline Protestant denominations, insofar as they're similar—try to achieve these goals? I suggest that local churches borrow some resources from John Rawls's Political Liberalism. On the view I outline, it's valuable for local churches to see themselves as akin to political bodies composed of reasonable citizens. The idea, in essence, is that the relevant kind of reasonableness would make congregations more unified even while tolerating more diversity, and would accomplish all this without giving up their distinctly Christian identity.

Terjadinya konflik horizontal yang mengatasnamakan identitas kelompok (etnis, suku, keyakinan dan seterusnya) dikarenakan adanya phobia terhadap perbedaan. Padahal perbedaan suatu keniscayaan, karena manusia tidak akan mampu menyeragamkan atau menuntut orang lain untuk sama dengan dirinya, baik pada aspek pemikiran, keyakinan, etnis, suku, budaya, dan sebagainya. Filsafat multikulturalisme John Rawls merupakan alternatif tawaran politik kebudayaan untuk mengatasi konflik horizontal. Menurut Rawls, suatu masyarakat yang adil bukanlah hanya menjamin "the greatest happiness for the greatest number" yang selama ini terkenal dalam prinsip demokrasi. Tetapi, masyarakat yang adil menurutnya adalah adanya pengakuan dan penerimaan terhadap perbedaan dan keberagaman. Pendapatnya ini dia rangkai dalam pokok-pokok pemikirannya tentang keadilan, seperti: Justice as Fairness, Veil of Ignorance, Principle of Equal Liberty, Maximin Rule, Lexical Order dan Reflective Equilibrium.

We would philosophically analyze the underlying foundations of right in the metaphysical morality of Kant and that empirical and sociological inclination of Rawls towards Kantian conception of person. We believe that Rawls shifts from the Kantian conception of person which is a transcendental self. However, he does not altogether detach himself with the project of deontological ethics i.e. priority of right over the good. If we critically analyze the Rawlsian methodology of deontological ethics, we may scrutinize ontological reasons or grounds beyond his deontological ethics. Central theme of the moral theory is that of the theory of person. We must critically analyze the Kantian perspective on the deontological ethics. In this article we would excavate the fact that liberalism prioritizes a particular conception of good, which is higher good of liberal political society. It has priority over all other moral comprehensive doctrines, which is contradiction of deontological liberalism e.g. priority of right over the good. In the same realm of reasoning, it would emerge that Rawlsian Liberalism confines theory of justice to only liberal societies. In this way, this theory is not cross-culturally applicable and would only regulate liberal societies at large. We would discuss that super powers have lost their credibility to teach constitutional democracy to the non-liberal world under this theory which restrains deontological ethics as culturally specific and historically determined.

Renowned political philosopher John Rawls once expressed skepticism about the moral status of the European Union (EU). Yet generally EU scholars have either ignored Rawls or rather uncritically established positive links between his theory of domestic and international justice and the EU. This article argues that the EU cannot be morally justified from a Rawlsian perspective. Thus, Rawls's Euro-skepticism is not just a personal opinion, but is embedded in his political philosophy. The argument basically entails that the EU cannot plausibly be understood in terms of a Rawlsian (i) domestic society or (ii) society of peoples. It is also argued that Rawls's seemingly favorable yet rare mentioning of the 'European Community' means no theoretical support for the EU. Moreover, counter-arguments that the EU can be seen as in line with Rawls's notion of a realistic utopia are shown to be false. In consequence, serious adherents of Rawls's political philosophy cannot be committed EU defenders. Keywords: European integration, European Union, John Rawls, Law of Peoples, political liberalism, theory of justice

A review of Molly Harkirat Mann, Ricoeur, Rawls, and Capability Justice (London and New York: Continuum Books, 2012), pp. 232.

Rawls's account of international toleration in The Law of Peoples has been the subject of vigorous critiques by critics who believe that he unacceptably dilutes the principles of his Law of Peoples in order to accommodate non-liberal societies. One important component in these critiques takes issue specifically with Rawls's inclusion of certain non-liberal societies ('decent peoples') in the constituency of justification for the Law of Peoples. In Rawls's defence, I argue that the explanation for the inclusion of decent peoples in the constituency of justification is not, as is standardly assumed, that they are the kind of societies that ought to be tolerated in that way on some prior conception of which kinds of societies ought to be tolerated in that way. The real explanation appeals to a methodological principle underlying Rawls's approach to political justification, according to which liberals owe justification, as a matter of liberal principle, to those who comply with liberal principles for political institutions that apply to them. If such liberal principles can be complied with by agents who nevertheless cannot accept fully liberal justifications for those principles, then liberalism itself requires liberals to seek justifications which they can accept. This approach gives us a new way to view decent peoples: as just such agents, who are therefore owed a justification for the Law of Peoples that they can accept. Decency is thus a concept that is internal to liberal political justification at the international level. Reading Rawls in this way permits a coherent and attractive defence of his strategy of toleration and of his international theory as a whole. © The Author(s) 2012.

The social contract tradition of political legitimacy has a long and complex history. John Rawls believed himself to be working in this tradition of Locke, Rousseau and Kant, but not that of Hobbes whose Leviathan, he remarks, "raises special problems." Rawls never specifies what these problems are but there are indeed very serious problems with Hobbes' political theory. I argue that Hobbes' theory is an ideology fashioned in a chaotic social environment where self-preservation was precarious at best. His theory is based on his belief that there were only two alternatives for political order given the human condition as he saw it at the time, chaos or absolute power. This false dichotomy was one that Rawls and most other theorists did not accept. Hobbes' theory conflicts with Rawls' conception of rights, the purpose of government, and the nature of the person. Hobbes' theory is a form of ethical foundationalism and is what Rawls calls a comprehensive doctrine unacceptable in Rawls' political liberalism.

We consider one-to-one matching (roommate) problems in which agents (students) can either be matched as pairs or remain single. The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we review a key result for roommate problems (the ''lonely wolf'' theorem) for which we provide a concise and elementary proof. Second, and related to the title of this paper, we show how the often incompatible concepts of stability (represented by the political economist Adam Smith) and fairness (represented by the political philosopher John Rawls) can be reconciled for roommate problems.

The sections fall into some sections. The first one isintroduction to Rawls theoretical issues on politics especially onwhat is called PR. The misconceptions of Rawls thought held bysome religious believers will be dealt with explicitly. I will, then,try to explain that Rawls reflective equilibrium leaves room fordistinctively religious beliefs based on faith and religions. And, theoverlapping consensus which is crucial Rawls later thought. Based on this explanation above I come to second sectionthat deals with Indonesia's political issues that is related toPancasila as a common ground. The issue is mainly on therelationship between religion and state in a highly diversitybackground especially diversity in religions. This section isremarkably important to see various ideologies took dialecticalprocess in its historical footprints. And, I come to third section. In this way, I will produce thepossibility of Pancasila as PR. Some frequent critical questionsresponding PR from the opposing groups will also be answeredclearly. In the final section, then, I try to give the explanation onreligion, as a comprehensive doctrine, should play a role inpolitical arena that in the light of Rawls' PR.

El jurista requiere comprender que su actividad debe estar justificada desde un concepto de justicia como equidad. Este concepto ha de permitir la consolidación del derecho como instancia instrumental que garantiza la coacción y la regulación de las acciones humanas de forma ordena y civilizada. En este trabajo se reconstruyen algunas de las ideas fundamentales que justifican a la justicia como equidad, expuesta por el Jhon Rawls. De igual modo, son abordados, en términos semánticos, los dos principios de la justicia que permiten a una sociedad democrática contar con instituciones sociales justas, equitativas y eficientes.The lawyer requires to understand that his activity must be justified from a concept either of justice and of equity. This concept must allow the allocation of law as instrumental step which guarantee its enforcement and the ordered and civilized regulation of human actions. In this paper some fundamental ideas that justify the justice as equity are rebuild as Jhon Rawl exposed. In the same manner, there is a semantically approach to the two justice principles that allows a democratic society to have social, fair and equitable institutions.

El jurista requiere comprender que su actividad debe estar justificada desde un concepto de justicia como equidad. Este concepto ha de permitir la consolidación del derecho como instancia instrumental que garantiza la coacción y la regulación de las acciones humanas de forma ordena y civilizada. En este trabajo se reconstruyen algunas de las ideas fundamentales que justifican a la justicia como equidad, expuesta por el Jhon Rawls. De igual modo, son abordados, en términos semánticos, los dos principios de la justicia que permiten a una sociedad democrática contar con instituciones sociales justas, equitativas y eficientes.The lawyer requires to understand that his activity must be justified from a concept either of justice and of equity. This concept must allow the allocation of law as instrumental step which guarantee its enforcement and the ordered and civilized regulation of human actions. In this paper some fundamental ideas that justify the justice as equity are rebuild as Jhon Rawl exposed. In the same manner, there is a semantically approach to the two justice principles that allows a democratic society to have social, fair and equitable institutions.