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The study aims to conceptualize Russia's "Pivot to the East" phenomenon. The author suggests original system of criteria for measuring de facto pivot towards the particular region, focusing on Russia's export flows, their geographic and commodity diversification as Russia's key strategic priorities. Besides, she explores empirically the contemporary changes in Russia's de facto export flows. The author concludes that the "pivot" was supported by the general course towards de-Westernization. Russia is definitely moving away from the West, although this progress is not rapid and systemic yet, but rather selective. However, having turned away from the West, Russia has not yet turned to the East. The pivot towards the Asian region is very limited. The two main directions of the pivot to the East are (1) small markets of South and Southeast Asia, whose share in Russian exports is extremely small, and (2) unfriendly Singapore, Japan, and South Korea. At the same time, despite the status of the largest regional partner, expanding trade with China do not correspond to the country's strategic interests. The turn towards China contributes to de-industrialization and securing Russia's role as a large supplier of raw materials. Trade complementarity is limited and asymmetric. Simultaneously, the export potential in trade with India is underestimated. Russia began to turn not towards the East, but rather towards the Global South. The process in accompanied by the growing importance of the Middle East and North Africa, as well as partially African and Latin American countries. At the same time, there is no direction towards the post-Soviet space (with the exception of a confident trade rapprochement with Kazakhstan and Tajikistan).

Development studies; Russia; Far East; International affairs; Energy; Shanghai cooperation organization; Economic development; Security policy; Multilateral organizations; Diplomacy; Regionalism; Russian–European relations; Russia's "pivot to the East"; Annexation of Crimea; Regional politics; Eurasia; Ukraine; Sanctions regime; Foreign policy

Development studies; Russia; Far East; International affairs; Energy; Shanghai cooperation organization; Economic development; Security policy; Multilateral organizations; Diplomacy; Regionalism; Russian–European relations; Russia's "pivot to the East"; Annexation of Crimea; Regional politics; Eurasia; Ukraine; Sanctions regime; Foreign policy

Intro -- Half Title -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- 1. Putin's War on Ukraine -- 2. Russia Tries to Overturn the Euro-Maidan Revolution -- 3. Brinkmanship and the Unfreezing of the Ukraine War -- 4. The "Special Military Operation" Begins -- 5. Russia Downsizes its Goals in Ukraine -- 6. Russia's Summer War -- 7. Counter-Offensive and Mobilisation -- 8. Russia's Isolation from the West and the Post-Soviet Space -- 9. Russia Pivots to the East -- 10. The Resilience of Russia's Influence in the Global South -- Conclusion -- Notes -- Index -- Back Cover.

The deterioration of Russia's relations with the West over the Crimea in 2014, and the ongoing crisis in the Ukraine, has led to a new emphasis on the Asia Pacific in the country's foreign policy. However, it remains a matter of debate whether Russia's "pivot to the East" represents a fundamental strategic shift or merely a tactical geopolitical manoeuver. In addition, it remains open to question whether Russia's Asian pivot encompasses countries across the region other than just China which remains at the heart of the Kremlin's Asia-Pacific policy. This article examines Southeast Asia in current Russian foreign policy and strategic thinking, assesses Russia's stance towards the region with regard to bilateral ties and multilateral mechanisms and presents an outline of the future development of Russia's engagement with Southeast Asia. The arguments put forward in the article suggest that Southeast Asia is at least secondary to China within the Asian pivot, while the pivot itself is at least secondary within Russia's overall foreign policy. The main value of Southeast Asia for Moscow lies in its image-building strategy, with the West as the primary audience. We can therefore assume that there is unlikely to be any groundbreaking developments in Russia's relations with Southeast Asia for the foreseeable future, although the former will welcome cooperative initiatives from the latter.

The deterioration of Russia's relations with the West over the Crimea in 2014, and the ongoing crisis in the Ukraine, has led to a new emphasis on the Asia Pacific in the country's foreign policy. However, it remains a matter of debate whether Russia's "pivot to the East" represents a fundamental strategic shift or merely a tactical geopolitical manoeuver. In addition, it remains open to question whether Russia's Asian pivot encompasses countries across the region other than just China which remains at the heart of the Kremlin's Asia-Pacific policy. This article examines Southeast Asia in current Russian foreign policy and strategic thinking, assesses Russia's stance towards the region with regard to bilateral ties and multilateral mechanisms and presents an outline of the future development of Russia's engagement with Southeast Asia. The arguments put forward in the article suggest that Southeast Asia is at least secondary to China within the Asian pivot, while the pivot itself is at least secondary within Russia's overall foreign policy. The main value of Southeast Asia for Moscow lies in its image-building strategy, with the West as the primary audience. We can therefore assume that there is unlikely to be any groundbreaking developments in Russia's relations with Southeast Asia for the foreseeable future, although the former will welcome cooperative initiatives from the latter. (Contemp Southeast Asia/GIGA)

Intro -- Foreword -- Contents -- Notes on Contributors -- 1 Introduction -- 1 Understanding Russia's Relations with the GCC -- 2 About the Volume -- 2 New-Old Key Player: What to Expect from Russia's Growing Role in the Middle East -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Russian Relations with the Middle East from the Cold War to 2010 -- 3 Crisis at Home, and Challenges Abroad -- 4 Russian Interest in the Middle East Revives After 2010 -- 4.1 Russia's Syrian Intervention -- 4.2 Public Support -- 5 Impact of Syrian Intervention on Russia's Relations with Other Middle East States -- 5.1 Gulf Arab States -- 5.2 Iran -- 5.3 Israel -- 5.4 Turkey -- 5.5 Balancing Acts-Libya, Egypt, Turkey and Qatar -- 6 Trump's Impact on Russian Policy Towards the Middle East -- 7 Where the Russian Intervention Is Headed -- 8 Conclusion -- 3 What's Driving Russia's Return to the Middle East? -- 1 Introduction -- 2 A Search for Self-Identity -- 3 Soviet Legacy -- 4 A Domestic Dimension -- 5 Russia's Interests in the Middle East -- 6 A Burden of Partnership -- 6.1 Turkey -- 6.2 Israel -- 6.3 Iran -- 6.4 Saudi Arabia -- 7 The Middle East: A Window of Opportunity or a Trap for Russia? -- 4 Russian Foreign Policy in the Gulf: A Quest for Regional Partnerships and Opportunities -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Brief Overview of the History of Relations -- 3 Current Russian Interests in the Gulf -- 3.1 Russia's Economic Interests in the Gulf -- 3.2 Political Interests -- 3.3 National Security, Counterterrorism, and Islamic Dimension of Russia-GCC Ties -- 4 Russia's Potential Partners in the Gulf -- 5 Russian Arms Sales and the Collective Security of the Gulf -- 6 Conclusion -- 5 Russia and the Gulf States: Between West and East -- 1 Introduction -- 2 The United States, the West and the Gulf -- 3 The Gulf Pivot to the East -- 4 Russia-Between East and West -- 5 Conclusion.

Western countries have asserted since the beginning of hostilities in Ukraine that they would use sanctions as a critical tool to suppress Russia's economy and sever its ability to trade with the rest of the world. They have kept their promise by continually adding to the number of sanctions as Russia's war in Ukraine has stretched into it second year.As of January 2024, the Russian Federation was subject to over 28,000 sanctions and the majority of these occurred after Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Approximately 16,000 of these sanctions were imposed against individuals, while nearly 10,000 were imposed against companies and 3,200 against institutions. Additionally, there have been sectoral sanctions such as general trade embargoes on gas and oil. The EU and the U.S. have imposed most of these but countries like Japan, South Korea and Switzerland have also participated. While these sanctions intended to hamper Russia's war effort and foment domestic economic and political instability, most have not achieved these objectives. Russia has maintained its military activities in Ukraine while recent IMF forecasts predict growth of 2.6 percent in 2024 — at a time when many EU countries are heading toward recession amidst significant political uncertainty in 2024 — a pivotal election year in many Western democracies.Perhaps the greatest achievement has been reinforcing Russia's trade pivot to the East and the Global South and away from the European Union. As a result, Russia's trade turnover reached $530.2 billion in the first nine months of 2023. Exports reached $316.9 billion, while imports reached $213.3 billion. Russian exports to Asian countries reached $226.6 billion, an increase of 10.3% year on year, while imports amounted to $139.7 billion, increasing 39.5%. China accounted for $105 billion during the same time period compared to $78 billion for all of 2021. And Chinese imports of fuels were $52.7 billion in 2021 compared to $77.0 billion in the first nine months of 2023. China comprised $81.8 billion in imports to Russia (almost 40%) in the first nine months of 2023 while imports were 54.5 billion in all of 2021. During that same time, Russia's exports to India were $52 billion versus $8 billion for 2021. Indian imports of Russian fuel increased from $4 billion in all of 2021 to $46 billion during the first nine months of 2023.In contrast, Russian exports to the EU were $47 billion in the first nine months of 2023, a significant decrease from $192.8 billion in all of 2021. Russian imports from the EU sunk below $32 billion in the first nine months in 2023 from $81 billion just 21 months earlier. Fuel imports from Russia to the EU collapsed from $120 billion in 2021 to less than $27 billion in the first 9 months of 2023. Lastly, sanctions greatly reduced the share of imports from Russia from 28% in 2021 to 3% in 2023.Building a new trade frameworkThe trade numbers clearly depict the momentous redirection in Russian trade flows during the nearly two years since Russia's invasion of Ukraine. But they don't reflect the geopolitical activities underpinning this seismic change nor do they indicate recent initiatives that the Russian government has undertaken to solidify the direction of trade. In this respect, Russia has actively engaged in a wide array of diplomatic activities, ranging from bilateral talks with countries like India and Iran to efforts to expand the membership and geopolitical reach of the BRICS and the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU).Late last year, India's Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov met in Moscow to discuss issues concerning the usual political, defense, and cultural partnerships. They also discussed more seriously, economic cooperation issues intended to buttress the strong growth in Russia-India trade that has occurred since 2022. The focus of these economic discussions centered on logistics, particularly those related to the establishment of the North-South International Transport Corridor (INSTC). All three segments of the corridor are now functional. These include the Western route (Russia-Azerbaijan-Iran-India), the Middle route (Russia-Iran-India) and the Eastern route (Russia-Central Asia-Iran-India). Russia hopes the increased use of the corridor will improve the infrastructure in Caspian ports and the ability to improve the status of Astrakhan and Makhachkala as transport hubs. Now that the Vladivostok-Chennai Sea route or Eastern Maritime Corridor (EMC) is also operational, India and Russia will have a realistic opportunity to elevate economic cooperation going forward and this will only bolster bilateral relations.The corridor is beneficial to India as well, both economically and geopolitically. It reflects the Indian elite's desire for viable alternatives to China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). India is also confident the corridor will provide greater access to Central Asia bypassing Pakistan and continue to strengthen its economic ties with Iran and Russia. Another way that Russia is seeking to enhance regional trade is through the EEU. On December 25, EEU leaders met and signed an agreement with Iran. The agreement marked the end of two years of negotiations and will come into force after the ratification by the national parliaments. The Iran-EEU Free Trade Agreement eliminates tariffs of 87% of traded goods between the parties. It represents Iran's most extensive trade deal to date and it's an important deal for Russia as it solidifies another trade partner and underscores its leading role in the trade group and in Central Asia's economic development. Finally, in January 2024 the BRICS announced the expansion of the group by five new members: Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The new membership will increase total BRICS GDP to $28.5 trillion or 28.1% of global output, compared to the G7 countries' 43.2% of global output. While the expansion of BRICS is notable from an economic perspective, it's more meaningful in a geopolitical context. The addition of Middle Eastern and more African countries gives the group a larger presence along key shipping and trade routes. It also increases the BRICS share of global oil production to 43% and 25% of exports. It's also important to note that BRICS accounts for 72% of global rare earth elements, which are key to high-tech weapons and consumer goods, including circuit boards and mobile phones.While many in the West only pay attention to the rhetoric about Russia's weak and collapsing economy and its economic isolation, Western policymakers need to follow closely Russia's continued initiatives in the geopolitical sphere. Russia's economic engagement may be complicated due to the joining of some difficult geopolitical realities, but the evolving framework has the potential to disrupt the traditional "rules-based global order" if not undermine it. Therefore, a policy of constructive and unrestricted engagement in trade and economic relations on a global scale needs to be a key tool of commercial diplomacy for Western policymakers going forward. This would include greater restraint from the heavy-handed sanctions policies that only reduce Western access to key goods and lead to higher global inflation, the brunt of which is borne by the middle- and lower-class consumer.

Russia's oft-declared "pivot" to the East, focused principally on China, has attained a measure of success. However, to become effective and sustainable, relations between Russia and Japan must be raised to a higher level. The absence of a peace treaty between the two countries due to their dispute over the Kuriles remains a stumbling block.

This paper investigates the Korean foreign direct investment (FDI) in the Russian Far East, a significant area to develop South Korea's new northern policy and Russia's pivot to the East policy. Unlike the insignificant influence of the Korean FDI on Russia's economy as a whole, South Korea is one of the key economic partners in the Russian Far East. For the period 2015–2019, South Korea is the 4th largest investor in the Russian Far East. In 2019, 69.7% of the Korean investments in the Russian Far East concentrated on Primorsky Krai, which contradicts the general trend that the world investments in the Russian Far East are highly skewed in Sakhalin Oblast to participate in the gas and oil projects. The Korean FDI in the Russian Far East aims market seeking rather than resource seeking. Besides, due to the high entry barrier of "nine bridges", there are limited numbers of companies in nine bridges-industries.

В 2014 году страны Европейского союза, Соединенные Штаты Америки и некоторые другие государства ввели экономические санкции против России, что привело к диверсификации торговых связей и изменению отношений с западными партнерами (стратегия «поворота на Восток»). Неоднозначные выводы современных исследований, посвященных эффективности санкций и мер по преодолению их негативных последствий, обосновали необходимость рассмотрения данных вопросов на примере антироссийских экономических санкций. Проанализированы различные макроэкономические данные, а также показатели цифрового развития и финансовой доступности. Данное исследование основывается на методах графического, сравнительного и корреляционного анализа. Анализ данных внешнего сектора показывает, что экономические санкции негативно повлияли на торговлю со странами-инициаторами и прямые иностранные инвестиции. В то же время, «поворот на Восток» до сих пор не реализован в полном объеме. Для преодоления негативного влияния санкций и усиления экономического роста диверсификация связей должна сопровождаться другими мерами, сосредоточенными на цифровом развитии, цифровых финансовых технологиях и доступности финансовых услуг. Анализ взаимосвязи между цифровым развитием и неравенством в доходах выявил, что, с точки зрения экономического роста цифровая трансформация может принести больше пользы странам с умеренным неравенством, включая Россию, нежели странам, где неравенство выражено в меньшей степени. Изучено, каким образом цифровая политика может повлиять на преодоление негативных последствий санкций в России. Полученные результаты помогут решить проблему оптимизации поведения России как страны, ставшей объектом санкций, что является предметом дальнейших исследований. ; Starting from 2014 the European Union countries, the United States of America and some other states imposed economic sanctions against Russia, resulting in diversification of trade ties away from western partners ("pivot to the East" strategy). The mixed findings of recent sanctions literature related to their effectiveness and measures to overcome the negative consequences, has necessitated the examination of these issues for the case of anti-Russian economic sanctions. We use various macroeconomic data along with indicators of digital development and financial inclusion. The methodology comprises a combination of graphical, comparative, and correlation analysis. The analysis of external sector data shows that economic sanctions had substantial negative impact on trade and foreign direct investment with main senders. At the same time, the "pivot to the East" after 2014 has not been implemented yet as much as expected. To overcome negative impact of sanctions and to promote economic growth, the current diversification of ties should be accompanied by other measures, centred on digital development, digital financial technologies, and financial inclusion. We assess linkages between digital development and wealth inequality and we found that in most countries with moderate wealth inequality, including Russia, the digital transformation could bring more benefits in terms of economic growth, than in countries with lower wealth inequality. The overall study allowed us to examine digital policy implications to overcome the negative effects of sanctions in Russia. The obtained results will contribute to addressing the problem of optimisation of Russia's behaviour as a target country that is the subject of future research. ; Исследование выполнено при поддержке гранта РФФИ и Академии общественных наук Китая, проект № 19–51–93009 «Торговая политика России и Китая в условиях трансформации международной торговой системы». ; The article has been prepared with the support of the Russian Foundation for Basic Research and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, the research project No. 19–51–93009 "The trade policy of Russia and China in the context of the transformation of the international trading system".

Economic sanctions against Russia form a completely new context for public and private efforts to cope with crisis trends in Russian economy. With limited access to global goods, capital, and technology markets, it can at best minimize costs of the crisis but not come back to the normal growth path. Strategies to find new trade partners and sources of capital outside the group of countries that have introduced economic sanctions against Russia are welcome, but their potential is rather limited. Under these circumstances, crisis management should be centered neither on the alleged 'Russia's pivot to the East' nor on the wide-scale import substitution but on normalization of economic relations with key country partners, regaining currency stability, and structural reforms aimed at moving national economy away from commodity specialization.