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From the abstract: Integration and Dis-Integration or Dis-Integration and Integration or Dis-Integration and Re-Integration can be quite a word play. The Dis-Integration of the former Soviet Union (FSU) in the early 1990s marks a serious and unprecedented development in modern history. It was a break-up of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics into fifteen newly independent states. Hereby, twelve states formed the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), a structure that was to keep some order over the break-up. Three countries – the Baltics – announced their total independence and declared no will to be part of the CIS. A later Integration or Re-Integration within the CIS is being actively discussed and debated up to now. Several theories have evolved on the future of the region. Huntington's thesis predicts the 'Clash of Civilizations'. He argues that the future battle over world politics will be over religious and cultural factors. Huntington predicts a split-up of the world along religious lines. In turn, Duncan rejects religion to be a factor in the current developments of the CIS. He limits Kuzio's idea of a division between the CIS into 'radicals' and 'pragmatists' among the two groups – the 'Westernizers' and 'Slavophiles'. Duncan concludes that there is generally a shift towards pragmatism in the foreign policies of the member states of the FSU. Disillusionment with the West is widespread. Most important factors that make countries tend towards a Westernist' or Eurasianist' course are linked to ethnicity and conflict. The author views the political regime and economic reforms are less important. Other studies focus more on the relationship between Russia and the other CIS countries. Alexandrova's arguments support the trend towards pragmatism. She adds that Moscow gave up the concept of re-integration, which it was convinced of in the first years of transition. Russia's foreign policy from Yeltsin to Putin shifted from Multilateralism to Bilateralism. Russian capital, invested in the near-abroad, is seen as a strong instrument to influence other CIS states and force them to Moscow's security policy. Another -less recent- study on "Integration and Disintegration" from 1997 by authors of Brown University/U.S. and institutes from five newly independent states gives some outlook over the future ten years until 2006. Base for discussion were four rather extreme and abstract scenarios. Researchers and other experts from the region specialising in politics and security were confronted with the scenarios and asked to discuss and express their views on the future of the CIS. Economics did not play a major role in their debates over the tendencies within the region. In my work I will demonstrate that the energy sector, particularly the natural gas sector, plays an essential role in re-integrative tendencies. Logically, the largest successor of the FSU, the Russian Federation, plays a dominant role. As part of my work I will review prices for natural gas in the CIS. Applying the theory of Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) enables me to compare prices internationally. Unfortunately, the data limit allows only a rough comparison. However, it supports trends developed in prior sections of the work. A statistical analysis is not used due to the insufficient data set. The structure of my dissertation is as following: Section 2 summarizes the theoretical framework regarding integration and disintegration, based on findings of the 1997-study by authors of Brown University. In the progress of the dissertation I will illustrate that findings of the latter study are close to reality even today. After explaining the theoretical framework I will outline the hypothesis of my work. At the end of that section I will give an overview of the factors that lead to the disintegration of the Soviet Union. I will then relate the impact on the natural gas sector across the region. It is the outset on which the later work builds on. In Section 3 I will describe the creation of a new CIS market for natural gas on three levels driven by the Russian Federation. Given the fact that the natural gas industries in the CIS are mostly state regulated, shedding light upon the inter-governmental dimension will explain policies and -most importantly- Russia's motivation. What strategies has Moscow developed over the years in terms of controlling this sector? A further look at the inter-company dimension will picture the main players –large corporations- that are producing, transporting and distributing natural gas throughout the region. It will support the tendencies about Russia's role developed in the beginning of the section. That dimension will illustrate the companies' role as the players on the domestic Russian and foreign 'near-abroad' market. The third part of the section will be a basic price analysis, discussing the available data set. Do prices serve to understand evolving market mechanisms and tendencies towards re-integration within the CIS? Section 4 summarizes the findings of my work. I will put together the 'pieces' in Russia's natural gas 'puzzle'. Table of Contents: 1.INTRODUCTION7 1.1Theories7 1.2The Natural Gas Sector8 1.3Countries Covered9 1.4Data9 1.5Methodology10 1.6Plan10 2.ONE THEORY OF INTEGRATION AND DIS-INTEGRATION IN POST-SOVIET COUNTRIES11 2.1Expectations of Experts of the Various Countries12 2.1.1Georgia12 2.1.2Ukraine12 2.1.3Belarus13 2.1.4Turkmenistan14 2.1.5Kazakstan15 2.1.6Russia15 2.2A Cross-Country Picture16 2.3Relevance of the Study Regarding the Natural Gas Market17 2.4Dis-Integration of the Soviet Union and the Natural Gas Market18 3.RE-INTEGRATION OF THE CIS NATURAL GAS MARKET21 3.1Inter-Governmental Dimension21 3.1.1Grouping the Countries21 3.1.2Main CIS – Natural Gas Export Markets23 3.1.2.1Turkmenistan – Iran23 3.1.2.2Russia – South-Eastern Europe and Turkey24 3.1.2.3Russia – Europe25 3.1.2.4Russia – China28 3.1.3The Countries as 'Pieces' in Russia's Natural Gas 'Puzzle'?30 3.2The Inter-Company Dimension31 3.2.1Brief Portraits of the Players32 3.2.1.1Gazprom32 3.2.1.2Itera33 3.2.1.3The Independent Gas Producers35 3.2.1.4The Oil Companies35 3.2.2The Players Acting in the Strategic CIS36 3.2.2.1In Georgia and Turkmenistan to the South and South-West36 3.2.2.2In Turkmenistan and Kazakstan to the South-East and East38 3.2.2.3In Ukraine and Belarus for Access to the West39 3.2.3Restructuring of the Russian Monopoly41 3.2.4Changes with the Reforms42 3.3Prices44 3.3.1Data44 3.3.2Purchasing Power Parity45 3.3.3Russia's Domestic Market47 3.3.3.1A Start to Deregulate Prices48 3.3.3.2Low versus International Prices?51 3.3.4Russia's Export Market to the Near-Abroad53 3.3.4.1Comparison on FSU – Level53 3.3.4.2Comparison with Far-Abroad54 3.3.4.3Comparison with Russia's Domestic Market55 4.CONCLUSION58 5.APPENDIX61 5.1Data61 5.2Literature72

Over the past few years the EU has begun taking some steps against the spread of nuclear weapons within its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). At the Thessaloniki Summit June 2003, the European Council adopted its first draft Strategy against the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). In order to assess the significance of the Strategy, this paper will first present and evaluate the Union's record in the field, then review the newly released Strategy, and finally make suggestions as to how it can be improved. The EU is not an unitary actor in the nuclear non-proliferation domain, being mainly constrained by the diversity of positions of its members as regards nuclear weapons on the one hand and the transatlantic link on the other. The EU notably includes eleven NATO members comprising two NWS and four countries that host Alliance's nuclear weapons, along with four highly disarmament-minded countries. One of the strands of EU action has consisted in taking initiatives aimed at strengthening the existing regime at multilateral forums. They have been geared predominantly to the universalisation of treaties and the multilateralisation of arrangements. Examples include the promotion of the indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the adoption of a Code of Conduct on ballistic missile proliferation. In general, the EU performs increasingly well at multilateral venues, which offer a favourable framework for internal coordination. The effectiveness of the Union's action remains limited, though. Insufficient means to accomplish the stated objectives account for that. Furthermore, this policy remains selective in nature, addressing some issues while sidelining others. Important omissions, which often illustrate EU reluctance to oppose the US over nuclear issues, are exemplified by the European silence on the NMD question or the weakening of the US-Russian strategic arms reduction process. Another significant strand of action consists of the Union's approaches to regional proliferation crises. In this domain, the EU has a fairly uneven and predominantly negative record. It is significantly involved in nuclear-related assistance programmes to Russia in the form of Co-operative Threat Reduction (CTR) efforts. Additionally, the Union contributed to facilitate Ukraine's renunciation of nuclear weapons through the ratification of the Lisbon Protocol. It has also participated in KEDO while upgrading its diplomatic role in the Korean peace process. Most recently, the European input has proved central in handling the crisis over Iran's lack of compliance with IAEA requirements. However, the EU has had difficulties in framing responses to some of the most acute proliferation crises of the past few years. The example of Iraq serves a recent illustration of intra-European disagreement on how to tackle proliferation. The reaction to the Indian/Pakistani nuclear tests in May 1998 was hardly noticeable. In general, the EU's approach to avert proliferation is characterised by a tendency to take a comprehensive approach to reducing regional tensions and, in most cases, to follow US-crafted responses. Despite the enhancement of its action during the last decade, the EU is still ineffective as a non-proliferation actor. The Union's selective approach has privileged non-proliferation over disarmament, and even within the non-proliferation realm, it has emphasised some issues and regions to the detriment of others. The virtual absence of policies directly focused on addressing proliferation constitutes a further difficulty. Finally, the EU does not yet make an effective and concerted use of the means at its disposal. Against this record, the newly released Strategy against the proliferation of WMD reaffirms the traditional features of the Union's role, while correcting some of its most obvious deficiencies. Broadly speaking, the Union will be guided by the following primary objectives: the universalisation of disarmament and non-proliferation agreements; the enhancement of the effectiveness of inspection/verification mechanisms, especially by improving the detectability of violations; the strengthening of export control policies and the expansion of CTR and technical assistance programmes. The initiatives presented in the Action Plan include some institutional measures designed to upgrade the capacity of action of the Union, the strengthening of EU internal legislation and a few proposals for EU external action. On the whole, the Strategy's principal emphasis is placed on enhancing the effectiveness of the existing regimes rather than in launching new steps to expand the non-proliferation agenda. At the level of means, the Union first reaffirms its current policy, i.e. "to contain proliferation while dealing with its underlying causes". The principal novelty is that the Strategy also introduces new instruments. It envisages the introduction of a policy of "sticks and carrots" that links non-proliferation commitments to co-operation agreements or assistance programmes into the EU 's relations with third countries. Political and economic levers are included in the list of instruments the Union can avail itself of. Finally, the strategy also foresees the use of force as a measure of last resort, which constitutes an absolute breakthrough. The Strategy offers some potential for the EU to make a relevant contribution to the non-proliferation regime, especially since it has framed some answers as to how deal with non-cooperative states. In order to realise this potential, it is suggested that the Union considers a series of issues in the further development of the strategy. Firstly, it should ensure that non-proliferation objectives are adequately mainstreamed into the Union's external relations. To this end, it should concretise the proposed "sticks and carrots" model into a clear conditionality framework with a Non-Proliferation Clause analogous to the Human rights clauses already applied by the Community in its relations with Third Countries. Secondly, the EU should further enhance its capacity to act by putting in place an "internal think tank" to craft further non-proliferation initiatives. As far as possible, it should find a satisfactory "division of labour" with the US in the resolution of proliferation crises, complementing US initiatives with other means rather than merely endorsing them financially. Finally, it should also try to adopt a balanced approach capable of engaging the non- Western as well as the Western world. This includes facilitating the access of Third World countries to civilian nuclear technology, clearly linking forcible counter-proliferation action to an UN Security Council mandate, and, most importantly, introducing disarmament measures into the Strategy.

ABSTRACTThe purpose of this study is to examine the geopolitical importance and impact of Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline on Turkey and the countries of the world as well as the region. It also discusses the factors influencing its construction.Since 19th century, oil has been one of the strategic resources, which could shape the relations within world community by affecting the economies and policies of individual states. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, newly independent Republics came to the international arena. Nowadays, it is so obvious to express that Caucasus-Caspian region with enourmous natural resources especially, natural gas and oil became one of the important regions of the world. In this respect, it has been claimed that the "Great Game of 21st century" could be replayed in this region.After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, international relations entered a new era. New world order or disorder began to be negotiated. New dimensions were introduced to the system of international relations. In this respect, walls were torn down, and as Fukuyama stated that the dialetic had ended and liberalism had defeated communism. Liberalism and open market economy were introduced to old communist world. Foreign investors accelarated their activities in these regions. Therefore, international oil companies together with their governments came to the scene. They were willing to control the energy exploration and exportation of Caucasus-Caspian region.It is obvious that after the independence of former Soviet Republics, there have been widespread negotiations and activities of actors related to the transportation of oil, large amount of which will be extracted in near future. In this sense, the project of Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline was initiated. There have been many factors, which affects the construction of Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline. These factors could be stated as new dimensions, which shaped international relations and changes occurred in international energy policy including supply, demand, and cost of oil. Moreover, internal and foreign policies of each actor affected the issue. The first part of thesis is introduction. This part gives historical perspective about the oil industry of Caucasus-Caspian region. In this sense, firstly, oil policy of Tsarist Russia was investigated. Secondly, oil policy of Soviet Union was investigated. The second part explains oil exploration and exportation since 90s in Caucasus-Caspian region. In this part, firstly, the estimated reserves of Caucasus-Caspian region were studied. Secondly, the developments related to the status of Caspian were presented. Thirdly, exploration and exportation of Azeri oil after independence of Azerbaijan were explained. Finally, in this part, alternative pipeline routings and factors influencing these pipeline routings were presented.The third part includes issues related to Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline. In this part, the definition of Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline was done. In addition, the developments occurred in Turkey and international arena related to Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline were presented. Finally, the benefits of Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline for Turkey, the region and other parties were investigated.The fourth part explains the views, interests, political and economic tactics of other actors related to oil exploration and exportation in Caucasus-Caspian region. This part divided to three sections. In the first section, the views, interests, and activities of the Commonwealth of Independent States were explained. In this sense, foreign and energy policies of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia, Russian Federation, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan were studied. In the second section, the views, interests and activities of Non-CIS actors were explained. In this respect, foreign and energy policies of the US, Iran and China were investigated. Moreover, in the third section, the views, interests, and activities of international oil companies and impact of price of oil were studied.Finally, in the conclusion, some recommendations related to the construction of Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline were presented.ÖZETBu çalışmanın amacı, Bakü-Ceyhan petrol boru hattının, Türkiye ve dünya açısından önemini, etkilerini ve bu boru hattının yapımını etkileyen unsurları incelemektir.Petrol, ülkelerin politikalarını ve ekonomilerini etkileyerek uluslararası topluluğun ilişkilerinin yapısını değiştiren, stratejik bir maddedir. Sovyetler Birliğinin dağılmasından sonra, yeni bir dönem başladı. Yeni bağımsızlığını kazanmış cumhuriyetler, uluslararası topluluğa girdiler. Özellikle petrol ve doğalgaz gibi yeraltı zenginliklerine sahip olan Kafkasya-Hazar bölgesi, tüm dünyanın ilgi odağı oldu. Liberalizm ve piyasa ekonomisi uygulanmaya başlandı. Yabancı yatırımcılar, bu bölgedeki çalışmalarını hızlandırdılar. Uluslararası petrol şirketleri, hükümetleriyle beraber bu bölgenin kaynaklarını kontrol etme gayreti içine girdiler.Petrolün çıkarılması kadar taşınması da önemli bir konudur. Petrol boru hattı, üzerinden geçen ülkeye transit geliri, boru hattının yapımıyla ilgili olarak da istihdam olanağı sağlar. Daha da önemlisi, petrol boru hattı üzerinden geçen ülkeye ekonomik ve politik bir güç verir. Bu bağlamda, petrol boru hatları konusunda çok ciddi bir mücadele yaşanmaktadır.Bakü-Ceyhan petrol boru hattı, Türkiye'nin savunduğu önemli bir projedir. Ulusal politikalar ve uluslararası ilişkilerde meydana gelen değişiklikler bu projeyi etkilemektedir. Bakü-Ceyhan petrol boru hattının yapımını etkileyen diğer bir faktör de petrol fiyatları, petrolün arz ve talebi konularını içeren uluslararası enerji politikasındaki değişikliklerdir. Bunların yanısıra, konuyla ilgili tarafların iç, ekonomi ve dış politikalarındaki değişiklikler ve petrol şirketlerinin tutumları, Bakü-Ceyhan petrol boru hattının yapımını etkilemektedir.Bu çerçevede, çalışmanın birinci bölümü, Kafkasya-Hazar bölgesinin petrol endüstrisinin tarihini içermektedir. Bu bölümde önce, Çarlık Rusyası ve sonra Sovyetler Birliği'nin petrol politikaları incelenmiştir. İkinci bölümde, 90'lardan itibaren Kafkasya-Hazar bölgesindeki petrol üretim ve ihracıyla ilgili gelişmeler incelenmiştir. Bu bölümde, önce, Kafkasya-Hazar bölgesinin rezervleriyle ilgili çalışmalar sunulmuştur. Ardından, Hazar'ın statüsü ile ilgili gelişmeler açıklanmıştır. Sonra, Azerbaycan'ın bağımsızlığını kazanmasından sonra Azeri petrolünün çıkarılması ve ihracıyla ilgili gelişmeler ele alınmıştır. Son olarak, alternatif boru hattı güzergahları ve bu güzergahları etkileyen unsurlar üzerinde durulmuştur. Üçüncü bölümde, Bakü-Ceyhan petrol boru hattının özellikleri incelenmiştir. Bu bağlamda, 1993'ten 1999 Haziran'a kadar olan gelişmeler üzerinde durulmuştur. Son olarak, bu hattın Türkiye, bölge ülkeleri ve diğer aktörler açısından yararları ele alınmıştır.Dördüncü bölümde, önce Kafkasya-Hazar bölgesindeki petrolün çıkarılması ve pazarlanmasıyla ilgili Bağımsız Devletler Topluluğu'na üye olan, Azerbaycan, Gürcistan, Ermenistan, Rusya Federasyonu, Kazakistan ve Türkmenistan'ın dış politikaları ve enerji politikaları değerlendirilmiştir. Ayrıca, bölgede önemli etkiye sahip Amerika Birleşik Devletleri, İran ve Çin'in bu konuyla ve bölgeyle ilgili dış politikaları ve enerji politikaları üzerinde durulmuştur. Son olarak da uluslararası petrol şirketlerinin görüşleri ve petrol fiyatlarının düşmesi konuları incelenmiştir.Sonuç olarak, Bakü-Ceyhan petrol boru hattının yapımı, birçok unsurdan etkilenmektedir. Bakü-Ceyhan petrol boru hattı,Türkiye'nin bölge ülkeleriyle ilişkilerini yoğunlaştıracak ve Türkiye'nin bölgedeki siyasal ve ekonomik gücünü attıracak, önemli bir işbirliği aracıdır.

Book reviewed in this article:THE GOVERNMENT OF NEW SOUTH WALES. By R. S. ParkerDOCUMENTS ON AUSTRALIAN FOREIGN POLICY 1937–49. Vol III: January–June 1940. Edited by H. Kenway, H. J. W. Stokes and P. G. EdwardsPUBLIC EXPENDITURES AND SOCIAL POLICY IN AUSTRALIA. Volume I: The Whitiam Years. 1972–75. Edited by R. B. Scotton and Helen FerberFROM WHITLAM TO FRASER: Reform and Reaction in Australian Politics. Edited by Allan Patience and Brian HeadILLUSIONS OF POWER: The fate of a reform government. By Michael SextonPOLITICS BETWEEN DEPARTMENTS: The fragmentation of executive control in Australian government. By Martin Painter and Bernard CareyCAPITALISM, SOCIALISM OR BARRARISM? The Australian Predicament: Essays in Contemporary Political Economy. By E. L. WheelwrightTRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN SOUTH EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC. Volume I. By Ernest Utrecht (with contributions by Kate Short)OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL OF AUSTRALIAN CORPORATIONS. By Michael LawriwskyFOREIGN INVESTMENT AND TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN AUSTRALIA: An Annotated Bibliography. By G. J. CroughAUSTRALIAN URBAN POLICY. By Max NeutzeFEDERAL POWER IN AUSTRALIA'S CITIES: Essays in Honour of Peter Till. Edited by Patrick N. TroyAUSTRALIAN CAPITAL CITIES: Historical Essays. Edited by J. W. McCarty and C. B. SchedvinTHE LAND RACKET: The Real Costs of Property Speculation. By Leonie SandercockPROTEST AND PUNISHMENT: The Story of the Social and Political Protesters transported to Australia 1788–1868. By George Rudè'THIS SIN AND SCANDAL': Australia's Population Debate 1891–1911. By Neville HicksTHE CONFIDENT YEARS: Australia in the Twenties. By Robert MurrayDEPRESSION DOWN UNDER. By Daisy McWilliams and others. Edited by Len FoxTHE ECONOMIC STATUS OF AUSTRALIAN ABORIGINES. By Jon C. Altman and John Nieuwenhuysen. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979)KULINMA: Listening to Aboriginal Australians. By H. C. CoombsKAROBRAN: The Story of an Aboriginal Girl. By Monica ClareRACE POLITICS IN AUSTRALIA. By C. M. TatzERNEST GILES: EXPLORER AND TRAVELLER 1835–1897. By Ray EricksenJAPANESE PRISONERS OF WAR IN REVOLT: The Outbreaks at Featherston and Cowra during World War II. By Charlotte Carr‐GreggDIE LIKE THE CARP!: The Story of the Greatest Prison Escape Ever. By Harry GordonLEGACY: The First Fifty Years. By Mark LyonsPOLITICS IN A UNION: The Hursey case. By Tas BullBIOGRAPHICAL REGISTER OF THE NEW SOUTH WALES PARLIAMENT 1901–1970. By Heather Radi, Peter Spearritt and Elizabeth HintonA SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY OF AUSTRALIAN MILITARY HISTORY 1891–1939. By Jean Fielding and Robert O'NeillLAST OF LANDS Antarctica. By J. F. Lovering and J. R. V. Prescott. (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1979)PAPUA NEW GUINEA: Its Economic Situation and Prospects for DevelopmentPRACTICE WITHOUT POLICY: Genesis of Local Government in Papua New Guinea. By D. M. FenburyPOLITICS AND MODERNIZATION IN SOUTH AND SOUTHEAST ASIA Edited by Robert N. KearneyPEASANTS AND POLITICS: Grass Roots Reaction to Change in Asia. Edited by D. B. MillerMILESTONES ON MY JOURNEY: The Memoirs of Ali Sastroamijoyo, Indonesian Patriot and Political Leader. Edited by C. L. M. PendersPACIFIC ISLANDERS UNDER GERMAN RULE: A Study in the Meaning of Colonial Resistance. By Peter J. HempenstallTAIM BILONG MANI: The evolution of agriculture in a Solomon Island society. By John ConnellJAPAN'S POLITICAL SYSTEM. By Robert E. WardA THEORY OF JAPANESE DEMOCRACY. By Nobutaka IkeCHINA'S ROLE IN WORLD AFFAIRS. By Michael B. YahudaCADRES, COMMANDERS, AND COMMISSARS: The Training of the Chinese Communist Leadership, 1920–45. By Jane L. PriceTHE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF HONG KONG. By Norman MinersCONGRESS AND THE RAJ: Facets of the Indian Struggle 1917–47. Edited by D. A. LowCOLLECTIVE IDENTITIES, NATIONALISMS AND PROTEST IN MODERN SRI LANKA. Edited by Michael RobertsDOCUMENTS OF THE CEYLON NATIONAL CONGRESS AND NATIONALIST POLITICS IN CEYLON 1929–1950. Edited by Michael RobertsARMIES AND PARTIES IN AFRICA. By Henry BienenA POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY OF AFRICA. By E. A. BoatengEXPANSION AND REACTION: Essays on European Expansion and Reactions in Asia and Africa. Edited by H. L. WesselingTHE IMPERIAL IMPACT: Studies in the Economic History of Africa and India. Edited by Clive Dewey and A. G. HopkinsRACISM AND POLITICAL ACTION IN BRITAIN. Edited by Robert Miles and Annie PhizackleaTHE ORIGINS OF ENGLISH INDIVIDUALISM: The Family, Property and Social Transition. By Alan MacfarlaneEMIGRANT GENTLEWOMEN: Genteel poverty and female emigration, 1830–1914. By A. James HammertonECONOCIDE: British Slavery in the Era of Abolition. By Seymour DrescherBEYOND ORANGE AND GREEN: The Political Economy of the Northern Ireland Crisis. By Belinda ProbertGERMANY 1866–1945. By Gordon A. CraigBONES OF CONTENTION: An Enquiry into East–West Relations. By Terence GarveyPOLITICS AND SOCIETY IN THE USSR. Second Edition. By David LaneSOVIET POLITICAL ELITES: The Case of Tiraspol. By Ronald J. HillTHE SHADOW OF THE WINTER PALACE: The Drift to Revolution 1825–1917. By Edward CrankshawWOMEN IN SOVIET SOCIETY: Equality, Development and Social Change. By Gail Warshofsky LapidusAPOSTLES INTO TERRORISTS: Women and the Revolutionary Movement in the Russia of Alexander II. By Vera BroidoMIDDLE EAST CONTEMPORARY SURVEY, vol. 1, 1976–77. Edited by Colin Legum and Haim ShakedARMED STRUGGLE IN PALESTINE: A Political‐Military Analysis. By Bard E. O'NeillTHE PHILOSOPHY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION. By Morton WhiteU. S. OCCUPATION IN EUROPE AFTER WORLD WAR II: Papers and Reminiscences from the April 23–24, 1976 Conference held at the George C. Marshall Research Foundation, Lexington, Virginia. Edited by Hans A. SchmittPOLITICAL CORRUPTION IN AMERICA. By George C. S. BensonCORRUPTION: A Study in Political Economy. By Susan Rose‐AckermanPOLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN LATIN AMERICA. Volume I: Citizen and State. Edited by John A. Booth and Mitchell A. SeligsonTHE THIRD WORLD REVOLUTION. By Fred J. CarrierMY MISSIONS FOR REVOLUTIONARY BOLIVIA, 1944–1962. By Victor AndradeMODERN REVOLUTIONS AND REVOLUTIONISTS: A Bibliography. By Robert BlackeyCLASS IDEOLOGY AND ANCIENT POLITICAL THEORY. By Ellen Meiksins Wood and Neal WoodMARX'S THEORY OF POLITICS. By John M. MaguireTHE WEALTH OF SOME NATIONS. By Malcolm CaldwellTHE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DISTRIBUTION: Equality versus Inequality. By Michael Don WardGRACCHUS BABEUF: The First Revolutionary Communist. By R. B. RoseCRISIS MANAGEMENT: Confrontation and Diplomacy in the Nuclear Age. By Phil WilliamsPEOPLE AND AGENCIES. By Bernard Schaffer and Elizabeth O'KeeffeLIBERALS AND SOCIAL DEMOCRATS. By Peter ClarkeVICTORIANS AT HOME AND AWAY. By Janet and Peter PhillipsTHE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THOUGHT OF HERBERT SPENCER. By DavidNO MAN'S LAND: Combat and Identity in World War I. By Eric J. LeedTHE SCIENTIFIC PUBLICATION SYSTEM IN SOCIAL SCIENCE: A Study of the Operation of Leading Professional Journals in Psychology, Sociology, and Social Work. By Duncan LindseySPORT IN HISTORY: The Making of Modern Sporting History. Edited by Richard Cashman and Michael McKernan

As our main guidelines in judging the probability of success in the formation of an economic union, we have used past trade patterns to indicate complementarities between the prospective partners, oil revenue projections to estimate the degree of future expansion of both demand and supply, and the principles of mutual self-interest and universal gain to argue for the likelihood of cooperation of all members. The essential participants in a Middle East Economic Community (MEEC), on these bases, would have to include most of the countries now producing food and other commodities in sufficient quantities for export to the partners, and enough of the major oil producers to provide the capital resources the community will need to accelerate its development during the next decade. At a minimum this would involve the Fertile Crescent, Egypt, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. The arguments put forward to indicate the interest of the last two countries in unification apply also to the other oil producers considered here—Libya and the smaller Gulf states. The need in the Middle East for enhanced food-producing capabilities recommends inclusion of the Sudan, though the latter suffers from internal political problems that might limit its participation in an essentially Arab enterprise.We have not considered the possible participation of other neighboring states in a Middle East Economic Community—Cyprus, Iran, Turkey, or even, after a settlement with the Palestinians, Israel—in order not to further complicate the discussion. While none of these countries might be interested in full MEEC membership in the foreseeable future, each might find considerable advantage in some sort of a link, possibly like Turkey's current associate standing in the European Community. Possible Iranian interest would have the same basis as that of the Arab oil exporters, promising investment opportunities in non-oil countries and a larger market in the long-run for new Iranian industries. On the other hand, Turkey is more like Egypt or Lebanon. It has already seen a considerable jump in its exports to the major Arab countries, from about $71 million in 1972 to $168 million, close to an eighth of all its exports, in 1975.Although Iran's imports from the potential community members account for less than 1.5 percent of its total imports, 10 percent of the value of its non-petroleum exports are destined for these Arab States. Almost 16 percent of its food exports and over 11 percent of its manufactured exports constitute the major categories of Iran's exports to this market.Cyprus, whose economy has suffered serious setbacks after the 1974 crisis, has, paradoxically had an extremely healthy growth of exports to these Middle Eastern states. By 1975, the total value of Cypriot exports to these countries was nearly 270 percent of its 1973 export figures to the same market. The principal factor behind this remarkable expansion of trade was due to the civil strife in Lebanon which disrupted its exports of vegetable and food products to these countries. Cyprus immediately filled the gap left by the Lebanese civil war; it remains to be seen, however, how strong and permanent the Cypriot foothold is in this market, since the end of the disturbances in Lebanon.Turkey imports 10 percent of its total imports from these countries and exports nearly 12 percent of its total exports to them. There is, however, a great difference in the composition of imports and exports. Eighty-eight percent of Turkish exports to these countries are varied. In terms of its total exports to this market, Turkey exports 36 percent in food products, 39 percent in non-fuel crude materials, and 15 percent in basic manufactures.The truly unique set of economic circumstances taking shape in the Middle East offer the region a chance for rapid development that could even exceed that of post-war Japan or Stalinist Russia. Such massive capital inflows that the oil-producers are now and will continue to enjoy for several years have never previously been seen in such a short period by any people. The Arabs will add this ingredient to economic structures which have already undergone considerable modernization in the past two generations. Transportation networks, educational and public health systems, and administrative bureaucracies, among other infrastructure elements, throughout the area are fairly well developed, thanks in no small part to past oil-related revenues.These oil revenues will bring their recipients sufficient wealth to provide adequately for their descendants, economic union or not. But, the degree to which their descendants live by their own economic activities, provided for by today's investments, and the extent that oil benefits will fuel regional development depend upon whether, when, and how much economic integration occurs.Both oil and non-oil states could reap considerable benefits from an economic union, and given their mutual needs for each other, they all would enter serious negotiations from individual positions of strength. To no small extent, the success of an Arab union may be as much dependent on the progress of an Arab-Israeli peace settlement. But, the advantages of integration to the core states of the Arab world, we maintain, are clear, and the degree to which these advantages can be realized depends upon how early in the upsurge of oil revenues economic union advances to an operative level. Some important early steps have been the Economic Unity Agreement and the establishment of the Kuwait Fund, the Arab Fund, the Abu Dhabi Fund, and the Inter-Arab Investment Guarantee Corporation. Most of these proposals have not achieved their full potential, and more genuine commitment is needed.Stirrings of movement toward such commitment were seen at the June 1975 meeting of the Arab Economic Unity Council. Rather than issuing still another call for immediate integration with more rhetorical value than economic content, the participants pledged a five-year effort to coordinate the policies of their governments with the aim of initiating a Middle East Economic Community in 1981. Of course, progress remains to be seen, but considerable political realism appeared to be shown at the 1975 AEUC meeting, recognizing the need for a step-by-step approach to integration, not only over the first five years, but also in the twenty-year period beginning in 1981 that was seen as necessary for complete implementation of the economic community.The challenge to integrate facing the Arabs is not as drastic as the economic equivalent of life or death, but the way in which it is met is likely to determine whether they emerge from the next quarter century as the major world economic power that their numbers, history, and fortunate endowment of natural resources seem to make possible.

President Tyler talks about the state of the union including the annexation of Texas and protests by the Mexican government regarding annexation ; The U.S. Serial set is a specially bound, consecutively numbered version of all House and Senate reports and documents. Many of the government documents in the Americas archive come originally from the U.S. Serial set, although were bound together at some later point into the collection that is now represented in this collection.

This volume explores emerging research and pedagogy in analytics, collaboration, and decision support with an emphasis on business intelligence and social media. In general, the chapters help understand where technology involvement in human decisions is headed. Reading the chapters can help understand the opportunities and threats associated with the use of information technology in decision making. Computing and information technologies are reshaping our global society, but they can potentially reshape it in negative as well as positive ways. Analytics, collaboration and computerized decision support are powerful decision aiding and decision making tools that have enormous potential to impact crisis decision making, regulation of financial systems, healthcare decision making and many more important decision domains.Many information technologies can potentially support, assist and even decide for human decision makers. Despite the potential, some researchers think that we know the answers to how these technologies will change society. The 'Wisdom of Crowds' or 'Big Data' become the topic of the day and are soon replaced with new marketing terms. In many ways, mobile technology is just another form factor to adapt decision support capabilities too and experiment with new capabilities. The cloud is a nebulous metaphor that adds to the mystery of information technology. Wireless technology enables the ubiquitous presence of analytics and decision support. With new networking capabilities, collaboration is possible anywhere and everywhere using voice, video and text. Documents can be widely shared and massive numbers of documents can be carried on a small tablet computer. Recent developments in technologies impact the processes organizations use to make decisions. In addition, academics are looking for ways to enhance their pedagogy to train students to be more adept in understanding how emerging technology will be used effectively for decision making in organizations.The chapters are based on papers originally reviewed at the Special Interest Group on Decision Support Systems (SIGDSS) Workshop at the 2013 International Conference on Information Systems (ICIS 2013). Ultimately this volume endeavors to find a balance between systematizing what we know, so we can teach our findings from prior research better, and stimulating excitement to move the field in new directions. Lakshmi Iyeris an Associate Professor and Director of Graduate Programs in the Information Systems and Supply Chain Management Department, Bryan School of Business and Economics at the University of North Carolina Greensboro (UNCG). She received her Ph.D. in Business Administration from the University of Georgia, Athens, GA and her M.S. in Industrial Engineering from the University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa. Her research interests are in the area of business analytics, knowledge management, emerging technologies its impact on organizations and users, and diversity in computing. Her research work has been published in or forthcoming in Communications of the AIS, Journal of Association for Information Systems, European Journal of Information Systems, Communications of the ACM, Decision Support Systems, eService Journal, Journal of Electronic Commerce Research, International Journal of Business Intelligence Research, Information Systems Management, Journal of Global Information Technology and Management, and others. She is a Board member of Teradata University Network, Chair of the Special Interest Group in Decision Support and Analytics (formerly SIGDSS), and served as research track co-chair for BI Congress.Dr. Iyer is also involved in community engaged outreach and scholarship that furthers the role of women in IT (wiit.uncg.edu). She is a member of the American Association of University Women (AAUW) and received the Dr. Shirley Hall Award from AAUW Greensboro Branch in April 2011 for exemplary contribution to enrich STEM education for women. She is founder and Director of the 'IT is for Girls' at UNCG, an outreach program for middle and high-school girls that aims to increase their awareness about education and career paths in computing. She has received funding from AAUW, National Center for Women in IT (NCWIT) and from foundations to offer STEM events for young women. Dr. Iyer serves as a co-chair of the Association of Information Systems' (AIS) task force on Women in IS to enhance the outreach efforts of AIS to women in Information Systems (IS) based on systematic assessment of the current status of women in IS, globally, including students (both current and potential) and professionals in academia, corporate, and non-profit organizations with the intent to creating a nurturing, supporting environment conducive to enhancing the growth and success of women in IS field.Daniel J. Poweris a Professor of Management and Information Systems at the College of Business Administration at the University of Northern Iowa, Cedar Falls, Iowa and the Editor of DSSResources.COM, the Web-based knowledge repository about computerized systems that support decision making, the editor of PlanningSkills.COM, and the editor of DSS News, a bi-weekly e-newsletter. Dan writes a regular column in Decision Support News. Also, Dan is a blogger on the Business Intelligence Network.Since 1982, Daniel Power has published more than 50 articles, book chapters and proceedings papers. His articles have appeared in leading journals including Decision Sciences, Decision Support Systems, Journal of Decision Systems, MIS Quarterly, Academy of Management Review, Communications of the Association for Information Systems and Information and Management. He is also co-author of a book titled Strategic Management Skills and he has authored four books on computerized decision support. His DSS Concepts book (2002) titled Decision Support Systems: Concepts and Resources for Managers is a broad ranging scholarly handbook on the fundamentals of building decision support systems. His expanded DSS Framework has received widespread interest. His latest book from Business Expert Press is titled Decision Support, Analytics, and Business Intelligence.Professor Power is the Editor-in-Chief of the Journal of the Midwest Association for Information Systems (JMWAIS), a member of two academic journal editorial boards, and was the founding section editor of the ISWorld pages on Decision Support Systems Research and was founding Chair of the Association for Information Systems Special Interest Group on Decision Support and Analytics (SIG DSA). Also, Professor Power was the founding President of the Midwest United States Chapter of the Association for Information Systems (MWAIS) and served as the at-large member of the Board of Directors.In 1982, Professor Power received a Ph.D. in Business Administration from the University of Wisconsin-Madison. He was on the faculty at the University of Maryland-College Park from 1982 to 1989. Dr. Power has been a visiting lecturer at universities in China, Denmark, Ireland, Israel, and Russia. Power has consulted with a number of organizations and in Summer 2003 he was a Visiting Faculty Research Fellow with the U. S. Air Force Research Lab Information Directorate (AFRL/IF).Dr. Power is a pioneer developer of computerized decision aiding and support systems. During 1975-77, he developed a computerized system called DECAID, Decision AID. In 1981-83, he reprogrammed and expanded the system for the Apple II PC.

Turkey recently suspended trade with Israel because of the "worsening humanitarian tragedy" in Gaza.Ankara says it will resume trade if Israel permits an "uninterrupted and sufficient flow" of aid into the enclave. Predictably, Israel's chief diplomat, Israel Katz, accused Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of behaving like a "dictator" while "disregarding the interests of the Turkish people and businessmen and ignoring international trade agreements." Hamas unsurprisingly praised Turkey.Tensions between Turkey and Israel have soared at various points in recent decades, such as the 2009 Davos Summit and the 2010 Gaza flotilla raid. Yet, until now, Turkish-Israeli economic relations always weathered those storms. Therefore, Turkey halting trade with Israel this month is a big deal."Since mid-October last year, when President Erdogan stepped up his sharp criticism of Israel's attack on civilians in Gaza, trade has been the one element of the two countries' relationship that has remained positive. Now that Turkey has cut off all trade with Israel, that positive element is gone," Matthew Bryza, the former U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and Eurasia, told RS."Erdogan appears to be breaking with tradition in taking a holistic approach to ties with Israel. In previous crises, trade relations always remained distinct from strained political ties. Now, the government appears not to be concerned with escalation on all fronts," said Batu Coşkun, a political analyst who specializes in Turkish affairs at the Sadeq Institute, in an interview with RS.According to Murat Aslan, a faculty member at Hasan Kalyoncu University and a researcher at the SETA Foundation, Turkey has cards it can play if it seeks to increase pressure on Israel beyond suspending trade. These include encouraging other countries to join Turkey in imposing embargos on Israel and closing Turkish airspace to Israeli flights. "We have to wait and see [if Turkey takes] these steps, but I know that there are [many] options," said Aslan.Domestic pressures and mounting tensionTurkey's domestic politics must be considered. At an earlier stage in the Gaza war, segments of Turkish society started pressuring Erdogan's government to take concrete steps against Tel Aviv beyond strong rhetoric. A few weeks ago, Turkey curbed trade with Israel in 54 areas, including steel, fertilizer, and jet fuel.In the lead up to last month's municipal elections, there were calls for severing all trade with Israel, which resonated with many of Erdogan's constituents. As a result, a fair share of Erdogan's traditional supporters either refused to vote, or they supported the New Welfare Party, an Islamist party that campaigned on opposing the government's policy of permitting continued trade with Israel amid the Gaza war.Now, in deciding to halt Turkish trade with Israel, "Erdogan appears to be reacting to retain his popularity," according to Coşkun. "This means that the president is likely to continue escalating rhetoric, which means more tension in ties with Israel."The economic impactIsrael has long maintained robust trade, investment, and commercial relations with Turkey. In 2023, bilateral trade stood at roughly $7 billion. Zorlu Holding, a Turkish conglomerate, is a major investor in Israel's economy, and Turkish construction companies have made lots of money in Israel over the years. It can be taken for granted that construction costs will increase in Israel, and there will be inflationary effects due to Ankara's decision to halt trade.But, for the time being, it is less than clear how much harm the Turkish embargo will inflict on Israel's economy, and how long the harm will last. Countries can adapt when their trade relations are interrupted or sanctions are imposed. Russia adjusting its trade routes and supply chains after the West waged financial warfare against Moscow in response to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 is an example. Similarly, Israeli policymakers are now busy trying to assess what damage will likely be inflicted on their economy and how to adjust to offset the effects of Turkey's embargo.Additionally, Turkey's economy will take a hit too. This was a major reason why Ankara did not implement the embargo sooner. There is widespread support across Turkey's political spectrum for the Palestinians, but also a debate over how much of a price the nation should pay to support Gaza."It will definitely harm the Israeli economy in unprecedented ways given the internal situation in Israel and the Houthis' measures at the entrance of the Red Sea," said Ali Bakir, an assistant professor at Qatar University's Ibn Khaldon Center and nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council's Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative, in an interview with RS."Having said this, it will also harm the Turkish economy, which is already struggling and is being adjusted to recover," Bakir added, noting that regional governments that are afraid of taking such financial risks should step up to help those, like Turkey, that are willing to do so. Azerbaijani oilThe impact of Turkey's actions on Azerbaijan and, more specifically, its oil exports to Israel will matter. Azerbaijani oil goes through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline and then on to Israel via tanker. If Ankara would stop allowing Azerbaijan to export oil to Israel through the Ceyhan port, Israel's economy could greatly suffer."It's not clear at this point whether or not Turkey will cut off those flows of [Azerbaijani] oil…to Israel. Were that to be the case, that could have a more significant impact on Israel's economy as the economy adjusts to having to find new supplies," said Bryza, who also served as U.S. ambassador to Azerbaijan. He noted that Israel has long-term energy contracts with Azerbaijan, and it would have to pay much more for oil if bought on the spot market."If Turkey halts this flow…then Israel has to find another source for energy. Otherwise, they will be in trouble," added Aslan.Nonetheless, given the nature of the Ankara-Baku alliance, Turkey may refrain from taking this action. "I would be surprised if Turkey were to cut off flows of Azerbaijani oil through and from the Turkish port of Ceyhan to Israel because that would also damage the interests of Azerbaijan," said Bryza. "Turkey and Azerbaijan have the closest of bilateral relationships with the cliche describing that relationship, they are 'one nation and two states.'"Will others follow Turkey in halting trade with Israel?Turkey's suspension of bilateral trade will inevitably harm the Israeli economy, at least in the near-term. This will be an additional cost that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's government, and Israel as a country will have to pay for its crimes against the civilians of Gaza. However, if Turkey is alone in imposing an embargo on Israel, the economic harm inflicted on Israel could be limited. What needs to be considered is the possibility of other countries following Ankara's lead, which could make Israel's economic challenges more serious.Turkey's decision will certainly be welcome by Arab citizens across the Middle East and North Africa. They will likely point to Ankara's embargo on Israel as an example of how Muslim countries should deal with Israel and call on their governments to follow suit. Whether those governments will do so, however, is another question.

Secretary of State Antony Blinken is set to travel to Beijing this week in the latest round of high-level diplomacy between the U.S. and China. Since the U.S.–China relationship hit new lows in late 2022 and early 2023 — thanks to incidents like then-Speaker Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taiwan and a Chinese spy balloon's visit to U.S. airspace — both sides have made a welcome effort to slow the slide toward crisis and conflict.This effort has focused on top leaders exchanging views through in-person meetings. Last year, Blinken, Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen, Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo, and climate envoy John Kerry all made the trip to China. China's top diplomat Wang Yi and top economic official He Lifeng visited the United States, culminating in President Xi Jinping's trip to California to meet with President Joe Biden alongside the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in November. This year, a new round of exchanges began with Yellen's trip to China several weeks ago.All this back and forth has been accompanied by attempts from both sides to show they are mindful of some of the other's concerns, such as U.S. reassurances on the One China Policy, which has maintained stability in the Taiwan Strait for decades, and Chinese support for U.S. restrictions on the production of fentanyl, the drug helping to drive America's ongoing opioid crisis. Discussions between the two militaries on crisis communications are now proceeding well after years of paralysis.Despite these promising small steps toward reviving the relationship, however, the two sides are now in danger of complacency toward the prospect of serious conflict. As the State Department signals that no new positive initiatives are on the agenda for Blinken's visit, U.S.–China diplomacy increasingly seems devoted to talks for the sake of talks, without any ambition to make progress on the deep and powerful underlying forces driving both sides toward confrontation.As my colleague Michael Swaine explains in a recent research brief, the appearance of stability between Washington and Beijing is likely a product of political expediency on both sides rather than a durable foundation for coexistence. Biden, facing a difficult reelection campaign against an opponent with a predilection for making conflict with China the center of every conversation, has made the wise calculation that maintaining calm around China will help him focus on his preferred themes. Xi Jinping, for his part, is preoccupied with economic difficulties, a far-reaching anti-corruption campaign in the military, and last year's purge of several top leaders. As the wars in Ukraine and Gaza rage on, both Washington and Beijing have reason to avoid adding another international crisis to their plates.On the one hand, these short-term considerations reflect a deeper potential for alignment. The United States and China are both status-quo powers with an interest in limited reforms to the current global system. The dynamic economies of the two countries flourish when the global system is politically stable and increasingly connected. Both countries see clear diplomatic and economic benefits to supporting the Global South's hunger for development. Leaders on both sides recognize the terrible threat posed by global economic instability, large-scale forced population movements, transnational crime, pandemic disease, and the climate crisis. Because existing arrangements including the domestic institutions of both countries face these dire risks, both governments are exploring promising techniques — including industrial policy, expanded development financing, and revisions to global governance issues like business taxation and the U.N. Security Council — that could chart a path out of today's global turmoil.Instead of joining forces and coordinating their potentially complementary efforts, leaders on both sides are seeking to reconstitute domestic unity around efforts to repel the threat posed by the other. Rather than working together on a reform agenda, the United States has been rallying its alliance network to isolate China while China has been impugning U.S. conduct to gain favor in the Global South.Each country sees the initiatives of the other as a challenge to its own prospects rather than a potential contribution to a stable and prosperous world. This zero-sum hostility is increasingly institutionalized in all levels of government on both sides, devoting ever more resources to and establishing ever more careers on the proposition that success on the other side means suffering and failure on "our" side.In the last month alone, U.S. officials have attacked China's trade with Russia and prepared sanctions to punish it; blamed the problem of weak consumer demand in the global economy on Chinese "overcapacity"; added a new "minilateral" alliance network joining the United States, Japan, and the Philippines to its complement of trilateral and quadrilateral arrangements meant to hem in China militarily; and advanced legislation that now looks likely to become law that would expropriate TikTok because of its association with China.Also in the last month, China opened a WTO dispute claiming that the Inflation Reduction Act, Biden's signature climate and industrial policy bill, violates trade law and established rules that will eliminate Intel microprocessors and Microsoft software from Chinese government computers and servers. In a call with Biden, Xi said that U.S. restrictions on Chinese business are second only to Taiwan in the potential for inciting conflict — a notable escalation in the urgency of Chinese warnings.This suggests the pressures to conflict continue to build. Beijing and Washington's current mutual interest in keeping up the appearance of stability is only temporary. The fragility of the relationship leaves open the possibility that some unforeseen event could quickly push either side to change its calculus away from détente toward conflict. Even if the short-term desire on both sides to focus on domestic challenges keeps the calm for the rest of 2024, the two countries, having squandered the opportunity to move in a new direction, are at risk of entering another escalatory spiral next year.What could Washington and Beijing do if they wanted instead to seize this opportunity and confront the problems at the root of the U.S.–China conflict? In a research report last year, I argued that they should embrace "common good diplomacy," a new framework for a stable bilateral relationship. Through joint efforts to build an inclusive global system, the United States and China could create the basis for genuinely healthy forms of competition and cooperation by overcoming the structural pressures for zero-sum conflict, including the exclusionary system of global authority, weak and inequitable global economic growth, and the climate crisis.The new rapprochement routine is certainly better than a march to war — but it will not do much to avert that worst-case scenario, either. A genuine attempt at mutual understanding, recognition of shared interests, and embrace of difficult negotiations is the only path to achieving security for either country.

UPDATE 4/17, 12:45 PMThe House Republicans released three of the bills on Wednesday. The supplemental package includes approximately $26 in aid for Israel, $60 billion for Ukraine, and $8 billion for the Indo-Pacific. The fourth bill, which Johnson says will include the "REPO Act, TikTok bill, sanctions and other measures to confront Russia, China, and Iran," has not yet been introduced. The legislation will reportedly include an "open" amendment process and is expected to be voted on on Saturday night.After months of waiting, Speaker of the House Mike Johnson (R-La.) is expected to unveil an ambitious foreign aid plan this week. According to a one-pager that contained an incomplete list of the items in the bill posted on X on Monday by PBS News correspondent Lisa Desjardins, the plan includes at least $48 billion for Ukraine and $14 billion for Israel, as well as money for allies in the Indo-Pacific and operations in the Red Sea. As far as the foreign aid is concerned, details of the plan are remarkably similar to the bill that the Senate passed in February, and which Johnson has thus far refused to bring to the House floor for a vote. That bill contained roughly $60 billion in aid for Ukraine, and $14 billion in security assistance for Israel. Johnson's plan is reported to also include other Republican sweeteners such as legislation that could ban TikTok and permit the U.S. to seize Russian assets to increase the scale of aid for Kyiv. The House is planning to vote on each of the elements separately later this week, and then send one single package to the Senate containing each approved piece. While the aid for the Indo-Pacific figures to be uncontroversial and a version of the TikTok ban has already passed the House, the other parts of the legislation face a more complicated situation.A number of congressional Democrats have raised concerns about approving more unconditional aid to Israel as it continues to carry out its war in Gaza which has killed more than 33,000 Palestinians, most of them women and children. But, in the aftermath of Iran's strikes on Israel over the weekend, a sufficient number of Democrats are likely to vote in favor of the aid. And, as Politico noted this morning, "there's an understanding that [sending aid to Israel] will be the price of finally securing Ukraine funding." The biggest holdup, as has been the case since Johnson assumed the speakership, is additional assistance for Ukraine. Regardless of the "important innovations" that Johnson hopes to include in the legislation, getting a package through while surviving politically remains a difficult needle to thread. The problem for Johnson has never been procedural or substantive — the Speaker will likely need Democratic support to bring the legislation to a vote, and each element of the package should have enough votes to pass on its own. But none of Johnson's maneuvering over the past few months is likely to relieve him of the accompanying political headache. After the House passed a bill to fund the government last month, Rep. Marjorie Taylor Greene (R-Ga.) filed a motion to vacate, a process that could result in a vote to remove Johnson from the speakership. Following Johnson's announcement to the GOP conference that he was moving forward with his foreign aid proposal, Rep. Thomas Massie (R-Ky.) said that he would co-sponsor Greene's motion. Massie has told reporters that there will be more GOP votes to remove Johnson than the eight that voted to oust then-Speaker Kevin McCarthy last October. Some members of the Freedom Caucus, who have been opposed to continued funding for Kyiv, have also expressed concern over Johnson's plan, but it is unclear whether they would support removing him.. The group put out a statement on Monday saying that "under no circumstances will the House Freedom Caucus abide using the emergency situation in Israel as a bogus justification to ram through Ukraine aid with no offset and no security for our own wide-open borders" Johnson appeared Tuesday to take on his detractors. "I am not resigning," he said after a morning meeting of fellow House Republicans on Capitol Hill. Calling himself a "wartime Speaker," he called efforts to oust him "absurd ... not helpful."The Republican Party's margin in the House is so narrow — it will drop to 217-213 when Rep. Mike Gallagher (R-Wis.) resigns on Friday — that Johnson can only afford two GOP "no" votes before having to rely on Democratic members to save his job. Some Democrats have already said that they were open to helping Johnson if the Speaker allows a vote on Ukraine aid.Massie, who has already called on Johnson to resign, said that this outcome would not work for Johnson. If he relies on Democrats, "He goes further in the hole with Republicans. He becomes toxic to the conference," Massie said, according to NBC News' Sahil Kapur. "For every Democrat who comes to his aid he'll lose 2-3 more Rs." The Biden administration and prominent Senate Democrats have so far reserved judgment on Johnson's proposal, saying that they wanted to see the final details before weighing in, but they appeared open to supporting the eventual package. "It does appear at first blush that the Speaker's proposal will in fact help us get aid to Ukraine, aid to Israel and needed resources to the Indo-Pacific," National Security Council spokesman John Kirby said. "We just want to get more detail." Biden and Johnson spoke by phone on Monday night, and, given the hurdles that the speaker will have to overcome to get his plan through the House, he is likely to want to ensure that whatever does get through has support in the Senate and White House. Johnson also met with former President Donald Trump over the weekend in Florida, but the presumptive 2024 GOP nominee's praise for the Speaker does not appear to have won over skeptical Republican members. Trump was noncommittal about supporting Johnson's aid request, though he maintained that any future money sent to Kyiv should be "in the form of a loan rather than a gift." Some Republicans may be determined to advance a foreign aid bill to the floor regardless of how the votes on the looming legislation go. "One House Republican made the point to me that if this GOP plan doesn't pass, the floodgates will open and they'll just sign the Senate bill discharge petition," said Punchbowl News' Jake Sherman on X.The discharge petition, which would send the bill to the floor over the Speaker's objections, currently has 195 of the necessary 218 signatures. Only one Republican, the recently retired Rep. Ken Buck, has signed on so far.House rules typically allow 72 hours for members to review bill text before voting. If that procedure is followed, Johnson's foreign aid bill could be brought to a vote as soon as Friday night.

For a conflict discussed in starkly moralistic terms, the ways the Ukraine war is talked about by its most enthusiastic Western supporters can be remarkably cynical about the human carnage involved. "Aiding Ukraine, giving the money to Ukraine is the cheapest possible way for the U.S. to enhance its security," Zanny Minton Beddoes, editor-in-chief of the Economist, recently told the Daily Show's Jon Stewart. "The fighting is being done by the Ukrainians, they're the people who are being killed." This view is not unique to Beddoes. It's been widely expressed by those most in favor of an open-ended, prolonged war and most against the kind of peace negotiations that would shorten it. "Four months into this thing, I like the structural path we're on here. As long as we help Ukraine with the weapons they need and the economic support, they will fight to the last person," said Sen. Lindsay Graham (R-S.C.) early into the war, accidentally voicing what the war's critics have often said about the war — that the U.S. will fight it "to the last Ukrainian." Later, Graham called it the "best money we've ever spent." "It is a relatively modest amount that we are contributing without being asked to risk life and limb," Sen. Roger Wicker (R-Miss.), ranking Republican on the Senate Armed Services Committee, told the Associated Press last year. "The Ukrainians are willing to fight the fight for us if the West will give them the provisions. It's a pretty good deal." "I call that a bargain," North Dakota Governor Doug Burgum has said about the war funding, pointing to the damage Ukrainian forces had inflicted on the Russian military. "No Americans are getting killed in Ukraine. We're rebuilding our industrial base. The Ukrainians are destroying the army of one of our biggest rivals. I have a hard time finding anything wrong with that," U.S. Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) remarked.Americans "should be satisfied that we're getting our money's worth on our Ukraine investment," wrote Sen. Richard Blumenthal (D-Conn.), because "for less than 3 percent of our nation's military budget, we've enabled Ukraine to degrade Russia's military strength by half," and "all without a single American service woman or man injured or lost." But politicians aren't the only armchair warriors who look at the enormous death and destruction suffered by Ukraine by prolonging the war as akin to a brilliant business decision. Hawkish think tanks have made similar arguments. "When viewed from a bang-per-buck perspective, U.S. and Western support for Ukraine is an incredibly cost-effective investment," Timothy Garten Ashe wrote for the weapons maker-funded Center for European Policy Analysis. "Support for Ukraine remains a bargain for American national security," wrote Hudson Institute Senior Fellow and Director of the Center on Europe and Eurasia Peter Rough. "For about 5 percent of total U.S. defense spending over the past 20 months, Ukraine has badly degraded Russia, one of the United States' top adversaries, without shedding a single drop of American blood." And major U.S. newspapers have likewise published similar perspectives. "We have a determined partner in Ukraine that is willing to bear the consequences of war so that we do not have to do so ourselves in the future," former top George W. Bush officials Condoleezza Rice and Robert Gates celebrated in the pages of the Washington Post. "For all the aid we've given Ukraine, we are the true beneficiaries in the relationship, and they the true benefactors," wrote Bret Stephens at the New York Times, pointing to the fact that NATO is paying in only money, while "Ukrainians are counting their costs in lives and limbs lost." What's distasteful about this is not just the flippant way it treats the unimaginable scale of loss of life, permanent disability and emerging long-term crises being experienced by Ukrainians — as mere abacus beads to be moved around in a cost-benefit analysis centered on the United States and its NATO allies. It's also the fact that, far from being "willing," "determined" and ready to "fight to the last person," many Ukrainians have demonstrated that they do not want to risk their lives in this war — a share of the population that is getting larger and more vocal the longer the war has gone on. Since the start of the war, when many fleeing Ukrainian men were stopped at the border and ordered to return to potentially fight, thousands of Ukrainians have defied the government's ban on men aged between 18 and 60 leaving the country — to the point of spending large sums of money and even risking their lives to get out. Many hunkered down in their homes to dodge enlistment officers, while tens of thousands signed a petition opposing increasingly aggressive conscription practices. Early last year, Ukraine's parliament upped the punishment for desertion, which soldiers have this year admitted is still a growing problem. By November 2023, the BBC determined that a total of nearly 20,000 Ukrainian men had fled the country to avoid being drafted, while the State Border Service revealed a month later that more than 16,500 had been stopped from leaving. At one point, the country's law enforcement uncovered a massive scheme across nearly a dozen regions that gave out falsified medical certificates declaring someone unfit for military service in return for as much as $10,000. This phenomenon has only intensified as Kyiv has dramatically expanded its conscription plans to make up its disadvantage in manpower, including proposals for lowering the draft age and creating a central database of potential recruits, all while resorting to more aggressive drafting tactics and recruiting increasingly older and less healthy men. These plans have engendered massive opposition, with protests by soldiers' families that have taken place around the country since last year calling for a cap on the length of military service continuing and intensifying; earlier this month. One hundred women blocked a road and mistakenly attacked another woman due to rumors of draft officials coming to take the village's men away. "I don't see the 500,000 more people ready to die," admitted a former Ukrainian government minister and current army captain last November. It increasingly appears that many of those who are most enthusiastic to keep the war going and avoid a negotiated end aren't, as we keep being told, the Ukrainians who are most likely to be killed or wounded in the fighting. Instead they are politicians and commentators far, far away from the front line in other countries who view its attendant death and destruction as akin to a board game — or, in their words, as a "good deal," a "bargain," and a satisfying "investment" for their own countries.In other words, it looks increasingly like all too many other U.S.-led wars.