Suchergebnisse

The article analyses how the reconstituted Republic of Lithuania constructed its identity in the context of foreign and security policy. The main purpose of this study is to find out how Lithuanian identity was constructed in 1991–1994 and what kind of tensions unfolded regarding the integration processes. The study relies on the premise that the internally formed identity of a country is the main aspect that provides insights into foreign and security policy, represents relations with other countries and describes self-positioning in international politics. Therefore, it is important to analyze how this identity was constructed. Post-structuralists argue that identity, which is the main concept of post-structuralistic analysis, is understood as discursive, political, social, and relational (the distinction between the Self and the Other). Therefore, the relation between identity and foreign and security policy is constitutive, this identity is not given and stable but varies and transforms according to foreign and security policies. The discourse analysis is used as a method and means to identify the socially constructed reality. By discourse we refer to spoken and written texts. Therefore, the basic material for research is 100 articles in which politicians, commentators, intellectuals, etc. have been analyzing the Lithuanian foreign and security policy from 1991 to 1994. The texts are taken from three Lithuanian newspapers: "Lietuvos rytas", "Lietuvos aidas", and "Atgimimas". The results are divided into two dimensions: Western dimension (addressing Europe in general and the European Union) and regional dimension (addressing Northern Europe, the Baltic region, and Central Europe). Several observations could be made. European representations have been dominant in the discourse. There have been a few different aspects with regard to this. Lithuania has been perceived as belonging to the same civilization as Europe, and Europe has been understood as the most important security guarantor. At the same time, however, Lithuania has also regarded Europe with distrust and felt inferior. Therefore, willingness to be integrated into Western security organizations, on the one hand, and fears and intention to primarily formulate national identity, on the other, have formed tensions between these two visions. Three regions have been understood merely as means to reach the strategic purposes and get integrated into Europe. Northern Europe has been generally perceived as a friendly, well-developed and reliable region. Therefore, this partnership could have contributed to guaranteeing Lithuania's security and integration. However, there has been no common historical or cultural background between Lithuania and Northern Europe. For this reason, Northern Europe has existed as a stranger in the context of identity. Conversely, there have been a few cohesive aspects between Lithuania and Central Europe, but Central Europe has been represented as unreliable in the terms of security. Compared to Northern or Central Europe, only the Baltic region has been understood in greater depth. However, the main questions about the core of the Baltic identity have not been still answered, but the common Baltic region has been seen as instrumental and useful for integration processes. This research shows the complexity of Lithuanian identity and the possible roots of nowadays' tendencies. Despite the fact that Lithuanian identity has been based on orientation towards Europe, there have been other dimensions found in public discussions between 1991 and 1994. Finally, Lithuanian identity has laid on the limited pro-European background with a few additional fragments. Finally, all subjects, such as different regions, have been understood as strange Others.

The article analyses how the reconstituted Republic of Lithuania constructed its identity in the context of foreign and security policy. The main purpose of this study is to find out how Lithuanian identity was constructed in 1991–1994 and what kind of tensions unfolded regarding the integration processes. The study relies on the premise that the internally formed identity of a country is the main aspect that provides insights into foreign and security policy, represents relations with other countries and describes self-positioning in international politics. Therefore, it is important to analyze how this identity was constructed. Post-structuralists argue that identity, which is the main concept of post-structuralistic analysis, is understood as discursive, political, social, and relational (the distinction between the Self and the Other). Therefore, the relation between identity and foreign and security policy is constitutive, this identity is not given and stable but varies and transforms according to foreign and security policies. The discourse analysis is used as a method and means to identify the socially constructed reality. By discourse we refer to spoken and written texts. Therefore, the basic material for research is 100 articles in which politicians, commentators, intellectuals, etc. have been analyzing the Lithuanian foreign and security policy from 1991 to 1994. The texts are taken from three Lithuanian newspapers: "Lietuvos rytas", "Lietuvos aidas", and "Atgimimas". The results are divided into two dimensions: Western dimension (addressing Europe in general and the European Union) and regional dimension (addressing Northern Europe, the Baltic region, and Central Europe). Several observations could be made. European representations have been dominant in the discourse. There have been a few different aspects with regard to this. Lithuania has been perceived as belonging to the same civilization as Europe, and Europe has been understood as the most important security guarantor. At the same time, however, Lithuania has also regarded Europe with distrust and felt inferior. Therefore, willingness to be integrated into Western security organizations, on the one hand, and fears and intention to primarily formulate national identity, on the other, have formed tensions between these two visions. Three regions have been understood merely as means to reach the strategic purposes and get integrated into Europe. Northern Europe has been generally perceived as a friendly, well-developed and reliable region. Therefore, this partnership could have contributed to guaranteeing Lithuania's security and integration. However, there has been no common historical or cultural background between Lithuania and Northern Europe. For this reason, Northern Europe has existed as a stranger in the context of identity. Conversely, there have been a few cohesive aspects between Lithuania and Central Europe, but Central Europe has been represented as unreliable in the terms of security. Compared to Northern or Central Europe, only the Baltic region has been understood in greater depth. However, the main questions about the core of the Baltic identity have not been still answered, but the common Baltic region has been seen as instrumental and useful for integration processes. This research shows the complexity of Lithuanian identity and the possible roots of nowadays' tendencies. Despite the fact that Lithuanian identity has been based on orientation towards Europe, there have been other dimensions found in public discussions between 1991 and 1994. Finally, Lithuanian identity has laid on the limited pro-European background with a few additional fragments. Finally, all subjects, such as different regions, have been understood as strange Others.

The article analyses how the reconstituted Republic of Lithuania constructed its identity in the context of foreign and security policy. The main purpose of this study is to find out how Lithuanian identity was constructed in 1991–1994 and what kind of tensions unfolded regarding the integration processes. The study relies on the premise that the internally formed identity of a country is the main aspect that provides insights into foreign and security policy, represents relations with other countries and describes self-positioning in international politics. Therefore, it is important to analyze how this identity was constructed. Post-structuralists argue that identity, which is the main concept of post-structuralistic analysis, is understood as discursive, political, social, and relational (the distinction between the Self and the Other). Therefore, the relation between identity and foreign and security policy is constitutive, this identity is not given and stable but varies and transforms according to foreign and security policies. The discourse analysis is used as a method and means to identify the socially constructed reality. By discourse we refer to spoken and written texts. Therefore, the basic material for research is 100 articles in which politicians, commentators, intellectuals, etc. have been analyzing the Lithuanian foreign and security policy from 1991 to 1994. The texts are taken from three Lithuanian newspapers: "Lietuvos rytas", "Lietuvos aidas", and "Atgimimas". The results are divided into two dimensions: Western dimension (addressing Europe in general and the European Union) and regional dimension (addressing Northern Europe, the Baltic region, and Central Europe). Several observations could be made. European representations have been dominant in the discourse. There have been a few different aspects with regard to this. Lithuania has been perceived as belonging to the same civilization as Europe, and Europe has been understood as the most important security guarantor. At the same time, however, Lithuania has also regarded Europe with distrust and felt inferior. Therefore, willingness to be integrated into Western security organizations, on the one hand, and fears and intention to primarily formulate national identity, on the other, have formed tensions between these two visions. Three regions have been understood merely as means to reach the strategic purposes and get integrated into Europe. Northern Europe has been generally perceived as a friendly, well-developed and reliable region. Therefore, this partnership could have contributed to guaranteeing Lithuania's security and integration. However, there has been no common historical or cultural background between Lithuania and Northern Europe. For this reason, Northern Europe has existed as a stranger in the context of identity. Conversely, there have been a few cohesive aspects between Lithuania and Central Europe, but Central Europe has been represented as unreliable in the terms of security. Compared to Northern or Central Europe, only the Baltic region has been understood in greater depth. However, the main questions about the core of the Baltic identity have not been still answered, but the common Baltic region has been seen as instrumental and useful for integration processes. This research shows the complexity of Lithuanian identity and the possible roots of nowadays' tendencies. Despite the fact that Lithuanian identity has been based on orientation towards Europe, there have been other dimensions found in public discussions between 1991 and 1994. Finally, Lithuanian identity has laid on the limited pro-European background with a few additional fragments. Finally, all subjects, such as different regions, have been understood as strange Others.

The article analyses how the reconstituted Republic of Lithuania constructed its identity in the context of foreign and security policy. The main purpose of this study is to find out how Lithuanian identity was constructed in 1991–1994 and what kind of tensions unfolded regarding the integration processes. The study relies on the premise that the internally formed identity of a country is the main aspect that provides insights into foreign and security policy, represents relations with other countries and describes self-positioning in international politics. Therefore, it is important to analyze how this identity was constructed. Post-structuralists argue that identity, which is the main concept of post-structuralistic analysis, is understood as discursive, political, social, and relational (the distinction between the Self and the Other). Therefore, the relation between identity and foreign and security policy is constitutive, this identity is not given and stable but varies and transforms according to foreign and security policies. The discourse analysis is used as a method and means to identify the socially constructed reality. By discourse we refer to spoken and written texts. Therefore, the basic material for research is 100 articles in which politicians, commentators, intellectuals, etc. have been analyzing the Lithuanian foreign and security policy from 1991 to 1994. The texts are taken from three Lithuanian newspapers: "Lietuvos rytas", "Lietuvos aidas", and "Atgimimas". The results are divided into two dimensions: Western dimension (addressing Europe in general and the European Union) and regional dimension (addressing Northern Europe, the Baltic region, and Central Europe). Several observations could be made. European representations have been dominant in the discourse. There have been a few different aspects with regard to this. Lithuania has been perceived as belonging to the same civilization as Europe, and Europe has been understood as the most important security guarantor. At the same time, however, Lithuania has also regarded Europe with distrust and felt inferior. Therefore, willingness to be integrated into Western security organizations, on the one hand, and fears and intention to primarily formulate national identity, on the other, have formed tensions between these two visions. Three regions have been understood merely as means to reach the strategic purposes and get integrated into Europe. Northern Europe has been generally perceived as a friendly, well-developed and reliable region. Therefore, this partnership could have contributed to guaranteeing Lithuania's security and integration. However, there has been no common historical or cultural background between Lithuania and Northern Europe. For this reason, Northern Europe has existed as a stranger in the context of identity. Conversely, there have been a few cohesive aspects between Lithuania and Central Europe, but Central Europe has been represented as unreliable in the terms of security. Compared to Northern or Central Europe, only the Baltic region has been understood in greater depth. However, the main questions about the core of the Baltic identity have not been still answered, but the common Baltic region has been seen as instrumental and useful for integration processes. This research shows the complexity of Lithuanian identity and the possible roots of nowadays' tendencies. Despite the fact that Lithuanian identity has been based on orientation towards Europe, there have been other dimensions found in public discussions between 1991 and 1994. Finally, Lithuanian identity has laid on the limited pro-European background with a few additional fragments. Finally, all subjects, such as different regions, have been understood as strange Others.

Although the Lisbon Treaty maintained the general exclusion of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) matters from ECJ jurisdiction, it introduced a number of changes into this area, including an explicit statement that the Court is competent to review the legality of the Council decisions imposing restraining measures on persons. The article analyzes the nature and origin of those changes and considers the legal implications for the level of the protection of fundamental rights in the European Union. For this purpose the author firstly considers the context of the exclusion of CFSP matters from the ECJ jurisdiction, including discussions on the issue at the European Convention, and, secondly, takes a closer look at the separate heads of jurisdiction over which the Court is competent to act after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. A conclusion is made that the Lisbon Treaty did not introduce significant changes to ECJ jurisdiction. Similarly to the pattern of previous amendment treaties, the Lisbon Treaty again gave recognition to the practice of the ECJ on relevant questions. Nonetheless, the amendments made by the Lisbon Treaty should be welcome for introducing more clarity into the legal regulation of the matter, thus boosting the legal certainty and protection of fundamental rights in the European Union.

Although the Lisbon Treaty maintained the general exclusion of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) matters from ECJ jurisdiction, it introduced a number of changes into this area, including an explicit statement that the Court is competent to review the legality of the Council decisions imposing restraining measures on persons. The article analyzes the nature and origin of those changes and considers the legal implications for the level of the protection of fundamental rights in the European Union. For this purpose the author firstly considers the context of the exclusion of CFSP matters from the ECJ jurisdiction, including discussions on the issue at the European Convention, and, secondly, takes a closer look at the separate heads of jurisdiction over which the Court is competent to act after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. A conclusion is made that the Lisbon Treaty did not introduce significant changes to ECJ jurisdiction. Similarly to the pattern of previous amendment treaties, the Lisbon Treaty again gave recognition to the practice of the ECJ on relevant questions. Nonetheless, the amendments made by the Lisbon Treaty should be welcome for introducing more clarity into the legal regulation of the matter, thus boosting the legal certainty and protection of fundamental rights in the European Union.

Incapability of the EU to act unanimously in the field of foreign and security policy and efficiently participate in resolution of international issues is very often justified by insufficient political will of the EU member states. Non-existence of the image of EU as international player raises issues concerned with capability of this organization to be a subject of international law, raises doubts as for its reliability as much as it concerns other players of international relations. Political will should be understood as a degree of determination of political leaders to seek for and put into practice a certain type of policy. However, when lack of political will is used to justify inaction, the reasons for that lie much deeper. The problem considered in this paper sounds as follows: although the EU member-states declare particular goals of foreign policy, however they do not take any measures to implement them while justifying themselves by lack of political will or determination. The purpose of this paper is to investigate what the argument of political will means in the context of EU foreign and security policy, what circumstances it is used at and what could be possible interpretations of it. It is asserted that the lack of political will in the EU foreign and security policy conceals the differences of member states' national interests that cause the lack of political will of entire EU as well as create a gap between the goals declared in the CFSP and actual decisions. Evolution of the CFSP and survey of existing situation as well as analysis of internal processes helps to perceive the way how foreign and security policy is formed in the second pillar, what role is attributed to appropriate institutions and who has a decisive vote while making final decisions. Neorealism theory of international relations was used as a background. In Part 2 of the paper there was analysed the concept of political will and its possible interpretations. While seeking to highlight how widely this term was used, here were submitted the quotations of the officials responsible for the EU foreign policy as well as political leaders of EU member states and academicians. Possible meanings of political will also were submitted and finally it was attempted to deconstruct the argument while singling out the most important factors. In Part 3, particular cases of unsuccessful policy of the EU in regard to third parties were analysed. The argument of political will is rather often heard while assessing and surveying the implementations of the EU goals in Africa, therefore for the investigation the samples of relationship between EU and Morocco and Zimbabwe were selected. Intergovernmental principle of CFSP operation, unanimous decision-making and reluctance of lodging more powers into hands of institutions reveals that member states are the main players in this field. Wide context of the usage of political will as a term and complexity of determination of this concept induces to treat this term as a screen to cover other reasons and incites searching what is concealed under it. The hypothesis raised at the beginning of the paper was confirmed. The samples considered obviously revealed discrepancies of the national interests of the EU member states. Different attitudes of the EU countries cause inactivity of entire European Union meanwhile the failures in foreign policy are named as the lack of political will.

Incapability of the EU to act unanimously in the field of foreign and security policy and efficiently participate in resolution of international issues is very often justified by insufficient political will of the EU member states. Non-existence of the image of EU as international player raises issues concerned with capability of this organization to be a subject of international law, raises doubts as for its reliability as much as it concerns other players of international relations. Political will should be understood as a degree of determination of political leaders to seek for and put into practice a certain type of policy. However, when lack of political will is used to justify inaction, the reasons for that lie much deeper. The problem considered in this paper sounds as follows: although the EU member-states declare particular goals of foreign policy, however they do not take any measures to implement them while justifying themselves by lack of political will or determination. The purpose of this paper is to investigate what the argument of political will means in the context of EU foreign and security policy, what circumstances it is used at and what could be possible interpretations of it. It is asserted that the lack of political will in the EU foreign and security policy conceals the differences of member states' national interests that cause the lack of political will of entire EU as well as create a gap between the goals declared in the CFSP and actual decisions. Evolution of the CFSP and survey of existing situation as well as analysis of internal processes helps to perceive the way how foreign and security policy is formed in the second pillar, what role is attributed to appropriate institutions and who has a decisive vote while making final decisions. Neorealism theory of international relations was used as a background. In Part 2 of the paper there was analysed the concept of political will and its possible interpretations. While seeking to highlight how widely this term was used, here were submitted the quotations of the officials responsible for the EU foreign policy as well as political leaders of EU member states and academicians. Possible meanings of political will also were submitted and finally it was attempted to deconstruct the argument while singling out the most important factors. In Part 3, particular cases of unsuccessful policy of the EU in regard to third parties were analysed. The argument of political will is rather often heard while assessing and surveying the implementations of the EU goals in Africa, therefore for the investigation the samples of relationship between EU and Morocco and Zimbabwe were selected. Intergovernmental principle of CFSP operation, unanimous decision-making and reluctance of lodging more powers into hands of institutions reveals that member states are the main players in this field. Wide context of the usage of political will as a term and complexity of determination of this concept induces to treat this term as a screen to cover other reasons and incites searching what is concealed under it. The hypothesis raised at the beginning of the paper was confirmed. The samples considered obviously revealed discrepancies of the national interests of the EU member states. Different attitudes of the EU countries cause inactivity of entire European Union meanwhile the failures in foreign policy are named as the lack of political will.

The aim of the thesis is to reveal the significance of energy policy and energy security of EU and Lithuania. The first chapter presents the concept of energy policy, energy security and threats to it. The second chapter discusses the influence of NATO and the EU on energy policies and energy securities of other countries. The third chapter discusses Lithuania's energy policy, the attitude of the country's political parties towards the increase in energy security, reasons for Visaginas Nuclear Power Plant project failure and the threat of the Astravets Nuclear Power Plant to country's security. The following conclusion can be drawn – at the moment one of the main EU goals indeed is to ensure energy safety and form a joint energy policy of State Members, while the relevance of energy security in Lithuania is in many cases determined by Russia's energy policy, therefore it can be stated that the defensive statements have been confirmed.

The aim of the thesis is to reveal the significance of energy policy and energy security of EU and Lithuania. The first chapter presents the concept of energy policy, energy security and threats to it. The second chapter discusses the influence of NATO and the EU on energy policies and energy securities of other countries. The third chapter discusses Lithuania's energy policy, the attitude of the country's political parties towards the increase in energy security, reasons for Visaginas Nuclear Power Plant project failure and the threat of the Astravets Nuclear Power Plant to country's security. The following conclusion can be drawn – at the moment one of the main EU goals indeed is to ensure energy safety and form a joint energy policy of State Members, while the relevance of energy security in Lithuania is in many cases determined by Russia's energy policy, therefore it can be stated that the defensive statements have been confirmed.

The aim of the thesis is to reveal the significance of energy policy and energy security of EU and Lithuania. The first chapter presents the concept of energy policy, energy security and threats to it. The second chapter discusses the influence of NATO and the EU on energy policies and energy securities of other countries. The third chapter discusses Lithuania's energy policy, the attitude of the country's political parties towards the increase in energy security, reasons for Visaginas Nuclear Power Plant project failure and the threat of the Astravets Nuclear Power Plant to country's security. The following conclusion can be drawn – at the moment one of the main EU goals indeed is to ensure energy safety and form a joint energy policy of State Members, while the relevance of energy security in Lithuania is in many cases determined by Russia's energy policy, therefore it can be stated that the defensive statements have been confirmed.

The aim of the thesis is to reveal the significance of energy policy and energy security of EU and Lithuania. The first chapter presents the concept of energy policy, energy security and threats to it. The second chapter discusses the influence of NATO and the EU on energy policies and energy securities of other countries. The third chapter discusses Lithuania's energy policy, the attitude of the country's political parties towards the increase in energy security, reasons for Visaginas Nuclear Power Plant project failure and the threat of the Astravets Nuclear Power Plant to country's security. The following conclusion can be drawn – at the moment one of the main EU goals indeed is to ensure energy safety and form a joint energy policy of State Members, while the relevance of energy security in Lithuania is in many cases determined by Russia's energy policy, therefore it can be stated that the defensive statements have been confirmed.

While looking through the lens of governmentality, the article analyses how the Lithuanian energy secu-rity policy and the energy security risks constructed by the political powers coincide with the energy secu-rity preferences and perception of risks in Lithuania society. The article first analyses the rationality of Lithuanian energy policy (by examining the con-formity of the energy security policy chosen by the Government with the public interest) and then turns its attention to the implementation and consequences of specific energy projects (examining public opin-ion). The analysis of public attitudes is based on 2013 and 2017 and the analysis of energy policy as the most important energy policy documents for 2012–2017. The study shows that the mismatch between public opinion and policy goals can undermine the implementation of energy security policy

While looking through the lens of governmentality, the article analyses how the Lithuanian energy secu-rity policy and the energy security risks constructed by the political powers coincide with the energy secu-rity preferences and perception of risks in Lithuania society. The article first analyses the rationality of Lithuanian energy policy (by examining the con-formity of the energy security policy chosen by the Government with the public interest) and then turns its attention to the implementation and consequences of specific energy projects (examining public opin-ion). The analysis of public attitudes is based on 2013 and 2017 and the analysis of energy policy as the most important energy policy documents for 2012–2017. The study shows that the mismatch between public opinion and policy goals can undermine the implementation of energy security policy

While looking through the lens of governmentality, the article analyses how the Lithuanian energy secu-rity policy and the energy security risks constructed by the political powers coincide with the energy secu-rity preferences and perception of risks in Lithuania society. The article first analyses the rationality of Lithuanian energy policy (by examining the con-formity of the energy security policy chosen by the Government with the public interest) and then turns its attention to the implementation and consequences of specific energy projects (examining public opin-ion). The analysis of public attitudes is based on 2013 and 2017 and the analysis of energy policy as the most important energy policy documents for 2012–2017. The study shows that the mismatch between public opinion and policy goals can undermine the implementation of energy security policy