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Das Konzept der preemptive self-defense wurde erstmals im Rahmen der National Security Strategy der Bush-Administration im Jahr 2002 postuliert. Nach diesem sind militärische Maßnahmen bei einer Bedrohung durch internationale Terrororganisationen oder einem sogenannten Schurkenstaat mit Massenvernichtungswaffen, selbst wenn noch Unsicherheiten hinsichtlich Ort und Zeit des anzunehmenden Angriffs bestehen, vom völkerrechtlichen Selbstverteidigungsrecht gedeckt. Im Rahmen der Debatte um den Irakkrieg im Jahr 2003 wurde das Konzept der preemptive self-defense fälschlicherweise als Rechtfertigungsgrundlage für die Invasion des Iraks diskutiert und weitgehend als mit dem Völkerrecht unvereinbar abgelehnt. Christian Richter weist in seiner Untersuchung nach, dass das Konzept der preemptive self-defense an sich durchaus mit dem Völkerrecht vereinbar ist. Dies geschieht anhand einer grundlegenden Prüfung des Art. 51 UN-Charta, des Völkergewohnheitsrechts und der Staatenpraxis. Vor dem Hintergrund des massiven Erstarkens des internationalen Terrorismus und der jüngsten Atomwaffentests Nordkoreas im September 2016 gewinnt das Konzept der preemptive self-defense wieder an Bedeutung. »Preemptive Self-Defense – The Compatibility of the Concept of Preemptive Self-Defense with Public International Law« For the first time the concept of preemptive self-defense was promulgated in the National Security Strategy 2002. According to this concept the use of force against so-called rogue states or international terror organizations is consistent with the law of self-defense when there are uncertainties concerning the place and time of the assumed attack, especially in the case of an actual threat involving weapons of mass destruction. Within the debate concerning the legality of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the concept of preemptive self-defense was mistakenly discussed as a justification, and widely assessed as incompatible with public international law. Given the growing intensity of international terror organizations in the Middle East, as well as the latest North Korean nuclear weapon tests in September 2016, the concept of preemptive self-defense is of increasing importance. By analyzing Article 51 UN-Charta, the customary international law, as well as state practice, Christian Richter demonstrates that the concept of preemptive self-defense is in fact compatible with public international law. Das Konzept der preemptive self-defense wurde erstmals in der National Security Strategy 2002 postuliert. Nach diesem sind militärische Maßnahmen bei einer Bedrohung durch internationale Terrororganisationen oder einem sogenannten Schurkenstaat mit Massenvernichtungswaffen, selbst wenn noch Unsicherheiten hinsichtlich Ort und Zeit des anzunehmenden Angriffs bestehen, vom völkerrechtlichen Selbstverteidigungsrecht gedeckt. Im Rahmen der Debatte um den Irakkrieg wurde das Konzept der preemptive self-defense fälschlicherweise als Rechtfertigungsgrundlage diskutiert und als mit dem Völkerrecht unvereinbar abgelehnt. Christian Richter weist in seiner Untersuchung des Art. 51 UN-Charta, des Völkergewohnheitsrechts und der Staatenpraxis nach, dass das Konzept der preemptive self-defense an sich mit dem Völkerrecht vereinbar ist. Studium der Rechtswissenschaften sowie der Rechts- und Staatsphilosophie in Passau. Referendariat in Frankfurt am Main und Hamburg. Auslandsaufenthalte in Orléans (Frankreich), Washington D.C. (USA) und Philadelphia (USA). Promotion an der Johannes Kepler Universität Linz. Rechtsanwalt in einer auf internationales Wirtschaftsrecht spezialisierten Kanzlei in Hamburg. Dozent für Völkerrecht, Staatsrecht und Rechtsphilosophie an der Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr in Hamburg.

Das Konzept der Preemptive self-defense wurde erstmals im Rahmen der National Security Strategy der Bush-Administration im Jahr 2002 postuliert. Nach diesem sind militärische Maßnahmen bei einer Bedrohung durch internationale Terrororganisationen oder einem sogenannten Schurkenstaat mit Massenvernichtungswaffen, selbst wenn noch Unsicherheiten hinsichtlich Ort und Zeit des anzunehmenden Angriffs bestehen, vom völkerrechtlichen Selbstverteidigungsrecht gedeckt. Im Rahmen der Debatte um den Irakkrieg im Jahr 2003 wurde das Konzept der Preemptive self-defense fälschlicherweise als Rechtfertigungsgrundlage für die Invasion des Iraks diskutiert und weitgehend als mit dem Völkerrecht unvereinbar abgelehnt. Christian Richter weist in seiner Untersuchung nach, dass das Konzept der Preemptive self-defense an sich durchaus mit dem Völkerrecht vereinbar ist. Dies geschieht anhand einer grundlegenden Prüfung des Art. 51 UN-Charta, des Völkergewohnheitsrechts und der Staatenpraxis. Vor dem Hintergrund des massiven Erstarkens des internationalen Terrorismus und der jüngsten Atomwaffentests Nordkoreas im September 2016 gewinnt das Konzept der Preemptive self-defense wieder an Bedeutung. / »Preemptive Self-Defense – The Compatibility of the Concept of Preemptive Self-Defense with Public International Law« -- For the first time the concept of preemptive self-defense was promulgated in the National Security Strategy 2002. According to this concept the use of force against so-called rogue states or international terror organizations is consistent with the law of self-defense when there are uncertainties concerning the place and time of the assumed attack, especially in the case of an actual threat involving weapons of mass destruction. -- Within the debate concerning the legality of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the concept of preemptive self-defense was mistakenly discussed as a justification, and widely assessed as incompatible with public international law. Given the growing intensity of international terror organizations in the Middle East, as well as the latest North Korean nuclear weapon tests in September 2016, the concept of preemptive self-defense is of increasing importance. By analyzing Article 51 UN-Charta, the customary international law, as well as state practice, Christian Richter demonstrates that the concept of preemptive self-defense is in fact compatible with public international law

Opens a symposium on Rodin's War and Self-Defense (New York: Oxford U Press, 2003) by posing the text's main question: How can the concept of self-defense provide justification for war? Arguing that there is no valid analogy between self-defense & national defense, a theory of self-defense is posited, maintaining that self-defense comprises normative relations between four elements: the subject of the right, the object against whom the right is held, the act that is the content of the right, the end of the self-defense. It is asserted that the best way to justify self-defense is via an account of the interaction of rights in situations of violent conflict. This understanding is extended to a notion of national defense able to justify war, raising the issue of the two levels of war, whereby war can be described as a relation among persons & a relation among nations or states. A reductive & an analogical strategy for potentially vindicating a right of national defense are then considered & found wanting. It is contended that possessing a right of defense against an aggressor state does not include possessing a right to kill soldiers of that state unless they are normatively responsible for some action that alienated their rights. This is so unless, at the very least, the traditional just war claim that soldiers are exempt from moral responsibility for taking part in an unjust war is forsaken. A call is made for an international ethics able to discern the relationship between the rights & values of states & those of individuals & to resolve any conflicts. J. Zendejas

When the Bush and Blair administrations justified the 2003 war on Iraq as an act of preemptive self-defense, this was greeted in many quarters with understandable skepticism. How can the right of self-defense be legitimately invoked when no prior aggressive attack has occurred and there is no evidence that one is imminent? This question, much debated in the months leading up to the war, invites us to reflect critically on the content of the right of self-defense. Yet there is a deeper question to be asked about the idea of a war of self-defense; namely, how is it that war can be considered an act of self-defense at all? How exactly is it that the concept of self-defense can provide a justification for war? It is this question that I ask in War and Self-Defense and the answer I arrive at is a surprising one.

First imagine a case in which a person uses violence in self-defense; then imagine a case in which two people engage in self-defense against a threat they jointly face. Continue to imagine further cases in which increasing numbers of people act with increasing coordination to defend both themselves and each other against a common threat, or a range of threats they face together. What you are imagining is a spectrum of cases that begins with acts of individual self-defense and, as the threats become more complex and extensive, the threatened individuals more numerous, and their defensive action more integrated, eventually reaches cases involving a scale of violence that is constitutive of war. But if war, at least in some instances, lies on a continuum with individual self- and other-defense, and if acts of individual self- and other-defense can sometimes be morally justified, then war can in principle be morally justified as well. It follows that the only coherent forms of pacifism are those that reject the permissibility of individual self- or other-defense—for example, those based on an absolute prohibition of violence or killing.

Part of a symposium on David Rodin's War and Self-Defense (New York: Oxford U Press, 2003) challenges five of his objections to the reductive strategy of defending the permissibility of war by appealing to rights of self-defense. Contrary to the idea that if reductive strategy were correct than it would be unnecessary or disproportionate to kill, it is contended that the reductive strategy can in principle justify war in response to lesser aggression. It is argued that killing need not be a disproportionate response to a lesser aggression & the requirement of retreat does not apply when capitulation would involve losses preventable by lethal & proportionate resistance. In acknowledging that the moral basis for killing in war is distinct from the moral basis for individual self-defense, it is demonstrated that the reductive strategy is incompatible with traditional just war theory; however, it is argued that it is just war theory that is false. Rodin's assertion that national defense is in irreconcilable tension with humanitarian intervention is rejected, arguing that the reductive strategy sees no right of self-defense for a state persecuting its citizens, therefore its sovereignty is forfeit. Once it desists from persecuting its citizens, any continued intervention becomes unjustified aggression that then can be defended against. J. Zendejas

While an abundance of literature covers the right of states to defend themselves against external aggression, this work is dedicated to the right to personal self-defense in international law. Drawing on his extensive experience as a human rights practitioner and scholar, Dr Hessbruegge sets out, in careful detail, the strict requirements that human rights impose on defensive force by law enforcement authorities, especially police killings in self-defense. The text also discusses the exceptional application of the right to personal self-defense in military-led operations, notably to contain violent civilians who do not directly participate in hostilities

While an abundance of literature covers the right of states to defend themselves against external aggression, this work is dedicated to the right to personal self-defense in international law. Drawing on his extensive experience as a human rights practitioner and scholar, Dr Hessbruegge sets out, in careful detail, the strict requirements that human rights impose on defensive force by law enforcement authorities, especially police killings in self-defense. The text also discusses the exceptional application of the right to personal self-defense in military-led operations, notably to contain violent civilians who do not directly participate in hostilities

Introduction -- The right to personal self-defense as a general principle of law -- A human right to self-defense? -- Defensive force by law enforcement agents -- Personal self-defense in military-led operations -- Human rights standards for self-defense between private persons -- Self-defense against the state - resistance against human rights violations -- The right to personal self-defense in a rechtsstaat - final reflections