Food, water, and shelter, as fundamental components of human existence are no less critical in an aviation unit than the number of enemies shot down, as a combat force can be made or broken over necessities. During World War II, Russian pilots returned to bases where food and housing were not to be taken for granted, and free time was dictated by forces largely outside their control. The overall living conditions of Russian pilots during the war were varied, unpredictable, and improvised. ; Winner of the 2020 Friends of the Kreitzberg Library Award for Outstanding Research in the Junior Arts/Humanities category. ; Borscht, Barracks, and Bears: How Russian Pilots Lived in WWII Sarah Clark HI 355: WW2 Colloquium Phase 3 Word Count: 3,307 December 6, 2019 Clark-Borscht, Barracks, and Bears-page 1 Introduction What were the living conditions of Russian pilots in WWII? Food, water, and shelter, as fundamental components of human existence are no less critical in an aviation unit than the number of enemies shot down, as a combat force can be made or broken over necessities. During World War II, Russian pilots returned to bases where food and housing were not to be taken for granted, and free time was dictated by forces largely outside their control. The overall living conditions of Russian pilots during the war were varied, unpredictable, and improvised. When the war began, pilots unused to wartime conditions had to adapt quickly to their new conditions. One pilot recalled: the sun was baking hot on the street. I walked slowly towards the airfield and came up to the dispersal area. It was like a disturbed anthill. They were repairing the old shelters. Here and there they were digging new ones. They assigned the headquarters dug-out for the use of the staff. Fyodorov and Godunov decided to use an enormous plywood container in which, at one time, an aircraft had arrived from the factory in parts…We had supper –field rations, as if we were at the front—and spent the night in the dug-out. Tired after the day's work and even more so after the previous sleepless night, everyone soon dropped off. Of course, after comfortable quarters, snow-white sheets and a soft bed, it is not cosy to sleep on a plank bed; but aircrew get used to anything.1 Food Sources Throughout the war, sources of food varied, but the three most common were rations, villagers, and American Lend-Lease food. Rations were the primary source of food for Russian pilots. The military had its own rationing system, separate from and prioritized above the civilian system.2 At first, most foods were produced and distributed by state associated farms and collectives. Throughout the war, more and more initiative was given to peasants to make food production a private enterprise to increase production and reduce the burden on state-owned 1 Kaberov, Swastika in the Gunsight, 5. 2 Ganson, "Food Supply," 78. Clark-Borscht, Barracks, and Bears-page 2 sources.3 Typical rations for the Russian armed forces consisted of a simple breakfast of porridge known as kasha, a type of soup called borscht for lunch, and bread with pickles or cucumbers for dinner, and for aviators 100 grams of vodka after combat missions.4 In general, variety and items such as meat, fat, and fresh fruits and vegetables were hard to come by. Throughout the war, Russians both were allocated and received fewer daily calories than the soldiers of several other countries. In early 1941, Russian infantrymen were allocated 2,954 calories a day, which was increased to 3,450 in September.5 Members of active flying units were supposed to receive 4,712.6 Compared to other Allied nations, this basic allowance was low. For instance, the United States allocated 4,748 calories for front-line soldiers, and Britain allocated 5,300 for soldiers fighting in cold weather.7 Despite official instructions, it was common for Russians to receive less than their daily allotted calories, placing them even farther below their Allied comrades. Pilots overcame the lack of food and added variety by trading with nearby villagers if based near or in a village. There are multiple accounts of pilots and technicians going into towns to exchange unused items such as underwear or more common items such as "tobacco, cigarettes, bread, and sugar for milk, sour cream, eggs, and butter and sometimes meat."8 Exchanges could be a one-time or reoccurring transaction. For instance, while in Romania, one squadron member paid a Romanian for a daily supply of ten eggs.9 However, making deals with the locals was not always favored by senior officers, as squadron members were arrested and 3 Moskoff, "The First Priority," 126; Ganson, "Food Supply," 75-76. 4 Collingham, "Fighting on Empty," 319. 5 Collingham, "Fighting on Empty." 319. 6 Moskoff, "The First Priority," 127. 7 Collingham, "Out of Depression," 434; Collingham, "Fighting on Empty," 319. 8 Noggle, A Dance with Death, 145, 186. 9 Mariinskiy, Airacobra, 142. Clark-Borscht, Barracks, and Bears-page 3 imprisoned in some units.10 Yet, the prevalence of such transactions illustrates the desperation for sufficient and adequate food. Pilots not only traded with villagers and peasants, but they also took advantage of their surroundings. They scavenged through the remains of old villages, especially on the way towards Berlin in 1944 and 1945.11 One of the most common items searched for was alcohol. For instance, one fighter pilot, heading towards Berlin, recalled that "in the deserted workshops of the sugar mill the omnipresent procurement officers…found tanks of spirits."12 In other locations, where natural resources such as rivers were more abundant, pilots occasionally resorted to fishing to provide fresh meat in desperate times, when the food supplied in the mess hall was either meager or nonexistent.13 Another way variety was increased was through the introduction of American Lend- Lease items, especially in 1943 and after. For instance, dairy items from America like dried eggs and milk powder, hard to come by in Russia, supplemented protein and fat intake, and packaged meats such as Spam were a welcome respite from dried fish.14 To show this one pilot reported that "American food, it was a feast—canned meat, dried eggs, canned milk."15 While American food was only a tiny sliver of what the air forces ate during the war, it certainly provided a respite from the standard fare. 10 Noggle, A Dance with Death, 145. 11 I Remember, "Airmen: Ivan Konovalov," https://iremember.ru/en/memoirs/airmen/ivan-konovalov/ [accessed 14 October 2019]. 12 Kramarenko, Combat over the Eastern Front, 77-78. 13 Timofeyeva-Yegorova, Red Sky Black Death, 114. 14 Collingham, "Fighting on Empty," 340; I Remember, "Airmen: Kolyadin Victor Ivanovich," https://iremember.ru/en/memoirs/airmen/ kolyadin-victor-ivanovich/ [accessed 14 October 2019]. 15 Pennington, Wings, Women, and War, 119. Clark-Borscht, Barracks, and Bears-page 4 Factors that Affected Food Squadron location, when correlated with timeframe, was one of the most significant factors affecting food availability and type, including geographic location, distance relative to frontlines, and proximity to inhabited villages. Geographic location was significant because Russia is a massive country, and front lines stretched for hundreds of miles. Food supplies were inadequate to begin with, and the distribution system was incomplete and inefficient. These issues were only compounded by the rapidly advancing German forces during Operation Barbarossa.16 Not every unit received equal amounts of food, and food reserves were not in place, especially at the beginning, resulting in troops at the front and rear being shorted.17 To show the variation, one fighter pilot, who spent some time near the front lines at Smolensk, wrote "I'm still amazed that—whether advancing or retreating—we were always well supplied with food."18 Conversely, other pilots reported periodic food shortages lasting several days near front lines.19 Therefore food availability varied greatly from one unit to the next. Distance from the front impacted food supply because it affected the ability of food to reach airfields. At the beginning of the war, food shortages were common in contested areas, such as the North Caucasus and Ukraine.20 Plus, reserves were either too far away or not built up enough to sustain prolonged shortages.21 During German advances supplies were not always able to be delivered, causing aircrews to survive on what meager items they had stockpiled.22 Other 16 Moskoff, "The First Priority," 113. 17 Moskoff, "The First Priority," 115. 18 Drabkin, Barbarossa, 85. 19 Noggle, A Dance with Death, 186. 20 Pennington, Wings, Women, and War, 79. 21 Moskoff, "The First Priority," 115. 22 Noggle, A Dance with Death, 186; Pennington, Wings, Women, and War, 79. Clark-Borscht, Barracks, and Bears-page 5 times, aircrews were forced to pick up supplies with their aircraft because the ground vehicles were unable to reach their airfields.23 The type of action an air unit was supporting, such as a retreat or an advance, also affected their food supply. When a regiment formally moved to a new airfield in preparation for an operation, and if time allowed, the airfield would be prepped by a service battalion consisting of combat support and maintenance personnel, who stocked up supplies and prepared the housing and airfield facilities for the arrival of the unit.24 Thorough preparation resulted in efficiency and ease of movement. However, when movement to a new airfield was either hastily planned or unplanned as a result of an unexpected retreat, there was no preparation, resulting in the opposite effect: no supplies. For instance, while retreating in 1942, one pilot wrote that upon reaching the assigned base they "found nothing there—no staff, no mess hall, no fuel" because the ground support had been unable to reach the base in time to prepare it.25 However, the unit in that scenario ended up being fed by a woman from a local village, illustrating the last essential component of location: proximity to an inhabited area.26 Airfields were frequently built near villages. Consequently, instead of official housing, pilots would be billeted with the town residents. Occasionally villagers had items unavailable to military members, such as fresh vegetables from their gardens or dairy products, such as milk. 27 One last factor to consider in analyzing food supply is unit type: bombers versus fighters. Food for both types of units was dreary and monotonous with occasional highlights of canned 23 Noggle, A Dance with Death, 67. 24 Bessette, "Soviet Military Transportation Aviation," 196. 25 Timofeyeva-Yegorova, Red Sky Black Death, 108. 26 Timofeyeva-Yegorova, Red Sky Black Death, 108. 27 Timofeyeva-Yegorova, Red Sky Black Death, 85, 176. Clark-Borscht, Barracks, and Bears-page 6 American food, items gained from the locals, or the rationed chocolate and Coca-Cola.28 For instance, in 1942, one bomber pilot reported eating brown bread, a lot of cereal, and in the fall-potatoes, while another bomber pilot reported eating a breakfast of gruel, bread, butter, and tea the following year.29 Fighter pilots reported similar types of food including soup, tea, and bread.30 Overall, food was more affected by location, type of action, and timeframe than type of unit because units across all aircraft types experienced times of relative abundance and shortage, based on locational and situational factors. Housing Housing was also based on location and situation. The spectrum ranged from sleeping in and under aircraft using tarps and covers as blankets to large houses in nearby villages, and later even villas. Pilots were usually billeted separately from the enlisted technicians. Commonly, the technicians were kept closer to the aircraft in dugouts, huts, or trenches, so that they were quickly accessible and ready for action, while it was more common for pilots to live outside the airfield. However, there were times when pilots and technicians lived together, such as one tail gunner who lived in the same local home as her pilot.31 Housing Situations One of the main differences in airfield accommodations was the age of the airfield. New airfields were usually less developed because they were formed during war when a base was needed during a rapid advance or unplanned retreat. Hasty quarters usually consisted of dugouts built into the ground, sometimes made by female workers from nearby cities, such as 28 I Remember, "Airmen: Kolyadin Victor Ivanovich," https://iremember.ru/en/memoirs/airmen/ kolyadin-victor-ivanovich/ [accessed 14 October 2019]. 29 I Remember. "Airmen: Kolyadin Victor Ivanovich," https://iremember.ru/en/memoirs/airmen/ kolyadin-victor-ivanovich/ [accessed 14 October 2019]; I Remember, "Airmen: Ivan Konovalov," https://iremember.ru /en/memoirs/airmen/ivankonovalov/ [accessed 14 October 2019]. 30 Kramarenko, Combat over the Eastern Front, 78. 31 Timofeyeva-Yegorova, Red Sky Black Death, 176. Clark-Borscht, Barracks, and Bears-page 7 Leningrad.32 Pilots also lived in trenches or around the aircraft until more permanent quarters could be made.33 Again, there were exceptions. New airfields were better prepared when movements were planned well in advance, and airfield service battalions were available to go to the airfield first and prepare it for the unit, which included billeting arrangements.34 Conversely, older airfields, many of which had been training schools or air bases before the war, already had a developed infrastructure. They had permanent quarters or at least buildings that could be readily turned into barracks. For instance, one pilot recalled living in an old school building on an airfield that had been a training school two years before the war.35 Even in 1944, when the Russians refitted three Ukrainian air bases for the Americans, they refitted an artillery barracks and school buildings for the Americans to live in.36 Also, as the Russians moved east in 1944 and 1945 they utilized barracks on former German airfields. If housing was not available on the airfield, pilots were billeted in the homes of villagers or other available buildings, within several miles of the airfield. Even within the homes there was a lot of variation. Usually the home's residents still lived there, and one of two scenarios occurred: either a couple or as many as possible pilots would be billeted there. For example, one pilot recalls that "the overcrowding was horrendous, but room was found for me. In a crooked hut…having delicately pushed the hostess to the oven in her kitchen."37 Houses could become crowded and uncomfortable when pilots, other officers, and non-maintenance personnel, were forced to live together. Alternatively, other pilots were billeted alone and given a lot of space and 32 Kaberov, Swastika in the Gunsight, 91. 33 Timofeyeva-Yegorova, Red Sky Black Death, 106. 34 Bessette, "Soviet Military Transportation Aviation," 196. 35 Reshetnikov, Bomber Pilot on the Eastern Front, 33. 36 Plokhy, Forgotten Bastards, 35. 37 Reshetnikov, Bomber Pilot on the Eastern Front, 138. Clark-Borscht, Barracks, and Bears-page 8 relatively nice accommodations. Also, nearby villages were occasionally abandoned, resulting in pilots living in vacant homes.38 Overall, village billeting was varied. Uncontrollable Factors Another variable that should not be overlooked is the effect of the war on housing options. Barracks and dugouts were not immune to German air raids. When permanent buildings or dugouts were destroyed, pilots slept in hastily rebuilt dugouts or under the aircraft. Combat readiness also dictated how close aircrews slept to their aircraft because if a raid was expected, pilots needed to be ready to defend their airfield at a moment's notice.39 Bombings, when the signal of a German advance, also contributed to units moving from new bases and having to find new quarters altogether. Other times, the housing at a new base was inhabitable. For instance, one mechanic wrote that "all of the habitable dwellings nearby were mined by the Germans, so we had to live under the wings of our aircraft."40 Therefore, stable and safe housing was not to be taken for granted in combat conditions. Weather also played devil's advocate with housing. Mud, rain, and snow are all part of life in Russia and had devastating effects on airfield usage and quality of life inside aircrew quarters. During the rainy season, dugouts were flooded with inches to feet of water, either forcing pilots to pump the water out in colder seasons or live under the aircraft in warmer weather.41 Snow, on the other hand, made its way into primitive buildings in the form of ice. Escaping the cold was impossible. Changes in weather patterns and the beginning of colder seasons also resulted in insect and animal infestations, such as fleas, rats, and mosquitos. One rat 38 Kramarenko, Combat over the Eastern Front, 26. 39 Tomofeyeva-Yegorova, Black Sky Red Death, 106. 40 Noggle, A Dance with Death, 151. 41 Noggle, A Dance with Death, 110, 173. Clark-Borscht, Barracks, and Bears-page 9 infestation was so bad a pilot remarked that "they were routinely crushed under people's feet."42 Overall, weather was just one more variable that made housing unpredictable. Commodities Not only was housing itself varied and often improvised, but commodities nowadays taken for granted were as well. Most of what the pilots had for furniture, light, and linens were makeshift. Oil drums and shell casings were used as crude lamps and stoves. Any available material was burned in those stoves, including used bomb fuse-boxes.43 Beds, tables, and any other furniture were typically cobbled together from planks, wood scraps, straw, and aircraft covers. Pillows were stuffed with everything from weeds to straw. Again, there were exceptions, especially later in the war, when air units took over German airfields or lived in residences currently or previously owned by the wealthy. For example, one pilot wrote that his unit was "billeted for a rest in some factory-owner's villa…on soft feather beds," and remarked that "the conqueror's position has its advantages."44 Overall though, pilots did not live in luxury. They made what they needed from what was available. Personal Free Time The small amount of free time in between tasking, or during rough weather, helped the pilots let loose and mentally cope with being in combat. On a personal level, people kept busy with what was available. Those who had books read them and then shared them, which led to book discussions.45 Games requiring little space, such as dominos, chess, and cards were played; although, some commands forbade cardplaying, calling it bourgeois.46 People who were musically gifted and carried their instrument, such as a guitar or accordion, around would play 42 Pennington, Wings, Women, and War, 116. 43 Noggle, A Dance with Death, 124. 44 Kramarenko, Combat over the Eastern Front, 73. 45 Reshetnikov, Bomber Pilot on the Eastern Front, 138. 46 Drabkin, Barbarossa, 42. Clark-Borscht, Barracks, and Bears-page 10 for their fellow airmen. Some of the women would knit, embroider, or sew new pairs of silk underwear. And everyone looked forward to letters from home, especially when the Germans occupied territory where their loved ones lived. For instance, one pilot wrote that when she received the first letter from her mother, five months into the war, she "felt such relief! All these months I had worried about my family, whether they were suffering somewhere under German occupation."47 Pilots were desperate for news about the wellbeing and whereabouts of relatives and friends. Unit Free Time Beyond the personal level, units organized events amongst themselves. Some had a newsletter that members would write in and distribute amongst the unit.48 Usually those had a political overtone. Nevertheless, they were an opportunity for people to use skills other than flying, such as creative writing, journalism, and drawing. Activities such as talent shows and performances were also organized, including events such as formal readings, performance of plays or sketches, and solo acts. For example, one squadron had the only Gypsy to fly for Russia in the war, who performed dances of his culture, until he died in combat.49 Parties and dances were also held, especially in some of the female units, to celebrate successful missions with dancing and singing.50 Celebrations were an outlet for the emotion created by the stresses of combat and unpredictable living conditions. Occasionally if located near a larger city, such as Leningrad, and if tasking allowed, pilots were able to partake in urban activities, such as movies, concerts, and dance classes. At times, events were formally organized by unit commanders to increase morale and let their 47 Timofeyeva-Yegorova, Red Sky Black Death, 81. 48 Kaberov, Swastika in the Gunsight, 6. 49 Kramarenko, Combat over the Eastern Front, 61. 50 Noggle, A Dance with Death, 71 . Clark-Borscht, Barracks, and Bears-page 11 personnel get away from the humdrum of front-line duties, while other times, attending a movie or performance was not command mandated. For instance, one corps commander gave circus tickets to his officers and ordered them to go on a night when no flights were scheduled.51 While in a different squadron a group of pilots was invited to a musical premiere in Leningrad while the city was being barraged by the Germans.52 Not only did pilots seek out entertainment, but entertainment sought them out, in the form of traveling performers, artists, and mobile theaters that traveled throughout the eastern front, providing performances for units unable to go to a city or populated area. Relationships Beyond mere activities, relationships were another way to pass the time. Wedding ceremonies were a change from the more frequent funeral ceremonies. Pilots married either pilots from other commands or members of various service battalions. To illustrate the difference between a funeral and wedding, an airman wrote, "the regiment personnel celebrated a festive and memorable event. And it had nothing to do with war, blood, or death. It was quite the opposite of a funeral."53 Joyous occasions were a welcome relief from the cruel ways of combat. Relationships were unavoidable in squadrons where technicians and combat support staff were frequently female. Even in units with only female pilots, relationships were not uncommon with male members of the same or other units. There was one female pilot, for example, whose former commanding officer proposed after the war ended.54 Relationships were crucial in motivating pilots to return from every flight and survive the war, while also serving to satisfy the soft side of human existence. 51 Reshetnikov, Bomber Pilot on the Eastern Front, 157. 52 Kaberov, Swastika in the Gunsight, 178. 53 Antipov & Utkin, Dragons on Bird Wings, 75. 54 Timofeyeva-Yegorova, Red Sky Black Death, 201. Clark-Borscht, Barracks, and Bears-page 12 However, humans were not the only ones to fulfill this need for affection, as pets were not forbidden. Often, stray dogs or cats were picked up when a unit passed by an abandoned area. They were either adopted by a whole unit or individuals, as was the case with the Gypsy and his dog, Jack.55 However, there were other scenarios, where a pet would be left behind by higher-ups who briefly visited the unit. For example, Alexander Novikov, then Air Force supreme commander, left behind a bear cub he had been given. At the squadron, the small cub ate and slept with the men, which became difficult as she grew. In the end, she was killed by outsiders, and the air unit refused to eat her.56 While an unusual scenario, it still shows the connections unit members made with animals that ended up in their possession. Focusing on caring for a pet was a needed distraction. Conclusion During World War II, the men and women in the Russian air forces lived an unpredictable life, dictated by the whims of combat. Food would be available one day and not the next. Moving from base to base increased unpredictability, as not all locations were supplied equally, especially when close to combat or advancing German forces. Air force units stretched from Leningrad to Ukraine, which strained the initially inadequate supply system. Time was not always available for building new housing, resulting in external billeting and quickly-built dugouts. Improvisation was the name of the game, as the pilots had to make do with the food, materials, and housing they could scavenge or trade for. Pilots with imagination and creativity were able to create a home away from home that at least met the bare minimum of their needs, despite limited free time to decompress and get away from combat stressors. 55 Kramarenko, Combat over the Eastern Front, 61. 56 Kramarenko, Combat over the Eastern Front, 69. Clark-Borscht, Barracks, and Bears-page 13 Research Question: What were the living conditions of Russian pilots in WWII?Outline 1. Introduction 1.1. Research question 1.2. Idea of the variability, range of living conditions 2. Living Conditions 2.1. Food 2.1.1. Food sources 2.1.1.1. Rations 2.1.1.1.1. Calorie comparison 2.1.1.2. Local sources 2.1.1.3. American food 2.1.2. Factors affecting food 2.1.2.1. Location 2.1.2.1.1. Timeframe 2.1.2.1.2. Movement type 2.1.2.1.3. Billeting 2.1.2.2. Unit type 2.2. Housing 2.2.1. Introduction 2.2.2. Housing Situations 2.2.2.1. New Airfields 2.2.2.2. Old Airfields 2.2.2.3. Living in Villages 2.2.3. Uncontrollable Factors 2.2.3.1. Combat Conditions 2.2.3.2. Weather 2.2.4. Commodities 2.3. Free Time 2.3.1. Personal Level 2.3.1.1. Hobbies: sewing, knitting, poetry, music 2.3.1.2. Letters from home 2.3.2. Unit Level Activities 2.3.2.1. Newspapers, performances 2.3.2.2. Nearby towns 2.3.2.2.1. Leader/command initiated 2.3.3. Relationships 2.3.3.1. People 2.3.3.2. Pets 3. Conclusion Clark-Borscht, Barracks, and Bears-page 14 Bibliography Primary Sources Drabkin, Artem. Barbarossa and the Retreat to Moscow: Recollections of Fighter Pilots on the Eastern Front. South Yorkshire: Pen & Sword Books LTD, 2007. I Remember. "Airmen: Kolyadin Victor Ivanovich." https://iremember.ru/en/memoirs/airmen/ kolyadin-victor-ivanovich/ [accessed 14 October 2019]. I Remember. "Airmen: Ivan Konovalov." https://iremember.ru/en/memoirs/airmen/ivan-konovalov/ [accessed 14 October 2019]. Kaberov, Igor. Swastika in the Gunsight: Memoirs of a Russian Fighter Pilot 1941-1945. Stroud: Sutton Publishing, 1999. Kramarenko, Sergei. The Red Air Force at War: Air Combat over the Eastern Front and Korea: A Soviet Fighter Pilot Remembers. Barnsley, England: Pen & Sword Military, 2008. Mariinskiy, Evgeniy. Red Star Airacobra: Memoirs of a Soviet Fighter Ace, 1941-45. Solihull: Helion & Company, 2006. Noggle, Anne. A Dance with Death: Soviet Airwomen in World War II. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1994. Reshetnikov, Vasiliy. Bomber Pilot on the Eastern Front: 307 Missions Behind Enemy Lines. South Yorkshire: Pen & Sword Books LTD, 2008. Timofeyeva-Yegorova, A. Red Sky, Black Death: A Soviet Woman Pilot's Memoir of the Eastern Front. Bloomington: Slavica Publishers, 2009. Scholarly Books Pennington, Reina. Wings, Women, and War: Soviet Airwomen in World War II Combat. Modern War Studies. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2001. Plokhy, Serhii. Forgotten Bastards of the Eastern Front: American Airmen Behind the Soviet Lines and the Collapse of the Grand Alliance. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2019. Clark-Borscht, Barracks, and Bears-page 15 Scholarly Articles Bessette, John. "Soviet Military Transport Aviation" in The Soviet Air Forces edited by Paul Murphy, 188-211. Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 1984. Collingham, Lizzie. "The Soviet Union—Fighting on Empty" in The Taste of War, 317-346. New York: Penguin Press, 2012. Collingham, Lizzie. "The United States—Out of Depression and into Abundance" in The Taste of War, 415-466. New York: Penguin Press, 2012. Ganson, Nicholas. "Food Supply, Rationing, and Living Standards" in The Soviet Union at War, 1941-1945 edited by David Stone, 69-92. South Yorkshire: Pen & Sword Books Ltd, 2010. Moskoff, William. "The First Priority: Feeding the Armed Forces" in The Bread of Affliction: The Food Supply in the USSR During World War II, 113-134. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Additional Sources Antipov, Vladislav, and Igor Utkin. Dragons on Bird Wings: The Combat History of the 812th Fighter Regiment. Translated by James F. Gebhardt. 1st English ed. Kitchener, ON: Aviaeology, 2006.
El trabajo de investigación, se divide en tres grandes bloques. El primero lo hemos denominado, El Derecho a la Felicidad como Derecho Constitucional. El segundo lleva por título Los límites del Producto Interior Bruto. Por último, el tercero de los mismos es el relativo a Los Índices de Felicidad. En cuanto a los principales objetivos y temas de esta investigación, de igual manera podemos agruparlos también en tres, y se corresponden con cada una de las partes en los que hemos dividido este trabajo. En primer lugar, conocer si existe o ha existido a lo largo de la historia, lo que podríamos denominar como un derecho a la felicidad, y si ese derecho ha sido reconocido en los textos constitucionales de las distintas naciones. En segundo lugar, comprobar si el Producto Interior Bruto, que se ha convertido desde su creación en el principal indicador del nivel de desarrollo y de bienestar material de un país, tiene sus limitaciones y carencias, y si por tanto, es el más adecuado para medir el progreso y el bienestar de nuestras sociedades. Asimismo, conocer si diversas organizaciones internacionales y/o alguna comisión, se han pronunciado al respecto mediante resoluciones o recomendaciones, para seguidamente estudiarlas. En tercer y último lugar, comprobar si, en correspondencia con el objetivo anterior, son necesarios nuevos índices e indicadores complementarios al Producto Interior Bruto y si se han creado lo que denominaremos como "índices de felicidad" desde una perspectiva internacional, especialmente por las organizaciones internacionales más relevantes, para seguidamente analizar los mismos, junto al índice de la Felicidad Nacional Bruta de Bután, pionero a nivel nacional. Hemos empleado como principal metodología a seguir, tanto el análisis de contenido de dichos textos constitucionales, como el de las citadas recomendaciones y resoluciones de diferentes organizaciones internacionales; así como el análisis comparativo de los resultados que se han obtenido de los índices de felicidad analizados. Todo ello ha supuesto, teniendo en cuenta la complejidad del fenómeno a investigar, junto a los objetivos de la investigación, la puesta en práctica de una metodología cualitativa, mediante un amplio desarrollo normativo, y con un análisis teórico, documental y bibliográfico, realizado fundamentalmente tanto en la primera como en la segunda parte de este trabajo; junto a un tratamiento descriptivo y comparativo de los resultados obtenidos en los distintos índices de felicidad analizados, el cual se desarrolla principalmente en la tercera parte de la investigación. En la primera parte, El Derecho a la Felicidad como Derecho Constitucional, repasamos las Constituciones, además de determinadas Declaraciones, que a lo largo de la historia han reconocido ese derecho a la felicidad, o al menos el derecho a su búsqueda, en sus propios textos. En la segunda parte, Los límites del Producto Interior Bruto, comprobamos como existe una corriente a nivel internacional, con voces de gran peso, que critican la utilización del Producto Interior Bruto como única medida del progreso y desarrollo de los países, como así lo refleja la relevante Comisión para la Medición del Desempeño Económico y el Progreso Social; el Proyecto Global para la Medición del Progreso de las Sociedades, de la Organización para la Cooperación y el Desarrollo Económicos (OCDE); la Resolución de 2011 del Parlamento Europeo que lleva por título Más allá del PIB - Evaluación del progreso en un mundo cambiante; y la Resolución 65/309 de la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas del mismo año, denominada La felicidad: hacia un enfoque holístico del desarrollo; las cuales no hacen otra cosa que incidir en la necesidad de implantar nuevos índices e indicadores que complementen al Producto Interior Bruto como medida del desarrollo y bienestar de las naciones, y en los que la felicidad debe tener un papel cada vez más transcendente. Por último, en la tercera parte, analizamos los tres índices de felicidad a nivel internacional que consideramos más relevantes en la actualidad. Se trata del Índice de Desarrollo Humano del Programa de Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo (PNUD), el World Happiness Report de la Sustainable Development Solutions Network de Naciones Unidas (SDSN) y el Better Life Index de la Organización para la Cooperación y el Desarrollo Económicos (OCDE). Asimismo, procedemos a analizar un índice de felicidad a nivel nacional, la Felicidad Nacional Bruta de Bután. Respecto a las principales conclusiones alcanzadas, como aspectos generales podemos afirmar que, por extraño que pueda parecer, ya que nos encontramos ante dos conceptos de ámbitos muy diferentes, existe una relación entre Derecho y Felicidad. De hecho, el Derecho a la felicidad, al bienestar subjetivo o al menos el derecho a la búsqueda de la felicidad en alguna de su acepciones, ha sido a lo largo de la historia, y sigue siéndolo en algunos Estados, un Derecho reconocido en las Constituciones de diversas naciones, si bien es cierto que en una minoría de las mismas. Por otro lado, existen diversos factores que nos demuestran que debemos replantearnos los instrumentos actuales de medición del desarrollo y del progreso, especialmente el Producto Interior Bruto, el cual además no puede emplearse como la única medida que determine el bienestar de una nación. Por tanto, la medición del bienestar debe complementarse con diversos estudios e índices que profundicen en la felicidad como un nuevo enfoque holístico del desarrollo. Asimismo, en un plano público, y en relación con la primera de las conclusiones, si la felicidad es el objetivo último de todo Gobierno, los índices de felicidad deben de servir a los gobernantes de las naciones a orientar sus políticas hacia la misma, si lo que pretenden es que sus ciudadanos sean lo más felices posibles. Por último, llegamos a diversas conclusiones a raíz de los resultados obtenidos en los distintos índices de felicidad. The research is divided into three sections. The first one is called, The Right to Happiness as a Constitutional Right. The second one is entitled The Limits of Gross Domestic Product. Finally, the third one is related to Happiness Indices. The main objectives of this research are also three, and they correspond to each one of the sections. First, to determine whether there is or there has been throughout history, what might be called as a right to happiness, and if that right has been recognized in the Constitutions of some nation. Second, to verify if the Gross Domestic Product, which has become since its creation in the main indicator of the level of development and material welfare of a country, has its limitations and shortcomings, and if it is the best option to measure progress and welfare of our societies. Also, to find out if any international organization and/or commission, have pronounced about it with resolutions or recommendations, in order to study them. Third, and finally, to determine if new rates and additional indicators of Gross Domestic Product are needed and whether have been created what we call as "indices of happiness" from an international perspective, especially by relevant international organizations, in order to analyze them, with the Gross National Happiness of Bhutan, a pioneering nationwide. We have used as main methodology, the content analysis of these constitutional provisions, and of these recommendations and resolutions by international organizations; and the comparative analysis of the results that have been obtained with the happiness indices analyzed. All this has meant, taking into account the complexity of this investigation and its objectives, the implementation of a qualitative methodology with a comprehensive study of the policy framework, and a bibliographic and theoretical analysis, during the first and second part of this research. In the third part of the investigation has been carried out a descriptive and comparative analysis of the results obtained in the different happiness indices studied. In the first section, The Right to Happiness as a Constitutional Right, we reviewed the Constitutions and certain statements, which have recognized the right to happiness, or at least the right to the pursuit of happiness. In the second section, The Limits of Gross Domestic Product, we confirm that there is a current and international movement, that criticizes the use of Gross Domestic Product as the only one measure of progress and development of countries, such as have been indicated by the relevant Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress; the Global Project on Measuring the Progress of Societies, of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD); the Resolution in 2011 of the European Parliament entitled Beyond GDP - Measuring progress in a changing world; and the Resolution 65/309 of the United Nations General Assembly the same year, called Happiness: towards a holistic approach to development. All of them believe in the need to introduce new indexes and indicators to complement Gross Domestic Product as a measure of development and welfare of nations, and that happiness should play an important role. Finally, in the third section, we analyze the three indices of happiness at international level that we consider most relevant today. These are the Human Development Index of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the World Happiness Report of the Sustainable Development Solutions Network United Nations (SDSN) and the Better Life Index of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Also, we proceed to analyze a happiness nationwide index, the Gross National Happiness of Bhutan. Regarding the main conclusions, we can say that, despite of the fact that they are two very different concepts, we can find a relationship between Law and Happiness. In fact, the right to happiness, to subjective well-being or at least the right to pursuit of the happiness, has been throughout the ages, and still is in some States, a right recognized in the Constitutions of different countries, although it is true that they are a minority. On the other hand, there are several factors that show us that we need to rethink about current measurement instruments of development and progress, especially the Gross Domestic Product, which cannot be used as the only one measure in order to determine the well-being of a nation. Therefore, the measurement of welfare should be complemented by different studies and indexes related to happiness as a new holistic approach to development. Also, in a public level and in relation to the first conclusion, if happiness is the last goal of any government, happiness indices should help the rulers of nations in order to direct their policies towards the happiness, if what they want is that their citizens were as happy as possible. Finally, we have reached different conclusions related to the results of the indices of happiness analyzed.
Erase and Forget is an inquiry into the nature of human conscience and the limits of deniability. It premiered at the 2017 Berlin Film Festival, where it was nominated for the Glashuette most original documentary award. Charting 'the deep bonds between Hollywood's fictionalized conflicts and America's hidden wars', Andrea Luka Zimmerman's ERASE AND FORGET is a new investigative documentary which charts the extraordinary life and times of Bo Gritz, one of America's highest decorated veterans and the 'inspiration' for Rambo and Brando's Colonel Kurtz. Using never before seen archive footage of covert US operations, and interviews filmed over a ten year period, ERASE AND FORGET provides a complex perspective of an individual and a country in crisis. ERASE AND FORGET is a compelling inquiry into the nature of human conscience which raises urgent questions about US militarism and gun control, and embodies contemporary American society in all its dizzying complexity and contradictions. Erase and Forget was long-listed for BIFA new talent emerging producer award, with Ameenah Ayub Allen, 2018 / Nominated for Glashuette original documentary award, Berlin Film festival, 2017 /Platinum Reel Award, Nevada International Film Festival, 2018 / Semi finalist, best documentary Hot Springs Womens film festival, 2018 / Spotlight Documentary Film awards, 2017 Erase and Forget was screened at Spring Sessions in Wadi Rum, in Jordan (http://www.springsessions.org/happenings/announcement244?edition=edition2019-en) and in a special session at Goethe Institut Ramallah, including discussion with the director (https://www.events.ps/en/Events/1086/Screening-and-discussion-with-the-director-of-Erase--Forget). --- DIRECTOR'S STATEMENT: "You already know enough. So do I. It is not knowledge we lack. What is missing is the courage to understand what we know and to draw conclusions." Sven Lindqvist, from 'Exterminate All The Brutes' I chose to work with Bo over ten years because I needed to understand how he was part of history (as much as what history). I am fascinated by profound questions of responsibility – on the part of ourselves and others. There can be no moral high ground or hierarchy if we are genuinely seeking to understand extreme behaviour. We are part of a system that makes enormous profits out of structural and political violence. Bo is really a witness to the excesses of the military-industrial complex. I wanted to explore how a highly intelligent man came to believe, through cultural and social conditioning, that killing in such a way and on such a scale might be perceived as virtuous. My years with Bo recorded his reflections on life before, during and after his time as 'the real Rambo – the American Warrior'- when the reasons for transgressing these boundaries had shifted. Bo is a man of a thousand faces. His is a public life lived in the media age. It is a life made from fragments, from different positions, both politically and in terms of their mediation. His life is contradictory and assembled from all these shards. There is no single 'right' life or reading of his public activities. My portrait of Bo is drawn mainly from original material, which I shot over ten years, but it also includes found footage from the world's first truly public archive – the global online media bank, scattered across numerous platforms. My structural approach is instinctual, distinctive, and formally rigorous articulated in tightly selected montages – each emotional unfolding is countered with a denial of feeling, hence producing a confliction emotional experience, truer the creative maladjustment necessary when grappling with structural and political violence and their spectacular representations through Hollywood (dominant) cinema. While working with a broadly chronological, autobiographical narrative, I also operate associatively, tracking parallels and seeking echoes and refrains of action and reflection across the decades of Bo's diverse military, political and social experiences. The exploration of this complex and constantly changing relationship between event and image is one of my key intentions in and for the film. When contentious ideas and actions enter this social mediated space, all too often crude binaries (of action and reaction, right and wrong, etc…) are created. These are, as is evident across the world today, extremely dangerous. I see my film being in creative dialogue with Swedish writer Sven Lindqvist's Exterminate all the Brutes, a seminal work exploring the origins of totalitarian thinking. The film is an inquiry into the nature of human conscience and the limits of deniability. Over the course of a decade of filming, it became clear that the focus must be Bo's own relationship with his public image, activities and response (underpinned by the known and covert activities of his military career). Director's Statement on the Relationship with Cinema: Hollywood's Ghosts Fiction creates reality. Hollywood and political structures in the United States are tightly knit. On a material level, there are exchanges of personnel and funds. Hollywood regularly employs (often retired) covert operators and military staff as advisers and the story rights of military operations often become the properties of major studios. Whereas the purchase of such rights is, by definition, often after the fact, on occasion funding precedes the event. For instance, a covert prisoner-of-war recovery mission led by Bo Gritz was in part financed by Clint Eastwood in return for a possible option on the story. It is variously claimed, that Bo is the soldier who the Rambo series is modelled on. The flow of funds from Hollywood to the military is not exclusive. The Pentagon contributes by providing army assistance (military advisers, helicopters, use of bases, etc…) to productions that it deems supportive of US policy. Such films inform climates of public opinion within which policy operates. They open imaginative spaces and arenas of ethical consideration in which certain kinds of military operations are validated. Furthermore, Hollywood cinema serves as a curious, discursive space for policy makers (and thus for speechwriters as well as scriptwriters). Ronald Reagan, on numerous occasions, publicly drew on the Rambo series to articulate his foreign policy vision and promote his political aspirations: "After seeing Rambo last night, I know what to do next time this happens." [Ronald Reagan, 1985] Where Reagan at times dipped into the movies to illustrate an argument, Bo is produced as if he were a movie star, by both the media and by his own public performances. On January 31st, 1983, CBS News described Bo's foray into Laos as "the stuff from which movies are made…a case of life imitating art". The inadvertently implied elision of difference between 'life' and 'art' in this strictly nonsensical news-speak is telling. Does the above mean that 'this mission is a model for movies that this mission is modelled on'? Touring the country for his own presidential campaign, Bo is hailed on national television as the 'real-life Rambo' as well as the "model for the real life Rambo". The description of Bo as a mythical figure has been drawn in terms of another such character: Colonel Kurtz. A journalist on Nevada Regional news, declared that Bo is "[…] the mythical Colonel Kurtz in Apocalypse Now…". It was not just the news media however, that tried to fuse Bo with the 'mythical' Colonel Kurtz. In 1975, Francis Ford Coppola's production company approached Bo during the making of Apocalypse Now to ask for permission to superimpose Marlon Brando's face over Bo's. As Bo explains, "he wanted to use the photograph in General William C. Westmoreland's book showing me with Nurse Toi kneeling in front of a lot of really mean-looking Cambodian mercenaries as the headliner for his new movie. Colonel Kurtz was commanding a Cambodian army and I was Major Gritz, and I did command a Cambodian army. Matter of fact I was the first to do so". What does it mean that Bo so eagerly figures himself as the man who inspired these representations? After all, he is not unaware of the fact that Coppola's Kurtz and indeed, the entire plot of Apocalypse Now, is taken from Joseph Conrad's Heart of Darkness and set in the context of the Indochinese war. Rather, Bo's suggestion that 'Kurtz' is a play on 'Gritz' not only indicates a desire to project himself as famous and infamous, it also points to a willingness to perform his own history, including that of his covert operations, in accordance with the conventions of Hollywood cinema. Bo's willingness to perform according to a 'script' (both inspired by Hollywood and subsequently itself adapted and produced by Hollywood in a feedback loop between the silver screen and covert policy) gives the POW 'production' an actual star – a star who becomes a simulacum of the Hollywood characters and vice versa. Bo's authenticity is produced not only by his own insistence that he is the basis for his Hollywood avatars, but equally by his parallel insistence that he has no interest in these figures or, as he dismissively puts it, 'Hollyweird' and its 'play acting'. This denial, by masking his desire to identify himself as the 'original', therefore makes his identification more plausible, precisely by producing him as 'the real thing'. The chicken comes back to roost Rambo III was released in 1988. The film ends with a dedication printed over its final scene: 'This film is dedicated to the gallant people of Afghanistan'. At the time of its release, the Reagan administration's covert funding for operations in Afghanistan was at its highest. The film premiered as President Gorbachev announced the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, a policy decision that was welcomed by none more than the marketing team working on Rambo III. The film rode the wave of euphoria for US political and military 'success'. This was, then, a historical context which enabled the film's hero to be figured – both by the film's marketing team and, indeed, by audiences, who read the film in the social and discursive context of the times – as individually responsible for the defeat of the Soviets in Afghanistan. There is another, utterly un-distributed film that stands as testimony to the Reagan government's dedication to the 'gallant people of Afghanistan'. Untitled and shot on Super 8 Sound film in the autumn of 1986, it is the record of a secret training program for Afghan Mujahedeen on US soil. Bo claims that the training program was initiated by the National Security Council (NSC) under the direction of State Department official William Bode and that the funding was allegedly channelled through Stanford Technology, a CIA front-company. Spectres Bo was part of a world where deniability lies at the forefront of action on the uncertain line between knowing and unknowing (post-truth before the event …). The spectral nature of covert operations resides in their being officially, 'neither confirmed, nor denied'. Thus the spectral is produced by official discourse, but admissible to it only as that which cannot be admitted. However, rather than being a product of official denial, it is a product of 'deniability'. This involves not the denial of a particular event, but the denying of official authorisation of an event. Dislocating action and intention, cause and effect, creates a shadow realm from which strategic operations march forward like zombies. An operation appears to have been carried out in the absence of an originating order. The action is spectral in as much as it seems to escape the laws of causality that govern the rest of the world – it is an effect without identifiable cause. A methodology of making This led me to develop a film making approach through which I have tried to understand the person within this context of visibility and invisibility – between deniable reality and fiction. There is a curious symmetry between the careers of Reagan and Bo. On the one hand there is the actor turned politician, who became President and imagined he'd been a soldier; and on the other there is the soldier who would have been President, who flirted with the movies and now defines himself as 'real' in contra-distinction to them. The relationship between Bo and the President he served has surely been subject to Bo's mythologizing autobiographical imagination. Nonetheless, the speculative discursive space that has opened around the relationship (in biographies and autobiographies, in news reports and internet conspiracy sites) has effected a conflation of political drama and movies, of covert operator (whose modus operandi is disguise, dissemblance, subterfuge) and movie actor. And so, focusing on such a figure as Bo, has allowed me to trace a series of discursive and imaginary movements that issue not so much into an exchange between domains, as a conflation of domains. Bo seems to induce a certain ontological confusion, a collapse of fiction and history, biography and popular myth, which is not restricted to his own imagination. It is a confusion that the media are happy to propagate (this is so for his detractors as well as his champions, for the major news channels and fringe internet conspiracy blogs alike). And how timely for our times this is… --- '.like a Lynchian nightmare of right-wing America.' Total Film ★★★★ 'The film is so loopy you end up like Laocoön, wreathed by serpents of paradox and contradiction.' Financial Times ★★★★ 'Zimmermann marshals her material…with relentlessly thought-provoking confidence.' Empire ★★★★ 'An especially probing portrait of a wounded man and his role in the fetishisation of state-sanctioned violence.' Time Out ★★★★ 'This illuminating portrait of a rather broken champion is enriched by extraordinary archive footage.' Filmuforia ★★★★ 'Gripping and jaw-dropping, it's a documentary that needs to be seen to be believed.' Morning Star ★★★★ 'Bo's nonchalance when talking about his behaviour in countries such as Panama makes your jaw drop. An education.' EVENING STANDARD 'This is a new way to make a documentary, exploiting the bountiful public record of the Internet age.' Variety …like a Lynchian nightmare of right-wing America. Tim Coleman, Total Film Erase and Forget reflects the kind of ideological instability that has contributed to the US's surreal political moment. Jessica Loudis, Frieze ERASE AND FORGET explores 'the deep bonds between Hollywood's fictionalized conflicts and America's hidden wars' through a complex portrayal of US soldier, whistle-blower and ex-presidential candidate Bo Gritz, taking us to a world before President Trump. One of America's highest decorated veterans, the 'inspiration' behind RAMBO, Colonel John 'Hannibal' Smith (THE A-TEAM) and Brando's Colonel Kurtz (APOCALYPSE NOW), Gritz was at the heart of American military and foreign policy – both overt and covert – from the Bay of Pigs to Afghanistan, before turning whistle-blower and launching anti-government training programmes. Today he lives in the Nevada desert where he once secretly trained Afghan Mujahedeen, is loved by his community and still admired as a hero figure by white supremacists for his role in the Ruby Ridge siege of 1992. This event was a key turning point in the rise of the far right and militia anti-Government groups in the US. Filmed over ten years, Zimmerman's film is an artist's perspective of an individual and a country in crisis, which raises urgent questions about US militarism and gun control. Deploying confessional and exploratory interviews, news and cultural footage, creative re-enactment and previously unseen archive material, ERASE AND FORGET explores the implications on a personal and collective level of identities founded on a profound, even endemic violence. It examines the propagation of that violence through Hollywood and the mass media, the arms trade and ongoing governmental policy. Revealing the filmmaker's own nuanced relationship with a controversial subject, without judgment and sensationalism, ERASE AND FORGET proposes a multi-layered investigation of war as a social structure, a way of being for individuals and countries in what is becoming an era of 'permanent conflict'.
Until very recently, in the debates on water in the Spanish and European context, the concept of the Human Right to Water and Sanitation (HRWS) evoked foreign realities, typical of Latin American countries or other regions of the global south. However, since the beginning of the Great Recession in 2008, as a result of the consequent emergence of situations of poverty and precariousness, the concern to defend the recognition and implementation of this right became present. The declaration of the HRWS by the United Nations in 2010 (United Nations 2010a,2010b), coinciding with this historical juncture, has promoted processes and debates around its effective implementation at an international, European and Spanish level. The current health crisis and the consequent economic debacle caused by the COVID-19 at the beginning of 2020 have updated the urgency of the debate on the HRWS. In 2015, the plenary session of the European Parliament supported the citizens' initiative Right2Water, which sought to guarantee the right to water for all people and the transposition of the HRWS into the legislation of member states. The current reform process of the Drinking Water Directive (98/83/EC) is justified, among other reasons, by the need to adapt these regulations to the aforementioned commitment to coherence. The Right2Water initiative was transferred to Spain, mainly thanks to the encouragement of the Association of Public Water Supply and Sanitation Operators (Asociación de Operadores Públicos de Abastecimiento y Saneamiento Agua, AEOPAS), within the framework of the statewide Public Water Network (Red Agua Pública, RAP), through the Social Pact for Public Water (Pacto Social por el Agua Pública, PSAP). The effects of the crisis also coincided with privatization processes of water services that, justified by austerity policies, European institutions promoted in the countries most affected by the crisis, despite strong social opposition. In some of these countries, such as Spain, the process of privatization has been especially related to the seek of funding by municipalities in crisis, through the perverse mechanism of the 'concession fee', which allows for a rapid injection of money into the municipal treasury in exchange for a decades-long privatization of the service. This process is usually accompanied by increasing rates and greater pressure on users with payment problems. The relations between the causes and consequences of the crisis and privatization, as well as the emergence of situations of water poverty of different types, have led to the present existence of a social movement, with a solid discourse that is committed to defending the human right to water, as well as the model of public management, in our cities. At the same time, the existence of public water management companies, which formally maintain public ownership of the service but practice a mercantile management style (priority of profit and loss accounts, opacity, consideration of users as clients) has led to demands to renew public management models to guarantee compliance with the human right to water in a broad and deep sense, redefined in an antagonistic way: a recognition of access to drinking water and sanitation as a human right rigorously conceived that puts into question the neoliberal logic of managing water services. This is one of the core arguments this article addresses: the HRWS today constitutes the banner of a movement that is articulated around the concept of water as a common good and that is oriented towards the objective of building a collaborative and transparent model of public management. The ownership of water and sanitation services operators (in their different modalities, from strictly public to strictly private formulas) is related to the implementation of the HRWS, which contributes to the reactivation of debates on the need to preserve or recover ('remunicipalización') the public character of these services, and with the need to generate legal frameworks that guarantee effective local democratic policies. To this social dimension, committed to the public and democratic dimension, open to new debates on common goods management, another characteristic is added: the human rights movement in Spain has been in tune from its beginnings in discourse and organizational structure with socio-eco-integrating perspectives of natural resources, aquatic ecosystems management, which is at the foundation of the possibility of implementing the human right to water. This is a relevant and somewhat distinctive quality of the Spanish experience, which contrasts with the unfortunate, although historically explainable, disagreements and conflicts that frequently characterize the social and environmental perspectives in the movements in defense of water. In addition to the above, this article presents a new approach to the typology of water poverties. Until recently, the efforts that have been carried out in the implementation of the HRWS have been focused especially on accessibility, condemning and trying to alleviate the deficits in supply and sanitation coverage in the Global South. In contrast, its recent reception in European countries has focused especially on affordability (prohibition of cuts, guarantee of a vital minimum, social rates) and on implications for governance (transparency, accountability) and the management model (public versus private). However, throughout this research it has been found that accessibility remains a significant problem in certain European regions, especially related to the existence of marginal settlements, slums, homelessness, temporary immigrant workers in rural areas, etc. The problem of HRWS is thus situated in the broader context of access to housing and dignified living conditions, and is related to the marginalization and exclusion of groups or social sectors, due to various factors, generally combined, of economic, cultural and/or ethnic nature. Finally, another issue that this article addresses is the question of the legal regulation of the human right to water in Spain. It will seem strange to a non-expert observer of this matter that after the intense concern, organization and reflection on the subjects that have been mentioned, and which are presented in detail below, and in a country with such a long tradition of water policy and legislation as Spain, we lack a state or autonomic-wide regulatory framework for the management of urban water. And not only do we still lack this or these framework(s) but we have been discussing their need for many years (the jurisdictions and responsibilities over the urban cycle are municipal) and, if they are really needed, their nature, contents and scale of formulation. The article analyzes the keys to this process and ends by presenting the latest propositions on this subject from the HRWS social movement in which its authors are conceptually situated. From a theoretical (urban political ecology) and methodological (transdisciplinary participatory research-action) point of view, the article has been developed in the double framework in which the authors operate. On the one hand, the working group on the urban water cycle of the New Water Culture Foundation (Fundación Nueva Cultura del Agua) and, on the other, the Research Networks of Excellence of the National Research Agency on water poverty (WAPONET, CSO2017-90702-REDT), made up of researchers from seven Spanish universities (Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona, Politécnica de Catalunya, Oberta de Catalunya, Jaume I de Castellón, Alicante, Oviedo, Granada y Sevilla). As a space for transdisciplinary action-participation on which this work has been specifically based, mention should be made of the Andalusian Social Committee on Water (Mesa Social del Agua de Andalucía), whose composition and main activities between 2017 and 2020 are reflected throughout these pages. We owe information, ideas and experiences to all the colleagues who participate in these spaces, where we carried out a real process of co-production of knowledge, throughout years of work in common. ; El derecho humano al abastecimiento y al saneamiento (DHAS) constituye hoy en España y en Europa la bandera de un movimiento que se articula en torno al concepto del agua como bien común y que se orienta al objetivo de construir un modelo de gestión pública participativa y transparente. La materialización efectiva del DHAS se relaciona discursivamente con la titularidad pública o privada de los operadores de los servicios urbanos de agua, lo que ha contribuido a la reactivación de los debates sobre la necesidad de conservar o recuperar el carácter público de estos servicios, y sobre la necesidad de generar marcos jurídicos que garanticen políticas de democracia local efectiva. A esta dimensión sociopolítica, se añade otra característica: el movimiento del DHAS en España sintoniza en discurso y articulación organizativa con las perspectivas socio-eco-integradoras de la gestión del agua como recurso natural, de los ecosistemas acuáticos. Ésta es una cualidad importante y en cierta manera distintiva de la experiencia española, que contrasta con los desencuentros y conflictos que frecuentemente caracterizan a las perspectivas social y ambiental en los movimientos de defensa del agua, y en general de los recursos naturales. Complementariamente a lo anterior, este artículo presenta un nuevo enfoque de la tipología de pobrezas hídricas. La reciente recepción del DHAS en los países europeos se ha focalizado especialmente en la asequibilidad (prohibición de cortes, garantía del mínimo vital, tarifas sociales) y en las implicaciones para la gobernanza (transparencia, rendición de cuentas) y el modelo de gestión (publico versus privado). No obstante, a lo largo de la investigación que se presenta, se ha constatado que la accesibilidad sigue siendo un problema significativo en ciertas regiones europeas, relacionado especialmente con la existencia de asentamientos marginales, chabolismo, personas sin hogar o trabajadores temporeros inmigrantes en áreas rurales. Finalmente, este artículo aborda la cuestión de la regulación legal del derecho humano al agua en España, analizando las claves de este proceso y presentando las últimas propuestas del movimiento del DHAS en el que sus autores conceptualmente se sitúan. Desde un punto de vista teórico (ecología política urbana) y metodológico (investigación-acción participativa transdisciplinar), el artículo se ha desarrollado en el doble marco en el que los autores se desenvuelven. Por una parte, el grupo de trabajo de ciclo urbano del agua de la Fundación Nueva Cultura de Agua (https://fnca.eu/oppa/ciclo-urbano-del-agua); y, por otra, la Red de Excelencia de la Agencia Estatal de Investigación sobre pobreza hídrica (WAPONET, CSO2017-90702-REDT, https://waponet.org/approach/).
Against the backdrop of repeated political violence between Israel and different belligerents in the first and second decades of the 21st century (2003-2017) and by employing a social-psychological theoretical framework, this dissertation explores the effects of political violence on Israelis ' social and national identities. The findings support the discussion of the social consequences of political violence in Israel, be them increased cohesiveness among different social groups (ethnic minority and majority) or social fragmentation and increased polarization between other groups (rich vs. poor or political right vs. left). Whereas Social Identity Theory constitutes the theoretical base for the explored hypotheses, Israeli social place-making practices are also discussed. Topic Whereas a vast amount of literature has been dedicated to the effects of exposure to violence on individuals and groups for over a century, it mainly focuses on type, duration or location of such violence. Since the relevant literature seems to consider the occurrence of political violence a unitary phenomenon, it consistently fails to attend to a most important factor- the aftermath of such violence. By overlooking the discrepancy in violence' aftermath and by neglecting any analysis derived from it, I argue that the comprehensive literature examining the social effects of political violence and post-conflict societies is missing a vital piece of the puzzle. Accordingly, the contribution of this dissertation to the conflict literature is twofold: first, it disaggregates the aftermaths of two common forms of political violence, wars and military operations and explores their effects on individuals, groups and the Israeli society as a whole. Second, it closely examines some of the central assumptions of Social Identity Theory, one of the most comprehensive theories of group relations in the context of concrete political violence. It does so while paying special attention to highly fascinating identity components and basic social building blocks: national identification, social trust and social rifts in Israel. Methods The dissertation employs various methodologies: First, a macro-level, statistical examination of the relationship between different war outcomes and socio-national identities was conducted using two web-based experiments. Second, a qualitative analysis of Zionism in Europe and in Israel's early years complemented a discussion of Israeli narratives of belonging, memory politics, ingredients of national pride and contemporary social challenges. Third, a quantitative micro-level analysis of the effect of successful and unsuccessful military operation on the Israeli society was conducted. The latter utilized a unique, self-compiled database, following an extensive manual content analysis , alongside data originating in annual social surveys conducted in Israel by the Guttmann institute. Knowledge gained The first empirical chapter (chapter four) was set to establish the underlying assumption upon which the dissertation is based; Namely, that different outcomes of political violence have distinctive effects on individual identities. In this chapter, predictions derived from Social Identity Theory were put into an initial macro-level analysis through two original web experiments. The latter explored the effect of different war outcomes (distinguishing between victory, defeat, stalemate and a negotiated agreement) on social and national identities . Whereas the research supported the underlying hypothesis according to which distinctive war outcomes are associated with distinctive effects when national identification is concerned, no significant differences between war outcomes were found in relation to individuals' social identities. These results are consistent with Social Identity Theory and the self-esteem protection/enhancement strategies derived from it (BIRGing and CORFing ); the significant differences between war outcomes (mainly between victories and defeats) are explained by individuals' tendencies to share in the glory of a successful other (to BIRG) following a positively evaluated war outcome, and to distance themselves from an unsuccessful group (to CORF), following a negatively valued war outcome. The non-significant results concerning social identities are consistent with Simmel's conflict hypothesis suggesting that conflicting interactions strengthen the internal cohesion of pre-existing groups. In this regard, it appears as though individuals react to the conflict itself whereas its aftermath did not play any significant role. The overall outcomes obtained thus laid the foundations for an extensive micro-level analysis of the effect of outcomes of political violence on socio-national identities among Israelis. Chapter five refocused the attention on the state of Israel and the Israeli society. It provided a historical analysis of Jewish-Israeli nationalism, rooted in the Zionistic movement in Europe in the late 19th century, which preceded the establishment of the state of Israel. The analysis centered on nation-building processes which took place in Israel's first years, namely, the constructing of a new Jewish-Israeli identity by means of institutionalizing the Hebrew language as an official language, integration of new immigrants and the role of the Israeli defense force as a melting pot. The study of the origins of Israeli national pride, both in the country's first years and in contemporary times, complemented the discussion as it is entwined with both Jewish and Israeli identities. The analysis suggests that while Israel was established as a democracy, it was never a space of ethnic diversity. As the national home for world jury based on a Zionist narrative and highly influenced by the Holocaust, no plurality of ethnic discourses existed in Israel in over 50 years. The research describes the way state-sponsored dominant Jewish and Zionist narratives morphed into a uni-dimensional Israeli identity. This, in turn, prevented Arab-Israelis, the largest ethnic minority in Israel, from being incorporated into the Israeli society. Recurrent political violence as part of the on-going Israeli Palestinian conflict further contributed both to the exclusion of Arab-Israelis from the original Israeli narrative and to the bonding of Jewish Israelis. It was only in the last decades and against the backdrop of significant changes endured by the Israeli society that place-making processes were put on the political and social agenda. Whereas nation and community-building processes are still prominent in contemporary Israel, they now exist side by side a vibrant and vocal discourse of post-Zionism, Jewish secularism and "Israelism" which is not based on Judaism but on an Israeli cultural narrative. Persistent political violence that contributed to social fragmentation in Israel's first decades alongside cultural commonalities between Jewish and Arab Israelis now begin to serve as a common denominator in contemporary Israeli society. If those continue to resonate among Israelis, it is thus not implausible that they would eventually substitute Judaism and Zionism as social unifiers in the process of creating a "same boat" society. Under such circumstances and with diminishing boundaries between Arab and Jewish Israelis, the former will no longer be construed as an "out-group" by the Jewish majority in Israel. Nonetheless, drifting away from the original Jewish integrator and common factor of more than 75% of the country's population may threaten the Jewish communities of Israel with social fragmentation. Consequently, the study of the effect of political violence on both Jewish and non-Jewish communities in Israel set forth in the upcoming chapters is of great importance for the future of Israel. Chapter six set out to examine the relationship between Israelis and their nation-state following different outcomes of Israeli military operations. Special attention was paid to changes in levels of national pride among Jewish Israelis, Arab Israelis and new immigrants across a tempestuous ten-year period (2003-2013) and in conjunction with successful and unsuccessful conclusions of Israeli warfare, as perceived by the Israeli public. Using a regressing analysis of data originating in social surveys, the research tested the validity of predictions derived from Social Identity Theory in both the individual and the social levels. Results indicate that the effect of recurrent warfare on national identification among Israelis is highly mitigated by the perceived outcome of such warfare as well as by sub-group membership (ethnic/social majority vs. minority). Consistent with Social Identity Theory, an Israeli military success was highly associated with increased national identification for the general Israeli population. However, contrary to conventional wisdom and to the "minority hypothesis ", the same effect was also registered among Israeli Arabs. While Israeli Arabs, the largest ethnic minority in Israel, might share neither the country's collective Jewish narrative nor its Zionist ethos they are Israeli citizens who nonetheless feel a sense of belonging to the state of Israel . As such, they are a part of a larger in-group which shares personal and economic interests. Those are equally and existentially threatened when Israel is experiencing unsuccessful military operations. This positivistic evidence suggests that Israeli Arabs' identification with the state of Israel lies in the area of "Israeliness that is beyond Jewishness". The analysis also affirmed the existence of an "embedded identity effect" concerning national identification among Jewish Israelis; Israeli Jews, the majority ethnic group in Israel, maintained high national-identification levels regardless of the way the warfare was concluded. This finding is unsurprising considering Israel's Jewish character and the circumstances of its creation. Whilst societies subjected to external threat may unite in the face of a common enemy, chapter seven sought to examine whether this is true in the Israeli context and if so, whether the outcomes of political violence mitigate the effect. Whereas a large scholarship examined the effect of violence on social cohesion and political tolerance in Israel, it mostly focused on Arab-Israelis and immigrant. The research presented in chapter seven studied the effect of discrepant outcomes of Israeli warfare on social cohesion, social tensions and trust between the various communities of Israel (both Jewish and non-Jewish). The research focused on the general level of social trust in society alongside six specific social rifts, prevalent in present-day Israel: the intercommunal rift (between the Israeli Jewish community and the Israeli-Arab community), the Jewish intercommunal rift (between Jews of Ashkenazi and Sephardic/Mizrachi origins), the religious rift (between orthodox and non-orthodox Jewish communities), the ideological/political rift , the socio-economic rift and the nativist tension (between native Israelis and new immigrants). Results revealed a highly significant effect of Israeli military success concerning all six social rifts and a very mild effect concerning social trust. For all but one rift (the Jewish inter-communal rift), successful termination of Israeli warfare was associated with an increased social tension between the different communities in Israel (though in different levels of significance). This unfortunate finding which points to increased fractionalization among the different communities in Israel following Israeli military successes is in line with several other studies examining the effects of political violence on political exclusionism in Israel. Whereas the literature supports the notion that in time of crisis social cohesion increases, it is not surprising to find increased tensions following military successes rather than failures. An exception to the observed rise in social tensions in Israel is the increased cohesion between Ashkenzi and Sephardic/Mizrachi Jews (the Jewish intercommunal rift). The results support the conclusion that the Jewish population, the majority ethnic group in Israel, is united behind the idea that Israel is a homeland for the Jewish people (and possibly a necessary refuge from rising anti-Semitism around the globe). A decrease in Jewish intercommunal tension following Israeli victories supports the cohesive potential of in-group pride and is consistent with the Jewish foundation and Zionistic narrative of Jewish Israelis and with the existence of an embedded Jewish-Israeli identity . As for the national level, a "rally around the flag" effect is a term used to describe the uniting power of common threats. An underlying motive for this surge in national unity is linked to patriotism, as individuals respond to threats by identifying with their in-group . However, when the crisis is over, politics and society quickly revert to normal and existing social rifts resurface. Whereas an unsuccessful termination of an Israeli military operation is likely to induce a "rally around the flag" effect, a military success demonstrates the opposite effect. Consequently, the seemingly rising tensions between various communities in Israel observed following an Israeli military success is consistent with a reverse "rally around the flag" effect and reflects the fractionalized nature of the Israeli society. Another explanation to the observed trend of increased social tensions following a successful warfare may be directly linked to the experience of in-group guilt or shame despite a successful outcome. Such gilt might lead to rising tension between those who are more/less supportive of the outcome, or perhaps feel that more should have been done to achieve a more solid outcome. Finally, the increased tensions may speak to the theorized dynamic at the heart of the present and similar works that reflects the more destructive side of pride and in-group glorification. According to that scholarship, out-group hate can even extend to people perceived to be "hostile minorities ". Whilst the increase in intercommunal tension is expected and in line with the results of similar studies examining the effect of violence or stress on the relationships between Jewish and Arab Israelis, the increase in religious tensions, socio-economic tension and ideological tensions could be reflective of a second circle of out-group hate; Supporters of the political left alongside less observant and wealthier elements of the Israeli society , may experience in-group guilt and possibly shame despite the perceived successful outcome, thus distancing themselves from those experiencing pride at the outcome. The effect of education, in particular higher education, in reducing social tensions and increasing social trust emerges as another important finding of this research. Whether education provides a sense of optimism and control over one's life that allows people to trust, or whether it provides opportunities for contact and networks' creation with others, the study confirms the potential role of education in reducing social tension even in a highly diverse and conflict-torn Israeli society. Moreover, since social divisions may be exploited by political entrepreneurs, and since increasing social tensions might result in the erosion of social capital, raising the alarm would be the first step in directly addressing such important issues (for example, by policy making). Lastly, any serious peace negotiation with a Palestinian leadership would require difficult concessions to be made by both parties. As such, the way towards a peaceful conclusion of the Israeli Palestinian conflict would inevitably depend, among others, on the social strength and cohesion of the Israeli civil society.:Table of Contents 1. Introduction 1.1 Background and Motivation . 7 1.1.1 National Identification . 10 1.1.2 Social Trust . 14 1.1.3 Focusing on Israel . 16 1.2 Prologue . 17 1.3 Contribution Scope . 18 1.4 Overview of Aims and Chapters . 20 2. Theoretical Framework: Conflict Research, National Identification and Social Trust Part I: Conflict Research 2.1 Conflict Research . 24 2.1.1 General Theory and Practices . 25 2.1.2 Contemporary Trends and Challenges . 26 2.1.3 Looking Forward . 27 Part II: Belonging, Identity and the Nation 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 Identity Formation . 28 Social Belonging and Group Identification . 29 The Sense of Belonging, Nationhood and Statehood . 30 2.4.1 What is a Nation? . 30 2.4.2 National Identification . 32 2.4.3 Hierarchies of National Belonging . 33 2.4.4 The Nation State . 34 2.4.5 Nationhood and Statehood . 35 Conflict Patriotic Affinity: Conceptual Outlines . 38 2.6.1 Between Patriotism and Nationalism . 41 Coping With Threatened Social Identity . 42 and Group Identification . 36 2 3 2.7.1 Social Identity Theory . 42 2.7.2 Basking In Reflected Glory . 45 2.7.3 Cutting Off Reflected Failure . 46 2.7.4 Self-Embedded Social Identity . 48 2.7.5 National Identity of Ethnic Minorities . 50 Part III: Social Trust and Cohesiveness 2.8 Social Capital and Cohesion . 52 2.9 Unraveling the Riddle of Social Trust . 54 2.9.1 Threats to Social Trust and Social Cohesion . 56 3. Methodology 3.1 Macro-level Analysis . 60 3.1.1 Appropriateness . 60 3.1.2 A Short History of Web Experiments . 61 3.1.3 Web Experiments: Advantages and Challenges . 63 3.2. Micro-level analysis . 69 3.2.1 Focusing on The state of Israel and Israeli Society . 69 Contemporary Israeli Media . 72 Military Censorship . 75 3.2.2 Episodes of High Intensity Political Violence . 75 3.2.3 Perceived Outcomes of Political Violence . 77 3.2.4 Relevant Issues Concerning the Use of Survey Data . 78 Vague Concepts . 78 Categorizing Identities . 80 3.2.5 The Israeli Democracy Index . 82 3.2.6 Control Variables . 83 3.3 Framing in Communication and Their Effect on Public Opinion . 84 3.3.1 The Use of Emphasis and Equivalence Framing in Shaping Public Opinion . 85 3.3.2 The Effect of Frames in Shaping Individual Perceptions . 87 3.3.3 Assessing a Frame's Strength in Political Settings . 88 4. The Ending matters: National and Social Identification Following Discrepant War Outcomes 4.1 Introduction . 90 4.2 Experimental Study I . 93 4.2.1 Procedure and Experimental Design . 93 4.2.2 Measures . 95 4.3.3 Results . 95 4.2.4 Discussion . 99 Seriousness Check . 99 National Identity . 100 Social Identity . 102 4.3 Experimental Study II . 103 4.3.1 Using video Vs. Text in Experimental Research . 103 4.3.2 Procedure and Experimental Design . 104 4.3.3 Measures . 105 4.3.4 Results . 106 4.3.5 Discussion . 109 Seriousness Check . 109 National Identity . 109 4.4 Limitations . 110 4.5 Conclusion . 111 5. Focusing on the State of Israel and Israeli Society 5.1 Introduction . 114 5.2 Jewish Nationalism and the Zionist Movement in Europe . 114 5.3 Zionism, National Identity and Hebrew Culture Following the Establishment of The State of Israel . 118 5.3.1 The Israeli Defense Forces . 119 Serving in the Israeli Defense Forces . 120 Education, Socialization and Nation Building . 121 The Effect of the IDF on the Israeli Society . 123 5.3.2 Sport as an Integrative Tool for Shaping Israeli Collective Identity . 129 5.4 The Jewish and Democratic Nature of the State of Israel . 132 4 5.5 5.6 5.7 5 Current Challenges to Contemporary "Israeliness" . 134 5.5.1 Ethnic-religious Classification of Israelis- Between Citizenship and Nationality . 136 5.5.2 Israeli Nationalist Particularism . 137 Israeli Patriotism and Ingredients of Israeli National Pride . 140 5.6.1 Tzedakah, Gemilut Hasadim and Tikun Olam . 141 5.6.2 Mashav . 142 5.6.3 Operation "Good Neighbor" . 144 Conclusion . 148 6. Together We Stand? Perceived Outcomes of Political Violence and National Pride 7. 6.1 Introduction . 150 6.2 Hypotheses . 151 6.3 Data, Measures and Method . 153 6.3.1 Focusing on Israel . 153 6.3.2 Military Operations . 154 6.3.3 Survey Measures: National Identification . 155 6.3.4 Perceived Outcome of Military Operation . 157 6.3.5 Control Variables . 158 6.4 Findings and Discussion . 159 6.4.1 Preliminary Findings . 159 6.4.2 Disaggregating the Israeli Society . 163 6.4.3 Interaction Analysis . 164 6.5 Robustness Checks . 169 6.5.1 Israel's General Situation . 170 6.5.2 Proximity to the Center of Violence . 171 6.6 Conclusion . 172 In Us We Trust? The Effect of Military Operations on Social Cleavages and Social Cohesion in Israel 7.1 Introduction . 174 7.2 Hypothesis . 175 7.3 7.4 6 Data, Measures and Method . 179 7.3.1 7.3.2 7.3.3 7.3.4 The Israeli Society in Context . 179 Military Operations . 181 Perceived Levels of Tension and Trust in the Israeli Society . 183 Perceived Outcomes of Israeli Military Operations . 185 Control Variables . 185 7.3.5 Findings and Discussion . 186 7.4.1 7.4.2 7.4.3 Preliminary Findings . 187 The Effect of Individual Level and Country Level Variables on Social Tensions and Social Trust . 189 Examining the Effect of Israeli Military Operation on Inter-group Tensions . 193 Exploring the Rise and Fall of Social Trust . 197 7.4.4 Conclusion . 200 7.5 8. Conclusion . 203 8.1 Limitations . 210 8.2 Going forward: Ideas for Future Research . 213 8.3 Final remarks/Epilogue . 215 9. References . 218 10. List of Figures . 254 Appendices A. The Evolution of Conflict Research in the 20th Century . 255 B. Supplementary Material Chapter Four . 268 B.1 Experiment I . 268 B.2 Experiment II . 274 B.3 Witnessing a Real Conflict as a Potential Covariate . 287 C. Supplementary Material and Robustness Checks, Chapter Six . 288 D. Supplementary Material and Robustness Checks, Chapter Seven . 308
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The latest Houthi strike in the Red Sea has for the first time killed civilians — three workers on a Barbados-flagged cargo ship — underscoring the ineffectiveness of the Biden military response after five long months of militant attacks there. It also shows how elusive the goal is for ending the nearly decade-long war in Yemen.Just two weeks after assuming the presidency in January 2021, Joe Biden took three key steps in hopes of ending the war in Yemen. First, he removed the Houthis from the Foreign Terrorist Organization designation that was announced in the last days of Donald Trump's tenure. Second, he appointed Tim Lenderking as Special Envoy to Yemen. Finally, he announced that Washington would stop supporting Saudi offensive operations in Yemen, and declared that the war in Yemen had to end. Ending the war in Yemen has remained a major policy objective of his administration.By the time of these announcements, the Saudi regime, under Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, or MBS, had begun extracting itself from the Yemeni quagmire, so the new U.S. position was not received with the hostility from Riyadh it might have expected; indeed, it was formally "'welcomed" in the hope that Washington's diplomatic involvement might assist this process. Since then, Lenderking has actively joined UN Special Envoy Hans Grundberg in his efforts to bring about an end to the war in Yemen, although the impact of his involvement remains unclear. Major developments took place in April 2022 with the announcement by Grundberg of a truce between the Houthis and the Saudi-led coalition. (While that truce officially expired the following October, fighting since then has been small scale, and neither the Saudis nor the Emiratis have conducted air strikes against the Houthis.) A few days after Grundberg's announcement, the president of Yemen's internationally recognized government (IRG), Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, who had clung to that post since 2012, was unceremoniously replaced by a Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) at a meeting in Riyadh hosted by MBS. Much like the resignation statement announced by Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri in Riyadh in 2017, Hadi's renunciation was read in circumstances that suggested duress.The PLC consists of eight men -- Rashad al Alimi, the former Interior Minister who ascended to the presidency, and leaders of the various anti-Houthi military factions as vice presidents, some of them aligned with the Saudis and others with the Emiratis. When handing over his authority, Hadi gave them the mandate to negotiate "with (Ansar Allah) the Houthis for a permanent ceasefire throughout the republic and sit at the negotiating table to reach a final and comprehensive political solution that includes a transitional phase that will move Yemen from a state of war to a state of peace." Predictably, given the composition of the council, its members have since spent more energy disagreeing with each other than fighting the Houthis. Another major development later in 2022 was the start of direct and publicly acknowledged negotiations between the Saudis and the Houthis, resulting in the effective marginalization of both the UN-sponsored process and the PLC, but opening space for Omani mediation. During most of 2023, those talks progressed with two major markers: in April, an official trip to Sana'a, the Houthi-controlled capital, by a senior Saudi delegation, followed in September by a return visit to the Kingdom by senior Houthis. On both occasions there were widespread rumors that an agreement was on the verge of being reached. Indeed, PLC members were summoned to Riyadh on both occasions to be informed of the situation, rather than consulted. Similarly, the UN Special Envoy was, at best, informed of developments. The draft agreement involved a six-month cease-fire, to be followed by three months of intra-Yemeni discussions in preparation for a two-year transition phase. The Houthis' main concession was that the Saudis would sign as "mediators" rather than "participants" thus reducing the possibility of war crimes charges against Riyadh stemming from its highly destructive bombing campaign during earlier years in the conflict. In return, the Saudis agreed to pay the salaries of all government staff, including the Houthis' military and security personnel, for at least six months. The expected culmination would have been an event where the Houthis and the IRG, which had a great deal to lose by such an agreement, including generous Saudi subsidization, would sign as participants a document witnessed by the Saudis and likely the Omanis as mediators. It would have formalized Saudi Arabia's exit from the Yemen conflict while leaving to UN mediation the more difficult task of addressing the intra-Yemeni struggles.More recent developments in the Red Sea, however, have made it increasingly difficult to continue negotiations, let alone conclude the pending agreement. The Houthi seizure of the Galaxy Leader on November 19 was followed by a series of attacks on Israeli-connected shipping out of what Houthis said was solidarity with the Palestinian civilians in Gaza. The initial U.S. response was timid, largely because of the Biden administration's remaining hope that a public event formalizing the "end" of the Yemen war, would enable it to claim a major foreign policy success in an election year. While this hope explains Washington's restraint, it doesn't explain why the administration failed to consult with its major allies in Europe. As a result, when the U.S. established the ineffective Prosperity Guardian operation on December 18, it gained meager international support and a rapid disavowal by major European countries who announced their own operation in mid-February 2024.In the absence of a formal agreement, UN Special Envoy Grundberg, on December 23, announced a roadmap towards peace which includes "the parties' commitment to implement a nationwide ceasefire, pay all public sector salaries, resume oil exports, open roads in Taiz and other parts of Yemen, and further ease restrictions on Sana'a airport and the Hudaydah port…. and prepare for a Yemeni-owned political process under UN auspices." The IRG's welcoming of the announcement was, to say the least, muted. Regional states, particularly Saudi Arabia, were more positive, and both the UAE and the six-member Gulf Cooperation Council expressed support. Grundberg has tried to move his road map forward, but the escalations that have taken place in the Red Sea increasingly threaten those efforts. On January 11, the U.S. and UK initiated Operation Poseidon Archer against targets on the Yemeni mainland for the first time, intending to downgrade the Houthis' capability to launch missiles and drones. Initially presented as a "one-off," the strikes have become almost daily, and, by the end of February, had hit 230 sites throughout the country. The number of Houthi attacks, however, has not diminished. While few ships are hit, and those that have been have suffered only minor damage, the Rubymar, a British-owned ship struck on February 18 sank two weeks later, polluting the sea with fertilizer and a massive oil slick. There is no sign of an end to Houthi attacks: despite weeks of strikes, the U.S. officials remain unclear about their impact due to lack of information about Houthi stocks of projectiles. Meanwhile, the majority of Yemenis support Houthi actions in support of Palestine, even if they are unhappy with Houthi governance. The only explicit support for U.S. and UK strikes within Yemen comes from the IRG, a number of whose leaders have asked for the strikes to be complemented by materiel, training and other military support to fight and somehow defeat the Houthis. Widely seen as acting in defense of the Palestinians, however, the Houthis' popularity appears to have risen sharply both domestically and abroad, especially in Arab and predominantly Muslim countries. Should the U.S. and UK escalate their involvement in the Yemen conflict — a possibility made more likely by Wednesday's fatal Houthi strike— prospects for a worsening of the situation loom, increasingly reminiscent of Iraq or Afghanistan decades ago. While the Saudi involvement in the Yemen war appears to have ended, however informally, Yemenis are now facing the prospect of a new form of international intervention in their crisis, alongside the already worsening economic situation and humanitarian crisis which, between 2015 and until recently was considered the "world's worst" by the United Nations. Unfortunately, in the absence of any immediate likelihood of an end to Israel's catastrophic destruction of Gaza, prospects for peace in Yemen appear increasingly remote.
The Convention on the Rights of the Child, approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 20 November 1989, states in Article 2 that "States Parties shall respect and ensure the rights set forth in the present Convention to each child within their jurisdiction without discrimination of any kind, irrespective of the child's or his or her parent's or legal guardian's race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, property, disability, birth or other status." Therefore, the child becomes a citizen from birth and is competent to learn from birth. Competent in learning, asking questions, seeking answers, and generating a culture of their own. By affirming the right to be recognised as a citizen of the present, competent, culture-generating, we affirm the strength and extraordinary potential of the child and their right to express it. 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THE TITLE OF MY THESIS IS THE ROLE OF THE IDEAS AND THEIR CHANGE IN HIGHER EDUCATION POLICY-MAKING PROCESSES FROM THE EIGHTIES TO PRESENT-DAY: THE CASES OF ENGLAND AND NEW ZEALAND IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE UNDER A THEORETICAL POINT OF VIEW, THE AIM OF MY WORK IS TO CARRY OUT A RESEARCH MODELLED ON THE CONSTRUCTIVIST THEORY. IT FOCUSES ON THE ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF IDEAS ON THE PROCESSES OF POLICY MAKING BY MEANS OF EPISTEMIC COMMUNITIES, THINK TANKS AND VARIOUS SOCIOECONOMIC CONTEXTS THAT MAY HAVE PLAYED A KEY ROLE IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE DIFFERENT PATHS. FROM MY POINT OF VIEW IDEAS CONSTITUTE A PRIORITY RESEARCH FIELD WHICH IS WORTH ANALYSING SINCE THEIR ROLE IN POLICY MAKING PROCESSES HAS BEEN TRADITIONALLY RATHER UNEXPLORED. IN THIS CONTEXT AND WITH THE AIM OF DEVELOPING A RESEARCH STRAND BASED ON THE ROLE OF IDEAS, I INTEND TO CARRY ON MY STUDY UNDER THE PERSPECTIVE OF CHANGE. DEPENDING ON THE DATA AND INFORMATION THAT I COLLECTED I EVALUATED THE WEIGHT OF EACH OF THESE VARIABLES AND MAYBE OTHERS SUCH AS THE INSTITUTIONS AND THE INDIVIDUAL INTERESTS, WHICH MAY HAVE INFLUENCED THE FORMATION OF THE POLICY MAKING PROCESSES. UNDER THIS LIGHT, I PLANNED TO ADOPT THE QUALITATIVE METHODOLOGY OF RESEARCH WHICH I BELIEVE TO BE VERY EFFECTIVE AGAINST THE MORE DIFFICULT AND POSSIBLY REDUCTIVE APPLICATION OF QUANTITIVE DATA SETS. I RECKON THEREFORE THAT THE MOST APPROPRIATE TOOLS FOR INFORMATION PROCESSING INCLUDE CONTENT ANALYSIS, AND IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS TO PERSONALITIES OF THE POLITICAL PANORAMA (ÉLITE OR NOT) WHO HAVE PARTICIPATED IN THE PROCESS OF HIGHER EDUCATION REFORM FROM THE EIGHTIES TO PRESENT-DAY. THE TWO CASES TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION SURELY SET AN EXAMPLE OF RADICAL REFORM PROCESSES WHICH HAVE OCCURRED IN QUITE DIFFERENT CONTEXTS DETERMINED BY THE SOCIOECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS AND THE TRAITS OF THE ÉLITE. IN NEW ZEALAND THE DESCRIBED PROCESS HAS TAKEN PLACE WITH A STEADY PACE AND A GOOD GRADE OF CONSEQUANTIALITY, IN LINE WTH THE REFORMS IN OTHER STATE DIVISIONS DRIVEN BY THE IDEAS OF THE NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT. CONTRARILY IN ENGLAND THE REFORMATIVE ACTION OF MARGARET THATCHER HAS ACQUIRED A VERY RADICAL CONNOTATION AS IT HAS BROUGHT INTO THE AMBIT OF HIGHER EDUCATION POLICY CONCEPTS LIKE EFFICIENCY, EXCELLENCE, RATIONALIZATION THAT WOULD CONTRAST WITH THE GENERALISTIC AND MASS-ORIENTED IDEAS THAT WERE FASHIONABLE DURING THE SEVENTIES. THE MISSION I INTEND TO ACCOMPLISH THORUGHOUT MY RESEARCH IS TO INVESTIGATE AND ANALYSE INTO MORE DEPTH THE DIFFERENCES THAT SEEM TO EMERGE FROM TWO CONTEXTS WHICH MOST OF THE LITERATURE REGARDS AS A SINGLE MODEL: THE ANGLO-SAXON MODEL. UNDER THIS LIGHT, THE DENSE ANALYSIS OF POLICY PROCESSES ALLOWED TO BRING OUT BOTH THE CONTROVERSIAL AND CONTRASTING ASPECTS OF THE TWO REALITIES COMPARED, AND THE ROLE AND WEIGHT OF VARIABLES SUCH AS IDEAS (MAIN VARIABLE), INSTITUTIONAL SETTINGS AND INDIVIDUAL INTERESTS ACTING IN EACH CONTEXT. THE CASES I MEAN TO ATTEND PRESENT PECULIAR ASPECTS WORTH DEVELOPING AN IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS, AN OUTLINE OF WHICH WILL BE PROVIDED IN THIS ABSTRACT. ENGLAND THE CONSERVATIVE GOVERNMENT, SINCE 1981, INTRODUCED RADICAL CHANGES IN THE SECTOR OF HIGHER EDUCATION: FIRST CUTTING DOWN ON STATE FUNDINGS AND THEN WITH THE CREATION OF AN INSTITUTION FOR THE PLANNING AND LEADERSHIP OF THE POLYTECHNICS (NON-UNIVERSITY SECTOR). AFTERWARDS THE SCHOOL REFORM BY MARGARET THATCHER IN 1988 RAISED TO A GREAT STIR ALL OVER EUROPE DUE TO BOTH ITS CONSIDERABLE INNOVATIVE IMPRINT AND THE STRONG ATTACK AGAINST THE PEDAGOGY OF THE 'ACTIVE' SCHOOLING AND PROGRESSIVE EDUCATION, UNTIL THEN RECOGNIZED AS A MERIT OF THE BRITISH PUBLIC SCHOOL. IN THE AMBIT OF UNIVERSITY EDUCATION THIS REFORM, TOGETHER WITH SIMILAR MEASURES BROUGHT IN DURING 1992, PUT INTO PRACTICE THE CONSERVATIVE PRINCIPLES THROUGH A SERIES OF ACTIONS THAT INCLUDED: THE SUPPRESSION OF THE IRREMOVABILITY PRINCIPLE FOR UNIVERSITY TEACHERS; THE INTRODUCTION OF STUDENT LOANS FOR LOW-INCOME STUDENTS AND THE CANCELLATION OF THE CLEAR DISTINCTION BETWEEN UNIVERSITIES AND POLYTECHNICS. THE POLICIES OF THE LABOUR MAJORITY OF MR BLAIR DID NOT QUITE DIVERGE FROM THE CONSERVATIVES' POSITION. IN 2003 BLAIR'S CABINET RISKED TO BECOME A MINORITY RIGHT ON THE OCCASION OF AN IMPORTANT UNIVERSITY REFORM PROPOSAL. THIS PROPOSAL WOULD FORESEE THE AUTONOMY FOR THE UNIVERSITIES TO RAISE UP TO 3.000 POUNDS THE ENROLMENT FEES FOR STUDENTS (WHILE FORMERLY THE CEILING WAS 1.125 POUNDS). BLAIR HAD TO FACE INTERNAL OPPOSITION WITHIN HIS OWN PARTY IN RELATION TO A MEASURE THAT, ACCORDING TO THE 150 MPS PROMOTERS OF AN ADVERSE MOTION, HAD NOT BEEN INCLUDED IN THE ELECTORAL PROGRAMME AND WOULD RISK CREATING INCOME-BASED DISCRIMINATION AMONG STUDENTS. AS A MATTER OF FACT THE BILL FOCUSED ON THE INTRODUCTION OF VERY LOW-INTEREST STUDENT LOANS TO BE SETTLED ONLY WHEN THE STUDENT WOULD HAVE FOUND A REMUNERATED OCCUPATION (A SYSTEM ALREADY PROVIDED FOR BY THE AUSTRALIAN LEGISLATION). NEW ZEALAND CONTRARILY TO MANY OTHER COUNTRIES, NEW ZEALAND HAS ADOPTED A VERY WIDE VISION OF THE TERTIARY EDUCATION. IT INCLUDES IN FACT THE FULL EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMME THAT IS INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED AS THE POST-SECONDARY EDUCATION. SHOULD WE SPOTLIGHT A PECULIARITY OF THE NEW ZEALAND TERTIARY EDUCATION POLICY THEN IT WOULD BE 'CHANGE'. LOOKING AT THE REFORM HISTORY RELATED TO THE TERTIARY EDUCATION SYSTEM, WE CAN CLEARLY IDENTIFY FOUR 'SUB-PERIODS' FROM THE EIGHTIES TO PRESENT-DAY: 1. BEFORE THE 80S': AN ELITARIAN SYSTEM CHARACTERIZED BY LOW PARTICIPATION RATES. 2. BETWEEN MID AND LATE 80S': A TREND TOWARDS THE ENLARGEMENT OF PARTICIPATION ASSOCIATED TO A GREATER COMPETITION. 3. 1990-1999: A FUTHER STEP TOWARDS A COMPETITIVE MODEL BASED ON THE MARKET-ORIENTED SYSTEM. 4. FROM 2000 TO TODAY: A CONTINUOUS EVOLUTION TOWARDS A MORE COMPETITIVE MODEL BASED ON THE MARKET-ORIENTED SYSTEM TOGETHER WITH A GROWING ATTENTION TO STATE CONTROL FOR SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATION. AT PRESENT THE GOVERNMENT OF NEW ZEALAND OPERATES TO STRENGHTHEN THIS PROCESS, PRIMARILY IN RELATION TO THE ROLE OF TERTIARY EDUCATION AS A STEADY FACTOR OF NATIONAL WALFARE, WHERE PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT CONTRIBUTES ACTIVELY TO THE GROWTH OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMIC SYSTEM5. THE CASES OF ENGLAND AND NEW ZEALAND ARE THE FOCUS OF AN IN-DEPTH INVESTIGATION THAT STARTS FROM AN ANALYSIS OF THE POLICIES OF EACH NATION AND DEVELOP INTO A COMPARATIVE STUDY. AT THIS POINT I ATTEMPT TO DRAW SOME PRELIMINARY IMPRESSIONS ON THE FACTS ESSENTIALLY DECRIBED ABOVE. THE UNIVERSITY POLICIES IN ENGLAND AND NEW ZEALAND HAVE BOTH UNDERGONE A SIGNIFICANT REFORMATORY PROCESS SINCE THE EARLY EIGHTIES; IN BOTH CONTEXTS THE IMPORTANCE OF IDEAS THAT CONSTITUTED THE BASE OF POLITICS UNTIL 1980 WAS QUITE RELEVANT. GENERALLY SPEAKING, IN BOTH CASES THE PRE-REFORM POLICIES WERE INSPIRED BY EGALITARIANISM AND EXPANSION OF THE STUDENT POPULATION WHILE THOSE BROUGHT IN BY THE REFORM WOULD PURSUE EFFICIENCY, QUALITY AND COMPETITIVENESS. UNDOUBTEDLY, IN LINE WITH THIS GENERAL TENDENCY THAT REFLECTS THE HYPOTHESIS PROPOSED, THE TWO UNIVERSITY SYSTEMS PRESENT SEVERAL DIFFERENCES. THE UNIVERSITY SYSTEM IN NEW ZEALAND PROCEEDED STEADILY TOWARDS THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A MANAGERIAL CONCEPTION OF TERTIARY EDUCATION, ESPECIALLY FROM 1996 ONWARDS, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REFORMATORY PROCESS OF THE WHOLE PUBLIC SECTOR. IN THE UNITED KINGDOM, AS IN THE REST OF EUROPE, THE NEW APPROACH TO UNIVERSITY POLICY-MAKING HAD TO CONFRONT A DEEP-ROOTED TRADITION OF PROGRESSIVE EDUCATION AND THE IDEA OF EDUCATION EXPANSION THAT IN FACT DOMINATED UNTIL THE EIGHTIES. FROM THIS VIEW POINT THE GOVERNING ACTION OF MARGARET THATCHER GAVE RISE TO A RADICAL CHANGE THAT REVOLUTIONIZED THE OBJECTIVES AND KEY VALUES OF THE WHOLE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM, IN PARTICULAR IN THE HIGHER EDUCATION SECTOR. IDEAS AS EFFICIENCY, EXCELLENCE AND CONTROL OF THE PERFORMANCE BECAME DECISIVE. THE LABOUR CABINETS OF BLAIR DEVELOPED IN THE WAKE OF CONSERVATIVE REFORMS. THIS APPEARS TO BE A FOCAL POINT OF THIS STUDY THAT OBSERVES HOW ALSO IN NEW ZEALAND THE REFORMING PROCESS OCCURRED TRANSVERSELY DURING PROGRESSIVE AND CONSERVATIVE ADMINISTRATIONS. THE PRELIMINARY IMPRESSION IS THEREFORE THAT IDEAS DEEPLY MARK THE REFORMATIVE PROCESSES: THE AIM OF MY RESEARCH IS TO VERIFY TO WHICH EXTENT THIS STATEMENT IS TRUE. IN ORDER TO BUILD A COMPREHENSIVE ANALYLIS, FURTHER SIGNIFICANT FACTORS WILL HAVE TO BE INVESTIGATED: THE WAY IDEAS ARE PERCEIVED AND IMPLEMENTED BY THE DIFFERENT POLITICAL ELITES; HOW THE VARIOUS SOCIOECONOMIC CONTEXTS INFLUENCE THE REFORMATIVE PROCESS; HOW THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES CONDITION THE POLICY-MAKING PROCESSES; WHETHER INDIVIDUAL INTERESTS PLAY A ROLE AND, IF YES, TO WHICH EXTENT.
In Politics, one week can be a long time. The last couple of weeks in the Democratic Primary have dramatically changed the political landscape. Obama's "golden boy"image has suffered major setbacks and those asking for Hillary to quit now appear to have discovered a new "glow" surrounding her political persona.First there was that San Francisco speech in which Obama, with anthropological detachment, observed that he perfectly understood why people in mid-town America were "bitter" as their jobs "were being exported overseas" and as a consequence, were "clinging to their religion and their guns." This, together with other silly anecdotes during his campaign in Pennsylvania which purportedly showed a lack of connection with the common man (including his bad bowling scores, his discomfort in sitting around in a bar and sharing a beer with the locals, and his preference for arugula salad!), won him the label of elitist and out of touch with blue collar workers. These missteps were also well-exploited by Hillary Clinton, who in contrast with Obama, during the same campaigning route, portrayed herself as a "regular working gal", conquered the white blue-collar vote and did much better than expected in the wealthy Philadelphia suburbs. Thus, she won handily in Pennsylvania, and was able to extend the momentum gained in Ohio and Texas. Although it appears as a mathematical certainty that Obama will win the delegate count, she is still ahead in superdelegates, but, more importantly, Obama seems to be losing ground fast. If she wins Indiana and Obama gets North Carolina this coming Tuesday, the agony goes on.Bill Clinton is already talking about the popular vote (which Hillary is winning clearly if Florida votes count). That decision will most likely be made at the National Convention in August, if by then there is no declared winner.In the meantime, Obama has had to deal with the "Reverend problem", as Rev. Jeremiah Wright continued to damage his national image. When Barack denounced his anti-America sermons and declarations (the latest one being a claim that the US government had "invented the HIV virus as a means of genocide against people of color"), Wright replied that "he was a politician, and that is what politicians do," thus aiming at debunking the myth that Obama is a new type of leader, a Washington outsider. This led to Michelle Obama's appearances in CNN and NBC to try to damage control or, as she put it, to "define ourselves and not let other people define us." Her strong, intelligent and straightforward demeanor may have partially succeeded in restoring his image as a leader who is in it not for power but because he sincerely believes he can change the country; while she her certainty might have reassured followers, the Jeremiah Wright story will not go away so easily. How much this has hurt Obama's chances in the Primary still remains to be seen, but, more importantly, it may have inflicted a deadly wound to his national chances at the Presidency.Politics is a complex phenomenon and public opinion is fickle. Voters have little time to follow the vicissitudes of a campaign, to understand the nuances of ideas and policies, to make well-informed decisions on which candidate will better represent them. In fact, that is the main value of political parties: to help people make sense of politics. Their role is to offer clear and consistent policy positions so voters can make up their minds on which party better represents their values, needs and demands, to aggregate the vote and articulate voters interests. But they also must appeal to deeper feelings and emotions, and generate symbols of identification and allegiance, in order to mobilize people to participate.Several new phenomena are at play in this election and political strategists are bewildered by them. The first is the premise that we are beyond partisan politics and ideologies. This is Barack Obama's claim, that his style of "new politics" transcends ideological barriers and crosses over political parties. That there are no more "red states" and "blue states", just people with similar problems. That he can appeal to people everywhere and from all political convictions by focusing on their individual values, needs and demands. That the old divides, namely, Market versus State, Private versus Public, Rich versus Poor, White versus Black, don't apply anymore. He posits that those frameworks are the wrong questions to ask, he talks about the new politics of unity, and he reassures them that he will rule for all. And his historical example is Ronald Reagan, who won over to his side the "Reagan Democrats". Regardless of the fact that this is the wrong analogy (that could be the subject of a different article), the main problem is that perhaps at this point in time, post-ideological politics may not be good politics, and will not win the election. He concedes important ideological points that should instead be argued. This is what has given Hillary the momentum: she went back to basics, and is speaking to each group directly, stating her "bread and butter policies first" positions in clear, pragmatic terms. Her upbeat, clear-eyed mood is more appealing to many than his "egg-head", post-modern intellectual analysis. That is why he has the PhDs and she has the blue collar vote.The next problem that bemuses political thinkers is the fact that, at a time when Bush's approval ratings are the lowest in the history of Gallup (27% on job performance, 21% on the economy), John Mc Cain continues to run very close to his Democratic rivals (Obama leads him 46% to 43% and Clinton 45% to 44%). When voters are asked which party they would prefer to win the election, over 44 per cent say Democratic. Of Independents (one third of the electorate, which will have the decisive vote) two-to-one prefer Democrats. So why is John Mc Cain still doing so well? The answer can be found is his likability and his proven independence from the party in several instances during his Senate career. In an extremely skillful slalom motion, he has been able to first win back the conservative majority of the Republican party by supporting the troop surge in Iraq and gaining a bland Bush endorsement (no easy feat given his positions on immigration, campaign-finance reform and his criticism of the way the war in Iraq was executed, and then succeeded in moving away from Bush as fast as possible, visiting New Orleans and portraying himself as a caring protector of the poor.Although voters disagree with him on main issues, such as staying in Iraq for as long as it takes, they trust him, his sincerity, his patriotism and his values. His age does not appear to be a problem. But this dichotomy between lack of support for the party and favorable ratings for the candidate could be interpreted as another indication that parties are in demise. But the paradox here is that this decline in party allegiance is not for the post-modern reasons we have pointed out above (demise of ideologies of Left and Right, emergence of a range of post-material political issues such as the environment, consumer rights, and lifestyle choices). Instead, here we are confronted with an older type of politics, one that precededideologies, namely a more personalistic style of politics, based on primordial feelings about leaders who embody the Rousseauan will of the people. This is much more likely to be found in European "continental" and Latin American political cultures than in the Anglo-Saxon ones, where modern mass based representative parties were invented.If modern democracy in inconceivable without political parties, as Shattschneider and Schumpeter concluded, will charisma alone be enough to carry representative government forward? And, if the Primary goes his way, will the charisma of a Washington outsider and political dreamer trump the one of a down to earth Senator of Arizona? Will the issue of race play a role in the national election? Faced with the choice of a black candidate with admirable academic credentials but unproven political record running for the favorite party, and a white patriot representing a highly discredited party, who will Americans vote for? Political analysts and historians will have to wait at least until this November to sort all this out. Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Science and Geography Director, ODU Model United Nations Program Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia
Este documento refleja el entorno dentro del cual se está luchando actualmente por la justicia de género en el mundo. También da un paso para atrás para darnos un marco analítico que explique las tensiones centrales entre la justicia de género y otros elementos de la justicia social o económica y las implicaciones estratégicas de los múltiples sitios en que operan las relaciones de género. Se inspira en las experiencias de feministas que se dedicaron al análisis y a la promoción al mismo tiempo que participaban en las negociaciones de las conferencias de las Naciones Unidas de los años 90. Estas conferencias – sobre el medioambiente, los derecho humanos, la población, el desarrollo social, la mujer, la vivienda, los niños, el VIH/SIDA, la seguridad alimentaria, el racismo – y sus revisiones cada cinco o diez años – han brindado una oportunidad única para negociar un programa social progresivo de forma sistemática y seguida. Pero aun cuando se estaban acordando los detalles de un programa de este tipo, el ámbito de la política económica estaba casi completamente supeditado al pensamiento económico neoliberal dominado por el Consenso de Washington. La interacción entre estas dos fuerzas constituye nuestro tema principal. El documento también comenta las implicaciones para la justicia de género del cambio en el orden mundial hacia la monopolaridad, y especialmente, el cambio de la era neoliberal a una época neoconservadora. El trabajo de feministas y demás académicos y activistas después de las conferencias de los años 90, muestran claramente que la seguridad de los medios de vida y de un entorno económico habilitador forman una base importante para satisfacer las necesidades de salud reproductiva y sexual mediante sistemas sanitarios que funcionen bien (Petchesky 2003). Sin embargo, algunos de los países que apoyaban más fervientemente la lucha por los derechos sexuales y de reproducción eran los más refractarios en las negociaciones económicas entre el Norte y el Sur. Estas tensiones se hicieron sentir no solamente en las conferencias de la ONU, particularmente en El Cairo y Beijing, sino también en sus revisiones 'más cinco'. A pesar de esto, se lograron avances considerables en cuanto a los derechos de reproducción y de salud sexual durante los años 90 por el control limitado sobre el poder del Estado que tenían los fundamentalistas religiosos. Este escenario ha cambiado mucho en el período neoconservador mediante, por un lado, más control por parte de los fundamentalistas religiosos sobre los niveles claves del poder estatal y, por otro, el auge de una economía política neoconservadora. La primera década de este siglo ha producido pruebas tangibles e importantes de lo dicho en conferencias claves sobre el VIH/SIDA, la infancia, la población, y también en muchos otros foros. Este informe parte de análisis previos de la fase anterior para extraer las consecuencias para el terreno actual en el que los feministas y sus aliados están luchando para mantener sus logros difíciles y avanzar hacia delante. ; This paper is a reflection on the environment within which the struggle for gender justice is currently under way in the global arena. It also steps back to provide an analytical frame to explain the core of the tensions between gender justice and other elements of social/economic justice, and the strategic implications of the multiple sites in which gender relations operate. It draws from the experiences of feminists who engaged in analysis and advocacy while participating in the negotiations of the United Nations conferences of the 1990s. These conferences— on environment, human rights, population, social development, women, habitat, children, HIV/AIDS, small island states, food security, racism—and their five- and 10-year reviews have provided a unique opportunity for negotiating a progressive social agenda in a systematic and ongoing way. But even as such an agenda was being spelled out, the global economic policy terrain was almost entirely subordinated to neoliberal economic thinking dominated by the Washington Consensus. The interplay between these two sets of forces is our subject matter. The paper also comments on the implications for gender justice of the shift to a unipolar world order, and in particular, the movement from the neoliberal era to the neoconservative one. The work of feminist and other scholars and activists following the conferences of the 1990s showed clearly that security of livelihoods and an enabling economic environment are an important basis for moving forward to meet reproductive and sexual health needs through well-functioning health systems (Petchesky 2003). Yet some of the very countries that were most vocal in their support for sexual and reproductive rights were also the most hard-nosed in South–North economic negotiations. These tensions came to the fore not only in the UN conferences themselves, especially Cairo and Beijing, but also in their "plus five" reviews. Despite this, considerable advances were possible on reproductive and sexual health and rights during the 1990s because of the limited control over state power by religious fundamentalists. This scenario has undergone a major change in the neoconservative period, with much stronger control over key levers of state power by religious fundamentalists on the one hand, and the rise of neoconservative political economy on the other. The first decade of this century has seen significant and tangible evidence of this in key conferences on HIV/AIDS, children, and population, as well as in many other sites. This paper builds on previous analysis of the earlier phase to draw out implications for the current terrain in which feminists and allies are struggling to maintain hard-won gains and move forward. ; Ce document est une réflexion sur l'environnement dans lequel se poursuit la lutte pour la justice sexuelle dans le monde. L'auteur prend aussi du recul pour fournir une grille d'analyse qui permette d'expliquer l'essentiel des tensions entre la justice sexuelle et d'autres éléments de la justice sociale et économique, et de tirer les conséquences stratégiques de la multiplicité des espaces dans lesquels interviennent les rapports sociaux entre hommes et femmes. Elle s'appuie sur l'expérience de féministes qui ont fait un travail d'analyse et de sensibilisation alors qu'elles participaient aux négociations des conférences organisées par les Nations Unies dans les années 90. Ces conférences, qui ont porté sur l'environnement, les droits de l'homme, la population, le développement social, les femmes, l'habitat, les enfants, le VIH/sida, les petits Etats insulaires, la sécurité alimentaire, le racisme, et l'examen de leurs retombées cinq et dix ans après ont été des occasions sans pareille de négocier un programme social progressiste de manière systématique et continue. Mais au moment même où ce programme se définissait, le terrain de la politique économique mondiale était presque entièrement occupé par la pensée économique néolibérale, elle-même dominée par le consensus de Washington. L'interaction de ces deux types de force est précisément le thème de ce document. L'auteur traite aussi des répercussions qu'ont eues sur la justice sexuelle le passage à un ordre mondial unipolaire et, en particulier, l'avènement de l'ère néoconservatrice après l'ère néolibérale. Les travaux réalisés par des féministes et d'autres intellectuelles et militantes à la suite des conférences des années 90 ont montré clairement que la sécurité des moyens d'existence et un environnement économique favorable sont des conditions importantes pour la satisfaction des besoins de santé gynécologique et génésique dans un système de santé bien rodé (Petchesky 2003). Cependant, certains des pays les plus assidus à défendre les droits en matière de sexualité et de procréation ont été aussi les plus intraitables dans les négociations économiques Sud-Nord. Ces tensions sont apparues au grand jour non seulement dans les conférences des Nations Unies elles-mêmes, en particulier au Caire et à Beijing, mais aussi dans les conférences d'examen tenues cinq ans plus tard. Malgré cela, il a été possible de réaliser des progrès considérables sur les droits et la santé en matière de procréation et de sexualité dans les années 90 parce que les fondamentalistes religieux n'avaient qu'un pouvoir limité sur l'Etat. La situation a complètement changé pendant la période néoconservatrice, marquée, d'une part, par une tenue beaucoup plus ferme des principaux leviers de l'Etat par les fondamentalistes religieux et, de l'autre, par la montée de l'économie politique néo-conservatrice. On en a eu des preuves tangibles et multiples pendant la première décennie de ce siècle, lors des grandes conférences sur le VIH/sida, les enfants et la population, et à bien d'autres occasions. Ce document s'inspire d'une analyse de la phase antérieure pour tirer les conséquences qui s'imposent pour la situation actuelle, où les féministes et leurs alliés se battent pour conserver des acquis durement gagnés et aller de l'avant.
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UPDATE, 1/16: Trump won the Iowa caucuses early-on Monday night, with 51% of the vote totals, followed by Ron DeSantis at 21%, Nikki Haley at 19%, and Vivek Ramaswamy, who later suspended his campaign, at 8%. In exit polling, 12% voters said that foreign policy was their most important issue going into the caucuses, behind the economy (38%) and immigration (34%).On the eve of the Iowa Caucus, a Donald Trump caucus captain said that Nikki Haley was a "warmonger" and a shill for the Deep State, and that Ron DeSantis was pretty much the same.Welcome to the beginning of the 2024 Republican primary contests where foreign policy is very much a part of the conversation.While Trump is still far ahead of his primary competitors, the battle for a distant second is in play. A Des Moines Register/NBC News poll last week showed Trump with 48 percent in Iowa, Haley at 20 percent and DeSantis at 16 percent. Vivek Ramaswamy trails in fourth with 8 percent. The Iowa caucuses begin tonight at 8 p.m. EST.Just as noteworthy, an Associated Press poll released in early January revealed that, "Foreign policy has gained importance among respondents from both parties. Some 46% of Republicans named it, up from 23% last year. And 34% of Democrats list foreign policy as a focal point, compared with 16% a year ago.""It also shows that the Israeli-Hamas war is feeding public anxiety," AP noted, reporting that double the amount of Americans are bringing up foreign policy now as compared to last year's polling on the same subject. The data also showed concerns about U.S. involvement with the Ukraine conflict were about where they were a year ago.But via their positions on both the Israel-Gaza and Russia-Ukraine conflicts, this is a diverse GOP presidential field when it comes to foreign policy.Donald TrumpThe current Republican frontrunner boasted in the spring that he would settle the Ukraine-Russia war in 24 hours. "The key is the war has to stop now because Ukraine is being obliterated," Trump said in March.Meanwhile, he has issued intermittent and mixed messages on Israel-Gaza, though often seems to imply it was a problem of those entities and not necessarily the U.S."So you have a war that's going on, and you're probably going to have to let this play out," Trump told Univision in November. "You're probably going to have to let it play out because a lot of people are dying."Trump appeared to acknowledge that as far as grievances, there were two sides regarding Palestine and the Jewish state. "There is no hatred like the Palestinian hatred of Israel and Jewish people. And probably the other way around also, I don't know," the former president said. "You know, it's not as obvious, but probably that's it too. So sometimes you have to let things play out and you have to see where it ends." Trump has called what was taking place in Gaza "unbelievable."Nikki HaleyIf Trump's inclination on both Ukraine and Gaza is somewhere between diplomacy and letting things play out, there are not two sides in these conflicts for Nikki Haley. For the former United Nations ambassador, there is the impenetrable righteousness of Ukraine and Israel, and the undebatable evil of Russia and Palestine.And she wants the U.S. fully backing the good guys of both. If you liked George W. Bush kicking off the Global War on Terror by declaring, "either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists," then Haley is your candidate.For Republicans, particularly in leadership and the donor class, for whom Bush-Cheney still represents the fundamental approach to Republican foreign policy — trying desperately to ignore that attitudes in the Trump-era base have changed — Haley is unquestionably their candidate.Not surprisingly, neoconservative lodestar Bill Kristol is a big Haley fan, and on the flipside, antiwar Republican Sen. Rand Paul recently launched a 'Never Nikki' campaign.Ron DeSantisBut if some Trump supporters revel in calling Haley a "warmonger," Ron DeSantis, who began his campaign promoting himself as a more responsible or viable version of Trump, now often gets lumped in with Haley.After calling Ukraine-Russia a "territorial dispute" in March 2023, the Florida governor seemed quick to walk back his remark, calling Russian head Vladimir Putin a "war criminal."In contrast, Trump has been urged to call Putin a war criminal but has refused to do so, while also admitting Russia "made a mistake" in invading Ukraine. "If you say he's a war criminal it's going to be a lot tougher to make a deal to get this thing stopped," Trump said in May.Haley has said she thinks President Biden isn't being aggressive enough with Russia.DeSantis has said it is far more important to support Israel than Ukraine, and that he would not try to stop Israel's war in Gaza, going so far as to say in the last Republican debate that he would support "mass removal" of the Palestinians.Vivek RamaswamyThe clearest '"America First" foreign policy message in 2024 to date on these two conflicts has not come from Trump, but entrepreneur Vivek Ramaswamy, who doesn't want the U.S. involved in the Russia-Ukraine war and says a negotiated peace with Ukraine giving up some territory is the only solution. "I don't think it is preferable for Russia to be able to invade a sovereign country that is its neighbor, but I think the job of the U.S. president is to look after American interests," Ramaswamy said in June. Haley has said Putin is "salivating" over a Ramswamy presidency — a neocon tactic used in the past on anti-war Republican candidates like Ron Paul, who was constantly accused of siding with America's enemies.Ramaswamy has said Israel had the right to defend itself after the October 7 terrorist attacks, but opposes U.S. intervention and aid, but also says that aid should be contingent on what actions Israel's government takes in Gaza."Israel is barreling toward a potentially catastrophic ground invasion of Gaza without clear objectives," Ramaswamy said in late October. "'Destroy Hamas' is not on its own a viable or coherent strategy."The fight for the foreign policy mantleTwo decades after the Global War on Terror, some candidates still run to carry on the legacy of George W. Bush, but others — even frontrunners — appear to reject that kind of foreign policy.The same goes for some Republican voters, though they appear split on the Ukraine and Israel issues. While a growing number oppose more aid to Ukraine for example, a plurality say the U.S. is not doing enough to support Israel in its war on Gaza and are more likely than Democrats to support Israel's bombardment and siege of the Palestinian territory. There is some hope, with restrainers on the conservative side quite vocally questioning not only the strategic thinking behind Biden's recent strikes against the Houthis, but their constitutionality.What does a Republican foreign policy look like in 2024? We won't know for some time, but it's arguably more of a question than an answer right now than at any time in modern party history.
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With opinion polls showing Donald Trump ahead of Joe Biden in the 2024 race, Washington policymakers are contemplating the possibility of another Trump administration.No doubt there would be dramatic changes in U.S. foreign policy. Including, it appears, in Washington's approach to North Korea.As Politico reported: "Donald Trump is considering a plan to let the Democratic People's Republic of Korea keep its nuclear weapons and offer its regime financial incentives to stop making new bombs, according to three people briefed on his thinking." This would overturn decades of international insistence that the North eschew nuclear weapons, commonly called CVID: complete, verifiable, irreversible dismantlement/denuclearization. Until now, questioning this policy triggered wild wailing, gnashing of teeth, and rending of garments among Korea-watchers.The conventional wisdom is that Washington must stand firm — until the end of time, or beyond, if necessary — despite the growing North Korean nuclear arsenal. Pyongyang has enough fissile material to make at least 45-55 weapons, and perhaps twice that number, though estimates vary widely. Moreover, the DPRK continues to add nukes. One controversial study warned that the North could amass as many as 242 weapons in the next few years, which would place it ahead of Israel, Pakistan, India, and the United Kingdom.Virtually no one believes that Pyongyang will denuclearize. Only South Africa, with just six weapons (and another being constructed), has eliminated an existing arsenal. Almost certainly disarming the DPRK would require either defeat or collapse of the Kim dynasty. Regarding North Korea, fantasy has seemingly become policy.However, it appears that Trump is prepared to overturn conventional wisdom when it comes to Pyongyang — again. After threatening war in 2017, he turned to summitry with Kim Jong-un, a switch widely denounced in Washington. Distrust of Trump as a negotiator was pervasive, with the greatest fear that he would succeed and agree to something other than CVID. After the 2019 Hanoi summit collapsed without a deal, Kim appears to have decided that Trump was unwilling to agree to sanctions relief without a commitment to full denuclearization. The former then ended his dialogue with the US (and South Korea).Biden continues to insist on CVID, instructing the DPRK not to conduct another nuclear test. Despite his proposals for contact, which at times came perilously close to begging, Kim has refused to talk. Rather, the latter is expanding North Korea's nuclear capability, testing ballistic missiles, launching satellites, developing submarine-launched and tactical weapons, and threatening first use of nukes. These efforts may now be aided by Russia, which is relying on the North to provide artillery shells and perhaps more for the Ukraine war.The future looks no better. Last year after the Supreme People's Assembly enshrined the North's nuclear status in law, Kim declared that "As long as nuclear weapons exist on Earth, and imperialism and the anti-North Korean maneuvers of the US and its followers remain, our road to strengthening our nuclear force will never end." This policy, he added, is "irreversible." He is likely strengthening his nuclear deterrent to prepare for talks with Washington — presumably offering to trade nuclear limits for sanctions relief.Policymakers almost uniformly reject this course since arms control won't deliver denuclearization, Washington's preferred outcome. However, the result still would be better, likely far better, than Pyongyang continuing to augment its stockpile and replacing Pakistan as a global Nukes 'R Us. However, that doesn't matter to critics.Some simply insist that the North cannot have nuclear weapons. Of course, it shouldn't have them, but successive U.S. presidents repeating that point have left North Korea as an undisputed nuclear state. Another argument is that dropping CVID would undermine the nonproliferation regime. However, the DPRK's possession of nuclear weapons, not America's recognition of that reality, poses the real nonproliferation challenge. Another claim is that the Republic of Korea and Japan would doubt Washington's commitment to denuclearization of the North. But Washington's attitude matters little if North Korea rejects that objective. Alliance cooperation does not require blinkered dogmatic futility.For some analysts the greatest fear is that acknowledging the North's nuclear status would fuel ROK support for an independent nuclear deterrent. Again, pretending that the DPRK does not possess nuclear weapons does not make them disappear. Washington's hapless CVID policy will not comfort South Koreans worried about nuclear threats from the North and Washington's willingness to respond militarily.Indeed, the latter poses the biggest problem for today's Ostrich policy. Since everyone knows Pyongyang is expanding its arsenal and means of delivery, the critical question is what to do in response. South Koreans might accept the pretense that CVID is a serious objective so long as Washington is willing to risk the American homeland and potentially millions of American lives to defend the South in the event of war.Alas, the "Washington Declaration," which grew out of South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol's visit to the US, engaged in magical thinking. Announced the two governments: "The ROK has full confidence in U.S. extended deterrence commitments and recognizes the importance, necessity, and benefit of its enduring reliance on the U.S. nuclear deterrent." Wonderful rhetoric, and hardly surprising, given how well the two presidents got along. However, the more and more sophisticated North Korea's armaments, the less credible this policy becomes.The DPRK is not going to launch a first strike on America. Indeed, absent U.S. security guarantees to and troops in the South, Pyongyang would pay little more attention to Washington than to Brussels or, frankly, to New Delhi or Sydney. However, the U.S. is prepared to strike the North, and in the event of war almost certainly would attempt to overthrow the Kim dynasty. Hence, Pyongyang's desire for an expansive deterrent — a mix of tactical and strategic weapons, with the latter distributed among submarine- and land-based missiles, the latter sporting multiple warheads. What American president then would be so reckless and irrational to put South Korea before the U.S.? Defending the ROK, a country well able to protect itself, is not worth risking millions of Americans' lives.In short, no amount of presidential karaoke is likely to preserve confidence in extended deterrence once Pyongyang credibly threatens the U.S. homeland. The best way to at least moderate the North Korean nuclear threat would be to abandon the CVID campaign and instead promote arms control, meaningful and verifiable limits on the DPRK's program in exchange for sanctions relief. And to do so sooner rather than later. At least, setting realistic objectives would be more likely to yield success. And if diplomacy restrained the North, Washington could resurrect CVID in future negotiations. Perhaps North Korean policy, leadership, or regime will eventually change. Donald Trump's foreign policy mistakes were many, but on the North's nuclear challenge he has been farsighted compared to most foreign policy analysts. That continues with his reported willingness to deal with the DPRK as it is, not how everyone wishes it were. North Korea is a nuclear state. It is time to confront that reality.
