Suchergebnisse

Autor opracowania stawia sobie za cel zbadanie usytuowania OLAF-u w systemie wielopoziomowego zarządzania UE (Multi-level Governance - MLG) wraz z określonymi interinstytucjonalnymi zależnościami i konsekwencjami takiego usytuowania, przy założeniu, że OLAF nie jest klasyczną instytucją ponadnarodową. Skoro OLAF jako agent i supervisor posiada kompetencje kontrolne nad instytucjami ponadnarodowymi, w tym nad swoim mocodawcą, jakim jest ponadnarodowa Komisja Europejska, to mało prawdopodobne jest, aby był także instytucją ponadnarodową.W badaniach wykorzystano dwa narzędzia teoretyczno-metodologiczne: Principal/Agent Theory oraz Principal/Supervisor/Agent Theory. ; The author of the study aims to investigate the location of OLAF in the multi-level governance system (MLG) of the European Union with specific interinstitutional consequences of such location, assuming that OLAF is not a classical supranational institution. If OLAF as an agent and supervisor has control powers over supranational institutions, including its principal, a supranational European Commission, it is unlikely that it would also be a supranational institution.Two theoretical and methodological tools were used in this research: Principal/Agent Theory and Principal/Supervisor/Agent Theory.

Autor opracowania stawia sobie za cel zbadanie usytuowania OLAF-u w systemie wielopoziomowego zarządzania UE (Multi-level Governance – MLG) wraz z określonymi interinstytucjonalnymi zależnościami i konsekwencjami takiego usytuowania, przy założeniu, że OLAF nie jest klasyczną instytucją ponadnarodową. Skoro OLAF jako agent i supervisor posiada kompetencje kontrolne nad instytucjami ponadnarodowymi, w tym nad swoim mocodawcą, jakim jest ponadnarodowa Komisja Europejska, to mało prawdopodobne jest, aby był także instytucją ponadnarodową. W badaniach wykorzystano dwa narzędzia teoretyczno-metodologiczne: Principal/Agent Theory oraz Principal/Supervisor/Agent Theory. ; The author of the study aims to investigate the location of OLAF in the multi-level governance system (MLG) of the European Union with specific interinstitutional consequences of such location, assuming that OLAF is not a classical supranational institution. If OLAF as an agent and supervisor has control powers over supranational institutions, including its principal, a supranational European Commission, it is unlikely that it would also be a supranational institution. Two theoretical and methodological tools were used in this research: Principal/Agent Theory and Principal/Supervisor/Agent Theory.

The fundamental thesis of this paper is that Moldovan civil society needs to improve its communication with society. The dependence of Moldovan NGOs on financial aid from EU donors could create a Principal/Agent relationship. NGOs should respect the needs of society and stimulate the government on a pro-European path. The author proves that communication between public administration and civil society is crucial in the process of integration with the EU. ; Artykuł przedstawia wybrane elementy sytuacji społeczeństwa obywatelskiego w Mołdawii. Podstawową tezą artykułu jest stwierdzenie, że organizacje społeczeństwa obywatelskiego w Mołdawii muszą poprawić swoją komunikację ze społeczeństwem. Uzależnienie mołdawskich NGO od pomocy finansowej od donatorów z UE może tworzyć stosunki zleceniodawca/agent. NGO powinny uwzględniać potrzeby społeczeństwa i stymulować rząd na ścieżce proeuropejskiej. Autor dowodzi, że komunikacja między administracją publiczną i społeczeństwem obywatelskim ma kluczowe znaczenie w procesie integracji z UE.

The study was prepared on the basis of the Principal-Agent Theory (PAT) and a method that is associated with it. This choice resulted from the major trajectories in the delegation processes, established on the one hand by states playing the role of principals, and on the other – by supranational institutions in their role as agents.The delegation theory explains the relationship between an entity that delegates power and that which is delegated (the receiving power) and helps analyze the phenomenon of the transfer of power between those entities, its reasons, circumstances, stages of the process, the outcomes and proper terminology and typology. This approach is, therefore, based and focused on the theoretical achievements in the area of research into the process of delegating. The delegation theory is actually the focal plane of theoretical approaches concerning delegating with the elements of the selection of the methods and logic of explanation, and so on. In addition to the clarification of the term of delegation of power and its stages, two basic types of delegation are examined, namely: primary and secondary delegation, and their derivatives, including the relationships between them in the multi-level governance of the European Union. ; The study was prepared on the basis of the Principal-Agent Theory (PAT) and a method that is associated with it. This choice resulted from the major trajectories in the delegation processes, established on the one hand by states playing the role of principals, and on the other – by supranational institutions in their role as agents.The delegation theory explains the relationship between an entity that delegates power and that which is delegated (the receiving power) and helps analyze the phenomenon of the transfer of power between those entities, its reasons, circumstances, stages of the process, the outcomes and proper terminology and typology. This approach is, therefore, based and focused on the theoretical achievements in the area of research into the process of delegating. The delegation theory is actually the focal plane of theoretical approaches concerning delegating with the elements of the selection of the methods and logic of explanation, and so on. In addition to the clarification of the term of delegation of power and its stages, two basic types of delegation are examined, namely: primary and secondary delegation, and their derivatives, including the relationships between them in the multi-level governance of the European Union.

Socio-economic transformation as a profound and thorough reform of the system and institutions promotes corruption practices and can be the means to fight one, too. Two kinds of understanding of corruption may be indicated: narrow (pathological and functional interpretation) and wider emphasising the neo-institutional argumentation, pointing out to systemic and structural causes of corruption. A theoretical and practical problem remains, whether corruption is of systemic nature (fundamental institution), or is secondary (consequence institution).The analysis of corruption may be done by means of the new institutionalism and consequence theories: transaction costs, theory of property rights, theory of clubs, principal-agent theory, theory of asymmetry information, capture theories, rent seeking theory, theory of games and theory of public choice.The dynamics of the Polish economy and wide researches in corruption (the differences between perceiving and experiencing) indicates that the corruption factors which paralyse the economic development have not dominated the economic system in Poland as yet, and that the system maintains its autonomy. Still, typical corruption- clientelistic societies are not common today, also in Poland. The above problems do not change the fact that corruption is a major problem and in the long run would cause a loss of competitiveness of Polish economy on the global market.

Teoria agencji jest wykorzystywana przede wszystkim do opisu zjawisk składających się na ład korporacyjny. Podejmowane są również próby użycia tej platformy teoretycznej do opisu procesów zawiązanych z funkcjonowaniem systemu szkolnictwa wyższego. Związki kontraktowe w tym sektorze umożliwiają wskazanie instytucji, które w zależności od przyjętej perspektywy badawczej mogą pełnić rolę pryncypała lub agenta. Najczęściej przedmiotem analiz są relacje występujące na styku państwo/rząd (pryncypał) – uczelnie publiczne (agenci). Celem artykułu jest ocena propozycji reformy systemu szkolnictwa wyższego w Polsce, przy wykorzystaniu perspektywy badawczej zawartej w teorii agencji. Jest to punkt wyjścia po pierwsze do identyfikacji najważniejszych dysfunkcjonalności obecnego systemu traktowanych jako przejawy problemu agencji. Po drugie propozycje nowych zasad funkcjonowania systemu zostały skonfrontowane z teoretycznymi mechanizmami łagodzenia konfliktu interesów: kontraktem opartym na wynikach i kontraktem opartym na obserwacji zachowań agenta. Rozważania zaprezentowane w artykule wskazują na możliwość identyfikacji efektywnych struktur instytucjonalnych w systemie szkolnictwa wyższego, których istotą jest rozwiązywanie problemu agencji. Fundamentem rekomendacji zawartych w propozycjach reformy systemu jest postulat zwiększenia autonomii instytucyjnej uczelni publicznych w stosunku do władz państwowych, ale również w stosunku do wewnętrznych jednostek. To silne kierownictwo uczelni, motywowane przez pryncypała za pomocą zindywidualizowanych narzędzi, przede wszystkim finansowych, sprawujące efektywną kontrolę nad procesami wewnątrz uczelni, jest warunkiem realizacji celów stojących przed polskim sektorem szkolnictwa wyższego. ; Agency theory is a concept used primarily to describe corporate governance phenomena. This theoretical platform is also used to describe the processes associated with the functioning of the higher education system. Contractual relationships in this sector make it possible to identify institutions that may act as principal or agent, depending on the perspective of the research perspective. Relations between the state / government (principal) and public universities (agents) are the most commonly studied subjects. The aim of the article is to present proposals for the reform of the higher education system in Poland, using agency theory as the research perspective. This was the starting point first to identify the most important dysfunctionalities of the current system as a manifestation of the agency problem. Secondly, the proposed new standards for the functioning of the system were confronted with theoretical mechanisms which are used to reduce conflict of interest: outcome-based contract and behavior-based contract. The considerations presented in the article point to the ability to identify effective institutional structures in the higher education system, the essence of which is to solve the agency problem. The foundation of the recommendations contained in all reform proposals is the desire to increase the institutional autonomy of public universities, in relation to state authorities, but also in relation to internal academic units. It is the strong leadership of the university, motivated by the principle of using personalized tools, primarily financial, with effective control over the processes within the university, is a fundament for achieving the goals of the Polish higher education sector.

Socio-economic transformation as profound and thorough reform of the system and institutions promotes corruption practices and can be the mean to fight against one, too. Two kinds of understanding of corruption may be indicated: narrow (pathologic and functional interpretation) and wider underlined the neo-institutional argumentation, pointing out to systemic and structural causes of corruption. A theoretical and practical problem remains, whether corruption are of systemic nature (fundamental institution), or are secondary (consequence institutuion). The analysis of corruption, may be done by means of the new institutionalism and consequence theories: transaction costs, theory of property rights, theory of clubs, principal-agent theory, theory of asymmetry information, capture theories, rent seeking theory, theory of games and theory of public choice. The dynamics of the polish economy and wide researches of corruption (the differences between perceiving and experiencing) indicates that the corruption factors which paralyse the economic development have not dominated the economic system in Poland as yet, and that system maintains its autonomy. Still, typical corruption-clientelistic societies are contemporary not common, in Poland too. The above problems do not change the fact that corruption are a major problem and in the long run would causes loss of competitiveness polish economy on the global market. ; Społeczno-ekonomiczna transformacja jako głęboka reforma systemu i instytucji przyczynia się do korupcyjnych praktyk, ale może być też narzędziem w walce z tym zjawiskiem. Występują dwa rozumienia korupcji: węższe (patologiczna i funkcjonalna interpretacja) i szersze podkreślające argumentację neoinstytucjonalną (systemowe i strukturalne źródła korupcji). Teoretycznym i praktycznym problemem pozostaje więc, czy korupcja ma naturę systemową (fundamentalna instytucja), czy drugorzędną (instytucja pochodna). Narzędziem badań może być nowy instytucjonalizm i zawierające się w nim teorie: kosztów transakcyjnych, praw własności, klubów, pryncypała-agenta, asymetrii informacji, .zawłaszczenia, pogoni za rentą, teorii gier i teorii wyboru publicznego. Dynamika polskiej gospodarki i szerokie badania korupcji (różnice między jej postrzeganiem a doświadczeniem) wskazują, że korupcyjne czynniki, które ograniczają wzrost ekonomiczny nie zdominowały jeszcze polskiej gospodarki i zachowuje ona swoją autonomię. Typowe społeczeństwa klientelistyczno-korupcyjne nie są obecnie zjawiskiem powszechnym, także w Polsce. Nie zmienia to jednak tego, że korupcja pozostaje głównym społecznym problemem i dłuższym horyzoncie czasowym może powodować utratę konkurencyjności polskiej gospodarki na globalnym rynku.

Socio-economic transformation as profound and thorough reform of the system and institutions promotes corruption practices and can be the mean to fight against one, too. Two kinds of understanding of corruption may be indicated: narrow (pathologic and functional interpretation) and wider underlined the neo-institutional argumentation, pointing out to systemic and structural causes of corruption. A theoretical and practical problem remains, whether corruption are of systemic nature (fundamental institution), or are secondary (consequence institutuion). The analysis of corruption, may be done by means of the new institutionalism and consequence theories: transaction costs, theory of property rights, theory of clubs, principal-agent theory, theory of asymmetry information, capture theories, rent seeking theory, theory of games and theory of public choice. The dynamics of the polish economy and wide researches of corruption (the differences between perceiving and experiencing) indicates that the corruption factors which paralyse the economic development have not dominated the economic system in Poland as yet, and that system maintains its autonomy. Still, typical corruption-clientelistic societies are contemporary not common, in Poland too. The above problems do not change the fact that corruption are a major problem and in the long run would causes loss of competitiveness polish economy on the global market. ; Społeczno-ekonomiczna transformacja jako głęboka reforma systemu i instytucji przyczynia się do korupcyjnych praktyk, ale może być też narzędziem w walce z tym zjawiskiem. Występują dwa rozumienia korupcji: węższe (patologiczna i funkcjonalna interpretacja) i szersze podkreślające argumentację neoinstytucjonalną (systemowe i strukturalne źródła korupcji). Teoretycznym i praktycznym problemem pozostaje więc, czy korupcja ma naturę systemową (fundamentalna instytucja), czy drugorzędną (instytucja pochodna). Narzędziem badań może być nowy instytucjonalizm i zawierające się w nim teorie: kosztów transakcyjnych, praw własności, klubów, pryncypała-agenta, asymetrii informacji, .zawłaszczenia, pogoni za rentą, teorii gier i teorii wyboru publicznego. Dynamika polskiej gospodarki i szerokie badania korupcji (różnice między jej postrzeganiem a doświadczeniem) wskazują, że korupcyjne czynniki, które ograniczają wzrost ekonomiczny nie zdominowały jeszcze polskiej gospodarki i zachowuje ona swoją autonomię. Typowe społeczeństwa klientelistyczno-korupcyjne nie są obecnie zjawiskiem powszechnym, także w Polsce. Nie zmienia to jednak tego, że korupcja pozostaje głównym społecznym problemem i dłuższym horyzoncie czasowym może powodować utratę konkurencyjności polskiej gospodarki na globalnym rynku.

This paper seeks answers to the following two research questions: whether it is possible to have democracy without people (here as an example of democracy at the supranational level in the EU), and what are the sources of such a democracy, if the source is not a nation, and the area is not a state? This paper provides a new approach to the theory of democracy and postulates to integrate a new type of democracy and traditional concept of democracy. The main theoretical paradigm on which the theory was based is supranationalism with elements of the theory of democracy and Multi-level Governance (MLG). Supranational democracy in the European Union is located on a supranational level of MLG, which means that it is not assigned to the state and – importantly – in practice demonstrates that it does not have to have a national character. The text presents a preliminary attempt at a theoretical analysis related to supranational democracy in the EU. In practice, the author goes towards identifying the constituent components of the concept of "supranational democracy" and the sources of this phenomenon in the European Union. ; This paper seeks answers to the following two research questions: whether it is possible to have democracy without people (here as an example of democracy at the supranational level in the EU), and what are the sources of such a democracy, if the source is not a nation, and the area is not a state? This paper provides a new approach to the theory of democracy and postulates to integrate a new type of democracy and traditional concept of democracy. The main theoretical paradigm on which the theory was based is supranationalism with elements of the theory of democracy and Multi-level Governance (MLG). Supranational democracy in the European Union is located on a supranational level of MLG, which means that it is not assigned to the state and – importantly – in practice demonstrates that it does not have to have a national character. The text presents a preliminary attempt at a theoretical analysis related to supranational democracy in the EU. In practice, the author goes towards identifying the constituent components of the concept of "supranational democracy" and the sources of this phenomenon in the European Union.

The goal of the article is to present a theoretical and practical evaluation of experience of apolitical civil servants working in committee-style preparatory bodies of the Council of the European Union and the European Commission. In the first part the hypotheses resulting from three theories of integration of different range (liberal intergovernmentalism, fusion theory, and deliberative supranationalism) are presented. The second part consists of the verification of those hypotheses, based on an empirical study conducted by the Author in 2013 in the period between January and June. The survey included Polish officials attending the meetings of committees and was followed by interviews.The thesis of the article is based on the assumption that the majority of decisions of the Council and the Commission are actually made in apolitical preparatory bodies. Both "bargaining" and "problem solving" attitudes, representing both political and apolitical models of EU decision making, are present at this level. Theoretically, the most appropriate attitude is the combination of the liberal intergovernmentalism, the fusion theory, and the deliberative supranationalism. Those approaches can serve as general theories of integration and can be used to explain other elements of EU functioning.

The goal of the article is to present a theoretical and practical evaluation of experience of apolitical civil servants working in committee-style preparatory bodies of the Council of the European Union and the European Commission. In the first part the hypotheses resulting from three theories of integration of different range (liberal intergovernmentalism, fusion theory, and deliberative supranationalism) are presented. The second part consists of the verification of those hypotheses, based on an empirical study conducted by the Author in 2013 in the period between January and June. The survey included Polish officials attending the meetings of committees and was followed by interviews.The thesis of the article is based on the assumption that the majority of decisions of the Council and the Commission are actually made in apolitical preparatory bodies. Both "bargaining" and "problem solving" attitudes, representing both political and apolitical models of EU decision making, are present at this level. Theoretically, the most appropriate attitude is the combination of the liberal intergovernmentalism, the fusion theory, and the deliberative supranationalism. Those approaches can serve as general theories of integration and can be used to explain other elements of EU functioning.

The purpose of this paper is to provide a political and legal analysis of the choice options, decisionmaking processes and negotiation strategies of political actors in dispute over the date of the presidential elections in Poland the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. Possible decisions are outlined in the form of a modified decision tree known from the decision theory, taking into account not only the options falling within the scope of individual actors' performance, but also scenarios triggered by specific choices and interdependent on the behavior of other actors (their cooperation or lack of cooperation). The descriptive-explanatory and predictive analysis is based on the assumptions of the public choice theory. The article also explains the legal determinants and boundaries of actions available to political actors ; Teisės fakultetas ; Vytauto Didžiojo universitetas

The paper is an attempt to outline a coherent methodological framework fostering a more sociologically informed perspective on the problem of corruption risk as it is typical of the functioning of state institutions in Poland. The approach is based upon the concept of a 'corruption event' which combines agential dispositions to take part in corrupt exchanges as well as their structural and systemic determinants. In this way, assuming the theory of social becoming as a starting point, the postulated methodology investigates the problem of corruption from the theoretical perspective of sociologies aiming to provide a holistic and synthetic ontology whose objective is to overcome the dichotomy between agency and structure.

In the post-cold era, the economic and military power of the People's Republic of China is constantly growing. As a result, the rebirth of the idea of the protectionist economic policy, which has always been present in the American public debate, took place in the U.S. This idea is evidently reflected in the foreign policy of the President of the United States of America, Donald Trump. This article includes the analysis of the contemporary economic protectionism of the United States from the perspective of the offensive realism theory created by John Mearsheimer. The theory is based on three fundamental assumptions: the structure of the international system is anarchic, the primary goal of a state is to survive, for that reason states seek maximalization of their power. ; W epoce pozimnowojennej ma miejsce stały wzrost potęgi ekonomicznej oraz militarnej Chińskiej Republiki Ludowej. Owa tendencja spowodowała odrodzenie idei protekcjonizmu gospodarczego w Stanach Zjednoczonych, która była wcześniej obecna w amerykańskiej debacie publicznej. Owa idea wyraźnie się przejawia w polityce obecnego Prezydenta USA Donalda Trumpa. Artykuł zawiera analizę współczesnego zjawiska protekcjonizmu gospodarczego USA z perspektywy teorii realizmu ofensywnego stworzonej przez Johna Mearsheimera, której podstawowymi założeniami są przekonanie o anarchicznej strukturze systemu międzynarodowego oraz o przetrwaniu jako naczelnym celu państwa, które w związku z tym dąży do maksymalizacji własnej potęgi.

W artykule zostały postawione dwa następujące pytania badawcze: jak wygląda demokracja bez narodu (tutaj na przykładzie demokracji na poziomie ponadnarodowym w UE)?, oraz jakie są źródła takiej demokracji, skoro źródłem nie jest naród, a obszarem występowania nie jest państwo? Głównym paradygmatem teoretycznym, na jakim zostało oparte opracowanie jest teoria ponadnarodowość z elementami teorii demokracji oraz multi-level Governance (MLG). Demokracja ponadnarodowa w Unii Europejskiej, jest ulokowana na jednym, ponadnarodowym po¬ziomie w MLG, co oznacza, że nie jest ona przypisana do państwa i - co istotne - w praktyce dowodzi, że wcale nie musi ona mieć charakteru narodowego. W tekście pojawia się wstępna próba analizy teoretycznej odnoszącej się do demokracji ponadnarodowej w UE. W praktyce za¬interesowania Autora poszły w kierunku identyfikacji komponentów składowych pojęcia "demokracja ponadnarodowa" oraz źródeł tego zjawiska w Unii Europejskiej. ; This paper seeks answers to the following two research questions: whether it is possible to have democracy without people (here as an example of democracy at the supranational level in the EU), and what are the sources of such a democracy, if the source is not a nation, and the area is not a state? This paper provides a new approach to the theory of democracy and postulates to integrate a new type of democracy and traditional concept of democracy. The main theoretical paradigm on which the theory was based is supranationalism with elements of the theory of democracy and Multi-level Governance (MLG). Supranational democracy in the European Union is located on a supranational level of MLG, which means that it is not assigned to the state and - importantly in practice demonstrates that it does not have to have a national character. The text presents a preliminary attempt at a theoretical analysis related to supranational democracy in the EU. In practice, the author goes towards identifying the constituent components of the concept of "su¬pranational democracy" and the sources of this phenomenon in the European Union.