Suchergebnisse

Au milieu du xxe siècle, le paradigme de la sécularisation annonçait, sinon la disparition totale, au moins la perte de toute influence du religieux sur le politique. Quelques décennies après, un brusque virement de la perception dominante s'était produit. Le (re)surgissement des fondamentalismes dans les principaux courants religieux de la planète demandait alors une révision de la réconfortante vision d'un monde libre de virulences religieuses et marchant droitement vers un avenir de progrès. Le paradigme du choc des civilisations s'est donc substitué à celui de la sécularisation. Scrutant de manière critique ces deux paradigmes, cet ouvrage propose une analyse de la place des groupes religieux en droit international. De la liberté collective de religion aux persécutions religieuses, et de la protection des groupes religieux minoritaires à la poursuite pénale des responsables des crimes contre ces groupes, les différentes formes d'encastrement du religieux à l'intérieur du discours juridique international sont abordées. L'ouvrage met en exergue les subtils compromis politiques sous-jacents à la construction de ce discours, les formes juridiques n'étant qu'une des manifestations d'un équilibre toujours instable entre le religieux et le séculier

Religious freedom encompasses the right of religious groups to define the tenets of their faith andto organise themselves according to these tenets, without arbitrary State interference. However, the limitsof religious groups' autonomy are controversial, especially in those cases where the exercise of religiousautonomy seems to be at odds with non-discrimination standards. The Inter-American Court of HumanRights has adopted many decisions on sexual orientation discrimination, but its case law on religiousfreedom is much scarcer. The two issues converged in the recent decision Pavez Pavez v Chile, in which theCourt set the limits of the autonomy of religious groups when confronted with non-discrimination standards.

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (later transformed into the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) was born with the aim of constituting a forum for dialogue between international actors with radically different political options and conceptions of security. After the end of the Cold War, the Organization's discourse was reoriented towards the promotion of a robust demiocratic ideal. However, the facts showed the limits of the initial optimism. The effective practice of the Organization continued to adhere to a traditional concept of security as interstate security, with some attention to the human rights dimension, but also with a high tolerance for non-democratic regimes. This variable geometry between the components of the concept of security is related to the very nature of the Organization: it was born as a way of guaranteeing a modus vivendi between States with conflicting interests and ideologies and maintains this character to a large extent, although nowadays the opposition is not between two different economic models but between States with varying degrees of democratization.

According to Article 41 of the Argentinian Constitution, all inhabitants have a right to environmental protection. Citizens have a right to a healthy and balanced environment, suitable for human development and productive activities to satisfy present needs without compromising those of future generations. The paper aims to analyze the tensions implicit in applying this constitutional norm by the Federal Supreme Court using the methodology of public law and legal theory. Indeed, the constitutional provision is broad, and its interpretation can lead to different solutions in a specific case. There are three main issues of legal interest discussed here. First, there is a delicate balance of protecting the environment against private property and economic activity, which the latter also being assured by the constitution. The point is particularly acute in Argentina, whose economy strongly depends on the primary sector. Second, there are tensions between the political branches (legislative/executive) and the judiciary. Environmental standards established by the judiciary are usually higher than those decided by the legislative branch. However, giving the judges the possibility to determine those standards in the absence of any previous legal norm (or even, sometimes, against that norm) could be a source of legal uncertainty. Finally, due to the federal nature of the Argentinian political system, the distribution of legislative and jurisdictional powers between the federal and local governments is disputed. In this equation, leaning towards the federal government may favor more homogeneity in environmental standards, which would simultaneously reduce local autonomy. This paper showsthat the Supreme Court tries to balance different constitutional values in resolving these tensions. The difficulty of finding an adequate constitutional balance is usually added to the legal and factual complexity of environmental issues, and the result is not always completely satisfactory. KEYWORDS: Argentina, Environmental Protection, ...

The determination of the obligations to prevent and repair environmental damage is linked to complex discussions of environmental justice, particularly with regard to the distribution of the burdens generated by these obligations. The article analyses who and under what conditions can decide this distribution. Two aspects are considered. The first is that of the balance between the legislative and executive branches, on the one hand, and the judicial branch, on the other. The second refers to the way in which the environmental protection, implicit in the obligations to prevent and repair damage, is combined with other constitutional rights. For this analysis, Argentine constitutional law, which since 1994 expressly protects the environment, is taken as a starting point. The question of the object of constitutional protection and how key concepts such as environmental damage and hazardous activity should be delimited are addressed. It is concluded that the distribution of the burdens generated by the prevention and repair of environmental damage requires considering the dimension of democratic legitimacy and forces us to think about a new determination of the limits between constitutional rights. ; La concreción de las obligaciones de prevenir y reparar el daño ambiental se vincula a complejas discusiones de justicia ambiental, particularmente en lo que respecta a la distribución de las cargas generadas por estas obligaciones. El artículo analiza quién y bajo qué condiciones decide esta distribución de cargas. Dos aspectos son considerados. El primero es el del balance entre las ramas legislativa y ejecutiva, por un lado, y la rama judicial, por el otro. El segundo se refiere al modo en que la protección ambiental implícita en las obligaciones de prevenir y reparar se conjuga con otros derechos constitucionales. Para este análisis, se toma como punto de partida el derecho constitucional argentino, que desde 1994 protege expresamente el medio ambiente. Se aborda la cuestión del objeto de protección constitucional ...

The concept of MERCOSUR citizenship, based on the freedom of movement and the equality of civil and social rights, intended a transition from a strictly economic regional integration to a political one. However, the weaknesses of the regional process (such as the slowness of the internalization of regional regulations, the heterogeneities in that internalization and the concurrence of other regional processes) hamper the consolidation of a regional regime of citizenship, leading to inequalities incompatible with the very concept of citizenship.
MERCOSUR, citizenship, economic integration, political integration, freedom of movement, equality, UNASUR

RésuméL'article considère l'interdiction des expulsions collectives dans la jurisprudence de la Cour européenne des droits de l'homme. La Cour adopte un point de vue réaliste qui permet d'inclure dans cette interdiction les expulsions au sens strict et les actes de non-admission, exigeant aux États d'agir toujours de bonne foi. Or, elle n'y inclut pas les expulsions implicites, et rabaisse significativement la protection conventionnelle par l'exclusion de l'exigence d'un entretien individuel. La possibilité de son application extraterritoriale et l'impossibilité d'écarter la responsabilité étatique sur la base d'accords avec des États tiers montrent cependant la portée large accordée à l'interdiction.

The European Court of Human Rights has developed the idea that religious freedom, as recognised by the European Convention on Human Rights, limits States possible approaches toward religion. The limits are related to the privatisation of religion as well as its differentiation from political power. The article proposes to evaluate the role of the European Court in the construction of a principle of State religious neutrality from the point of view of a critically revisited concept of secularisation. ; La Cour Européenne des Droits de l'Homme a développé l'idée que la liberté religieuse, reconnue par la Convention Européenne des Droits de l'Homme, impose des limites aux attitudes possibles des États envers le religieux. Ces limites s'inscrivent dans une démarche de privatisation du phénomène religieux ainsi que d'autonomisation entre celui-ci et le pouvoir politique. L'article propose de revisiter de manière critique l'idée de sécularisation pour comprendre le rôle de la Cour Européenne dans la construction d'un principe de neutralité étatique en matière de religion.

The paper addresses the issue of the expulsion of aliens under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. General aspects of the expulsion of aliens, as well as the situation of aliens under the Covenant, are first studied. Then the paper approaches the expulsion of aliens under the Covenant from a double point of view: the substantive limits to the power to expel an alien (which may come, for example, from the rules that protect life, physical integrity or family) and the procedural rules which must be respected. The paper considers the interpretative activity carried out by the Human Rights Committee, expressed both through its general observations and its individual decisions. It also mentions the interpretative criteria of the International Court of Justice.

The article discusses the rights of minorities in the system of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. It establishes a conceptual distinction between universal rights, specific rights of minorities in general and specific rights of particular minorities. Universal rights correspond to all individuals (e,g,, "no one shall be subjected to torture") or all groups of a certain class (e.g., "all families are entitled to protection"). Minority groups and their members are entitled to these rights in the same way as any other individual or group. Specific rights of minorities in general are granted to minority groups (e.g., "minority groups have the right to speak their own language") or their members (e.g., "persons belonging to a minority group have the right to speak the language of the group"). Finally, specific rights of particular minorities are granted to specific groups identified by their characteristics (e.g., "the linguistic minority X has the right to speak the X language") or their members (e.g., "any member of the linguistic minority X has the right to speak the X language") [.] ; Straipsnyje aptariamos mažumų teisės pagal Tarptautinį pilietinių ir politinių teisių paktą. Paktas įtvirtina konceptualų skirtumą tarp visuotinių teisių, specialiųjų mažumų teisių (taikomų visoms mažumoms) bei specialiųjų konkrečių mažumų teisių. Visuotinės teisės taikomos visiems asmenims (pavyzdžiui, "niekas negali būti kankinamas") arba visiems tam tikros klasės atstovams (pavyzdžiui, "visos šeimos turi teisę į apsaugą"). Mažumų grupės ir jų nariai šiomis teisėmis gali naudotis kaip ir bet kurie kiti asmenys ar jų grupės. Specifinės mažumų teisės (bendruoju požiūriu) yra suteikiamos visoms mažumų grupėms (pavyzdžiui, "mažumų grupės turi teisę kalbėti savo gimtąja kalba") arba jų nariams (pavyzdžiui, "asmenys, priklausantys mažumoms, turi teisę kalbėti mažumos kalba"). Tam tikros mažumų grupės specifinės teisės yra suteikiamos konkrečioms grupėms pagal jų charakteristikas (pavyzdžiui, "kalbinė mažuma X turi teisę kalbėti X kalba") arba jų nariams (pavyzdžiui, "bet koks kalbinės mažumos X narys turi teisę kalbėti X kalba") [.]