Suchergebnisse

The Essence of Negotiation -- Exogenous disagreement outcomes -- The Alternating Offers Procedure -- The Nash Program -- Comprehensive Bargaining Problems -- Comparative Statics -- A Bargaining Model with Threats -- Endogenous Threats -- Commitment and Endogenous Threats -- Bargaining over Wages -- The Policy Bargaining Model -- Destructive Threats.

We study the global macroeconomic effects of tariffs using a multiregional, general equilibrium model, EAGLE, that we extend by introducing US tariffs against Chinese imports into the US, and subsequently Chinese tariffs against US imports into China, consistent with recent trade policies by the US and the Chinese governments. We abstract from tariffs on goods exported from the euro area, focusing on a US-China trade war. A unilateral tariff from the US against China dampens US exports in line with the Lerner Symmetry theorem but global output contracts. Global output contracts even further after China retaliates. The euro area benefits from this trade war. These European trade diversion benefits are caused by cheaper imports from China and improved competitiveness in the US. As price stickiness in the export sector in each region increases, the negative effects of tariffs in the US and China are mitigated, but the positive effects in the euro area are then also dampened.