Suchergebnisse

In general, ESDP (European Security and Defence Policy) and its policy- and decision-making process pose a challenging puzzle for the theoretical research agenda of European integration studies. Even though ESDP is intergovernmentally constructed, classical (neo-) realist approaches seem to be unable to catch the full dynamics of the project. Institutionalist and social constructivist approaches, which underline the importance of norms, values and identity in the complex decision-making process of ESDP, add fruitful insights in many regards. This paper applies an institutionalist approaches based on the notion of socialisation and 'Brusselisation', which are analytically rich for analysing the ESDP decision-making process. The notion of Brusselisation is developed further into a theoretical concept that goes beyond the mere transfer of authority and expertise in the area of security and defence to the decision-making machinery in Brussels. This paper argues that socialisation processes of the involved actors constitute a completely new policy-making method and develops an approach to capture this new method. However, the fact that ESDP is intergovernmentally constructed and that the member states remain the main actors in this policy field is not contested. Particularly in the day-to-day management of ESDP, however, the Brussels-based bodies are increasingly in the driver's seat, gain a sort of de facto initiative power and conduct the European defence policy guided by a logic of appropriateness and a new style of decision-making. This new and 'brusselised' style of decision-making is understood as being situated 'between intergovernmentalism and socialisation processes'.

Der Beitrag befasst sich mit der Frage, inwieweit die Europäische Sicherheitsstrategie (ESS) als Grundlage ausreicht, um die Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik der EU als strategisch begründet zu bezeichnen oder um gar von einer europäischen Strategie im eigentlichen Sinne zu sprechen. So werden im ersten Abschnitt zunächst die Begriffe der Strategie und das Konzept der strategischen Kultur kurz erläutert und im Hinblick auf die EU beleuchtet. Das zweite Kapitel befasst sich sodann mit der ESS und ihrer Weiterentwicklung als vorrangige strategische Grundlage der EU. Der dritte Abschnitt bewertet abschließend die EU als strategischen Akteur mit strategischer Kultur statt klassischer Strategie. Die Ausführungen zeigen, dass die Union in zunehmenden Maße Politik auf einer strategischen Basis ausübt, aber dass sie noch nicht in der Lage ist, als vollwertiger strategischer Akteur im klassischen Sinne zu agieren, und dass man bei der ESS nicht von einer Strategie im klassischen Sinne sprechen kann. Allerdings argumentiert der Verfasser, dass genau dies von der Union auch nicht zu erwarten ist. (ICG2)

After the end of the Cold War and unification, Germany's role in the international system underwent a fundamental change. The so-called Berlin Republic developed a new strategic culture, relaxed its stance on the use of force and put its interests forth in a more self-confident way. These developments mark an essential change and renunciation of many norms and principles, which dominated German security policy until the end of the Cold War. Hence, the question arises if the concept of Germany as a 'civilian power' is still valid. The adaptation to the new security environment and the development of new ambitions is reflected in a far-reaching reform of the German armed forces. As an instrument of German foreign policy, the foremost task of the Bundeswehr is no longer territorial defence, but international conflict prevention and crisis management. Bundeswehr reform, however, is not matched by sufficient financial means, and so remains imperfect and problematic. (German Politics / FUB)

Defence date: 8 December 2006 ; Examining Board: Prof. Gunther Hellmann (Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität Frankfurt a.M.) ; Prof. Jens Otmar Höll (Österreichisches Institut für Internationale Politik, Wien) ; Prof. Alexander H. Trechsel (EUI, Florenz) ; Prof. Firedrich Kratochwil (EUI, Florenz, Supervisor)

The study of the EU's security and defence policy has until now lacked a comprehensive yet thorough and accessible volume on theoretical debates in the field. This timely volume addresses this and is an engaging assessment of the discussions about the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy. It brings together leading scholars in the field who present their respective theoretical viewpoints and illustrate how each has informed their empirical explorations. Pluralistic in its approach, the volume emphasizes the role of conceptual diversity for better explaining the EU's CSDP. It is a broad-range up-to-date survey that speaks to many of the theoretical debates in the field, including mainstream (neorealism, liberal institutionalism and strategic studies, sociological institutionalism), less mainstream (consistent constructivism and structural constructivism) and critical, inspired by neomarxism, Foucauldian approaches and the sociology of Pierre Bourdieu.

Europe is the region of the world where the network of security institutions is the densest. Yet, these institutions did not erase differences about conceptions of force employment among European countries and between European countries and the United States. Why have concepts of military power and force employment remained distinct and varied in Europe, and yet, what facilitates their convergence at the European Union level into the ambiguous notion of crisis management? We argue that an important answer to these questions is endogenous to the military: both role conceptions and organizational frames of military institutions are key underlying aspects of the differences at the national level and of the common ground at the European Union level. We examine and compare empirically the role conceptions and organizational frames of the armed forces in France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom since the early 1990s. [Reprinted by permission; copyright Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society/Sage Publications Inc.]

Europe is the region of the world where the network of security institutions is the densest. Yet, these institutions did not erase differences about conceptions of force employment among European countries and between European countries and the United States. Why have concepts of military power and force employment remained distinct and varied in Europe, and yet, what facilitates their convergence at the European Union level into the ambiguous notion of crisis management? We argue that an important answer to these questions is endogenous to the military: both role conceptions and organizational frames of military institutions are key underlying aspects of the differences at the national level and of the common ground at the European Union level. We examine and compare empirically the role conceptions and organizational frames of the armed forces in France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom since the early 1990s.